Quaere whether the British rule of the war of 1756 be
founded on correct principles.
The Rule of 1756 stands upon two grounds: 1st, that a trade,
such as the coasting or colonial trade, which, by the permanent
policy of a nation, is reserved for its own vessels, if opened to
neutrals during war, must be opened under the pressure of the
enemy's arms, and in order to obtain relief from that pressure,
which relief a neutral has no right to afford; 2d, if the trade be
not opened by law, that a neutral employed in a trade thus reserved
by the enemy to his own vessels identifies himself with that enemy
and assumes a hostile character.
A neutral ship, laden with a cargo of provisions, the property
of the enemy specially permitted to be exported for the supply of
his forces, is not entitled to freight.
It makes no difference in such a case as the above that the
enemy is carrying on a distinct war in conjunction with his allies,
who are in amity with the country of the captor, and that the
provisions are intended for the supply of the enemy's troops
engaged in that distinct war, and that the ship in which the
provisions are transported belongs to subjects of one of those
allies.
This was the case of a Swedish
Page 14 U. S. 383
vessel captured on 16 April, 1814, by the private armed schooner
Lawrence on a voyage from Limerick, in Ireland, to Bilboa,
in Spain. The cargo consisted of barley and oats, the property of
British subjects, the exportation of which is generally prohibited
by the British government, and as well by the official papers of
the custom house as by the private letters of the shippers, it
appears to have been shipped under the special permission of the
government for the sole use of his Britannic Majesty's forces then
in Spain. Bonds were accordingly given for the fulfillment of this
object. At the hearing in the district Court of Maine, the cargo
was condemned as enemy's property, and the vessel restored, with an
allowance, among other things, of the freight for the voyage,
according to the stipulation of the charter party. The captors
appealed from so much of the sentence as decreed freight to the
neutral ship, and upon the appeal to the Circuit Court of
Massachusetts, the decree as to freight was reversed, and from this
last sentence an appeal was prosecuted to this Court.
Page 14 U. S. 387
STORY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
The single point now in controversy in this cause is whether the
ship is entitled to the freight for the voyage. The general rule
that the neutral carrier of enemy's property is entitled to his
freight is now too firmly established to admit of discussion. But
to this rule there are many exceptions. If the neutral be guilty of
fraudulent or unneutral conduct, or has interposed himself to
assist the enemy in carrying on the war, he is justly deemed to
have forfeited his title to freight. Hence the carrying of
contraband goods to the enemy, the engaging in the coasting or
colonial trade of the enemy, the spoliation of papers, and the
fraudulent suppression of enemy interests have been held to affect
the neutral with the forfeiture of freight, and in cases of a more
flagrant character, such as carrying dispatches or hostile military
passengers, an engagement in the transport service of the enemy,
and a breach of blockade, the penalty of confiscation of the vessel
has also been inflicted. By the modern law of nations,
provisions
Page 14 U. S. 388
are not in general deemed contraband, but they may become so,
although the property of a neutral, on account of the particular
situation of the war or on account of their destination. If
destined for the ordinary use of life in the enemy's country, they
are not in general contraband, but it is otherwise if destined for
military use. Hence if destined for the army or navy of the enemy
or for his ports of naval or military equipment, they are deemed
contraband. Another exception from being treated as contraband is
where the provisions are the growth of the neutral exporting
country. But if they be the growth of the enemy's country, and more
especially if the property of his subjects and destined for enemy's
use, there does not seem any good reason for the exemption, for, as
Sir William Scott has observed, in such case the party has not only
gone out of his way for the supply of the enemy, but he has
assisted him by taking off his surplus commodities. But it is
argued that the doctrine of contraband cannot apply to the present
case, because the destination was to a neutral country, and it is
certainly true that goods destined for the use of a neutral country
can never be deemed contraband, whatever may be their character or
however well adapted to warlike purposes. But if such goods are
destined for the direct
Page 14 U. S. 389
and avowed use of the enemy's army or navy, we should be glad to
see an authority which countenances this exemption from forfeiture,
even though the property of a neutral. Suppose, in time of war, a
British fleet were lying in a neutral port -- would it be lawful
for a neutral to carry provisions or munitions of war thither
avowedly for the exclusive supply of such fleet? Would it not be a
direct interposition in the war and an essential aid to the enemy
in his hostile preparations? In such a case the goods, even if
belonging to a neutral, would have had the taint of contraband in
its most offensive character, on account of their destination, and
the mere interposition of a neutral port would not protect them
from forfeiture.
Strictly speaking, however,
Page 14 U. S. 390
this is not a question of contraband, for that can arise only
when the property belongs to a neutral,
Page 14 U. S. 391
and here the property belonged to an enemy, and therefore was
liable at all events to condemnation. But was the voyage lawful,
and such as a neutral could with good faith and without a
forfeiture engage in? It has been solemnly adjudged that being
engaged in the transport service or in the conveyance of military
persons in his employ are acts of hostility which subject the
property to confiscation. And the carrying of dispatches from the
colony to the mother country of the enemy has subjected the party
to the like penalty. And in these cases, the fact that the voyage
was to a neutral port was not thought to change the character of
the transaction. The principle of these determinations was asserted
to be that the party must be deemed to place himself in the service
of the hostile state, and
Page 14 U. S. 392
assist in warding off the pressure of the war or in favoring its
offensive projects.
Now we cannot distinguish these cases in principle from that
before the Court. Here is a cargo of provisions exported from the
enemy's country with the avowed purpose of supplying the army of
the enemy. Without this destination, they would not have been
permitted to be exported at all. Can a more important or essential
service be performed in favor of the enemy? In what does it differ
from the case of a transport in his service? The property nominally
belongs to individuals, and is freighted, apparently, on private
account, but in reality for public use and under a public contract
implied from the very permission of exportation. It is vain to
contend that the direct effect of the voyage was not to aid the
British hostilities against the United States. It might enable the
enemy indirectly to operate with more vigor and promptitude against
us and increase his disposable force. But it is not the effect of
the particular transaction that the law regards, it is the general
tendency of such transactions to assist the military operations of
the enemy and the temptations which it presents to deviate from a
strict neutrality.
Nor do we perceive how the destination, to a neutral port, can
vary the application of this rule; it is only doing that indirectly
which is prohibited in direct courses. Would it be contended that a
neutral might lawfully transport provisions for the British fleet
and army while it lay at Bordeaux preparing for an expedition to
the United States? Would it be contended that he might lawfully
supply a British
Page 14 U. S. 393
fleet stationed on our coast? We presume that two opinions could
not be entertained on such questions, and yet, though the cases put
are strong, we do not know that the assistance is more material
than might be supplied under cover of a neutral destination like
the present.
An attempt has been made to distinguish this case from the
ordinary cases of employment in the transport service of the enemy
upon the ground that the war of Great Britain against France was a
war distinct from that against the United States, and that Swedish
subjects had a perfect right to assist the British arms in respect
to the former, though not to the latter. Whatever might be the
right of the Swedish sovereign acting under his own authority, we
are of opinion that if a Swedish vessel be engaged in the actual
service of Great Britain or in carrying stores for the exclusive
use of the British armies, she must to all intents and purposes be
deemed a British transport. It is perfectly immaterial in what
particular enterprise those armies might at the time be engaged,
for the same important benefits are conferred upon an enemy, who
thereby acquires a greater disposable force to bring into action
against us. In the
Friendship, 6 Rob. 420. 426, Sir W.
Scott, speaking on this subject, declares,
"It signifies nothing whether the men so conveyed are to be put
into action on an immediate expedition, or not. The mere shifting
of drafts in detachments and the conveyance of stores from one
place to another is an ordinary employment of a transport vessel,
and it is a distinction totally unimportant
Page 14 U. S. 394
whether this or that case may be connected with the immediate
active service of the enemy. In removing forces from distant
settlements, there may be no intention of immediate action, but
still the general importance of having troops conveyed to places
where it is convenient that they should be collected, either for
present or future use, is what constitutes the object and
employment of transport vessels."
It is obvious that the learned judge did not deem it material to
what places the stores might be destined, and it must be equally
immaterial what is the immediate occupation of the enemy's military
force. That force is always hostile to us, be it where it may be.
Today it may act against France, tomorrow, against us, and the
better its commissary department is supplied, the more life and
activity is communicated to all its motions. It is not, therefore,
in our view, material whether there be another distinct war in
which our enemy is engaged or not; it is sufficient that his armies
are everywhere our enemies, and every assistance offered to them
must, directly or indirectly, operate to our injury.
On the whole, the Court is of opinion that the voyage, in which
this vessel was engaged was illicit and inconsistent with the
duties of neutrality, and that it is a very lenient administration
of justice to confine the penalty to a mere denial of freight.
Page 14 U. S. 395
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL.
As a principle, which I think new and which may certainly in
future, be very interesting to the United States, has been decided
in this case, I trust I may be excused for stating the reasons
which have prevented my concurring in the opinion that has been
delivered.
In argument, this sentence of the circuit court has been
sustained on two grounds -- 1st, that the exportation
Page 14 U. S. 396
of grain from Ireland is generally prohibited, and therefore
that a neutral cannot lawfully engage in it during war; 2d, that
the carriage of supplies to the army of the enemy is to take part
with him in the war, and consequently to become the enemy of the
United States so far as to forfeit the right to freight.
The first point has been maintained on its supposed analogies to
certain principles which have been at different times avowed by the
great maritime and belligerent powers of Europe respecting the
colonial and coasting trade, and which are generally known in
England and in this country by the appellation of the Rule of 1756.
Without professing to give any opinion on the correctness of those
principles, it is sufficient to observe that they do not appear to
me to apply to this case. The Rule of 1756 prohibits a neutral from
engaging in time of war in a trade in which he was prevented from
participating in time of peace, because that trade was, by law,
exclusively reserved for the vessels of the hostile state. This
prohibition stands upon two grounds:
1st. That a trade, such as the coasting or colonial trade,
which, by the permanent policy of a nation, is reserved for its own
vessels, if opened to neutrals during war, must be opened under the
pressure of the arms of the enemy, and in order to obtain relief
from that pressure. The neutral who interposes to relieve the
belligerent under such circumstances rescues him from the condition
to which the arms of his enemy has reduced him, restores to him
those resources which have been wrested from him by the
Page 14 U. S. 397
arms of his adversary, and deprives that adversary of the
advantages which successful war has given him. This the opposing
belligerent pronounces a departure from neutrality, and an
interference in the war to his prejudice, which he will not
tolerate.
2d. If the trade be not opened by law, that a neutral employed
in a trade thus reserved by the enemy to his own vessels identifies
himself with that enemy, and by performing functions exclusively
appertaining to the enemy character, assumes that character.
Neither the one nor the other of these reasons applies to the
case under consideration. The trade was not a trade confined to
British vessels during peace and opened to neutrals during war
under the pressure created by the arms of the enemy. It was
prohibited for political reasons entirely unconnected with the
interests of navigation, and thrown open from motives equally
unconnected with maritime strength. Neither did the neutral
employed in it engage in a trade then or at any time reserved for
British vessels, and therefore did not identify himself with them.
He was not performing functions exclusively appertaining to the
enemy, and consequently, in performing them did not assume that
character.
The second point presents a question of much more difficulty.
That a neutral carrying supplies to the army of the enemy does,
under the mildest interpretation of international law, expose
himself to the loss of freight is a proposition too well settled to
be controverted. That it is a general rule, admitting of few if any
exceptions is not denied by the counsel
Page 14 U. S. 398
for the appellants. But they contend that this case is withdrawn
from that rule by its peculiar circumstances. The late war between
the United States and Great Britain was declared at a time when all
Europe, including our enemy, was engaged in a war with which ours
had no connection and in which we professed to take no interest.
The allies of our enemy, engaged with him in a common war, the most
tremendous and the most vitally interesting to the parties that has
ever desolated the earth, were our friends. We kept up with them
the mutual interchange of good offices and declared our
determination to stand aloof from that cause which was common to
them and Great Britain. They too considered this war as entirely
distinct from that in which they were engaged. Although at a most
critical period we had attacked their ally, they did not view it as
an act of hostility to them. They did not ascribe it to a wish to
affect in any manner the war in Europe, but solely to the desire of
asserting our violated rights. They seemed almost to consider the
Britain who was our enemy as a different nation from that Britain
who was their ally.
How long this extraordinary state of things might have continued
it is impossible to say, but it certainly existed when the
Commercen was captured. What its effect on that capture
ought to be must depend more on principle than on precedent. It has
been said, and truly said, by the counsel for the captors that we
were at war with Great Britain in every part of the world. We were
enemies everywhere. Her troops in Spain or elsewhere as
Page 14 U. S. 399
well as her troops in America were our enemies. It was a
conflict of nation against nation. This is conceded, and therefore
the cargo of the
Commercen, being British property, was
condemned as prize of war. But although this must be conceded, the
corollary which is drawn from it -- that those who furnish their
armies in Spain with provisions aid them to our prejudice, and
therefore take part in the war and are guilty of unneutral conduct
-- must be examined before it can be admitted.
It is not true that every species of aid given to an enemy is an
act of hostility which will justify our treating him who gives it
or his vessels as hostile to us. The history of all Europe, and
especially of Switzerland, furnishes many examples of the truth of
this proposition. Those examples need not be quoted particularly,
because they stand on principles not entirely applicable to this
case. It is the peculiarity of this war which requires the adoption
of rules peculiar to a new state of things, in adopting which we
must examine the principle on which a nation is justified in
treating a neutral as an enemy. That a neutral is friendly to our
enemy and continues to interchange good offices with him can
furnish no subject of complaint, for then all commerce with one
belligerent would be deemed hostile by the other. The effect of
commerce is to augment his resources and enable him the longer to
prosecute the war; but this augmentation is produced by an act
entirely innocent on the part of the neutral and manifesting no
hostility to the opposing belligerent. It cannot therefore be
molested by him while the same good offices
Page 14 U. S. 400
are allowed to him, although he may not be enabled to avail
himself of them to an equal degree. It would seem, then, that a
remote and consequential effect of an act is not sufficient to give
it a hostile character; its tendency to aid the enemy in the war
must be direct and immediate. It is also necessary that it should
be injurious to us, for a mere benefit to another which is not
injurious to us cannot convert a friend into an enemy.
If these principles be correct, and they are believed to be so,
let us apply them to the present case. When hostilities commenced
between the United States and Great Britain, that country was
carrying on a war with France in which the great powers of Europe
were combined. We did not expect, and certainly had no right to
expect, that our declaration of war against one of the allies would
in any manner affect the operations of their common war in Europe.
The armies of Portugal and Spain were united to those of Britain,
and unquestionably aided and assisted our enemy, but they did not
aid and assist him against us, and therefore did not become our
enemies. Had any other of the combined powers equipped a military
expedition for the purpose of reinforcing the armies of Britain in
any part of Europe, or had a new ally engaged in the war, that
would have been no act of hostility against the United States,
although it would have aided our enemy. But if a military
expedition to the United States had been undertaken, the case would
have assumed a different aspect. Such expedition would be hostile
to this country, and the power undertaking it would
Page 14 U. S. 401
become our enemy. It would have been an interference operating
directly to our prejudice. The declaration of war against Great
Britain had, without doubt, a remote and consequential effect on
the war in Europe. The force employed against the United States
must be subducted from that employed in support of the common cause
in Europe, or greater exertions must be made which might sooner
exhaust those resources which enabled her to continue her gigantic
efforts in their common war. Consequently the declaration of war by
the United States remotely affected the war in Europe, to the
advantage of one party and the injury of the other. Yet no one of
the allies considered this declaration as taking part in that war
and placing America in the condition of an enemy. But had the
United States employed its force on the peninsula against the
British troops, or had they interfered in the operations of the
common war, it may well be doubted whether it might not have been
rightfully considered as taking part against the allies and
arranging itself on the side of the common enemy.
In answer to arguments of this tendency made at the bar it was
said that nations are governed by political considerations, and may
choose rather to overlook conduct at which they might justly take
offense than unnecessarily to increase the number of their enemies
or provoke increased hostility, but that courts of justice are
bound by the law and must inflexibly adhere to its mandate. While
this is conceded, it is deemed equally true that those acts which
will justify the condemnation of a
Page 14 U. S. 402
neutral as an enemy would also justify the treating his nation
as an enemy if they were performed or defended by the nation. There
is a tacit compact that the hostile act of the individual shall not
be ascribed to his government, and that, in turn, the government
will not protect the individual from being treated as an enemy. But
if the government adopts the act of the individual, and supports it
by force, the government itself may be rightfully treated as
hostile. Thus, contraband of war, though belonging to a neutral, is
condemned as the property of an enemy, and his government takes no
offense at it; but should his government adopt the act and insist
upon the right to carry articles deemed contraband, and support
that right, it would furnish just ground of war. The belligerent
might choose to overlook this hostile act, but the act would be in
its nature hostile.
The inquiry, then, whether the act in which this individual
Swede was employed, would, if performed by his government, have
been considered an act of hostility to the United States, and might
rightfully be so considered, is material to the decision of the
question whether the act of the individual is to be treated as
hostile. Great Britain and Sweden were allies in the war against
France. Consequently the King of Sweden might have ordered his
troops to cooperate with those of Britain in any place against the
common enemy. He might have ordered a reinforcement to the British
army on the peninsula, and this reinforcement might have been
transported by sea. An attempt on the part of the United States to
intercept it because it was
Page 14 U. S. 403
aiding their enemy would certainly have been an interference in
the war in Europe which would have provoked and would have
justified the resentment of all the allied powers. It would have
been an interference not to be justified by our war with Britain,
because those troops were not to be employed against us. If,
instead of a reinforcement of men, a supply of provisions were to
be furnished in that part of the allied army which was British,
would that alter the case? Could an American squadron intercept a
convoy of provisions or of military stores of any description going
to an army engaged in a war common to Great Britain and Sweden, and
not against the United States? Could this be done without
interfering in that war and taking part in it against all the
allies. If it could not, then any supplies furnished by the
government of Sweden, promoting the operations of their common war,
whether intended for the British or any other division of the
allied armies, had a right to pass unmolested by American
cruisers.
It is not believed that any act which, if performed by the
government, would not be deemed an act of hostility, is to be so
deemed if performed by an individual. Had the provisions then on
board the
Commercen been Swedish property, the result of
this reasoning is that it would not have been confiscated as prize
of war. Being British property, it is confiscable, but the Swede is
guilty of no other offense than carrying enemy's property -- an
offense not enhanced in this particular case by the character of
that property. He is therefore as much entitled to freight as if
his cargo had been
Page 14 U. S. 404
of a different description. His trade was not more illicit than
the carriage of enemy's goods for common use would have been.
If the cases in which neutrals have been condemned for having on
board articles the transportation of which clothe them with the
enemy character be attentively considered, it is believed that they
will not be found to contravene the reasoning which has been urged.
To carry dispatches to the government has been considered as an act
of such complete hostility as to communicate the hostile character
to the vessel carrying them. But this decision was made in a case
where the dispatches could only relate to the war between the
government of the captors and that to which the dispatches were
addressed. They were communications between a colonial government
in danger of being attacked and the mother country. In a subsequent
case, it was determined that a neutral vessel might bear dispatches
to a hostile government without assuming the belligerent character
if they were from an ambassador residing in the neutral state. Yet
such dispatches might contain intelligence material to the war. But
this is a case in which the belligerent right to intercept all
communications addressed to the enemy by the officers of that enemy
is modified and restrained by the neutral right to protect the
diplomatic communications which are necessary to the political
intercourse between belligerents and neutrals. It is a case in
which the right of the belligerent is narrowed and controlled by
the positive rights of a neutral; still more reasonably may
they
Page 14 U. S. 405
be narrowed and controlled by the positive rights of a
belligerent engaged in a war in which we have no concern and in
which we ought not to interfere. To transport troops, or military
persons belonging to the enemy from one place to another has also
been determined to subject the vessel to condemnation, but in those
cases the service in which it was supposed, the persons so conveyed
were to be employed was against the government of the captors. The
transportation of these persons was to aid the views of one
belligerent against the other, and was therefore to take part in
the war against that other. It is an act the operation of which is
direct and immediate.
It may be said that this reasoning would go to the protection of
British troops passing to the peninsula and of British supplies
transported in British vessels for their use; that it therefore
proves too much, and must consequently unsound.
It is admitted that, pressed to its extreme point, the argument
would go this extent, an extent which cannot be maintained; but it
does not follow that it is unsound in every stage of its progress.
In every case of conflicting rights, each must yield something to
the other. The pretensions of neither party can be carried to the
extreme. They meet -- they check -- they limit each other. The
precise line which neither can pass but to which each may advance
is not easily to be found and marked; yet such a line must exist,
whatever may be the difficulty of discerning it. To attack an enemy
or to take his property, if either can be done without violating
the sovereignty
Page 14 U. S. 406
of a friend, is of the very essence of war. None can be offended
at the exercise of this right who may not be offended at the
declaration of war itself. The injury which the allies of our
enemy, in a war common to them (but in which we are not engaged),
sustain by this occasional interruption is incidental, while on our
part it is the exercise of a direct and essential right. But when
we attack a friend who is carrying on military operations
conjointly with our enemy but not against us, we are not making
direct war, but are using those incidental rights which war gives
us against those direct rights which are exercised by a belligerent
not our enemy, and which constitute war itself. In either case it
would seem to me that the incidental must yield to the direct and
essential right.
Upon this view of the subject I have at length, not, it is
confessed, without difficulty, come to the conclusion that the
Commercen, being a Swedish vessel whose nation was engaged
in a war common to Great Britain and Sweden against France and to
which the United States was not a party, might convey military
stores for the use of the British armies engaged in that war as
innocently as she could carry British property of any other
description, and is therefore as much entitled to freight as she
would be had the property belonged to the enemy, but been destined
for ordinary use.
LIVINGSTON, J.
I concur in the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Considering Sweden
an ally of Great Britain in the war which the latter was carrying
on
Page 14 U. S. 407
in the peninsula, either the King of Sweden himself might send
transports with provisions for the use of the British army while
engaged in any common enterprise or his subjects might lawfully aid
in such transportation without a violation of their neutral
character as it regarded the United States. If the American
government had asserted the right of capturing and condemning
Swedish vessels or depriving them of their freight on the ground on
which it has been denied to the
Commercen, I am not
certain that Sweden would not have thought it a very serious
aggression, and would not have had a right to consider it, if
persisted in, as an act of hostility.
JOHNSON, J.
I also concur in the opinion of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and I do it
without the least doubt or hesitation. Sweden was an ally in the
war going on in the peninsula, and her subjects had an indubitable
right to transport provisions in aid of their nation or its allies.
The owner therefore had a right to his freight, for he did no act
inconsistent with our belligerent rights while in the direct and
ordinary exercise of those rights which a state of war conferred on
himself.
Sentence of the circuit court affirmed.