The Act of Assembly of Maryland of 1796, c. 67, prohibiting the
importation of slaves into that state for sale or to reside, does
not extend to a temporary residence, nor to an importation by a
hirer or person other than the master or owner of such slave.
Error on judgment, rendered by the Circuit Court for the County
of Washington in the District of Columbia against the plaintiff,
who was in that court a petitioner for freedom.
The plaintiff, being a child and the slave of the defendant, who
resided in Virginia, was, some short
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time before the month of May, 1810, put to live with Mrs.
Rankin, then residing also in Virginia, whose husband was an
officer in the marine corps stationed in the City of Washington.
Mrs. R. was to keep the girl for a year and was to give her
victuals and clothes for her services. Sometime in May, 1810, Mrs.
R. removed to Washington and brought the petitioner with her --
whether with or without the permission of Mr. Ball, is entirely
uncertain. It was probably, though not certainly, with his
knowledge. In October, 1810, Mr. Ball married, and soon after took
the petitioner into his possession and carried her home, he then
residing in Virginia. Mrs. R. gave her up, being of opinion, though
the girl had remained with her only seven or eight months, that she
was bound to give her up when required by her master. Mr. B.
afterwards removed himself into the city and brought the petitioner
with him. Upon this testimony the counsel for the petitioner prayed
the court below to instruct the jury that if it believed from the
evidence that the defendant knew of the intended importation of the
petitioner by Mrs. and did not object to it, then such importation
entitled the petitioner to her freedom; and, further, that it was
competent to the jury to infer from his knowing of the importation
and not objecting to it that such importation was made with his
consent. This instruction the court refused to give, but did
instruct the jury that if it should be of opinion that Mrs. R. was,
at the time she brought the petitioner into the City of Washington,
a citizen of the United States coming into the City of
Washington
Page 14 U. S. 3
with a
bona fide intention of settling therein, then
her importation of said slave was lawful and did not entitle the
petitioner to her freedom, whether the said importation were or
were not made with the consent of the defendant. An exception was
taken to this opinion, and the jury having found a verdict for the
defendant on which judgment was rendered by the court, the cause
was brought into this Court by writ of error.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court,
and after stating the facts, proceeded as follows:
This cause depends on an act of the State of Maryland which is
in force in the County of Washington. The first section of that
statute enacts:
Page 14 U. S. 4
"That it shall not be lawful to bring into this state any negro,
mulatto, or other slave, for sale or to reside within this state,
and any person brought into this state contrary to this act, if a
slave before, shall thereupon, immediately cease to be the property
of the person or persons so importing or bringing such slaves
within this state, and shall be free."
The 2d section contains a proviso in favor of citizens of the
United States coming into this state with a
bona fide
intention of settling therein and bringing slaves with them. The
4th section enacts that
"Nothing in this act contained shall be construed or taken to
affect the right of any person or persons traveling or sojourning
with any slave or slaves within this state, such slave or slaves
not being sold or otherwise disposed of in this state, but carried
by the owner out of the state, or attempted to be carried."
This act appears to the Court not to comprehend the case now
under consideration. The expressions of that part of the first
section which prohibits the importation of slaves are restricted to
cases of importation "for sale or to reside in this state." The
petitioner was obviously not imported for sale, nor is the Court of
opinion that the short time for which she was to continue with Mrs.
Rankin can satisfy the words "to reside within this state." The
legislature must have intended to prohibit a general residence, not
a special limited residence, where the slave is to remain for that
portion of the year for which she was hired that still
remained.
If on this point the first section of the act could be thought
doubtful, the fourth section seems to remove
Page 14 U. S. 5
that doubt. It declares that
"Nothing in the act contained shall be construed or taken to
affect the right of any person traveling or sojourning with any
slave or slaves within this state, such slave or slaves not being
sold or otherwise disposed of in this state, but carried by the
owner out of this state or attempted to be carried."
This section sufficiently explains the residence contemplated by
the legislature in the first section. The term "sojourning" means
something more than "traveling," and applies to a temporary, as
contradistinguished from a permanent, residence. The Court is also
of opinion that the act contemplates and punishes an importation or
bringing into the state by the master or owner of the slave. This
construction, in addition to its plain justice, is supported by the
words of the first section. That section declares that
"A person brought into this state as a slave contrary to this
act, if a slave before, shall thereupon cease to be the property of
the person or persons so importing or bringing such slave within
this state and shall be free."
It is apparent that the legislature had in view the case of a
slave brought by the owner, since it is the property of the person
importing the slave which is forfeited.
Upon the best consideration we have been able to give this
statute, the Court is unanimously of opinion that the petitioner
acquired no right to freedom by having been brought into the County
of Washington by Mrs. Rankin for one year's service, she having
been in the course of the year carried back to Virginia by her
master.
Page 14 U. S. 6
The circuit court appears to have considered the case as coming
within the proviso of the 2d section. If in this opinion that court
were even to be thought mistaken, the error does not injure the
petitioner, and is therefore no cause for reversal. The Court is
unanimously of opinion that the judgment ought to be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
