In May, 1871, one S settled upon unsurveyed public lands in
Oregon as an intending preemptor. In September following, he
induced his brother to remove from California and make like
settlement on adjoining unsurveyed lands and assisted him in
building and making other improvements thereon. After official
survey and filing of plat thereof in the local land office, each
filed a preemption declaration for the land severally occupied by
them. Shortly thereafter, and upon
ex parte affidavits
falsely averring his own residence and occupation thereon, S was
granted permission by the Commissioner of the General Land Office
to change his preemption declaration so as to include the land
claimed and occupied by his brother, who, as shown by the findings,
was a qualified preemptor, in actual occupation, with substantial
improvements. After issue of patent to S for the land embraced in
his amended declaration, he brought ejectment against his brother
for possession. The latter thereupon invoked the aid of a court of
equity to enjoin S from prosecuting his action of ejectment, to
declare the latter trustee of the property, and to compel transfer
thereof to him. In such action,
held:
(1) That while the determination of the Land Department in a
matter cognizable by it in the alienation of lands under the laws
of the United States cannot be collaterally impeached, when its
enforcement is sought -- where the matter determined is not
properly before the department, or its conclusion has been reached
from a misconstruction of the law applicable to the case, and it
has thus denied to a party rights which upon a correct construction
world have been conceded to him, or where misrepresentation and
fraud have been practiced necessarily affecting its judgment, a
court of equity in a proper proceeding will interfere and control
its determination so as to secure the just rights of the party
injuriously affected. The party acquiring the property under the
circumstances mentioned will be charged as a trustee of the
rightful owner, and be compelled to transfer the property to
him.
(2) By section 2261 of the Revised Statutes, and in consonance
with the established practice of the Land Department thereunder,
but one preemption declaration is permitted. The statutory
prohibition against a second declaration is unqualified, and
applies in all cases except where a prior claim has prevented the
completion of the original entry, or a mistake in the original
declaration has occurred without the knowledge or any fault of the
claimant.
Page 139 U. S. 643
(3) The tract applied for in the second declaration need not be
an entirely separate and distinct parcel to call into effect the
prohibition; it is enough if there be such addition to the original
land applied for as to justify the designation of it with the
addition as a different tract.
(4) The Commissioner of the General Land Office having no
authority to allow an amendment by a preemptioner of his original
declaration so as to cover a different tract, the Land Department
acquires by such amendment no jurisdiction to award the additional
tract to the claimant. Its action upon such additional tract will
not defeat the rights of the occupant thereof.
This is a suit in equity between two brothers whose last name is
Sanford and whose first names are not in the record, but only their
initials, C. W. of the plaintiff below and H. W. of the defendant
below.
The suit was brought to enjoin proceedings in an action of
ejectment commenced by the defendant below, the plaintiff in error
here, and to charge the latter as trustee of the property and
compel its transfer to the plaintiff. In the nomenclature of the
Code of Oregon, regulating procedure in civil cases, it is termed a
cross-bill. It sets forth with much particularity the several
matters upon which relief is prayed, the averments respecting which
are met by a general and specific denial in the answer of the
defendant. A replication having been filed to this answer, the
case, by consent of parties, was tried by the court. From its
findings it appears, among other things, that in May, 1871, the
defendant settled upon unsurveyed land of the United States in Coos
County, Oregon, with the intention of taking up 160 acres of it as
a preemption claim, so soon as the same was surveyed, and that in
September following, at his solicitation, his brother, the
plaintiff below, moved from California, where he then resided, and
settled upon adjoining lands, then unsurveyed, also with the
intention of taking up the same as a preemption claim when
surveyed. Since then, he has resided upon this adjoining land and
cultivated and improved it. His settlement was made and the land
was cultivated with the knowledge and at the request of the
defendant, who pointed out the land to him and aided him in
erecting buildings upon it and in improving it in various
Page 139 U. S. 644
other ways. In 1879, the land thus settled upon by the parties
was surveyed by the United States, and an approved plat thereof was
filed in the local land office in July of that year. On the 9th of
September following, the plaintiff filed a declaratory statement
for the parcels occupied by him, as a preemption claim, and on the
27th of the same month the defendant made a declaratory statement
for those which he occupied. Neither of these claims interfered
with the other, and, except on one occasion, from the time of the
settlement, no pretence had been made by either that he had any
superior right to the land occupied by the other. Both recognized
that they were ultimately to secure the parcels which they
severally occupied as their respective preemption claims, and with
that understanding and knowledge the plaintiff had made valuable
and lasting improvements upon the land on which he had settled.
On October 14, 1880, snore than a year afterwards, the defendant
was granted permission by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office to amend his declaratory statement so as to include within
it the parcels occupied by the plaintiff, which constitute the
premises in controversy. This permission was procured upon
ex
parte affidavits of the defendant and two witnesses, without
notice to the plaintiff of the proceeding. When they were filed,
the plaintiff had been, and was then, residing, as stated above,
upon the land, which had never been occupied by the defendant.
Pursuant to the permission, the defendant amended his declaratory
statement, and thus brought the premises before the Land Department
as part of his preemption claim, and was enabled to include them in
the patent ultimately obtained by him, in fraud of the rights of
the plaintiff. The court also found that at the time of his
settlement upon the land in dispute, the plaintiff was a qualified
preemptor; that he had made permanent improvements upon it, between
January, 1872, and January, 1883, with the knowledge of the
defendant, of the value of eighteen hundred dollars; that the
affidavits upon which the defendant was allowed to amend his
declaratory statement did not show that the plaintiff was in
possession of the premises or had made any improvements
Page 139 U. S. 645
thereon, but, on the contrary, falsely alleged that the house of
the defendant and his improvements were situated thereon, and that
thereby the Commissioner of the General Land Office was imposed
upon and deceived, and induced to allow the defendant to amend his
declaratory statement. And, as a conclusion of law, the court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree enjoining proceedings
in the action of ejectment, and adjudging that the defendant held
the legal title to the land in dispute in trust for him.
In conformity with this conclusion, a decree was entered in
favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant was required to convey
the premises to him. On appeal to the supreme court of the state,
this decree was affirmed, and to review this decree of affirmance
the case is brought, on a writ of error, to this Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the facts as above, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
By the Code of Oregon, the findings of the court in an equity
case of this kind are as conclusive as similar findings would be in
an action at law. Hill's Annotated Laws of Oregon, sec. 397. They
must therefore be taken as correct in the disposition of the
question before us, they not having been set aside or qualified by
any subsequent action of the court below. And upon them it is
contended that the amendment to the declaratory statement of the
defendant made in 1884, by which he was enabled to include within
it the land in controversy, never occupied or improved by him, but
at the time in the possession of the plaintiff, was in effect a
second declaration of a preemptive right to a different tract from
the one originally claimed by him, and was allowed in disregard of
the express prohibition of the statute, Rev.Stat. ยง 2261, or upon a
plain misconstruction of its provisions, and gave no jurisdiction
to the Land Department to treat the land thus included
Page 139 U. S. 646
as part of his preemption claim, and that, but for the
amendment, the land would have been awarded to the plaintiff. It is
objected to this contention that the question as to the defendant's
right as a preemption claimant to the land in controversy was a
matter to be determined by the Land Department, where it was
considered. It is true the determination of that department in
matters cognizable by it in the alienation of lands under the laws
of the United States cannot be collaterally impeached where its
enforcement is sought. In ejectment, the question always is who has
the legal title for the demanded premises, not who ought to have
it. In such cases, the patent of the government issued upon the
direction of the Land Department is unassailable. But while the
patentee holds the legal title, his equitable relations to other
parties are not thereby affected. That title, with important
qualifications hereafter mentioned, is as much subject to control
as the title to land held by him derived from private sources. If
one takes a title in his own name while acting as agent, trustee,
or guardian, or in any other fiduciary capacity, a court of equity
will, upon a showing of the fact in an appropriate proceeding,
subject the lands to proper trusts in his hands, or compel him to
transfer the title to the party equitably entitled to it. Nor does
it matter whether the party takes the title in his own name in good
faith, under the belief that he can thereby better manage the
property to the advantage of those for whom he is acting, or in
compliance with their wishes, or whether from an intention to
defraud them of their rights therein. In either case, a court of
equity will control the legal title so as to protect the just
rights of the true owner.
Townsend v.
Greeley, 5 Wall. 326,
72 U. S. 335;
Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 248, 272. All this is but
common knowledge, and the doctrine is constantly invoked for the
protection of the rights of parties against the mistake, accident,
or fraud of agents or parties acting in a fiduciary capacity, and
little difficulty is experienced in enforcing it where the property
held is not claimed under the adjudication of a court or other
tribunal affirming the title of the holder -- as, for instance,
upon the determination of a department like that established
Page 139 U. S. 647
to supervise proceedings for the alienation of the public lands.
In these latter cases, the action of a court of equity is limited,
so as not to interfere with the rightful exercise of the powers
entrusted to the department. The conclusions of the department are
not even then open to review for alleged errors in passing upon the
weight of evidence presented, for that would be to make a court of
equity a court of appeal from its decisions, which was never
contemplated.
But where the matters determined are not properly before the
department, or its conclusions have been reached from a
misconstruction by its officers of the law applicable to the cases
before it, and it has thus denied to parties rights which, upon a
correct construction, would have been conceded to them, or where
misrepresentations and fraud have been practiced necessarily
affecting its judgment, then the courts can, in a proper
proceeding, interfere and control its determination so as to secure
the just rights of parties injuriously affected.
Quinby v.
Conlan, 104 U. S. 420,
104 U. S. 426;
Baldwin v. Stark, 107 U. S. 463,
107 U. S. 465.
In such cases, a court of equity only exercises its ordinary
jurisdiction to prevent injustice from a misconstruction of the law
or the machinations of fraud. The misconstruction referred to must
be, as stated, of the law applicable to the case as established. Of
this misconstruction we have an instance in
Silver v.
Ladd, 7 Wall. 219, where it was held by the
Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary of the
Interior that the Donation Act of Oregon did not allow an unmarried
woman to take as a settler on the ground that she was not the head
of a family. But this Court decided that in this determination the
officers misconstrued the law, and upon a bill in equity, filed by
her son against subsequent patentees of the United States of the
lands, held that relief should be afforded by directing a transfer
of the title to him from such patentees. And the misrepresentations
and fraud mentioned necessarily affecting the judgment of the
department must be such as have prevented the unsuccessful party
from fully presenting his case, or the officers of the government
from fully considering it; such as have imposed upon its
jurisdiction, or turned
Page 139 U. S. 648
its attention from the real controversy. It must also appear
that, but for such imposition and fraud, the determination would
have been in favor of the plaintiff, and have entitled him to the
patent for the land in dispute.
Lee v. Johnson,
116 U. S. 49,
116 U. S. 50;
Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 408,
115 U. S. 413;
Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514,
101 U. S.
519.
The case at bar, upon the facts found, is brought fully within
the law as thus declared. The defendant, in his original
declaratory statement, did not include the premises in controversy
as part of his preemption claim. It covered only adjoining land.
Under the statute, he could not make a second declaration for
different property. Section 2261 of the Revised Statutes provides
that
"No person shall be entitled to more than one preemption right
by virtue of the provisions of section 2259, nor, where a party has
filed his declaration of intention to claim the benefit of such
provisions for one tract of land, he file at any future time, a
second declaration for another tract."
Section 2259 referred to designates who may be entitled to
preemption. The inhibition of section 2261 is positive and
unconditional. The tract applied for in the second declaration need
not be an entirely separate and distinct parcel to call into effect
the prohibition; it is enough if there be such addition to the
original land applied for as to justify the designation of it, with
the addition, as a different tract. With the filing of the first
declaration, the applicant is limited to the land designated,
whether less or different from what he supposed he could claim, or
what he may subsequently desire to acquire. The prohibition of the
statute is without qualification or exception, and the rights of
the preemptor must be measured by it.
Baldwin v. Stark,
107 U. S. 463,
107 U. S. 466.
Such has been the uniform ruling of the Land Department, except
where a prior claim has prevented the completion of the original
entry, or a mistake in the first declaration has occurred without
the knowledge or any fault of the claimant.
In the
Case of J. B. Raymond, 2 L.D. 854, the claimant
filed a declaratory statement in February, 1880, for a quarter
section of land in Kansas, and in April, 1883, he applied to the
local land office for permission to make a second
Page 139 U. S. 649
filing for the same land, alleging as a reason therefor that he
had made valuable improvements on his claim, but, having failed to
raise any crops on account of the drought, was unable to pay for
the land within the time prescribed by law. He therefore desired to
file a second declaratory statement for the same land, for the
better protection of his rights in the premises. The local land
office rejected the application, and the commissioner approved of
the decision. Subsequently the claimant asked permission to file
another declaration for the same or other land, but it met with a
similar rejection, and the case on both applications was brought
before the Interior Department, where the decision of the
commissioner in both instances was affirmed. Mr. Teller, then
Secretary, held that the claimant's application to file a new
declaration for other land was properly denied upon the second
clause of the statute, and that his application to file for the
same land was properly denied upon the first clause, he having
attempted to exercise the one preemptive right which was alone
permissible.
In
Allen v. Baird, 6 L.D. 298, it appeared that Allen
had made a declaratory statement for a tract of land as a preemptor
in March, 1883, although he had made such declaration for another
tract in August, 1880. It was sought to avoid the former filing
upon the ground that at the date thereof he was not twenty-one
years of age, and hence the filing was a nullity, and no bar to a
second one. The commissioner held that the second filing was
illegal, and upon appeal to the Interior Department his decision
was affirmed. In disposing of the case, Mr. Lamar, then Secretary,
after observing that Allen had stated in his first filing that he
was over twenty-one years of age when he knew the statement was
untrue, and that, the land being subject to settlement and entry,
he could not be heard to allege that the first filing was illegal,
said:
"The question of second filing was carefully considered by my
predecessor, Secretary Teller, in the case of
J. B.
Raymond, 2 L.D. 854, wherein it was held that under the
provision of section 2261, Revised Statutes, a preemptor may file
but one declaratory statement for land free to settlement
Page 139 U. S. 650
and entry. This ruling has been uniformly followed, and the only
exception is where the preemptor is unable to perfect his entry on
account of some prior claim, and there is no fault on his
part."
Reference is then made to other decisions of the department, and
to the case of
Baldwin v. Stark, cited above, where the
positive and unconditional character of the inhibition of the
statute is recognized by this Court.
In allowing the defendant in this case to amend his declaratory
statement, the Commissioner of the General Land Office assumed a
power which was not vested in him. No circumstances existed which
prevented the first declaration form bringing into operation the
express prohibition of the statute against a second one. The
claimant knew perfectly the character and extent of the land
originally claimed by him. He was at the time under no
misapprehension on that subject. The Commissioner, in allowing the
amendment to cover a much larger tract than at first claimed,
authorized a second declaration for a different tract, which was
not permissible. If that officer was of the opinion that the
statute did not apply to an amendment, thus enlarging the original
declaration, he misconstrued its provisions. Without such
enlargement, the premises in controversy would not have been
brought before the Land Department as a part of the claim of the
defendant, and no obstacle would have been presented to the award
of a patent to the plaintiff for the land. By the amendment,
therefore, the Department acquired no more jurisdiction to award to
the defendant the tract not embraced by his original declaration
than it had to award to him any other tract never entered by him as
a preemptioner in the local land office. Its subsequent action upon
the additional tract could not defeat the rights of the plaintiff
to the premises.
Besides the want of authority in the Commissioner to allow under
the form of an amendment an enlargement of the preemption claim,
the manner in which that officer was imposed upon taints the
transaction as one of fraud and misrepresentation on the part of
the claimant, by which material facts were concealed from the
Department. A court of equity has jurisdiction in such a case to
compel the transfer to the plaintiff of
Page 139 U. S. 651
property which, but for such fraud and misrepresentation, would
have been awarded to him, and of which he was thereby wrongfully
deprived.
Decree affirmed.