Forty-three years after the ancestor of the plaintiffs acquired
title, more than twenty years after that ancestor had positive
information of the wrong upon which the claims set up in this bill
in equity are grounded, twenty-five years after the purchase by the
defendant in good faith and with no knowledge of the wrong, this
suit was commenced, without any assertion of the right now set up
having been made during all that time.
Held, that these
facts disclosed laches which forbade the interference of a court of
equity.
In equity. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainants appealed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The facts in this case are these:
On March 1, 1838, one Fines Y. Roberson, whose name seems to
have been spelled in different ways, sometimes as above stated,
sometimes as "Phineas Robertson," again as "Phiness Y. Robinson,"
still again as "Phiness Robinson," received from the proper
authorities of the State of Texas the following land certificate,
entitling him as therein provided, and on the conditions therein
named, to one league and labor of land:
"
No. 127"
"This is to certify that Fines Y. Roberson has appeared before
the Board of Land Commissioners for the County of Houston and
proved, according to law, that he arrived in this republic, Jan'y
_____, eighteen and thirty-five, and that he is a
Page 139 U. S. 381
married man and entitled to one league and labor of land upon
the conditions of paying at the rate of three dollars and fifty
cents for each labor of irrigable land, two dollars and fifty cents
for each labor of temporal or arable land, and one dollar and
twenty cents for each labor of pasture land which may be contained
in the _____ secured to him by this certificate."
"Given under our hands the 1st day of March, 1838."
"E. GASSETT,
President"
"JOHN WORTHAM,
Ass. Comm'rs"
"Attest: SAM'L G. WELLS,
Clerk"
On the 5th day of March, 1838, he transferred a one-half
interest to Warner L. Underwood. The evidences of this transfer
were an assignment on the back of the certificate, as follows:
"For value received, I assign and convey unto Warner L.
Underwood the within certificate, as by deed also of this date.
March 5th, 1838."
"OSCAR ENGLEDOW FINES Y. ROBERSON"
"H. B. DANCE"
and a deed of the same date, to the same party, which disclosed
that only a one-half interest was conveyed, the other one-half
being reserved for the benefit of Joshua Robbins, to whom Roberson
had already transferred such interest. No land was ever located by
Underwood or Robbins under this certificate. Soon after this,
Underwood returned to Kentucky, and remained there until his death.
Thereafter, and on the 12th of May, 1855, a written assignment of
this certificate was made by Roberson to Dennis Trammell. On the
back of the certificate was pasted a thin brown paper, apparently
for the purpose of protecting the certificate against wear and
tear, but at the same time effectually concealing from observation
the assignment to Underwood, written thereon. This certificate,
thus on its face the property of Roberson, together with the
accompanying written assignment to Trammell, were offered for sale
to S. W. March, who, ignorant of any previous
Page 139 U. S. 382
transactions, purchased the same in good faith, paying one
thousand dollars and receiving an assignment and transfer from
Trammell. This was on June 23, 1855. March located this
certificate, and on August 8, 1855, received from the State of
Texas a patent for the lands located thereunder. On May 15, 1860,
by letter from one James Jeffries, Underwood was notified of the
location of the land by March, and of the patent to him, together
with the fact of the concealment of the transfer from Roberson to
himself by means of the paper pasted on the back of the
certificate. No action was taken by Underwood during his lifetime.
He lived nearly twelve years after the receipt of this information,
dying in February, 1872. During the last three or four years of his
life, by reason of disease, he was incapacitated for attention to
business. March, the purchaser of the certificate, the locator of
the lands, and the patentee from the state, died on the 29th of
July, 1878. This suit was commenced on June 13, 1881. The
plaintiffs claim as heirs of Underwood or purchasers from the heirs
of Underwood and Robbins, and represent all the rights of Underwood
and Robbins except an undivided interest of one-sixteenth,
belonging to A. N. Robbins, one of the heirs of Joshua Robbins, who
was made a defendant, and who submitted to an order
pro
confesso. The other defendants claim under the patentee,
March. The principal defense is laches, which in the judgment of
the circuit court was sufficient, and the bill was ordered
dismissed. 24 F. 74. In that conclusion we concur.
From the facts above stated, it appears that the bill was not
filed until forty-three years had passed since the ancestors of
plaintiffs acquired title to the certificate. During all these
years, no assertion of right was made by either Underwood or
Robbins or those claiming under them. Twenty-five years before the
filing of the bill, March purchased the certificate in good faith,
paying a large consideration, located it, and obtained a patent for
the lands from the state. He entered into possession and improved
the lands. The original purchasers, Underwood and Robbins, are
dead; the subsequent purchaser and patentee is also dead, and with
their death, the main witnesses
Page 139 U. S. 383
to this transaction have all passed away. The property has
become of value, and now, after a lapse of nearly half a century,
plaintiffs assert a claim which the owners have ignored for all
these years. It appears that Underwood, when he returned to
Kentucky soon after the purchase, returned in consequence of the
death of his father, who left a large estate, somewhat complicated.
Probably he considered attention to such estate, and its large
interests, of more importance than this float of doubtful value, in
a distant country of large area and small population. But, whatever
may have been the reason, surely this long delay discloses laches,
and such laches as forbid the present interference of a court of
equity. We have had before us this present term a somewhat similar
case, coming from the same state and the same district.
Hanner
v. Moulton, 138 U. S. 486.
There, as here, the controversy arose in respect to land taken
under a land certificate issued in 1838. There, as here, the
plaintiffs claimed title by succession from the original purchaser,
who had died prior to the commencement of the suit. There, the
adverse title under which defendants claimed did not arise until
1869, and knowledge of the adverse title did not come to plaintiffs
until 1876. The bill was filed in 1882, a few months after the bill
in the present case. We held on full review of the rulings of the
Supreme Court of Texas as well as the decisions of this Court, that
laches was a complete bar to the suit. Summing up at the close of
the opinion, MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD, speaking for the Court,
said:
"An interval of nearly thirteen years elapsed between the sale
of the certificate and the filing of the bill in this suit. The
value of the property has largely increased. Parties interested and
witnesses have died, and the memory of those who survive has
decayed. Not a person who is now interested in any of the land is
implicated in the fraud charged in the bill. Under the facts above
stated, the plaintiffs have been guilty of such laches that they
cannot have any relief in a court of equity.
Speidel v.
Henrici, 120 U. S. 377,
120 U. S.
387, and cases there cited;
Richards v.
Mackall, 124 U. S. 183,
124 U. S.
187-188.
See also Lansdale v. Smith,
106 U. S.
391."
Much stronger than that is this case. Not thirteen but
Page 139 U. S. 384
twenty-five years intervened between the sale of the
certificate, the patent of the land, and the commencement of this
suit. More than twenty years before its commencement, Underwood,
under whom plaintiffs principally claim, had positive information
as to the wrong which had been done and the manner in which it was
done. All the parties to the original transaction are dead. The
property has increased in value, and now these plaintiffs are
invoking the aid of a court of equity to dispossess those who
personally have acted in good faith, who were not parties to, or
cognizant of, any wrong, and who have occupied and improved the
property in full reliance upon the sufficiency of the title they
possessed. Surely if laches is ever recognized as a complete bar,
it ought to be in this case. And this doctrine of laches rests on
no arbitrary or technical rule. It is founded on the plainest
principles of substantial justice. Ownership of property implies
two things -- first, attention to it; second, a discharge of all
obligations, of taxation, or otherwise, to the state which protects
it. When it appears that one who now asserts a title to property,
arising more than the lifetime of a generation ago, has during all
these years neglected the property, and made no claim of title
thereto, a reasonable presumption is that, whatever may be apparent
on the fact of the instrument supposed to create the title, were
the full facts known, facts which cannot now be known by reason of
the death of the parties to the transaction, it would be disclosed
that no title was in fact obtained, or, if that be not true, that
he considered the property of such little value that he abandoned
it to the state which was protecting it. So if, the title being
beyond challenge, during these years he pays no taxes thereon,
makes no effort to improve or increase its value, and, by the labor
and efforts of others, under the protecting power of the state,
large value has been given to it, the state may properly say to
him, as may also the individuals who have thus wrought this change
in value:
"You abandoned the property when it was comparatively valueless.
You have taken no share in the burdens of taxation or the support
of the state. Others have toiled, paid taxes, and made the property
valuable. Therefore,
Page 139 U. S. 385
because of your shirking of duties and obligations, you shall
not, whatever may have been the nature of your title in the first
instance, be permitted to appropriate the value thus produced by
others."
Looking back through the fifty years which now have passed since
Underwood purchased an interest in this certificate, general
history discloses a marvelous change in the condition of things in
the State of Texas. Then, an enormous territory, a scanty
population, real estate of comparatively trifling value, sold by
the league, and not by the acre; now, a state of large area, it is
true, but with a vast and growing population, whose industries have
made its real estate of value. Surely a court of equity may look
with jealous eye upon the claims of anyone to a share in that value
based upon a title acquired a half a century ago -- a title which
he has ignored all these years and a value in the accomplishment of
which he has had absolutely no part.
We see no error in the ruling of the circuit court, and its
decree is
Affirmed.