On a libel
in rem, against two canal boats, brought by
two insurance companies, alleging that they had insured a cargo of
wheat on board of one of the boats, which was lost through the
carelessness of those in charge of the two boats, and that they had
paid $9,211.75 to the insured, who owned the wheat, as its value,
and received an abandonment of the cargo, and were subrogated to
the rights of the insured, the district court dismissed the libel,
and on appeal the circuit court reversed the decree and awarded to
the libellants a decree for $8,252.47, condemning both of the boats
therefor. In the district court, one of the boats was sold for
$2,100 and the proceeds were paid into court, and a stipulation for
value as to the other boat, in $1,000, was given by consent. The
claimant, who owned both of the boats at the time of the loss,
appealed to this Court.
Held that this Court had no
jurisdiction of the appeal,
Page 139 U. S. 332
because all that was involved was the $2,100 and $1,000, and the
aggregate of those sums did not exceed $5,000, and there was no
decree
in personam against the claimant.
The cases of
Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.
S. 578, and
The Jessie Williamson, Jr.,
106 U. S. 305,
cited and applied.
In admiralty. The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a libel in admiralty
in rem, filed on the 23d
of July, 1883, in the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New York by the Providence Washington
Insurance Company, of Providence, Rhode Island, and the Security
Insurance Company of New Haven, Connecticut, against the steam
canal boat
Sydney and the canal boat
William
Worden.
The libel alleged that on May 17, 1883, the
Sydney and
the
Worden, owned by the same persons and engaged in the
business of common carriers to and from the Cities of New York and
Buffalo by way of the Erie Canal and the Hudson River, left Buffalo
for New York, having on board, with other merchandise, 7,900
bushels of wheat, of the value of $9,211.75, consigned to Armour,
Plankinton & Co., of New York, the owners thereof; that on May
29, 1883, the boats ran aground on Esopus Island in the Hudson
River, whereby the
Worden was so damaged that she sank,
and the wheat which was on board of her became a total loss through
the carelessness of those in charge of the two boats, and that on
the 17th of May, 1883, the libellants, by a policy of insurance,
insured Armour, Plankinton & Co. on the said cargo of wheat
against the usual marine risks and perils of the voyage from
Buffalo to New York, and, under the policy, on the occurrence of
the said loss, accepted from the insured an abandonment of the
cargo as for a total loss, and paid to them $9,211.75, and thereby
became subrogated to all the rights of Armour, Plankinton
Page 139 U. S. 333
& Co., for such loss against the
Sydney and the
Worden.
The libel prayed for process against the two boats; for a
citation to all persons claiming any right, title, or interest in
the same; for the payment of the claim of the libellants, with
interest and costs; for the condemnation and sale of the said
vessels to pay the same, and for such other an further relief in
the premises as in law and justice the libellants might be entitled
to receive.
On the 14th of August, 1883, one Charles E. Wager put in a claim
to the two vessels as their owner. On the 15th of August, 1883, the
district court made an order, on the consent of the proctors for
the claimant, that the
Sydney be sold by the marshal. The
marshal sold the
Sydney for $2,100, and he paid that sum
to the clerk of the court, after deducting his costs and
disbursements, amounting to $166.84. On the 28th of August, 1883,
the proctors for the libellants and the claimant agreed that the
value of the
Worden be fixed at $1,000, in lien of an
appraisement, and that a bond to the marshal be given in that
amount, which was accordingly done.
On the 7th of September, 1883, Wager put in an answer to the
libel, setting up that at the times alleged in it he was the owner
of the
Sydney and the
Worden, admitting that the
wheat on board of the
Worden was consigned to Armour,
Plankinton & Co.; denying that the sinking of the
Worden was caused through negligence; denying, also, that
the libellants insured Armour, Plankinton & Co., and averring
that any payment made by the libellants for the loss of the wheat
was paid for the benefit and to the credit of Wager; that he paid
the premium for the insurance on the wheat to insure him against
his liability as a common carrier, and with a distinct agreement
with the shippers of the wheat and the libellants that, in case of
any loss or damage to the wheat while
in transitu, the
payment of such loss or damage by the insurance companies should
accrue to his benefit, and relieve him from his liability as a
common carrier for such damage and loss, and that he paid such
premium with the knowledge and consent of the libellants, and in
accordance with the well
Page 139 U. S. 334
established custom existing at Buffalo, whereby common carriers
insured themselves against losses under their liability as such for
damage and loss to the cargoes shipped on board of their boats.
The case was tried before Judge Brown, in the district court,
who dismissed the libel, with costs, giving an opinion which is
reported in 23 F. 88.
The libellants appealed to the circuit court, where the case was
heard by Judge Wallace, who made a decree reversing the decree of
the district court, awarding to the libellants a recovery against
both boats for $6,175.89, and $1,420.30 interest, and $656.28 costs
in both courts, being an aggregate of $8,252.47, and decreeing that
the two boats be condemned therefor. The decree also recited that
the
Sydney had been sold and the proceeds of the sale,
to-wit, $2,100, had been paid by the marshal into the registry of
the court, and that the value of the
Worden was fixed by
consent at $1,000, for which the usual stipulation for value was
duly given, and directed that the proceeds of the sale of the
Sydney be paid over to the proctor for the libellants, and
that the stipulators for the value of the
Worden cause the
engagement of their stipulation to be performed. The opinion of
Judge Wallace is reported in 27 F. 119. He filed the proper
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Wager, the claimant,
appealed to this Court.
The first question which arises is as to the jurisdiction of
this Court, inasmuch as the proceeds of the sale of the
Sydney were only $2,100 and the value of the
Worden was only $1,000, the aggregate of these two sums
not exceeding $5,000. There was no decree against any person
in
personam for any amount. The only decree was that the
Sydney and the
Worden be condemned for the
$8,252.47.
We are of opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction of this
appeal. In
Elgin v. Marshall, 106 U.
S. 578, a judgment had been rendered by a circuit court
for $1,660.75 against a town on interest coupons detached from
bonds which the town had issued. The bonds were for a larger sum
than $5,000. It was held by this Court that it had no jurisdiction
to reexamine the
Page 139 U. S. 335
judgment, on the ground that the statute limiting the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court to cases where the matter in dispute,
exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum or value of $5,000, had
reference to the matter directly in dispute in the particular cause
in which the judgment sought to be reviewed had been rendered, and
did not permit the court, for the purpose of determining its sum or
value, to estimate its collateral effect in a subsequent suit
between the same or other parties. It was further said that the
court could not add to the value of the matter determined any
estimate in money by reason of the probative force of the judgment
itself in some subsequent proceeding.
The principle involved in
Elgin v. Marshall was, on the
authority of that case, applied by this Court in an admiralty
cause.
The Jessie Williamson, Jr.,
108 U.
S. 305, the facts in which were substantially like those
in the present case. In the case of
The Jessie Williamson,
Jr., the counsel for the appellant invoked the authority of
The Enterprise, 2 Curtis 317, as taking the case out of
the rule laid down in
Elgin v. Marshall. In
The Jessie
Williamson, Jr., the libellant in a suit
in rem in
admiralty against a vessel claimed in his libel to recover $27,000
for damages growing out of a collision. A stipulation in the sum of
$2,100 as the appraised value of the vessel, was given in the
district court. The libel having been, on appeal, dismissed by the
circuit court, the libellant appealed to this Court, which held
that the matter in dispute did not exceed the sum or value of
$5,000, exclusive of costs, and that it had no jurisdiction of the
appeal. In
The Jessie Williamson, Jr., it was said by this
Court that although the libellant might recover $27,000 against the
vessel, it was plain that he could not recover on the stipulation
for value, which represented her, more than $2,100, and could not
recover against the sureties in the stipulation more than that
amount, and that, the suit being one
in rem only, the
value of the vessel, represented by the stipulation, was all that
was in dispute, because that was all that the libellant could
obtain or the stipulators lose in the suit. It was further shown in
the opinion in
The Jessie Williamson, Jr., that the facts
in that case differed from the
Page 139 U. S. 336
facts in the case of
The Enterprise, so that whatever
was said by this Court in apparent recognition of the propriety of
the decision in the case of
The Enterprise must be
regarded as
obiter dictum, and the views set forth in the
opinion in the last-mentioned case, so far as they conflict with
the actual rulings of this Court in the cases of
Elgin v.
Marshall and
The Jessie Williamson, Jr., must be
regarded as not having had the affirmative approval of this
Court.
The principle of the case of
Elgin v. Marshall, that
the sum or value really in dispute between the parties in the case
before this Court as shown by the whole record is the test of its
appellate jurisdiction, without regard to the collateral effect of
the judgment in another suit between the same or other parties, has
since been repeatedly affirmed by this Court, and that case cited
and approved.
Opelika City v. Daniel, 109 U.
S. 108;
Bruce v. Manchester & Keene
Railroad, 117 U. S. 514;
Glbson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27;
Vicksburg &c. Railroad v. Smith, 135 U.
S. 195.
The case of
The Jessie Williamson, Jr., has been cited
with approval by this Court in
Bowman v. Chicago &
Northwestern Railway, 115 U. S. 611, and
Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27.
It is very clear that if the libel in the present case had been
dismissed by the circuit court, the libellants could not have
appealed. The right of appeal must be reciprocal, and the statute
does not give to one party an advantage over the other party under
the same circumstances.
Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.
S. 165;
The Jessie Williamson, Jr.,
108 U. S. 305,
108 U. S.
311.
The appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.