The decree in this case in the court below, founded on the
report of a master, awarded to the complainant the recovery of
rental for five months, separately stated. In this respect, the
decree was sustained here,
136
U. S. 136 U.S. 89, but it was reversed and the cause
remanded, in order to have the computation made, after inquiry into
special subjects indicated in the mandate. The circuit court, after
determining the special matters, regarded the matter of the time
and amounts of the rental as settled by the former decree and as
sustained by this Court, and awarded interest on the amounts from
the date of the former decree:
Held that there was no
error in this; that the remanding of the cause did not reopen the
whole subject of the accounts, but, on the contrary, contemplated
no new investigation as to past matters.
Counsel should use respectful language, both in brief and in
oral arguments.
Page 138 U. S. 510
In equity. The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases, being appeals from two decrees of the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of Indiana, making allowances
to certain intervenors in railroad foreclosure suits, by
stipulation of parties are to be heard together and treated as one
case. They were before the Court a year ago.
Kneeland v.
American Loan & Trust Co., 136 U. S.
89.
The claims of the intervenors are for the rental of rolling
stock from the 1st of August, 1883, to the 1st of January, 1885.
The road during that time was in the possession of a receiver. From
the 1st of August, 1883, to the 1st of December, 1883, the
receivership was at the instance of a judgment creditor, the
remainder of the time at the instance of the bondholders, for whose
benefit the appellant became the purchaser at the foreclosure
sales. The only questions then determined which are important to
the present controversy were these: first the time for which the
property was responsible for the rental, and, second the method of
computing it. It was there adjudged that the bondholders,
represented by the appellant, the beneficial owners of the
property, could not be held liable for rental value prior to
December 1, 1883, and during the time that the receivership was at
the instance of a judgment creditor. It was also ruled, against the
contention of the appellant, that the mileage basis was not the
proper one for determining the compensation to be paid to the
intervenors, but that they were entitled to recover a reasonable
rental value, computed as ordinary rentals, by the month, and
irrespective of the actual use of the rolling stock. That was the
basis of computation pursued by the circuit court in the decrees
from which those appeals were taken, and therefore,
Page 138 U. S. 511
in that respect its rulings were sustained. In those decrees the
court had found the amounts due to the several intervenors, stating
each separately, and decreeing a recovery therefor. These decrees
were based upon and confirmed final reports made by the master.
Back of these reports was an immense volume of testimony upon which
they were founded. They stated the amounts due the intervenors,
separately and for different periods -- one, from August 1, 1883,
to August 1, 1884, and the other, from thence on to January 1,
1885. With these reports it was a simple matter of arithmetical
computation to determine the amount due to each intervenor for the
four months from August 1, 1883, to December 1, 1883, that being
simply one-third of the year. The order which was entered by this
Court was that the decrees be
"reversed, and the cases remanded with instructions to strike
out all allowances for rental prior to December 1, 1883, the time
when the receiver was appointed at the instance of the mortgagees,
and to allow the rentals as fixed for the time subsequent."
In other words, all that the court had to do was to deduct from
the amount allowed to each intervenor one-third of the amount
allowed for the year ending August 1, 1884. In each of the reports,
as well as the decrees, the rentals due from August 1, 1884, to
January 1, 1885, had been stated, and on receiving our mandates,
the circuit court interpreted them as in effect affirming so much
of the decrees as allowed these amounts to the intervenors, and its
new decrees awarded interest thereon from the date of the former
decrees. This is the first ground of alleged error.
We think the ruling of the circuit court was correct. The amount
of the allowances for these five months was separately stated, and
such allowances were sustained by this Court. While the former
decrees were in terms reversed and the cases remanded for the
entering of new decrees, yet the terms of those new decrees were
specifically stated, and, insofar as the separate and distinct
matters embraced in the former decrees were ordered to be
incorporated into the new, it is to be regarded as
pro
tanto an affirmance. Equity regards the
Page 138 U. S. 512
substance, and not the form. The rights of parties are not to be
sacrificed to the mere letter, and whether the language used was
reversed, modified, or affirmed in part and reversed in part is
immaterial. Equity looks beyond these words of description to see
what was in fact ordered to be done.
Illinois Central Railroad
v. Turrill, 110 U. S. 301.
That the computations were not made by this Court and the separate
amounts due each intervenor stated in the mandates to the trial
court was owing partly to a fact transpiring on the argument here,
and which appears in the closing part of our order as follows:
"Counsel for the Grant claims expressly stated in open court in
his argument that in case certain appeals from the Sixth Circuit
were affirmed, there might result a double allowance to his
clients, which they did not insist upon. As the details and sum are
not clearly presented, we can only say that this matter must be
taken into account in the subsequent disposition of the cases."
This was a matter not disclosed by the record, and of which we
were informed simply by the oral statement of counsel. For this
reason, as well as from the fact that there were several
intervenors, we left the matter of computation to the trial
court.
Another error alleged is this: after the mandates were filed in
the circuit court, the appellant moved that the matters be referred
to a master, with instructions to investigate and report the
correct and true amounts to be allowed to the claimants; also the
exact time at which proceedings were commenced by the mortgagees
for the foreclosure of the mortgage resting upon the St. Louis
division; whether any receiver was ever appointed at the instance
of the mortgagees in said St. Louis division mortgage, and also
whether the receivership theretofore existing under the creditors'
bill, known as "Braman's bill," or under that brought by the
mortgagees on the Toledo division, was ever extended to and made to
embrace certain foreclosure suits named. In support, he filed an
affidavit as to facts which he claimed to have ascertained since
the decision in this Court. This motion was denied, and the terms
of the decrees were settled by the circuit court. This ruling is
complained of, but it obviously was correct.
Page 138 U. S. 513
Counsel claims that under the reversal, the whole matter of
inquiry as to the accounts was opened. On the contrary, the clear
language of our decision was to strike out certain specific items
and to allow others as already fixed. No new investigation was
contemplated in respect to past matters. The only independent
matter left for consideration was that in respect to double
allowance, suggested by counsel on oral argument.
A final matter of objection, which applies only to case No.
1,539 and to the allowance in favor of the intervenor, the American
Loan & Trust Company, is this. To that company, for the year
ending August 1, 1884, there was, by the former decree, allowed
$33,735.28; deducting one-third leaves $22,490.19. The amount
allowed in this decree for such period was $23,262.72, or $772.53
more than the two-thirds. Counsel for this intervenor seems to have
gone back of the final reports of the master, into the testimony,
to work out this result, but, as we have already stated, no such
inquiry was intended to be left open by the former decision to one
party more than to the other. In this respect, therefore, there was
error, and the allowance to such intervenor must be reduced by that
sum.
We regret to notice in the brief of appellees' counsel in No.
1,540 some aspersions on the conduct of opposing counsel. It is not
pleasant to be compelled to remind counsel that language used in
briefs, as well as that employed in oral argument, must be
respectful.
The decree in No. 1,540 will be affirmed. In No. 1,539 it
will be modified, and the case remanded with instructions to reduce
the allowance to the American Loan and Trust Company by the sum of
$772.53. The costs of that appeal will be equally divided between
the appellant and the American Loan & Trust Company.