When the highest court of a state holds that a judgment of one
of its inferior courts, imposing punishment in a criminal case in
excess of that allowed by the statutes of the state, is valid and
binding to the extent to which the law of the state authorized the
punishment, and only void for the excess, there is no principle of
federal law invaded in such ruling.
This was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to
review a judgment of that court refusing to issue a writ of habeas
corpus for the discharge of the plaintiff in error, the petitioner
for the writ.
A law of Wisconsin declared that
"Any person who shall assault another and shall feloniously rob,
steal or take from his person any money or other property which may
be the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous
weapon, with intent if resisted to kill or maim the person robbed,
or, being so armed, who shall wound or strike the person robbed,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison not more than
ten years nor less than three years."
The petitioner in the court below, John Graham, and one Samuel
McDonald were charged with feloniously making an assault upon one
Alf. McDonald, putting him in bodily fear and danger of life and
feloniously robbing him of two hundred dollars in money, the
parties being armed at the time with a loaded revolver and wounding
and striking the said Alf. McDonald. In June, 1889, the parties
were tried in the Circuit Court for Ashland County, Wisconsin, and
were convicted as charged in the information, and were sentenced to
confinement in the state prison at hard labor, one for the period
of thirteen years and the other for the period of fourteen years.
As the law only authorized punishment by imprisonment not exceeding
ten years, and the parties were serving under a sentence much
longer than that period, they applied to the court below for a writ
of habeas corpus, alleging that the judgment was void as being in
excess of the authority vested
Page 138 U. S. 462
in the court by which it was rendered. The court below held that
the judgment was not void in the sense of being an absolute
nullity, but only erroneous, and that the remedy of the parties was
by a writ of error, and not by a writ of habeas corpus.
In re
Graham and
In re McDonald, 74 Wis. 450. The writ was
therefore refused. Subsequently one of the parties applied again to
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin for the writ, and it was again
refused. To review this last judgment, the case was brought to this
Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the facts as above, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
It is undoubtedly the general rule that a judgment rendered by a
court in a criminal case must conform strictly to the statute, and
that any variation from its provisions, either in the character or
the extent of punishment inflicted, renders the judgment absolutely
void, but it seems that under the law of Wisconsin a judgment in a
criminal case which merely exceeds in the time of punishment
prescribed by the sentence that which is authorized by law is not
absolutely void, but only erroneous, and that the error must be
corrected on appeal, and cannot be corrected by a writ of habeas
corpus. It would seem that a distinction is there made between
those cases in which the judgment is irregular as being in excess
of the time prescribed and those in which it is void as changing
the nature of the punishment from that authorized by the law, and
that in the former class, until the time is reached which is
prescribed by statute as the limit of the power of the court to
punish the prisoner, he has no remedy by habeas corpus.
If such be the law of the state, as would appear by this
decision and the argument of counsel, we do not see that we
Page 138 U. S. 463
have any right to interfere. That the prisoner should not have
been sentenced for any time in excess of ten years is very evident.
When the ten years have expired, it is probable the court will
order the prisoner's discharge, but until then, he has no right to
ask the annulment of the entire judgment. Such being the ruling of
the state court, and there being nothing in it repugnant to any
principle of natural justice, we think that the reason given for a
refusal of the writ of habeas corpus in the court below at the
present time was a sound one.
Nor is the doctrine of the Wisconsin court peculiar to the
courts of that state. In New York, it has been held that a judgment
in a criminal case which in the punishment it imposed exceeded that
prescribed by statute was not void except for the excess, where
such excess could be omitted in the execution of the judgment.
Thus, in
People v. Baker, 89 N.Y. 460, 467, the relator
was tried and convicted of a crime for which he was sentenced to be
imprisoned in the penitentiary for one year, and to pay a fine of
$500, and to stand committed until the fine was paid. Contending
that the offense of which he was convicted was shown by the minutes
of the court to have been merely an assault and battery for which
he could have been at most sentenced to be imprisoned for one year
and to pay a fine of $250 only, he applied to a judge of the
Superior Court of Buffalo for a writ of habeas corpus to be
discharged from imprisonment. That court refused to discharge him,
and, the general term of the court having affirmed the ruling, the
case was taken to the court of appeals of the state. In sustaining
the decision, that court held that if the relator was only
convicted of a simple assault and battery, he would not be entitled
to his discharge, for then the sentence to imprisonment for one
year was authorized and legal, observing that this was a separate
portion of the sentence, complete in itself, and the remainder of
the sentence could be held void and disregarded, and that the whole
sentence was not illegal and void because of the excess, adding
that such was the settled law of the state.
But, were the general doctrine of other states against that held
by the highest court of Wisconsin, it is not perceived how
Page 138 U. S. 464
we could interfere with the imprisonment of the plaintiff in
error. When the highest court of a state holds that a judgment of
one of its inferior courts imposing punishment in a criminal case
is valid and binding to the extent in which the law of the state
authorized the punishment, and only void for the excess, we cannot
treat it as wholly void, there being no principle of federal law
invaded in such ruling.
Judgment affirmed.
