The grant of lands to the Territory of Minnesota by the Act of
March 3, 1857, 11 Stat. 195, c. 99, and the grant to the State of
Minnesota by the Act of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 526, c. 105, were
grants
in praesenti, and took effect by relation upon the
sections of land as of the date of the grant, when the railroads
were definitely located, both as to so much of the grants as was
found within the limits of the State of Minnesota as defined by the
act admitting it as a state and as to so much thereof as was within
the limits of the Territory of Minnesota under the territorial
organization of 1857, but was not within the limits of the state
when admitted as a state.
It cannot be safely asserted that it has been the general policy
of the United states government to restrain a grant of land made to
a state in aid of railways to lands within such state when a part
of the line of road extends into one of the territories.
Where the language of a series of statutes is dubious and open
to different interpretations, the construction put upon them by the
Executive Department charged with their execution has great and
generally controlling force with this Court; but where a statute is
free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded
in favor of a presumption as to the policy of the government, even
though it may be the settled practice of the Department.
Page 137 U. S. 529
Congress may authorize a territorial corporation to construct a
railroad in a territory, and may make land grants in aid thereof,
which will be valid after a part of the territory becomes a
state.
The various land grant statutes reviewed.
Lands within Indian Territory, covered by said grant of March 3,
1857, passed on the extinguishment of the Indian title.
In equity, to quiet title. The case is stated in the
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit in equity brought by the St. Paul, Minneapolis,
and Manitoba Railway Company, a Minnesota corporation, against
Ransom Phelps, to quiet the title to about 80 acres of land in
Richland County, North Dakota, particularly described as the east
one-half of the southeast quarter of section 13, township 132,
range 48, alleged to belong to the plaintiff, and which was claimed
by the defendant.
The bill was filed April 29, 1884, and set forth at great length
the various steps by which the plaintiff derived its claim of
title, averred that the defendant had no valid title to the land,
by reason of plaintiff's prior right in the premises, and prayed
that its own equitable title be quieted and protected, and the
defendant be enjoined from setting up any claim whatever to the
land, and for other and further relief, etc. The defendant
answered, denying all the material allegations of the bill, and the
plaintiff filed a replication. The case was tried upon an agreed
statement of facts, and on the 3d of March, 1886, the circuit court
announced its decision and opinion in writing, pursuant to which it
ordered that the bill be dismissed at complainant's cost. The
opinion is reported in 26 F. 569. On the 4th of March, 1886, a
final decree was entered, dismissing the bill of complaint, and an
appeal to this Court was taken and allowed.
The material facts in the case are, briefly, as follows: the
plaintiff claims the land in dispute as the present beneficiary
under the Acts of Congress approved March 3, 1857, 11 Stat.
Page 137 U. S. 530
195, c. 99, and March 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 526, c. 105, making a
grant of lands to the Territory of Minnesota to aid in the
construction of railroads. The provisions of the act of 1857
material to this issue are as follows:
"
Be it enacted," etc.,
"That there be and is hereby granted to the Territory of
Minnesota, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of
railroads from Stillwater, by way of Saint Paul and Saint Anthony,
to a point between the foot of Big Stone lake and the mouth of
Sioux Wood River, with a branch via Saint Cloud and Crow Wing, to
the navigable waters of the Red River of the North at such point as
the legislature of said territory may determine; from St. Paul and
from Saint Anthony, via Minneapolis, to a convenient point of
junction west of the Mississippi, to the southern boundary of the
territory in the direction of the mouth of the Big Sioux River,
with a branch, via Faribault, to the north line of the State of
Iowa, west of range sixteen; from Winona, via Saint Peter, to a
point on the Big Sioux River, south of the forty-fifth parallel of
north latitude; also from La Crescent, via Target Lake, up the
valley of Root River, to a point of junction with the
last-mentioned road, east of range seventeen, every alternate
section of land, designated by odd numbers, for six sections in
width on each side of each of said roads and branches; but in case
it shall appear that the United States have, when the lines or
routes of said roads and branches are definitely fixed, sold any
sections, or any parts thereof, granted as aforesaid, or that the
right of preemption has attached to the same, then it shall be
lawful for any agent or agents to be appointed by the governor of
said territory or future state, to select, subject to the approval
of the Secretary of the Interior, from the lands of the United
States nearest to the tiers of sections above specified so much
land, in alternate sections or parts of sections as shall be equal
to such lands as the United States have sold or otherwise
appropriated, or to which the rights of preemption have attached,
as aforesaid, which lands (thus selected in lieu of those sold, and
to which preemption rights have attached as aforesaid, together
with the sections and parts of sections designated by
Page 137 U. S. 531
odd numbers as aforesaid, and appropriated as aforesaid) shall
be held by the territory or future State of Minnesota for the use
and purpose aforesaid,
provided that the land to be so
located shall in no case be further than fifteen miles from the
lines of said roads or branches, and selected for and on account of
each of said roads or branches."
Section 3 provides
"That the said lands hereby granted to the said territory or
future state shall be subject to the future disposal of the
legislature thereof for the purposes herein expressed and no
other."
Section 4 defines the manner in which the lands granted shall be
disposed of by the territory or future state.
The act of 1865 enlarged the original grant from six to ten
sections per mile on each side of the road, and the indemnity
limits from fifteen to twenty miles.
To carry out the provisions of the granting act, the territorial
legislature passed an act creating the Minnesota and Pacific
Railroad Company, and bestowed upon it the lands which had been
granted to the territory, and by the same act the terminus of the
main line of the road was fixed at Breckinridge at the mouth of the
Sioux Wood River, as the point "between the foot of Big Stone Lake
and the mouth of the Sioux Wood River," referred to in the act of
Congress.
On the 5th of December, 1857, the company filed with the
Commissioner of the General Land Office a map showing the definite
location of the main line of the road as far west as Breckinridge,
but as the public surveys at that time extended only to the west
line of range 38 -- about half the length of the road -- it was not
accepted as the map of definite location by the land office any
further west than the surveys extended. After the surveys had been
completed as far west as Breckinridge, the company filed another
map of definite location for the remaining part of the road, which
was in reality a map of the original location made to conform to
the public surveys. The exact date of the filing of this latter map
and its acceptance by the Land Department does not appear in the
record, but it was prior to May 25, 1869.
The railroad was completed to Breckinridge within the time
Page 137 U. S. 532
limited by the Act of March 3, 1865,
supra. It is
conceded that the tract in controversy is part of an odd section
lying within six miles of the line of the road, and that the
appellant has succeeded to all the rights and privileges respecting
the grant that were originally conferred upon the Territory of
Minnesota, and by its legislature conferred upon the Minnesota and
Pacific Railroad Company.
The main contention of the appellee is that this land, although
within six miles of the line of the road as definitely located, and
as actually constructed, and otherwise conforming to the
description of the lands granted by the act of 1857, was not
granted by that act, because it lies outside of the limits of the
present State of Minnesota, within what is now the State of North
Dakota, although at the date of the grant it lay within the limits
of Minnesota Territory. This contention is based upon the following
theory: at the time the grant of 1857 was made, Minnesota was a
territory, whose western boundary was the Missouri River. Five days
prior thereto -- to-wit, February 26, 1857 -- Congress passed an
enabling act for the proposed state, 11 Stat. 166, which designated
the western boundary thereof as follows:
"Beginning at the point in the center of the main channel of the
Red River of the North where the boundary line between the United
States and the British possessions crosses the same; thence up the
main channel of said river to that of the Boix des Sioux River;
thence [up] the main channel of said river to Lake Travers; thence
up the center of said lake to the southern extremity thereof;
thence in a direct line to the head of Big Stone Lake; thence
through its center to its outlet; thence by a due south line to the
north line of the State of Iowa."
Under this enabling act, the State of Minnesota was organized
and admitted into the union May 11, 1858, 11 Stat. 285. It is said
that it has been the settled policy of the government to confine
land grants made in aid of railroads wholly within a state or
territory to lands lying within the same state or territory, and
that therefore, inasmuch as the land in this case is outside of the
State of Minnesota, although within the limits of the territory as
it existed at the date of the grant, it cannot be included
Page 137 U. S. 533
in the grant to this branch of the road lying wholly within the
state.
This was the conclusion reached by the circuit court in view of
the ruling of the Land Department, and the refusal of the Secretary
of the Interior, in the adjustment of the grant to this branch of
the road, to certify to the state any lands lying beyond its
western boundary line, which ruling the court expressed itself
unwilling to reverse, or to jeopardize the rights and large
interests (including a prosperous village) that were said to have
grown up on the faith of it. Against this conclusion there are
strong, and, in our view, unanswerable, objections.
It was admitted that, according to the plain letter of the
statute, the grant would include lands west of the Bois des Sioux
River, in Dakota, and that the land in controversy is within that
grant. It is also conceded that Congress has the power to grant to
a state lands in another state or territory, to aid in the
construction of a railroad wholly within its own limits. But it is
argued that the positive and express provision of the law must give
way and be controlled by the presumption founded upon an alleged
policy of the government; that Congress, having in view the
probable organization of Minnesota Territory into a state, intended
to restrict the grant in question to lands within the limits of
such future state. We see much in the act itself and in the
circumstances which attended its enactment that repels such
presumption. In the first place, what is called the uniform and
settled policy of the government to confine land grants, in the
manner described, as far as it exists, was established by the
express provisions of statutory enactments, and not by any
construction of the interior and law departments of the government,
wherein they have assumed to find an opposition between the actual
text of the law and the public policy of the government, making the
former yield to the latter as expressive of the intent of
Congress.
In most if not all of the grants of land made to the various
states in aid of railroads within their respective limits, some
words of limitation were used to denote that the grant was
Page 137 U. S. 534
restricted to lands within each particular state, when such
restriction was intended. Thus, in the act of 1857 now under
consideration, the terminus of the second line of road provided for
was at "the southern boundary of the territory," and the terminus
of the branch of that road was at the "north line of the State of
Iowa." The Act of June 29, 1854, 10 Stat. 302, c. 72, which was
repealed August 4, 1854, 10 Stat. 575, c. 246, granted lands to the
Territory of Minnesota to aid in the construction of certain
railroads, one of which was to run from the southern line of the
territory via certain mentioned points to the eastern line of the
territory. The Act of June 3, 1856, 11 Stat. 20, c. 43, granted
lands to Wisconsin in aid of a railroad from Fond du Lac northerly
to the state line, and an act of the same date, 11 Stat. 21, c. 44,
made a grant of lands to Michigan in aid of a road to run from
Little Bay de Noquet via certain points to "the Wisconsin state
line." The Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 772, c. 98, granted lands
to Kansas in aid of a railroad to run from Leavenworth via certain
other points to the "southern line of the state," and also in aid
of a railroad to run from Atchison via Topeka to the "western line
of the state." The Act of May 5, 1864, 13 Stat. 64, c. 79, granted
to the State of Minnesota to aid in the construction of a railroad
from St. Paul to Lake Superior "every alternate section of public
land," etc., "within Minnesota." The Act of July 4, 1866, 14 Stat.
87, c. 168, granted lands to Minnesota to aid in the construction
of a road from Houston to the "western boundary of the state," and
for another road from Hastings to a point on the "western boundary
of the state." The Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 289, c. 270, ยง
28, granted lands to the State of Kansas to aid in the construction
of a southern branch of the Union Pacific Railroad, which was
designated to run from Fort Riley via certain named points to the
"southern line of the State of Kansas."
See also the
Florida-Alabama grant hereafter referred to; Act of May 15, 1856,
11 Stat. 9, c. 28, granting lands to the State of Iowa to aid in
the construction of certain railroads in that state; Act of May 12,
1864, 13 Stat. 72, c. 84, granting lands to the State of Iowa to
aid in the construction of a railroad in that state;
Page 137 U. S. 535
and Act of July 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 503, c. 130, donating public
lands to the several states and territories which may provide
colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts.
These statutes are all in harmony with the construction which we
think should be put upon the act under consideration. In almost the
same language in which those statutes grant lands to states, this
act provides "that there be and is hereby granted to the Territory
of Minnesota, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of
railroads," and then proceeds, in words no less express and precise
than the words of the statutes above cited, to define the lines of
the different roads and branches, to designate the points of their
termini, and to declare the terms, extent, location, and
limitations of the grants, all within the limits of the territory.
Not a word in any section or provision of the act indicates an
intention of Congress to confine the grant within the limits of the
contemplated state. The words of the grant are: "Every alternate
section of land designated by odd numbers for six [ten] sections in
width on each side of each of said roads and branches." Each of
what roads and branches? Such as are by the express terms of the
act confined within the proposed boundaries of the future state?
The question is answered by the act itself. It provides for four
separate roads and two branches, particularly designation the
points from which each is to start, and the limits within which the
terminus of each may be fixed. It expressly designates the terminus
of the third of these roads (the Winona and St. Peter) at "a point
on the Big Sioux River, south of the forty-fifth parallel of north
latitude," some 30 or 40 miles beyond the boundary of the state,
and that of the one under consideration, which might have been, if
so directed by the territorial legislature, also fixed beyond the
western boundary, and yet be within the terms of the act. These
provisions are all embodied in the same section, and all of them
alike constituted legislation in reference to the proposed state,
and if one was limited by the presumption of the rule of
construction contended for, so were all the others, for they all
prescribed, with respect to the extent of the grant, the same
terms, putting each grant on the same footing in proportion
Page 137 U. S. 536
to the length of the road,
i.e., "every alternate
section of land designated by odd numbers for six [ten] sections in
width on each side of each of said roads and branches." Again, it
is to be observed, that after the State of Minnesota was organized
and admitted into the union, with its boundaries fixed by the
Enabling Act, Congress passed an act, May 12, 1864, as to one of
these roads, and March 9, 1865, as to all the others, renewing the
grant of 1857 and enlarging it from six to ten miles on each side
of said roads and branches, and nothing is said in either of them
to indicate any restriction to the state limits of the lands
originally granted, or those added to the grant. We think that the
language of those acts is too plain and unequivocal to need or even
to admit the aid of an extrinsic rule of construction to get at the
intent and meaning of Congress. The assumption of the appellee that
the uniform policy of the government, as it is called, arose from
the construction put by the administrative department upon railroad
grants and that it arose with respect to the very first grant made
by Congress in aid of a railroad is erroneous. Counsel for the
appellee have failed to bring to our attention any instance of such
a construction except the one now before the Court. Had any such
cases been presented when the language of the statutes under
considerations was dubious and open to different interpretations,
the established construction of them by the department charged with
their execution would have very great force and generally a
controlling one in the formation of the judgment of this Court; but
where a statute, as in this case, is clear and free from all
ambiguity, we think the letter of it is not to be disregarded in
favor of a mere presumption as to what is termed the policy of the
government, even though it may be the settled practice of the
department.
We have already stated what we think the general policy
established by Congress has been is respect to the restriction of
land grants made in aid of railroads to be constructed wholly
within a state or territory, but we are of opinion that the alleged
general policy of the government in the matter under consideration
is hardly so broad as is claimed for it. We do
Page 137 U. S. 537
not think it can be safely asserted that it has been a general
policy of the United States government to restrict a grant made to
a state in aid of railroads to lands within such state where a part
of the line of road extended into one of the territories. As we
have already shown, that part of the grant to the Winona and St.
Peter Division, by the act of 1857, was never construed to have
that effect.
Another case to which we now refer is conclusive upon that
question. By the first section of the Act of Congress of July 23,
1866, 14 Stat. 210, c. 212, there was granted to the State of
Kansas, for the use and benefit of the St. Joseph and Denver City
Railroad Company, a Kansas corporation, to aid in the construction
of a railroad from Elwood, Kansas, westwardly via Marysville in
that state, so as to effect a junction with the Union Pacific
Railroad, or any branch thereof, not further west than the 100th
meridian of west longitude, every alternate section of land
designated by odd numbers, for ten sections in width on each side
of the road to the point of intersection. Such point of
intersection was in what was then the Territory of Nebraska. The
company filed a map of definite location of its line of road to a
connection with the Union Pacific Railroad Company in Nebraska,
March 25, 1870, and built sections of the road, from time to time,
as far as Hastings, Nebraska, where it made a junction with the
Burlington and Missouri River Railroad, July 15, 1872. It never
made a junction with the Union Pacific Railroad unless the
Burlington road is a branch thereof. The road as built did not
follow its line of definite location, but deviated from it in some
places a few rods, in others several miles. The company filed its
articles of incorporation in the office of the Secretary of State
of Nebraska April 1, 1873, but did not otherwise attempt to comply
with the laws of that state in respect to foreign corporations
extending their lines into that state. April 13, 1870, which was
after the definite location of the road, one Van Wyck entered at
the Beatrice land office in Nebraska, a portion of an odd section
of land in that state within ten miles of the road as definitely
located, and as actually built, and on the 15th of November, 1871,
obtained a
Page 137 U. S. 538
patent therefor from the United States. The tract, having been
claimed by the railroad company as a part of its grant, was sold by
it to one Knevals, who brought suit in the Circuit Court for the
District of Nebraska against Van Wyck, and obtained a decree in
that court, declaring that Van Wyck had received his patent and the
title it conveyed, in trust for the company, and that at the
commencement of the suit he held the lands in trust for the
complainant, to whom it was further decreed that he convey them.
That decree was affirmed by this Court at October term, 1882, the
case being reported as
Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.
S. 360. One of the defenses interposed to the suit was
that the company had not complied with the laws of Nebraska
allowing foreign railroad corporations to extend their roads into
that state. In treating of that point, this Court said (p.
106 U. S.
369):
"As to the want of compliance with the conditions imposed by the
laws of Nebraska allowing railroad companies organized in other
states to extend and build their roads within its limits, it is
sufficient to say that when the grant was made to the company,
Nebraska was a territory, and it was entirely competent for
Congress to confer upon a corporation of any state the right to
construct a road within any of the territories of the United
States. The grant of land and a right of way for the construction
of a road to a designated point within the territory was sufficient
authority for the company to construct the road to that point. It
may be well doubted whether the state subsequently created out of
the territory could put any impediment upon the enjoyment of the
right thus conferred."
Adopting the reasoning of the Court in that case, we say that if
it was entirely competent for Congress to confer upon a state
corporation the right to construct a railroad in any of the
territories, and obtain lands in a territory in aid thereof,
a
fortiori might a territorial corporation, under congressional
authority, construct a railroad in such territory and obtain its
full quota of lands, even though a part of the territory embracing
the granted lands should afterwards become a state.
The counsel for appellee, to sustain their statement as to the
ruling and action of the administrative department upon the
Page 137 U. S. 539
land grant legislation, cite the construction given by Attorney
General Crittenden to the Act of September 20, 1850, 9 Stat. 466,
c. 61, granting lands to the States of Illinois, Mississippi, and
Alabama in aid of a railroad from Chicago to Mobile. The first
section of that act granted a right of way one hundred feet wide
through the public lands to the State of Illinois for the
construction of a railroad through the public lands within the same
limits, followed by provisions in the first six sections declaring
the terms, limitations, and restrictions of the grant, with two
other branches. By the second section, there was granted to the
state, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of such
railroad and branches, every alternate section of public land
designated by even numbers for six sections in width on each side
of said road and branches. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth
sections detailed the manner in which the grant should be
administered, etc., and the seventh section provided as
follows:
"That in order to aid in the continuation of said Central
Railroad from the mouth of the Ohio River to the City of Mobile,
all the rights, privileges, and liabilities hereinbefore conferred
on the State of Illinois shall be granted to the States of Alabama
and Mississippi, respectively, for the purpose of aiding in the
construction of a railroad from said City of Mobile to a point near
the mouth of the Ohio River, and that public lands of the United
States, to the same extent in proportion to the length of the road,
on the same terms, limitations, and restrictions in every respect,
shall be, and is hereby, granted to said States of Alabama and
Mississippi, respectively."
In the adjustment of the grant, the States of Alabama and
Mississippi claimed the right to take lands not only for those
portions of the road within the boundaries of those states, but
also for that portion in Kentucky and Tennessee, and that question
was submitted to the Attorney General for an opinion. In a well
considered and clear opinion, that officer held that such claim of
those states could not be sustained, and that each grant was
confined to the portion of the line within the territorial limits
of the grantee state. There is in that opinion not the slightest
reference to the settled policy of
Page 137 U. S. 540
the government as a rule of construction, or as in any way
indicating the intention of Congress; not the slightest hint that
the words of the statute should be controlled by any presumption
based on what is termed the "public policy" of the government, as
to the restriction of land grants. His conclusion was based upon
the language of the act, holding that "the meaning and intention
of" Congress "as contained in the seven sections of the act will be
expressed and clearly understood" by taking the first six sections
of the act and applying them first to the State of Alabama and then
to the State of Mississippi, etc. Quoting some of the words of the
act, he says:
"To give to those words a different construction . . . would
lead to inexplicable difficulties, and to consequences
irreconcilable with plain provisions of the act."
5 Opinions Attys.Gen. 603.
The other case cited arose under the Act of May 17, 1856, 11
Stat. 15, c. 31, granting lands to the States of Florida and
Alabama "to aid in the construction of certain railroads in said
states." The claim of the State of Alabama to select indemnity
lands lying in Florida was denied by the then Attorney General upon
the authority of the opinion of Attorney General Crittenden in the
Alabama-Mississippi case above referred to. Neither of these cases
support the general policy contended for by the appellee, and each
is entirely unlike the one under consideration, where the entire
line of road and the entire grant of lands claimed by the appellant
are within the limits of the territory to which the grant was made
as it then existed.
Furthermore, at the time the grant of 1857 was made, the State
of Minnesota had no existence, and there was no absolute certainty
of there being such a state before the road was definitely located
and built. Congress was therefore very careful as to the terms in
which the grant was made. In the granting clause the language is
"that there be and is hereby granted to the Territory of
Minnesota," etc., while in other parts of the act, even in the same
section, the grant is referred to as having been made to the
territory or future state. It is thus seen that the language of the
act was framed to provide
Page 137 U. S. 541
for the administering of the grant either by the territory or by
the future state. The object to be accomplished was the building of
railroads to those parts of the then territory which were the most
thickly settled, and thus give to the settlers so many highways of
commerce to the eastern markets, and it was of little concern to
Congress whether the then territory or the future state was the
means of accomplishing the object. Now had the grant been wholly
administered by the territory, the question under consideration
would never have arisen, for had no state been created until after
the grant was administered, it is not conceived how the question
could have arisen. It hardly seems probable that Congress intended
the grant to mean one thing if administered by the territory and
another thing if administered by the state; or, to speak more
accurately, that the grant should be of a certain extent if
administered by the territory, and be greatly diminished if
administered by the state.
Again, it is settled law that railroad grants such as the one
under construction are grants
in praesenti, and take
effect upon the sections of land when the road is definitely
located, by relation, as of the date of the grant.
Van Wyck v.
Knevals, 106 U. S. 360. Had
this line of road been definitely located before the State of
Minnesota was admitted -- that is to say, if the right of the road
had attached to its granted lands while Minnesota was yet a
territory -- would it be seriously contended for an instant that
the land now in dispute did not pass under the grant? We think not,
and yet such is the legitimate consequence of the appellee's
contention.
It is also urged that these lands did not pass under the grant
of 1857, because at that time they were in the occupancy of the
Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Indians. The sixth section of the
act, however, made provision for such an emergency. It is there
declared as follows:
"That in case any lands on the line of said roads or branches
are within any Indian territory, no title to the same shall accrue,
nor shall the same be entered upon by the authority of said
territory or state until the Indian title to the same shall have
been extinguished."
By that section, the right of Minnesota to
Page 137 U. S. 542
lands within the Indian country was made somewhat in the nature
of a float, to become vested when the Indian title was
extinguished. When the road was definitely located, and the Indian
title was extinguished, the land passed to the state for the
benefit of the road.
Buttz v. Northern Pacific Railroad,
119 U. S. 55. The
title of the appellant is complete, and neither the appellee nor
the Northern Pacific Railroad, under which he claims, ever had any
title to the land in controversy.
It is immaterial that the appellant did not begin its suit at an
earlier date. The decision against it by the Secretary of the
Interior in 1871 was not binding as to the law of the case, and the
bringing of the suit in 1884 was in time.
Decree reversed, and cause remanded to the circuit court
with directions to enter a decree in consonance with this
opinion.