The Act of the Legislature of Minnesota approved March 7, 1887,
General Laws of 1887, c. 10, establishing a railroad and warehouse
commission, being interpreted by the supreme court of that state as
providing that the rates of charges for the transportation of
property recommended and published by the commission shall be final
and conclusive as to what are equal and reasonable charges, and
that there can be no judicial inquiry as to the reasonableness of
such rates, and a railroad company, in answer to an application for
a mandamus, contending that such rates, in regard to it, are
unreasonable, and not being allowed by the state court to put in
testimony on the question of the reasonableness of such rates,
held that the act is in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States as depriving the company of its property without
due process of law, and depriving it of the equal protection of the
laws.
The state had made no irrepealable contract with the company
that it should have the right for all future time to prescribe its
rates of toll, free from all control by the legislature of the
state.
This was a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of Minnesota awarding a writ of mandamus against
the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company.
The case arose on proceedings taken by the Railroad and
Warehouse Commission of the State of Minnesota under an act of the
legislature of that state, approved March 7, 1887, General Laws of
1887, c. 10, entitled "An act to regulate common carriers and
creating the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of
Minnesota and defining the duties of such commission in relation to
common carriers." The act is set forth in full in the margin.
*
Page 134 U. S. 419
The ninth section of that act creates a commission, to be known
as the "Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the
Page 134 U. S. 420
State of Minnesota," to consist of three persons, to be
appointed by the governor by and with the advice and consent of the
senate.
Page 134 U. S. 421
The first section of the act declares that its provisions shall
apply to any common carrier
"engaged in the transportation
Page 134 U. S. 422
of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by
railroad and partly by water, when both are used under a
Page 134 U. S. 423
common control, management, or arrangement, for a carriage or
shipment from one place or station to another, both being within
the State of Minnesota. "
Page 134 U. S. 424
The second section declares
"That all charges made by any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act, for any
Page 134 U. S. 425
service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of
passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection
Page 134 U. S. 426
therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or
handling of such property, shall be equal and reasonable, and
every
Page 134 U. S. 427
unequal and unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited,
and declared to be unlawful. "
Page 134 U. S. 428
The eighth section provides that every common carrier subject to
the provisions of the act shall print and keep for
Page 134 U. S. 429
public inspection schedules of the charges which it has
established for the transportation of property; that it shall
make
Page 134 U. S. 430
no change therein except after ten days' public notice, plainly
stating the changes proposed to be made, and the time when
Page 134 U. S. 431
they will go into effect; that it shall be unlawful for it to
charge or receive any greater or less compensation than that
Page 134 U. S. 432
so established and published for transporting property; that it
shall file copies of its schedules with the commission, and
Page 134 U. S. 433
shall notify such commission of all changes proposed to be made;
that in case the commission shall find at any time that
Page 134 U. S. 434
any part of the tariffs of charges so filed and published is in
any respect unequal or unreasonable, it shall have the power, and
it is authorized and directed, to compel any common carrier to
change the same, and adopt such charge as the
Page 134 U. S. 435
commission "shall declare to be equal and reasonable," to which
end the commission shall, in writing, inform such carrier in what
respect such tariff of charges is unequal and unreasonable, and
shall recommend what tariff shall be substituted therefor; that in
case the carrier shall neglect for ten days after such notice to
adopt such tariff of charges as the commission recommends, it shall
be the duty of the latter to immediately publish such tariff as it
has declared to be equal and reasonable and cause it to be posted
at all the regular stations on the line of such carrier in
Minnesota, and it shall be unlawful thereafter for the carrier to
charge a higher or lower rate than that so fixed and published by
the commission, and that if any carrier subject to the provisions
of the act shall neglect to publish or file its schedules of
charges or to carry out such recommendation made and published by
the commission, it shall be subject to a writ of mandamus "to be
issued by any judge of the supreme court or of any of the district
courts" of the state, on application of the commission, to compel
compliance with the requirements of section 8, and with the
recommendation of the commission, and a failure to comply with the
requirements of the mandamus shall be punishable as and for
contempt, and the commission may apply also to any such judge for
an injunction against the carrier from receiving or transporting
property or passengers within the state until it shall have
complied with the requirements of section 8 and with the
recommendation of the commission, and for any willful violation or
failure to comply with such requirements or such recommendation of
the commission, the court may award such costs, including counsel
fees, by way of penalty, on the return of said writs, and after due
deliberation thereon, as may be just.
On the 22d of June, 1887, the Boards of Trade Union of
Farmington, Northfield, Faribault, and Owatonna, in Minnesota,
filed with the commission a petition in writing complaining that
the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, being a
common carrier engaged in the transportation of property wholly by
railroad, for carriage or shipment from Owatonna, Faribault,
Dundas, Northfield, and Farmington
Page 134 U. S. 436
to the Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis, all of those places
being within the State of Minnesota, made charges for its services
in the transportation of milk from said Owatonna, Faribault,
Dundas, Northfield, and Farmington to St. Paul and Minneapolis
which were unequal and unreasonable in that it charged four cents
per gallon for the transportation of milk from Owatonna to St. Paul
and Minneapolis, and three cents per gallon from Faribault, Dundas,
Northfield, and Farmington to the said cities, and that such
charges were unreasonably high, and subjected the traffic in milk
between said points to unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage. The
prayer of the petition was that such rates be declared unreasonable
and the carrier be compelled to change the same and adopt such
rates and charges as the commission should declare to be equal and
reasonable. A statement of the complaint thus made was forwarded by
the commission on the 29th of June, 1887, to the railway company,
and it was called upon by the commission, on the 6th of July, 1887,
to satisfy the complaint or answer it in writing at the office of
the commission in St. Paul on the 13th of July, 1887. On the 30th
of June, 1887, Mr. J. F. Tucker, the assistant general manager of
the railway company, addressed a letter from Milwaukee to the
secretary of the commission saying:
"I have your favor of the 29th, with complaint as to milk rates
being unreasonable and unequal. They may be unequal, if
unreasonable. They are unreasonably low for the service performed
-- by passenger train -- and are 25 percent less than the same
commodity is charged into New York, with longer distances and
hundred times larger volume in favor of New York. I am frank to say
it is hard to appreciate complaints from boards of trade that
one-tenth of a cent per gallon on milk handled on passenger train
one mile is unreasonable. With what is the comparison made that
enables such a conclusion? It's not first-class rates by freight
train, and was made low to encourage the trade under the hope and
promise that when the trade were fostered, it would be advanced.
This, as usual, has been forgotten."
On the 13th of July, 1887 at the office of the commission
Page 134 U. S. 437
in St. Paul, the company appeared by J. A. Chandler, its duly
authorized attorney, and the Boards of Trade Union by its attorney,
and the commission proceeded to investigate the complaint. An
investigation of the rates charged by the company for its services
in transporting milk from Owatonna, Faribault, Dundas, Northfield,
and Farmington, to St. Paul and Minneapolis was made by the
commission, and it found that the charges of the company for
transporting milk from Owatonna and Faribault to St. Paul and
Minneapolis were three cents per gallon on ten-gallon cans; that
such charges were unequal and unreasonable, and that the company's
tariff of rates for transporting milk from Owatonna and Faribault
to those cities, filed and published by it as provided by chapter
10 of the Laws of 1887, was unequal and unreasonable, and the
commission declared that a rate of two and one-half cents per
gallon in ten-gallon cans was an equal and reasonable rate for such
services.
On the 4th of August, 1887, the commission made a report in
writing which included the findings of fact upon which its
conclusions were based, its recommendation as to the tariff which
should be substituted for the tariff so found to be unequal and
unreasonable, and also a specification of the rates and charges
which it declared to be equal and reasonable. This paper was in the
shape of a communication dated at St. Paul, August 4, 1887, signed
by the secretary of the commission and addressed to the company. It
said:
"It appearing, from your schedule of rates and charges for the
transportation of milk over and upon the Iowa and Minnesota
division of your road that you charge, collect, and receive for the
transportation of milk over and upon said line from Owatonna and
Faribault to the Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis three cents per
gallon, in ten-gallon cans, and from Dundas, Northfield, and
Farmington to said cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis two and
one-half cents per gallon in cans of like capacity, and complaint
having been made that such rates and charges are unequal and
unreasonable, and that the services performed by you in such
transportation are not reasonably worth the said sums charged
therefor, and this commission having
Page 134 U. S. 438
thereupon, pursuant to the provisions of section eight of an act
entitled"
"An act to regulate common carriers, and creating the railroad
and warehouse commission of the State of Minnesota, and defining
the duties of such commission in relation to common carriers,"
"approved March 7, 1887, examined the cause and reasonableness
of said complaint, and finding, pursuant to subdivision
e
of said section, that your said tariff of rates, so far as
appertains to the transportation of milk to the cities of St. Paul
and Minneapolis from the other places above named, and inasmuch as
said tariff provides for, or requires the charging or collection
of, a greater compensation than two and one-half cents per gallon,
is unreasonable and excessive. Therefore said commission recommends
and directs that you, the said Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway Company, shall alter and change your said schedule by the
adoption and substitution of a rate not to exceed two and one-half
cents per gallon for the services aforesaid from the cities of
Owatonna and Faribault, or either of them, to said St. Paul and
Minneapolis. The commission as at present advised, approves of the
custom and arrangement which, it is informed, has been adopted and
is now in use by the Minnesota & North western R. Co. of
collecting two and one-half cents per gallon on all milk
transported by it, regardless of distance; but this expression of
opinion is no part of the decision, notice, or order in this
case."
This report was entered of record, and a copy furnished to the
Boards of Trade Union, and a copy was also delivered, on the 4th of
August, 1887, to the company, with a notice to it to desist from
charging or receiving such unequal and unreasonable rates for such
services. The commission thus informed the company in writing in
what respect such tariff or rates and charges was unequal and
unreasonable, and recommended to it in writing what tariff should
be substituted therefor, to-wit, the tariff so found equal and
reasonable by the commission.
The company neglected and refused for more than ten days after
such notice to substitute or adopt such tariff of charges as was
recommended by the commission. The latter
Page 134 U. S. 439
thereupon published the tariff of charges which it had declared
to be equal and reasonable and caused it to be posted at the
station of the company in Faribault on the 14th of October, 1887,
and at all the regular stations on the line of the company in
Minnesota prior to November 12, 1887, and in all things complied
with the statute. The tariff so made, published, and posted was
dated October 13, 1887, and was headed:
"Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company (Iowa and
Minnesota Division). Freight tariff on Milk from Owatonna and
Faribault to St. Paul and Minneapolis, taking effect October 15,
1887,"
and prescribed a charge of two and one-half cents per gallon in
ten-gallon cans from either the Owatonna station or the Faribault
station to either St. Paul or Minneapolis to be the legal, equal,
and reasonable maximum charge and compensation for such service,
and declared that the same was in force and effect in lieu and
place of the charges and compensation theretofore demanded and
received therefor by the company.
On the 6th of December, 1887, the commission, by the attorney
general of the state, made an application to the supreme court of
the state for a writ of mandamus to compel the company to comply
with the recommendation made to it by the commission, to change its
tariff of rates on milk from Owatonna and Faribault to St. Paul and
Minneapolis, and to adopt the rates declared by the commission to
be equal and reasonable. The application set forth the proceedings
hereinbefore detailed; that the company had refused to carry out
the recommendation so made, published, and posted by the
commission; that it continued to charge three cents per gallon for
the transportation of milk in ten-gallon cans from Owatonna and
Faribault to St. Paul and Minneapolis; that said charge was
unequal, unreasonable, and excessive; that two and one-half cents
per gallon for the transportation by it of milk in ten-gallon cans
from Owatonna and Faribault to St. Paul and Minneapolis was the
maximum reasonable charge for the service; that any rate therefor
in excess of two and one-half cents per gallon in ten-gallon cans
was unequal, unreasonable, and excessive; that three cents per
gallon in ten-gallon cans was a higher rate
Page 134 U. S. 440
than was charged for the same distances on passenger trains by
any express company or by any other railroad company in Minnesota
engaged in transporting milk to St. Paul or Minneapolis; that two
and one-half cents per gallon in ten-gallon cans was the highest
rate charged for like distances on passenger trains by any such
company; that the milk transported by the company to St. Paul and
Minneapolis, over its Iowa and Minnesota division (extending from
Calmar, in Iowa, to Le Roy, in Minnesota, and from Le Roy, through
Owatonna and Faribault, to St. Paul and Minneapolis), large
quantities of which milk were shipped from Faribault, was so
transported by the company on a passenger train which ran daily
from Owatonna to St. Paul and Minneapolis, and that the company, by
means of such excessive charges, subjected the traffic in milk at
Faribault and Owatonna to undue and unreasonable prejudice and
disadvantage.
Thereupon an alternative writ of mandamus was issued by the
court, returnable before it on the 14th of December, 1887.
On the 23d of December, 1887, the company filed its return to
the alternative writ in which it set up:
(1) That it was not competent for the Legislature of Minnesota
to delegate to a commission a power of fixing rates for
transportation, and that the Act of March 7, 1887, so far as it
attempted to confer upon the commission power to establish rates
for the transportation of freight and passengers, was void under
the constitution of the state.
(2) That the company as the owner of its railroad, franchises,
equipment, and appurtenances, and entitled to the possession and
beneficial use thereof, was authorized to establish rates for the
transportation of freight and passengers, subject only to the
provision that such rates should be fair and reasonable; that the
establishing of such rates by the state against the will of the
company was
pro tanto a taking of its property and
depriving it thereof, without due process of law in violation of
section 1 of Article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States, and that the making of the order of October 13,
1887, was
pro tanto a
Page 134 U. S. 441
taking and depriving the company of its property without due
process of law in violation of said section 1, and therefore void
and of no effect.
(3) That the rate of three cents per gallon as a freight for
carrying milk in ten-gallon cans on passenger trains from Owatonna
and Faribault, respectively, to St. Paul and Minneapolis was a
reasonable, fair, and just rate; that the rate of two and one-half
cents per gallon in ten-gallon cans so fixed and established by the
commission was not a reasonable, fair, or just compensation to the
company for the service rendered, and that the establishing of such
rate by the commission against the will of the company was
pro
tanto a taking of its property without due process of law in
violation of said section 1.
The case came on for hearing upon the alternative writ and the
return, and the company applied for a reference to take testimony
on the issue raised by the allegations in the application for the
writ and the return thereto as to whether the rate fixed by the
commission was reasonable, fair, and just. The court denied the
application for a reference and rendered judgment in favor of the
relator, and that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue. An
application for a reargument was made and denied. The terms of the
peremptory writ were directed to be that the company comply with
the requirements of the recommendation and order made by the
commission on the 4th of August, 1887, and change its tariff of
rates and charges for the transportation of milk from Owatonna and
Faribault to St. Paul and Minneapolis, and substitute therefor the
tariff recommended, published, and posted by the commission,
to-wit, the rate of two and one-half cents per gallon of milk in
ten-gallon cans from Owatonna and Faribault to St. Paul and
Minneapolis, being the rates published by the commission, and
declared to be equal and reasonable therefor. Costs were also
adjudged against the company. To review this judgment the company
has brought a writ of error.
Page 134 U. S. 452
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The opinion of the supreme court is reported in 38 Minn. 281. In
it the court, in the first place, construed the statute on the
question as to whether the court itself had jurisdiction to
entertain the proceeding, and held that it had. Of course we cannot
review this decision.
It next proceeded to consider the question as to the nature and
extent of the powers granted to the commission by the statute in
the matter of fixing the rates of charges. On that subject it
said:
"It seems to us that if language means anything, it is perfectly
evident that the expressed intention of the legislature is that the
rates recommended and published by the commission, assuming that
they have proceeded in the manner pointed out by the act, should be
not simply advisory, nor merely
prima facie equal and
reasonable, but final and conclusive as to what are lawful or equal
and reasonable charges; that in proceedings to compel compliance
with the rates thus published, the law neither contemplates nor
allows any issue to be made or inquiry had as to their equality and
reasonableness in fact. Under the provisions of the act, the rates
thus published are the only ones that are lawful, and therefore, in
contemplation of law, the only ones that are equal and reasonable,
and hence, in proceedings like the present, there is, as said
before, no fact to traverse except the violation of the law in
refusing compliance with the recommendations of the commission.
Indeed the language of the act is so plain on that point that
argument can add nothing to its force. "
Page 134 U. S. 453
It then proceeded to examine the question of the validity of the
act under the Constitution of Minnesota, as to whether the
legislature was authorized to confer upon the commission the powers
given to the latter by the statute. It held that as the legislature
had the power itself to regulate charges by railroads, it could
delegate to a commission the power of fixing such charges, and
could make the judgment or determination of the commission as to
what were reasonable charges final and conclusive.
The Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company is a
corporation organized under the laws of Wisconsin. The line of
railroad owned and operated by it in the present case extends from
Calmar, in Iowa, to Le Roy, in Minnesota, and from Le Roy through
Owatonna and Faribault to St. Paul and Minneapolis, the line from
Calmar to St. Paul and Minneapolis being known as the "Iowa and
Minnesota Division," and being wholly in Minnesota from the point
where it crosses the state line between Iowa and Minnesota. It was
constructed under a charter granted by the Territory of Minnesota
to the Minneapolis and Cedar Valley Railroad Company by an Act
approved March 1, 1856, Laws 1856, c. 166, p. 325, to construct a
railroad from the Iowa line at or near the crossing of said line by
the Cedar River, through the valley of Strait River to Minneapolis.
Section 9 of that act provided that the directors of the
corporation should have power to make all needful rules,
regulations, and bylaws touching "the rates of toll, and the manner
of collecting the same;" and section 13, that the company should
have power to unite its railroad with any other railroad which was
then, or thereafter might be, constructed in the Territory of
Minnesota, or adjoining states or territories, and should have
power to consolidate its stock with any other company or companies.
By an act passed March 3, 1857, c. 99, 11 Stat. 195, the Congress
of the United States made a grant of land to the Territory of
Minnesota to aid in constructing certain railroads. By an act of
the legislature of the territory approved May 22, 1857, Laws 1857,
Extra Sess., p. 20, a portion of such grant was conferred upon the
Minneapolis and Cedar Valley
Page 134 U. S. 454
Railroad Company. Subsequently, in 1860, the State of Minnesota,
by proper proceedings, became the owner of the rights, franchises,
and property of that company. By an Act approved March 10, 1862, c.
17, Sp.Laws 1862, p. 226, the state incorporated the Minneapolis,
Faribault and Cedar Valley Railroad Company and conveyed to it all
the franchises and property of the Minneapolis and Cedar Valley
Railroad Company which the state had so acquired, and, by an Act
approved February 1, 1864, Sp.Laws 1864, p. 164, the name of the
Minneapolis, Faribault and Cedar Valley Railroad Company was
changed to that of the Minnesota Central Railway Company. That
company constructed the road from Minneapolis and St. Paul to Le
Roy, in Minnesota, and the road from Le Roy to Calmar, in Iowa, and
thence to McGregor, in the latter state, was consolidated with it.
In August, 1867, the entire road from McGregor, by way of Calmar,
Le Roy, Austin, Owatonna, and Faribault, to St. Paul and
Minneapolis was conveyed to the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul
Railway Company, which succeeded to all the franchises so granted
to the Minneapolis and Cedar Valley Railroad Company.
It is contended for the railway company that the State of
Minnesota is bound by the contract made by the territory in the
charter granted to the Minneapolis and Cedar Valley Railroad
Company; that a contract existed that the company should have the
power of regulating its rates of toll; that any legislation by the
state infringing upon that right impairs the obligation of the
contract; that there was no provision in the charter or in any
general statute reserving to the territory or to the state the
right to alter or amend the charter, and that no subsequent
legislation of the territory or of the state could deprive the
directors of the company of the power to fix its rates of toll,
subject only to the general provision of law that such rates should
be reasonable.
But we are of opinion that the general language of the ninth
section of the charter of the Minneapolis and Cedar Valley Railroad
Company cannot be held to constitute an irrepealable contract with
that company that it should have the right for all future time to
prescribe its rates of toll, free from all control by the
legislature of the state.
Page 134 U. S. 455
It was held by this Court in
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v.
Miller, 132 U. S. 75, in
accordance with a long course of decisions both in the state courts
and in this Court, that a railroad corporation takes its charter,
containing a kindred provision with that in question, subject to
the general law of the state and to such changes as may be made in
such general law, and subject to future constitutional provisions
and future general legislation in the absence of any prior contract
with it exempting it from liability to such future general
legislation in respect of the subject matter involved, and that
exemption from future general legislation, either by a
constitutional provision or by an act of the legislature, cannot be
admitted to exist unless it is given expressly, or unless it
follows by an implication equally clear, with express words.
There is nothing in the mere grant of power, by section 9 of the
charter, to the directors of the company to make needful rules and
regulations touching the rates of toll and the manner of collecting
the same which can be properly interpreted as authorizing us to
hold that the state parted with its general authority itself to
regulate at any time in the future when it might see fit to do so,
the rates of toll to be collected by the company.
In
Stone v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.
S. 307,
116 U. S. 325,
the whole subject is fully considered, the authorities are cited,
and the conclusion is arrived at that the right of a state
reasonably to limit the amount of charges by a railroad company for
the transportation of persons and property within its jurisdiction
cannot be granted away by its legislature unless by words of
positive grant, or words equivalent in law, and that a statute
which grants to a railroad company the right, "from time to time,
to fix, regulate, and receive the tolls and charges by them to be
received for transportation" does not deprive the state of its
power, within the limits of its general authority, as controlled by
the Constitution of the United States, to act upon the
reasonableness of the tolls and charges so fixed and regulated. But
after reaching this conclusion, the Court said, p.
116 U. S.
331:
"From what has thus been said it is not to be inferred that this
power of limitation or
Page 134 U. S. 456
regulation is itself without limit. This power to regulate is
not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of
confiscation. Under pretense of regulating fares and freights, the
state cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or
property without reward; neither can it do that which in law
amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just
compensation or without due process of law."
There being therefore no contract or chartered right in the
railroad company which can prevent the legislature from regulating
in some form the charges of the company for transportation, the
question is whether the form adopted in the present case is
valid.
The construction put upon the statute by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota must be accepted by this Court, for the purposes of the
present case, as conclusive, and not to be reexamined here as to
its propriety or accuracy. The supreme court authoritatively
declares that it is the expressed intention of the Legislature of
Minnesota, by the statute, that the rates recommended and published
by the commission, if it proceeds in the manner pointed out by the
act, are not simply advisory, nor merely
prima facie equal
and reasonable, but final and conclusive as to what are equal and
reasonable charges; that the law neither contemplates nor allows
any issue to be made or inquiry to be had as to their equality or
reasonableness in fact; that under the statute, the rates published
by the commission are the only ones that are lawful, and therefore,
in contemplation of law, the only ones that are equal and
reasonable, and that, in a proceeding for a mandamus under the
statute there is no fact to traverse except the violation of law in
not complying with the recommendations of the commission. In other
words, although the railroad company is forbidden to establish
rates that are not equal and reasonable, there is no power in the
courts to stay the hands of the commission if it chooses to
establish rates that are unequal and unreasonable.
This being the construction of the statute by which we are bound
in considering the present case, we are of opinion that, so
construed, it conflicts with the Constitution of United
Page 134 U. S. 457
states in the particulars complained of by the railroad company.
It deprives the company of its right to a judicial investigation,
by due process of law, under the forms and with the machinery
provided by the wisdom of successive ages for the investigation
judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy, and substitutes
therefor, as an absolute finality, the action of a railroad
commission which, in view of the powers conceded to it by the state
court, cannot be regarded as clothed with judicial functions or
possessing the machinery of a court of justice.
Under section 8 of the statute, which the Supreme Court of
Minnesota says is the only one which relates to the matter of the
fixing by the commission of general schedules of rates, and which
section, it says, fully and exclusively provides for that subject
and is complete in itself, all that the commission is required to
do is, on the filing with it by a railroad company of copies of its
schedules of charges, to "find" that any part thereof is in any
respect unequal or unreasonable, and then it is authorized and
directed to compel the company to change the same, and adopt such
charge as the commission "shall declare to be equal and
reasonable," and to that end it is required to inform the company
in writing in what respect its charges are unequal and
unreasonable. No hearing is provided for; no summons or notice to
the company before the commission has found what it is to find, and
declared what it is to declare; no opportunity provided for the
company to introduce witnesses before the commission -- in fact
nothing which has the semblance of due process of law -- and
although in the present case it appears that, prior to the decision
of the commission, the company appeared before it by its agent, and
the commission investigated the rates charged by the company for
transporting milk, yet it does not appear what the character of the
investigation was or how the result was arrived at.
By the second section of the statute in question, it is provided
that all charges made by a common carrier for the transportation of
passengers or property shall be equal and reasonable. Under this
provision, the carrier has a right to make equal and reasonable
charges for such transportation.
Page 134 U. S. 458
In the present case, the return alleged that the rate of charge
fixed by the commission was not equal or reasonable, and the
supreme court held that the statute deprived the company of the
right to show that judicially. The question of the reasonableness
of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company,
involving as it does the element of reasonableness both as regards
the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for
judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its
determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charging
reasonable rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation
takes place in the absence of an investigation by judicial
machinery, it is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and
thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself, without due
process of law and in violation of the Constitution of the United
States; and insofar as it is thus deprived, while other persons are
permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested
capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the
laws.
It is provided by section 4 of article 10 of the Constitution of
Minnesota of 1857 that "lands may be taken for public way, or the
purpose of granting to any corporation the franchise of way for
public use," and that
"all corporations, being common carriers, enjoying the right of
way in pursuance to the provisions of this section, shall be bound
to carry the mineral, agricultural, and other productions and
manufactures on equal and reasonable terms."
It is thus perceived that the provision of section 2 of the
statute in question is one enacted in conformity with the
Constitution of Minnesota.
The issuing of the peremptory writ of mandamus in this case was
therefore unlawful because in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, and it is necessary that the relief administered in
favor of the plaintiff in error should be a reversal of the
judgment of the supreme court awarding that writ, and an
instruction for further proceedings by it not inconsistent with the
opinion of this Court.
In view of the opinion delivered by that court, it may be
impossible for any further proceedings to be taken other than to
dismiss the proceeding for a mandamus if the
Page 134 U. S. 459
court should adhere to its opinion that, under the statute, it
cannot investigate judicially the reasonableness of the rates fixed
by the commission. Still, the question will be open for review,
and
The judgment of this Court is that the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, entered May 4, 1888, awarding a
peremptory writ of mandamus in this case, be reversed, and the case
be remanded to that court with an instruction for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this
Court.
*
"CHAPTER 10 -- AN ACT TO REGULATE COMMON CARRIERS AND CREATING
THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA,
AND DEFINING THE DUTIES OF SUCH COMMISSION IN RELATION TO COMMON
CARRIERS."
"
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Minnesota:"
"SECTION 1. (a) That the provisions of this act shall apply to
any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of
passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad
and partly by water, when both are used under a common control,
management, or arrangement, for a carriage or shipment from one
place or station to another, both being within the State of
Minnesota,
provided that nothing in this act shall apply
to street railways or to the carriage, storage, or handling by any
common carrier of property, free, or at reduced rates, for the
United States, or for the State of Minnesota, or for any municipal
government or corporation within the state, or for any charitable
purpose, or to or from fairs and expositions, for exhibition
thereat, or stock for breeding purposes, or to the issuance of
mileage, excursion, or commutation passenger tickets at rates made
equal to all, or to transportation to stock shippers with cars, and
nothing in the provisions of this act shall be construed to prevent
common carriers subject to the provisions of this act, from issuing
passes for the free transportation of passengers."
"(b) The term 'railroad' as used in this act shall include all
bridges or ferries used or operated in connection with any
railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating
a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement
or lease, and the term 'transportation' shall include all
instrumentalities of shipment or carriage."
"SEC. 2. (a) That all charges made by any common carrier subject
to the provisions of this act for any service rendered or to be
rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as
aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving,
delivering, storage, or handling of such property shall be equal
and reasonable, and every unequal and unreasonable charge for such
service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful,
provided that one carload of freight of any kind or class
shall be transported at as low a rate per ton, and per ton per
mile, as any greater number of carloads of the same kind and class
from and to the same points of origination or destination."
"(b) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to make or give any unequal or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm,
corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic
in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person,
company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular
description of traffic, to any unequal or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever"
"SEC. 3. (a) That all common carriers subject to the provisions
of this act shall, according to their respective powers, provide at
the point of connection, crossing, or intersection ample facilities
for transferring cars, and for accommodating and transferring
passengers and traffic of all kinds and classes from their lines or
tracks to those of any other common carrier whose lines or tracks
may connect with, cross, or intersect their own, and shall afford
all equal and reasonable facilities for the interchange of cars and
traffic between their respective lines and for the receiving,
forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property and cars to
and from their several lines and those of other common carriers
connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and
charges between such connecting lines or on freight coming over
such lines; but this shall not be construed as requiring any common
carrier to use for another common carrier its tracks, equipments,
or terminal facilities without reasonable compensation."
"(b) That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to
the provisions of this act to enter into any combination, contract,
or agreement, expressed or implied, to prevent, by change of time
or schedule, or by carriage in different cars or by any other means
or devices, the carriage or freight from being continuous from the
place of shipment to the place of destination, and no break of
bulk, stoppage, or interruption made by such common carrier shall
prevent the carriage of freight from being treated as one
continuous carriage from the place of shipment to the place of
destination unless such break, stoppage, or interruption was made
in good faith for some necessary purpose, and without any intent to
avoid or unnecessarily interrupt such continuous carriage, or to
evade any of the provisions of this act."
"(c) Every common carrier operating a railway in this state
shall, without unreasonable delay, furnish, start, and run cars for
the transportation of persons and property which, within a
reasonable time theretofore, is offered for transportation at any
of its stations on its line of road, and at the junctions of other
railroads, and at such stopping places as may be established for
receiving and discharging passengers and freights, and shall take,
receive, transport, and discharge such passengers and property at,
from, and to such stations, junctions, and places, on and from all
trains advertised to stop at the same for passengers and freights,
respectively, upon the due payment, or tender of payment, of tolls,
freight, or fare therefor, if such payment is demanded. Every such
common carrier shall permit connections to be made and maintained
in a reasonable manner with its side tracks to and from any
warehouse, elevator, or manufactory, without reference to its size
or capacity,
provided that this shall not be construed so
as to require any common carrier to construct or furnish any side
track off from its own land;
provided further that where
stations are ten (10) miles or more apart, the common carrier, when
required to do so by the railroad and warehouse commissioners,
shall construct and maintain a side track for the use of shippers
between such stations."
"(d) Whenever any property is received by any common carrier,
subject to the provisions of this act, to be transported from one
place to another within this state, it shall be unlawful for such
common carrier to limit in any way, except as stated in its
classification schedule hereinafter provided for, its common law
liability with reference to such property while in its custody as a
common carrier, as hereinbefore mentioned. Such liability must
include the absolute responsibility of the common carrier for the
acts of its agents in relation to such property."
"SEC. 4. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to enter into any contract,
agreement, or combination with any other common carrier or carriers
for the division or pooling of business of different and competing
railroads, or to divide between them the aggregate or net proceeds
of the earnings of such railroads or any portion thereof, and in
case of an agreement for the pooling of their business aforesaid,
each day of its continuance shall be deemed a separate
offense."
"SEC. 5. That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of
this act shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate,
rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, collect, or
receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation
for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation
of passengers or property subject to the provisions of this act
than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other
person or persons for doing for him or them a like and
contemporaneous service in the transportation of passengers or
property, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust
discrimination, which is hereby prohibited, and declared to be
unlawful."
"SEC. 6. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to charge or receive any
greater compensation for the transportation of passengers, or of
like kind or class and quantity of property, for a shorter than for
a longer distance over the same line, the shorter being included
within the longer distance; but this shall not be construed as
authorizing any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
act to charge or receive as great compensation for a shorter as for
a longer distance;
provided, however, that upon
application to the commission appointed under the provisions of
this act, such common carrier may, in special cases, after
investigation by the commissioners, be authorized to charge less
for longer than for shorter distances for the transportation of
passengers or property, and the commission may from time to time
prescribe the extent to which such designated common carrier may be
relieved from the operation of this section of this act."
"SEC. 7. (a) That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to charge or receive any
greater compensation per ton per mile, for the contemporaneous
transportation of the same class of freight, for a longer than for
a shorter distance over the same line, in the same general
direction, or from the same original point of departure, or to the
same point of arrival; but this shall not be construed as
authorizing any common carrier subject to the provisions of this
act to charge as high a rate per ton per mile for a longer as for a
shorter distance."
"(b) Whenever any railway company doing business in this state
shall be unable, from any reasonable cause, to furnish cars at any
railway station or side track, in accordance with the demands made
by all persons demanding cars at such stations or side tracks for
the shipment of grain or other freight, such cars as are furnished
shall be divided as equally as may be among the applicants until
each shipper shall have received at least one car, when the balance
shall be divided ratably in proportion to the amount of daily
receipts of grain or other freight to each shipper, or to the
amount of grain offered at such station on side tracks."
"(c) There shall in no case be more than one terminal charge for
switching or transferring any car, whether the same is loaded or
empty, within the limits of anyone city or town. If it is necessary
that any car pass over the tracks of more than one company within
such city or town limits in order to reach its final destination or
to be returned therefrom to its owner or owners, then the company
first switching or transferring such car shall be entitled to
receive the entire charge to be made therefor, and shall be liable
to the company or companies doing the subsequent switching or
transferring thereof for its or their reasonable and equitable
share of the compensation received, and if the companies so jointly
interested therein cannot agree upon the share thereof which each
is entitled to receive, the same shall be determined by the board
of railroad and warehouse commissioners, whose decision thereon
shall be final and conclusive upon all parties interested, and the
said board are authorized to establish such rules [and] regulations
in that behalf as to them may seem just and reasonable and not in
conflict with this act."
"SEC. 8. (a) That every common carrier subject to the provisions
of this act shall, within sixty (60) days after this act shall take
effect, print and thereafter keep for public inspection schedules
showing the classification, rates, fares, and charges for the
transportation of passengers and property of all kinds and classes
which such common carrier has established and which are in force at
the time upon its railroad, as defined by the first (1st) section
of this act. This schedule, printed as aforesaid by such common
carrier, shall plainly state the places upon its railroad between
which property and passengers will be carried, and shall contain
classification of freight in force upon each of the lines of such
railroad, a distance tariff, and a table of inter-station
distances, and shall also state separately the terminal charges,
and any rules or regulations which in any wise change, affect, or
determine any part of the aggregate of such aforesaid rates, fares,
and charges. Such schedules shall be plainly printed in large type,
and copies for the use of the public shall be kept in every depot
or station upon any such railroad, in such places and in such form
that they can be conveniently inspected."
"(b) No change of classification shall be made, and no change
shall be made in the rates, fares, and charges which have been
established and published as aforesaid, by any common carrier, in
compliance with the requirements of this section, except after ten
(10) days' public notice, which notice shall plainly state the
changes proposed to be made in the schedules then in force, and the
time when the changed schedules will go into effect, and the
proposed changes will be shown by printing new schedules, or shall
be plainly indicated upon the schedules in force at the time, and
kept for public inspection."
"(c) And when any common carrier shall have established and
published its classifications, rates, fares, and charges in
compliance with the provisions of this section, it shall be
unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand, collect, or
receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation
for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any
service in connection therewith, than is specified in such
published schedule of classifications, rates, fares, and charges as
may at the time be in force."
"(d) Every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act
shall file with the commission hereafter provided for in section
ten (10) of this act copies of its schedules of classifications,
rates, fares, and charges which have been established and published
in compliance with the requirements of this section, and shall
promptly notify said commission of all changes proposed to be made
in the same. Every [such] common carrier shall also file with said
commission copies of all contracts, agreements, or arrangements
with other common carriers in relation to any traffic affected by
the provisions of this act to which contracts, agreements, or
arrangements it may be a party. And in cases where passengers or
freight pass over lines or routes operated by more than one common
carrier, and the several common carriers operating such lines or
routes establish joint schedules of rates or fares, or charges or
classifications for such lines or routes, copies of such joint
schedules shall also in like manner be filed with said commission.
Such joint schedules of rates, fares, charges, and classifications
for such lines, so filed as aforesaid, shall also be made public by
such common carriers in the same manner as hereinbefore provided
for the publication of tariffs upon its own lines."
"(e) That in case the commission shall at any time find that any
part of the tariffs of rates, fares, charges, or classifications so
filed and published as hereinbefore provided are in any respect
unequal or unreasonable, it shall have the power, and is hereby
authorized and directed, to compel any common carrier to change the
same, and adopt such rate, fare, charge, or classification as said
commission shall declare to be equal and reasonable. To which end
the commission shall in writing inform such common carrier in what
respect such tariff of rates, fares, charges, or classifications
are unequal and unreasonable, and shall recommend what tariffs
shall be substituted therefor."
"(f) In case such common carrier shall neglect or refuse for ten
(10) days after such notice to substitute such tariff of rates,
fares, charges, or classifications, or to adopt the same as
recommended by the commission, it shall be the duty of said
commission to immediately publish such tariff of rates, fares,
charges, or classifications as they had declared to be equal and
reasonable, and cause the same to be posted at all the regular
stations on the line of such common carrier in this state, and
thereafter it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to charge
or maintain a higher or lower rate, fare, charge, or classification
than that so fixed and published by said commission."
"(g) If any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act
shall neglect or refuse to publish or file its schedule of
classifications, rates, fares, or charges, or any part thereof, as
provided in this section, or if any common carrier shall refuse or
neglect to carry out such recommendation made and published by such
commission, such common carrier shall be subject to a writ of
mandamus, to be issued by any judge of the supreme court or of any
of the district courts of this state, upon application of the
commission, to compel compliance with the requirements of this
section, and with the recommendation of the commission, and failure
to comply with the requirements of said writ of mandamus shall be
punishable as and for contempt, and the said commission, as
complainants, may also apply to any such judge for a writ of
injunction against such common carrier from receiving or
transporting property or passengers within this state until such
common carrier shall have complied with the requirements of this
section and the recommendation of said commission, and for any
willful violation or failure to comply with such requirements or
such recommendation of said commission, the court may award such
costs, including counsel fees, by way of penalty, on the return of
said writs, and after due deliberation thereon, as may be
just."
"SEC. 9. (a) That a commission is hereby created and established
to be known as the 'Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State
of Minnesota,' which shall be composed of three (3) commissioners,
who shall be appointed by the governor by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate."
"(b) The commissioners first appointed under this act shall
continue in office for the term of one, (1), two, (2), and three
(3) years, respectively, and until their successors are appointed
and qualified, beginning with the first (1st) Monday of January,
A.D. 1889, the term of each to be designated by the governor, but
their successors shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years,
and until their successors are appointed and qualified, except that
any person chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the
unexpired term of the commissioner whom he shall succeed. Any
commissioner may be removed by the governor for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. Said commissioners shall
not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment while
acting as such commissioners. No vacancy in the commission shall
impair the right of the remaining commissioners to exercise all the
powers of the commission."
"(c) Vacancies occasioned by removal, resignation, or other
cause shall be filled by the governor as provided in case of
original appointments. Not more than two of the commissioners
appointed shall be members of the same political party. No person
in the employ of, or holding any official relation to, any common
carrier subject to the provisions of this act or any law of this
state, or owning stocks or bonds, or other property thereof, or who
is in any manner interested therein shall enter upon the duties of
or hold such office."
"(d) The decision of a majority of the commission shall be
considered the decision of the commission on all questions arising
for its consideration. Before entering upon the duties of his
office, each commissioner shall make and subscribe, and file with
the Secretary of State, an affidavit in the following form:"
" I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I
will support the Constitution of the United States, and the
Constitution of the State of Minnesota, and that I will faithfully
discharge my duties as a member of the Railroad and Warehouse
Commission of the State of Minnesota according to the best of my
ability, and I further declare that I am not in the employ of, or
holding any official relation to, any common carrier within this
state, nor am I in any manner interested in any stock, bonds, or
other property of such common carrier."
"(e) Each commissioner so appointed and qualified shall enter
into bonds [to] of the State of Minnesota, to be approved by the
governor, in the sum of twenty thousand (20,000) dollars,
conditioned for the faithful performance of his duty as a member of
such commission, which bond shall be filed with the Secretary of
State."
"(f) The commission shall conduct its proceedings in such a
manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and
to the ends of justice. A majority of the commissioners shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but no
commissioner shall participate in any hearing or proceeding in
which he has any pecuniary interest. Said commissioner may from
time to time make or amend such general rules or orders as may be
requisite for the order and regulation of proceedings before it,
including forms of notices and service thereof, which shall conform
as nearly as may be to those in use in the courts of this state.
Any party may appear before said commission and be heard in person
or by attorney. Every vote and official act of the commission shall
be entered of record, and its proceedings shall be public upon the
request of either party interested, or at the discretion of the
commission. Said commission shall have an official seal, which
shall be judicially noticed. Any member of the commission may
administer oaths and affirmations. The principal office of the
commission shall be in the City of St. Paul, where its general
sessions shall be held."
"(g) Whenever the convenience of the public or of the parties
may be promoted, or delay or expenses prevented thereby, the
commission may hold special sessions in any part of the state. It
may, by one or more of the commissioners, prosecute any inquiry
necessary to its duties in any part of the state into any matter or
question of fact pertaining to the business of any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act."
"(h) The Attorney General of the State of Minnesota shall be
ex officio attorney for the commission, and shall give
them such counsel and advice as they may from time to time require,
and he shall institute and prosecute any and all suits which said
railroad and warehouse commission may deem it expedient and proper
to institute, and he shall render to such railroad and warehouse
commission all counsel, advice, and assistance necessary to carry
out the provisions of this act, or of any law of this state,
according to the true intent and meaning thereof. It shall likewise
be the duty of the county attorney of any county in which suit is
instituted or prosecuted to aid in the prosecution of the same to a
final issue upon the request of such commission. Said commission
are hereby authorized, when the facts in any given case shall in
their judgment warrant, to employ any and all additional legal
counsel that they may think proper, expedient, and necessary to
assist the Attorney General or any county attorney in the conduct
and prosecution of any suit they may determine to bring under the
provisions of this act, or of any law of this state."
"SEC. 10. (a) That the commission hereby created shall have
authority to inquire into the management of the business of all
common carriers subject to the provisions of this act, and shall
keep itself informed as to the manner and method in which the same
is conducted, and shall have the right to obtain from such common
carriers full and complete information necessary to enable the
commission to perform the duties, and carry out the objects, for
which it was created. In order to enable said commissioners
efficiently to perform their duties under this act, it is hereby
made their duty to cause one of their number to visit the various
stations on the lines of each railroad as often as practicable,
after giving twenty (20) days' notice of such visit and the time
and place thereof in the local newspapers, and at least once in
twelve (12) months to visit each county in the state in which is or
shall be located a railroad station, and personally inquire into
the management of such railroad business; and, for this purpose,
all railroad companies and common carriers, and their officers and
employees, are required to aid and furnish each member of the
railroad and warehouse commission with reasonable and proper
facilities, and each or all of the members of said commission shall
have the right, in his or their official capacity, to pass free on
any railroad trains on all railroads in this state, and to enter
and remain in at all suitable times, any and all cars, offices, or
depots, or upon the railroads, of any railroad company in this
state in the performance of official duties, and whenever, in the
judgment of the commission, it shall appear that any common carrier
fails in any respect or particular to comply with the laws of this
state, or whenever, in their judgment, any repairs are necessary
upon its railroad, or any addition to or change of its stations or
stationhouses is necessary, or any change in the mode of operating
its road or conducting its business is reasonable or expedient, in
order to promote the security, convenience, and accommodation of
the public, said commission shall inform such railroad company, by
a notice thereof in writing, to be served as a summons in civil
actions is required to be served by the statutes of this state in
actions against corporations, certified by the commission's clerk
or secretary; and if such common carrier shall neglect or refuse to
comply with such order, then the commission may, in its discretion,
cause suits or proceedings to be instituted to enforce its orders
as provided in this act."
"SEC. 11. (a) That in case any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be
done any act or thing in this act prohibited or declared to be
unlawful, or shall omit to do any act, matter, or thing in this act
required to be done, such common carrier shall be liable to the
person or persons, party or parties, injured thereby for the full
amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of
the provisions of this act, together with a reasonable counsel or
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery,
which attorney's fees shall be taxed and collected as part of the
costs in the case."
"(b) That any person or persons, party or parties, claiming to
be damaged by the action or nonaction of any common carrier subject
to the provisions of this act may either make complaint to the
commission, as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in his
or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such
common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act in
any district court of this state of competent jurisdiction, but
such person or persons shall not have the right to pursue both of
said remedies at the same time."
"(c) In any action brought for the recovery of damages, the
court before which the same shall be pending may compel any
director, officer, receiver, trustee, or agent of any corporation
or company, defendant in such suit to attend, appear, and testify
in such case, and may compel the production of the books and papers
of such corporation or company, party to any such suit; the claim
that any such testimony or evidence may tend to criminate the
person giving such evidence shall not excuse such witness from
testifying, but such evidence or testimony shall not be used
against such person on the trial of any criminal proceeding."
"SEC. 12. That any common carrier, subject to the provisions of
this act, or, whenever such common carrier is a corporation, any
director or officer thereof, or any receiver, trustee, lessee,
agent, or person acting for or employed by such corporation, who,
alone or with any other corporation, company, person, or party,
shall willfully do or cause to be done, or shall willfully suffer
or permit to be done any act, matter, or thing in this act
prohibited, or declared to be unlawful, or who shall aid or abet
therein, or shall willfully omit or fail to do any act, matter, or
thing in this act required to be done, or shall cause or willingly
suffer or permit any act, matter, or thing so directed or required
by this act to be done, not to be so done, or shall aid and abet
therein any such omission, or shall be guilty of any willful
infraction of this act, or shall aid or abet therein, shall be
deemed guilty of a violation of the provisions of this act, and
shall, upon conviction thereof in any district court of the state
within the jurisdiction of which such offense was committed be
subject to a penalty of not less than two thousand five hundred
(2,500) dollars or more than five thousand (5,000) dollars for the
first offense, and not less than five thousand (5,000) dollars or
more than ten thousand (10,000) dollars for each subsequent
offense."
"SEC. 13. (a) That any person, firm, corporation, or
association, or any mercantile, agricultural, or manufacturing
society, or any body politic or municipal organization, complaining
of anything done or omitted to be done by any common carrier
subject to the provisions of this act, in contravention of the
provisions thereof, may apply to said commission by petition, which
shall briefly state the facts."
"(b) Whereupon a statement of the charges thus made shall be
forwarded by the commission to such common carrier, who shall be
called upon to satisfy the complaint or to answer the same in
writing within a reasonable time, to be specified by the
commission. If such common carrier, within the time specified,
shall make reparation for the injury alleged to have been done,
said carrier shall be relieved of liability to the complainant only
for the particular violation of law thus complained of. If such
carrier shall not satisfy the complaint within the time specified,
or there shall appear to be any reasonable ground for investigating
said complaint, it shall be the duty of the commission summarily to
investigate the matter complained of in such manner and by such
means as it shall deem proper. No complaint shall at any time be
dismissed because of absence of direct damages to the complainant.
And, for the purposes of this act, the commission shall have power
to require the attendance of witnesses, and the production of all
books, papers, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any
matter under investigation, and to that end may invoke the aid of
any of the courts of this state, in requiring the attendance of
witnesses, and the production of books, papers, and documents,
under the provisions of this act."
"(c) Any of the district courts of this state within the
jurisdiction of which such inquiry is carried on shall, in case of
contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the commissioners
to any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act, or,
when such common carrier is a corporation, to an officer or agent
thereof, or to any person connected therewith, if proceedings are
instituted in the name of such commission as plaintiffs, issue an
order requiring such common carrier, officer, or agent, or person
to show cause why such contumacy or refusal should not be punished
as and for contempt, and if, upon the hearing, the court finds that
the inquiry is within the jurisdiction of the commission, and that
such contumacy or refusal is willful, and the same is persisted in,
such contumacy or refusal shall be punished as though the same had
taken place in an action pending in the district court for any
judicial district in this state. The claim that any such testimony
or evidence may tend to criminate the person giving such evidence
shall not excuse such witness from testifying, but such evidence or
testimony shall not be used against such persons on the trial of
any criminal proceeding."
"SEC. 14. (a) Whenever an investigation shall be made by said
commission, it shall be its duty to make a report in writing in
respect thereto, which shall include the findings of fact upon
which the conclusions of the commission are based, together with
its recommendation as to what reparation, if any, should be made by
the common carrier to party or parties who may be found to have
been injured, and such findings so made shall thereafter, in all
judicial proceedings, be deemed
prima facie evidence as to
each and every fact found. All reports of investigations made by
the commission shall be entered of record, and a copy thereof shall
be furnished to the party who may have complained, and to any
common carrier that may have been complained of, and the record
thereof shall be public."
"(b) If, in any case in which an investigation shall be made by
said commission, it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of
the commission, either by testimony of witnesses or other evidence,
that anything has been done or omitted to be done by any common
carrier in violation of the provisions of this act, or of any law
cognizable by said commission, or that any injury or damages has
been sustained by the party or parties complaining, or by other
parties aggrieved in consequence of any such violation, it shall be
the duty of the commission to forthwith cause a copy of its report
in respect thereto to be delivered to such common carrier, together
with a notice to said common carrier to cease and desist from such
violation, and to make reparation for the injury so found to have
been done, within a brief but reasonable time, to be specified by
the commission, and if, within the time specified, it shall be made
to appear to the commission that such common carrier has ceased
from such violation of law, and has made reparation for the injury
found to have been done, in compliance with the report and notice
of the commission, or to the satisfaction of the party complaining,
a statement to that effect shall be entered of record by the
commission, and the said common carrier shall thereupon be relieved
from further liability or penalty for such particular violation of
law."
"(c) But if said common carrier shall neglect or refuse, within
the time specified, to desist from such violation of law and make
reparation for the injury done in compliance with the report and
notice of the commission as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the
commission to forthwith certify the fact of such neglect or
refusal, and forward a copy of its report and such certificate to
the Attorney General of the state for redress and punishment as
hereinafter provided."
"SEC. 15. (a) That it shall be the duty of the Attorney General
to whom said commission may forward its reports and certificate as
provided in the next preceding section of this act, when it shall
appear from such report that any injury or damages has been
sustained by any party or parties by reason of such violation of
law by such common carrier, to forthwith cause suit to be brought
in the district court in the judicial district wherein such
violation occurred, on behalf and in the name of the person or
persons injured, against such common carrier for the recovery of
damages for such injury as may have been sustained by the injured
party, and the cost and expenses of such prosecution shall be paid
out of the appropriation hereinafter provided for the uses and
purposes of this act."
"(b) And the said court shall have power to hear and determine
the matter on such short notice to the common carrier complained of
as the court shall deem reasonable, and such notice shall be served
on such common carrier, his or its officers, agents, or servants,
in such manner as the court shall direct, and said court shall
proceed to hear and determine the matter speedily, and without the
formal pleading and proceedings applicable to ordinary suits in
equity, but in such manner as to do justice in the premises, and to
this end such court shall have power, if it thinks fit, to direct
and prosecute, in such mode and by such persons as it may appoint,
all such inquiries as the court may think needful to enable it to
form a just judgment in the matter of such petition. And on such
hearing the report of said commission shall be
prima facie
evidence of the matters therein stated."
"(c) And if it be made to appear to such court on such hearing,
or on report of any such person or persons, that the lawful order
or requirement of such commission drawn in question has been
violated or disobeyed, it shall be lawful for such court to issue a
writ of injunction, or other proper process, mandatory or
otherwise, to restrain such common carrier from further continuing
such violation, or such disobedience of such order or requirement
of said commission, and enjoining obedience to the same; and, in
case of any disobedience of any such writ of injunction or other
proper process, mandatory or otherwise, it shall be lawful for such
court to issue writs of attachment, or any other process of said
court incident or applicable to writs of injunction or other proper
process, mandatory or otherwise, against such common carrier, and,
if a corporation, against one or more of the directors, officers,
or agents of the same, or against any owner, lessee, trustee,
receiver, or other person failing to obey such writ of injunction
or other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, and said court
may, if it shall think fit, make an order directing such common
carrier or other person so disobeying such writ of injunction or
other proper process, mandatory or otherwise, to pay such sum of
money, not exceeding, for each carrier or person in default, the
sum of five hundred (500) dollars for every day after a day to be
named in the order, that such carrier or other person shall fail to
obey such injunction or other proper process, mandatory or
otherwise, and such moneys shall be payable as the court shall
direct, either to the party complaining, or into court to abide the
ultimate decision of the court, and payment thereof may, without
prejudice to any other mode of recovering the same, be enforced by
attachment or order in the nature of a writ of execution, in like
manner as if the same had been recovered by a final decree
in
personam in such court."
Either party to such proceeding before said court may appeal to
the supreme court of the state, under the same regulations now
provided by law in respect to security for such appeal, but such
appeal shall not operate to stay or supersede the order of the
court, or the execution of any writ or process thereon, unless the
court hearing or deciding such case should otherwise direct, and
such court may in every such matter order the payment of such costs
and counsel fees as shall be deemed reasonable.
"(d) In case the Attorney General shall not, within a period of
ten (10) days after the making of any order by the commission,
commence judicial proceedings for the enforcement thereof, any
railroad company or other common carrier affected by such order may
at any time within the period of thirty (30) days after the service
[of it] upon him or it of such order, and before commencement of
proceedings, appeal therefrom to the district court of any Judicial
District through or into which his or its route may run, by the
service of a written notice of such appeal upon some member or the
secretary of such commission. And upon the taking of such appeal
and the filing of the notice thereof, with the proof of service, in
the office of the clerk of such court, there shall be deemed to be
pending in such court a civil action of the character and for the
purposes mentioned it sections eleven (11) and fifteen (15) of this
act. Upon such appeal, and upon the hearing of any application for
the enforcement of any such order made by the commission or by the
Attorney General, the court shall have jurisdiction to examine the
whole matter in controversy, including matters of fact as well as
questions of law, and to affirm, modify, or rescind such order in
whole or in part as justice may require, and, in case of any order
being modified as aforesaid, such modified order shall, for all the
purposes contemplated by this act, stand in place of the original
order so modified. No appeal as aforesaid shall stay or supersede
the order appealed from insofar as such order shall relate to rates
of transportation or to modes of transacting the business of the
appellant with the public, unless the court hearing or deciding
such case shall so direct."
"SEC. 16. (a) That whenever facts in any manner ascertained by
said commission shall in its judgment warrant a prosecution, it
shall be the duty of said commission to immediately cause suit to
be instituted and prosecuted against any common carrier who may
violate any of the provisions of this act, or of any law of this
state. All such prosecutions shall be in the name of the State of
Minnesota except as is otherwise provided in this act or in any law
of this state, and may be instituted in any county in the state
through or into which the line of any common carrier so sued may
extend, and all penalties recovered under the provisions of this
act or of any law of this state in any suit instituted in the name
of the state shall be immediately paid into the state treasury by
the sheriff or other officer or person collecting the same, and the
same shall be by the state treasurer placed to the credit of the
general revenue fund."
"(b) For the purposes of this act except its penal provisions,
the district courts of this state shall be deemed to be always in
session."
"SEC. 17. (a) That the commission is hereby directed to require
annual reports from all common carriers subject to the provisions
of this act, to fix the time and prescribe the manner in which said
reports shall be made, and to require from such carriers specific
answers to all questions upon which the commission may need
information. Such annual reports shall show in detail the amount of
capital stock issued, the amounts paid therefor, and the manner of
payment for the same, the dividends paid, the surplus fund, if any,
and the number of stockholders, the funded and floating debts and
the interest paid thereon; the cost and value of the carrier's
property, franchises, and equipment; the number of employees, and
the salary paid each class; the amounts expended for improvements
each year, how expended, and the character of such improvements;
the earnings and receipts of each branch of business, and from all
sources; the operating and other expenses; the balance of profit
and loss, and complete exhibit of the financial operations of the
carrier each year, including an annual balance sheet; also the
total number of acres of land received as grants either from the
United States or from the State of Minnesota, the number [of] acres
of said grants sod , and average price received per acre, the
number acres of grants unsold, and the appraised value per acre.
Such detailed reports shall also contain such information in
relation to rates or regulations concerning fares or freights and
agreements, arrangements or contracts with express companies,
telegraph companies, sleeping and dining car companies, fast
freight lines, and other common carriers as the commission may
require, with copies of such contracts, agreements, or
arrangements."
"(b) And the commission may, within its discretion, for the
purpose of enabling it the better to carry out the purposes of this
act, prescribe (if, in the opinion of the commission, it is
practicable to prescribe such uniformity and methods of keeping
accounts) a period of time within which all common carriers subject
to the provisions of this act shall have, as near as may be, a
uniform system of accounts, and the manner in which such accounts
shall be kept."
"SEC. 18. (a) That such commissioners shall, on or before the
first (1st) day of December in each year, and oftener if required
by the governor to do so, make a report to the governor of their
doings for the preceding year containing such facts, statements,
and explanations as will disclose the actual workings of the system
of railroad transportation in its bearings upon the business and
prosperity of the people of this state and such suggestions in
relation thereto as to them may seem appropriate"
"(b) They shall also, at such times as the governor shall
direct, examine any particular subject connected with the
conditions and management of such railroads and report to him in
writing their opinion thereon, with their reasons therefor. Said
commissioners shall also investigate and consider what, if any,
amendment or revision of the railroad laws of this state the best
interest of the state demand, and they shall make a special
biennial report on said subject to the governor. All such reports
made to the governor shall be by him transmitted to the legislature
at the earliest practicable time."
"(c) Nothing in this act contained shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but
the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies,
provided that no pending litigation shall in any way be
affected by this act."
"SEC. 19. Each commissioner shall receive an annual salary of
three thousand (3,000) dollars, payable in the same manner as the
salaries of other state officers. The commissioners shall appoint a
secretary, who shall receive an annual salary of eighteen hundred
(1,800) dollars, payable in like manner. Said secretary shall,
before entering upon the duties of his office, make and file with
the Secretary of State an affidavit in the following form:"
"I do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will
support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the State of Minnesota, and that I will faithfully discharge my
duties as Secretary of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the
State of Minnesota according to the best of my ability, and I
further declare that I am not in the employ of or holding any
official relation to any common carrier or grain warehouseman
within said state, nor am I in any manner interested in any stock,
bonds, or other property of such common carrier or grain
warehouseman."
"The said secretary so appointed and qualified shall enter into
bonds to the State of Minnesota, to be approved by the governor, in
the sum of ten thousand (10,000) dollars, conditioned for the
faithful performance of his duty as secretary of such commission,
which bond shall be filed with the Secretary of State. The
commission shall have authority to employ and fix the compensation
for such other employees as it may find necessary to the proper
performance of its duties, subject to the approval of the governor
of the state. The commissioners shall be furnished with a suitable
office and all necessary office supplies. Witnesses summoned before
the commission shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are
paid witnesses in the district courts of the state. All the
expenses of the commission, including all necessary expenses for
transportation incurred by the commissioners or by their employees
under their order in making any investigation in any other place
than the City of St. Paul, shall be allowed and paid out of the
state treasury on the presentation of itemized vouchers therefor
approved by the chairman of the commission and the state
auditor."
"SEC. 20. That the sum of fifteen thousand (15,000) dollars is
hereby appropriated for the use and purposes of this act for the
fiscal year ending July thirty-first (31st), eighteen hundred and
eighty-eight (1888), and the sum of fifteen thousand (15,000)
dollars is hereby appropriated for the use and purposes of this act
for the fiscal year ending July thirty-first (31st), eighteen
hundred and eighty nine (1889)."
"SEC. 21. That all acts and parts of acts inconsistent herewith
are hereby repealed,
provided that the provisions of this
act shall apply to and govern the existing railroad and warehouse
commissioners appointed by virtue of an Act approved March fifth
(5th), eighteen hundred and eighty-five (1885), who are hereby
clothed with the powers and charged with the duties and
responsibilities of this act granted to and imposed upon the
railroad and warehouse commissioners of the State of
Minnesota."
"SEC. 22. This act shall take effect and be in force from and
after its passage."
"Approved March 7, 1887."
MR. JUSTICE MILLER, concurring.
I concur with some hesitation in the judgment of the court, but
wish to make a few suggestions of the principles which I think
should govern this class of questions in the courts. Not desiring
to make a dissent, nor a prolonged argument in favor of any views I
may have, I will state them in the form of propositions.
1. In regard to the business of common carriers limited to
points within a single state, that state has the legislative power
to establish the rates of compensation for such carriage.
2. The power which the legislature has to do this can be
exercised through a commission which it may authorize to act in the
matter, such as the one appointed by the Legislature of Minnesota
by the act now under consideration.
3. Neither the legislature nor such commission acting under the
authority of the legislature can establish arbitrarily, and without
regard to justice and right, a tariff of rates for such
transportation which is so unreasonable as to practically destroy
the value of property of persons engaged in the carrying business,
on the one hand, nor so exorbitant and extravagant as to be in
utter disregard of the rights of the public for the use of such
transportation, on the other.
4. In either of these classes of cases, there is an ultimate
remedy by the parties aggrieved, in the courts for relief against
such oppressive legislation, and especially in the courts of the
United States, where the tariff of rates established
Page 134 U. S. 460
either by the legislature or by the commission is such as to
deprive a party of his property without due process of law.
5. But until the judiciary has been appealed to, to declare the
regulations made, whether by the legislature or by the commission,
voidable, for the reasons mentioned, the tariff of rates so fixed
is the law of the land, and must be submitted to both by the
carrier, and the parties with whom he deals.
6. That the proper, if not the only, mode of judicial relief
against the tariff of rates established by the legislature, or by
its commission, is by a bill in chancery asserting its unreasonable
character, and its conflict with the Constitution of the United
States, and asking a decree of court forbidding the corporation
from exacting such fare as excessive, or establishing its right to
collect the rates as being within the limits of a just compensation
for the service rendered.
7. That until this is done it is not competent for each
individual having dealings with the carrying corporation, or for
the corporation with regard to each individual who demands its
services, to raise a contest in the courts over the questions which
ought to be settled in this general and conclusive method.
8. But in the present case, where an application is made to the
supreme court of the state to compel the common carriers, namely,
the railroad companies, to perform the services which their duty
requires them to do for the general public, which is equivalent to
establishing by judicial proceeding the reasonableness of the
charges fixed by the commission, I think the court has the same
right and duty to inquire into the reasonableness of the tariff of
rates established by the commission, before granting such relief,
that it would have if called upon so to do by a bill in
chancery.
9. I do not agree that it was necessary to the validity of the
action of the commission that previous notice should have been
given to all common carriers interested in the rates to be
established, nor to any particular one of them, any more than it
would have been necessary -- which I think it is not -- for the
legislature to have given such notice if it had established such
rates by legislative enactment.
Page 134 U. S. 461
10. But when the question becomes a judicial one, and the
validity and justice of these rates are to be established or
rejected by the judgment of a court, it is necessary that the
railroad corporations interested in the fare to be considered
should have notice, and have a right to be heard on the question
relating to such fare, which I have pointed out as judicial
questions. For the refusal of the Supreme Court of Minnesota to
receive evidence on this subject, I think the case ought to be
reversed on the ground that this is a denial of due process of law
in a proceeding which takes the property of the company, and if
this be a just construction of the statute of Minnesota, it is for
that reason void.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE GRAY and
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, dissenting.
I cannot agree to the decision of the Court in this case. It
practically overrules
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113, and the several railroad cases that were decided at
the same time. The governing principle of those cases was that the
regulation and settlement of the fares of railroads and other
public accommodations is a legislative prerogative, and not a
judicial one. This is a principle which I regard as of great
importance. When a railroad company is chartered, it is for the
purpose of performing a duty which belongs to the state itself. It
is chartered as an agent of the state for furnishing public
accommodation. The state might build its railroads if it saw fit.
It is its duty and its prerogative to provide means of
intercommunication between one part of its territory and another.
And this duty is devolved upon the legislative department. If the
legislature commissions private parties, whether corporations or
individuals, to perform this duty, it is its prerogative to fix the
fares and freights which they may charge for their services. When
merely a road or a canal is to be constructed, it is for the
legislature to fix the tolls to be paid by those who use it; when a
company is chartered not only to build a road, but to carry on
public transportation upon it, it is for the legislature to fix the
charges for such transportation.
Page 134 U. S. 462
But it is said that all charges should be reasonable, and that
none but reasonable charges can be exacted, and it is urged that
what is a reasonable charge is a judicial question. On the
contrary, it is preeminently a legislative one, involving
considerations of policy, as well as of remuneration, and is
usually determined by the legislature, by fixing a maximum of
charges in the charter of the company, or afterwards, if its hands
are not tied by contract. If this maximum is not exceeded, the
courts cannot interfere. When the rates are not thus determined,
they are left to the discretion of the company, subject to the
express or implied condition that they shall be reasonable --
express, when so declared by statute, implied by the common law
when the statute is silent -- and the common law has effect by
virtue of the legislative will.
Thus the legislature either fixes the charges at rates which it
deems reasonable or merely declares that they shall be reasonable,
and it is only in the latter case, where what is reasonable is left
open, that the courts have jurisdiction of the subject. I repeat --
when the legislature declares that the charges shall be reasonable,
or, which is the same thing, allows the common law rule to that
effect to prevail and leaves the matter there, then resort may be
had to the courts to inquire judicially whether the charges are
reasonable. Then, and not till then, is it a judicial question. But
the legislature has the right, and it is its prerogative, if it
chooses to exercise it, to declare what is reasonable.
This is just where I differ from the majority of the Court. They
say in effect, if not in terms, that the final tribunal of
arbitrament is the judiciary. I say it is the legislature. I hold
that it is a legislative question, not a judicial one, unless the
legislature or the law (which is the same thing) has made it
judicial by prescribing the rule that the charges shall be
reasonable, and leaving it there.
It is always a delicate thing for the courts to make an issue
with the legislative department of the government, and they should
never do so if it is possible to avoid it. By the decision now
made, we declare in effect that the judiciary, and not the
legislature, is the final arbiter in the regulation of fares
and
Page 134 U. S. 463
freights of railroads and the charges of other public
accommodations. It is an assumption of authority on the part of the
judiciary which, it seems to me, with all due deference to the
judgment of my brethren, it has no right to make. The assertion of
jurisdiction by this Court makes it the duty of every court of
general jurisdiction, state or federal, to entertain complaints
against the decisions of the boards of commissioners appointed by
the states to regulate their railroads, for all courts are bound by
the Constitution of the United States, the same as we are. Our
jurisdiction is merely appellate.
The incongruity of this position will appear more distinctly by
a reference to the nature of the cases under consideration. The
question presented before the commission in each case was one
relating simply to the reasonableness of the rates charged by the
companies -- a question of more or less. In the one case, the
company charged three cents per gallon for carrying milk between
certain points. The commission deemed this to be unreasonable, and
reduced the charge to two and one-half cents. In the other case,
the company charged $1.25 per car for handling and switching empty
cars over its lines within the City of Minneapolis and $1.50 for
loaded cars, and the commission decided that $1 per car was a
sufficient charge in all cases. The companies complain that the
charges as fixed by the commission are unreasonably low, and that
they are deprived of their property without due process of law;
that they are entitled to a trial by a court and jury, and are not
barred by the decisions of a legislative commission. The state
court held that the legislature had a right to establish such a
commission, and that its determinations are binding and final, and
that the courts cannot review them. This Court now reverses that
decision and holds the contrary. In my judgment, the state court
was right, and the establishment of the commission, and its
proceedings, were no violation of the constitutional prohibition
against depriving persons of their property without due process of
law.
I think it is perfectly clear, and well settled by the decisions
of this Court, that the legislature might have fixed the rates in
question. If it had done so, it would have done it through
Page 134 U. S. 464
the aid of committees appointed to investigate the subject, to
acquire information, to cite parties, to get all the facts before
them, and finally to decide and report. No one could have said that
this was not due process of law. And if the legislature itself
could do this, acting by its committees and proceeding according to
the usual forms adopted by such bodies, I can see no good reason
why it might not delegate the duty to a board of commissioners,
charged, as the board in this case was, to regulate and fix the
charges so as to be equal and reasonable. Such a board would have
at its command all the means of getting at the truth, and
ascertaining the reasonableness of fares and freights which a
legislative committee has. It might or it might not swear witnesses
and examine parties. Its duties being of an administrative
character, it would have the widest scope for examination and
inquiry. All means of knowledge and information would be at its
command, just as they would be at the command of the legislature
which created it. Such a body, though not a court, is a proper
tribunal for the duties imposed upon it.
In the case of
Davidson v. City of New Orleans,
96 U. S. 97, we
decided that the appointment of a board of assessors for assessing
damages was not only due process of law, but the proper method for
making assessments to distribute the burden of a public work among
those who were benefited by it. No one questions the
constitutionality or propriety of boards for assessing property for
taxation, or for the improvement of streets, sewers, and the like,
or of commissions to establish county seats, and for doing many
other things appertaining to the administrative management of
public affairs. Due process of law does not always require a court.
It merely requires such tribunals and proceedings as are proper to
the subject in hand. In the
Railroad Commission Cases,
116 U. S. 307, we
held that a board of commissioners is a proper tribunal for
determining the proper rates of fare and freight on the railroads
of a state. It seems to me, therefore, that the law of Minnesota
did not prescribe anything that was not in accordance with due
process of law in creating such a board and investing it with the
powers in question.
Page 134 U. S. 465
It is complained that the decisions of the board are final and
without appeal. So are the decisions of the courts in matters
within their jurisdiction. There must be a final tribunal somewhere
for deciding every question in the world. Injustice may take place
in all tribunals. All human institutions are imperfect -- courts as
well as commissions and legislatures. Whatever tribunal has
jurisdiction, its decisions are final and conclusive, unless an
appeal is given therefrom. The important question always is what is
the lawful tribunal for the particular case? In my judgment, in the
present case, the proper tribunal was the legislature, or the board
of commissioners which it created for the purpose.
If not in terms, yet in effect, the present cases are treated as
if the constitutional prohibition was that no state shall take
private property for public use without just compensation, and as
if it was our duty to judge of the compensation. But there is no
such clause in the Constitution of the United States. The Fifth
Amendment is prohibitory upon the federal government only, and not
upon the state governments. In this matter -- just compensation for
property taken for public use -- the states make their own
regulations, by Constitution or otherwise. They are only required
by the federal Constitution to provide "due process of law." It was
alleged in
Davidson v. New Orleans that the property
assessed was not benefited by the improvement; but we held that
that was a matter with which we would not interfere. The question
was whether there was due process of law. 96 U.S.
96 U. S. 106. If
a state court renders an unjust judgment, we cannot remedy it.
I do not mean to say that the legislature, or its constituted
board of commissioners or other legislative agency, may not so act
as to deprive parties of their property without due process of law.
The Constitution contemplates the possibility of such an invasion
of rights. But, acting within their jurisdiction (as in these cases
they have done), the invasion should be clear and unmistakable to
bring the case within that category. Nothing of the kind exists in
the cases before us. The legislature, in establishing the
commission, did not exceed its power, and the commission, in acting
upon the cases, did not
Page 134 U. S. 466
exceed its jurisdiction, and was not chargeable with fraudulent
behavior. There was merely a difference of judgment as to amount
between the commission and the companies, without any indication of
intent on the part of the former to do injustice. The board may
have erred; but if they did, as the matter was within their
rightful jurisdiction, their decision was final and conclusive
unless their proceedings could be impeached for fraud. Deprivation
of property by mere arbitrary power on the part of the legislature
or fraud on the part of the commission are the only grounds on
which judicial relief may be sought against their action. There was
in truth no deprivation of property in these cases at all. There
was merely a regulation as to the enjoyment of property, made by a
strictly competent authority, in a matter entirely within its
jurisdiction.
It may be that our legislatures are invested with too much
power, open, as they are, to influences so dangerous to the
interests of individuals, corporations, and society. But such is
the constitution of our republican form of government, and we are
bound to abide by it till it can be corrected in a legitimate way.
If our legislatures become too arbitrary in the exercise of their
powers, the people always have a remedy in their hands. They may at
any time restrain them by constitutional limitations. But so long
as they remain invested with the powers that ordinarily belong to
the legislative branch of government, they are entitled to exercise
those powers, among which, in my judgment, is that of the
regulation of railroads and other public means of
intercommunication, and the burdens and charges which those who own
them are authorized to impose upon the public.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE GRAY and MR. JUSTICE
LAMAR agree with me in this dissenting opinion.