Upon the construction of the constitution and laws of a state,
this Court, as a general rule, follows the decisions of the highest
court of the state, unless they conflict with or impair the
efficacy of some provision of the federal Constitution or of a
federal statute or a rule of general commercial law, and this is
especially the case when a line of such decisions have become a
rule of property affecting title to real estate within the
state.
When a circuit court of the United States in Illinois obtains
jurisdiction in equity of a proceeding to establish title to real
estate under the act of the legislature of that state of April 9,
1872, known as the "Burnt Records Act," in a case within the
provisions of the act, it may, following the decisions of the
courts of the state, proceed to adjudicate and determine in equity
all the issues between the parties relating to the property, as
well those at law as those in equity, and it is entirely within its
discretion whether it will or will not send the issues at law to be
determined by a jury.
It is no error in a court of equity to order buildings removed
from a tract of land over which a party to the record has a right
of way for ingress to and egress from his own property.
Michael Gormley, the appellant, on the 5th day of March, 1874,
made a subdivision, into blocks and lots, of certain property
within the limits of the Village of Glencoe, Cook County, Illinois,
entitled "Gormley's Addition to Glencoe," acknowledged the plat
before a justice of the peace, and had it certified to by the
county surveyor and duly recorded in the recorder's office of said
county. He derived title to so much of the property as is involved
in this case under a warranty deed from his father, Marcus Gormley,
the patentee, dated May 4, 1861, and recorded in the office of said
recorder on June 5th of that year. On the 15th of May, 1877,
Gormley and his wife executed a trust deed, which was duly
recorded, to one Loeb as trustee, conveying certain blocks and lots
in Gormley's addition to Glencoe, to secure a promissory note
Page 134 U. S. 339
described therein, which trust deed was duly acknowledged, and
released in due form of law all homestead rights of the grantors in
the property conveyed. The premises were subsequently sold under
the powers of sale in the trust deed for default in payment, and
conveyed by deeds dated September 10, 1878, some of the blocks to
Edward Clark, a block and some of the lots to Sarah J. Condon, and
some to others. Edward Clark died October 14, 1882, and Alfred
Corning Clark acquired title to the portion conveyed to him, as his
sole heir at law. On the 29th day of March, 1884, Sarah J. Condon
conveyed the premises deeded to her to Alfred Corning Clark, who by
that conveyance, and as heir to Edward, became the owner of blocks
3, 4, 5, 8 to 24, inclusive, and lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12, in
block 6, in Gormley's addition to Glencoe, in the County of Cook
and State of Illinois.
By the charter of the Village of Glencoe it was provided that
printed or written copies of all ordinances passed by the council
of the village should be posted up in at least three of the most
public places therein, within thirty days after their passage and
should take effect at the expiration of ten days after such
posting. On the 4th day of October, 1881, on a petition signed by
Michael Gormley, the Council of Glencoe vacated Adams Street,
between Grove Street and Bluff Street, in Gormley's addition, which
ran between blocks 8 and 9 of that addition, and upon which
Gormley's house, barn, and outbuildings then stood. This portion of
the street formed the means of ingress and egress to some 24 lots
in these 2 blocks. The ordinance was posted, and a certified copy
filed in the recorder's office by Gormley on October 17, 1881. On
the 3d of January, 1882, the Council of Glencoe passed an
ordinance, which was in Gormley's own handwriting, vacating some
ten streets and parts of streets in Gormley's addition, which
surrounded the property in controversy, and the evidence tended to
show that this was done upon representations made by Gormley that
he owned the property through which the streets passed, and that at
all events, such was the belief of the members of the council in
taking the action in question. On the 12th day of January, 1882,
the vote
Page 134 U. S. 340
on the passage of the ordinance was reconsidered, and again
reconsidered on January 24, 1882, and on the 7th of February, 1882,
the council passed an ordinance providing
"that any and all ordinances heretofore passed by this council
vacating any streets or parts of streets in Gormley's addition to
Glencoe or purporting so to do are hereby repealed, and all the
streets and parts of streets shown in the first and originally
recorded plat of said addition are hereby declared to be public
streets."
The ordinance of January 3, 1882, was never posted by the clerk,
and although the charter required ordinances to be entered at
length in an ordinance book, neither the ordinance of October 4,
1881, nor that of January 3, 1882, nor any of the repealing or
rescinding resolutions or ordinances, were entered at length in
such book. Shortly after the passage of the ordinance of January 3,
1882, Gormley applied to the clerk of the village to post the
ordinance, and the clerk replied that he should take the full time
allowed him by law to do so, namely, thirty days. He also applied
for a certified copy of the ordinance, but the clerk did not give
it to him. He then copied the minutes of the meeting of January 3,
1882, and posted such copy and made oath thereto, January 24, 1882,
and filed the same on that day in the Recorder's Office of Cook
County. On the 17th of January, 1882, Gormley filed in the Superior
Court of Cook County, Illinois, a petition for a mandamus upon the
clerk of the village to immediately post certified copies of the
ordinance passed on January 3, 1882, as required by law, and to
file for record, in the Recorder's Office Cook County, a duly
certified copy of the ordinance, or to furnish to him (Gormley) a
duly certified copy upon tender of his legal fees. This petition
was answered by the clerk, and a replication filed, and the cause
tried, a jury being waived, by Gary, J., who rendered judgment
dismissing the petition at Gormley's costs. The case was taken to
the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois, by which
court the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. After the
commencement of this action, Gormley sued out from the Supreme
Court of Illinois a writ of error to review the judgment of the
appellate court, and the judgment
Page 134 U. S. 341
of that court was thereupon affirmed.
Gormley v. Day,
114 Ill. 185.
Gormley sold several lots and blocks of his subdivision to
different parties; put down sidewalks, and threw up various streets
with a plow; street and sidewalk work in the addition was done by
the village, and portions of various streets were graded and
ditched. After the foreclosure, the taxes upon the premises in
dispute were paid by Alfred Corning Clark.
On the 31st of March, 1884, Clark filed his petition under the
"Burnt Records Act," so called, being chapter 116 of the Revised
Statutes of Illinois , setting up his title to the property in
controversy; alleging the destruction of the records of Cook County
and of his record title, on October 8 and 9, 1871, by fire; the
proceedings of the Council of the Village of Glencoe, of the clerk,
and of Michael Gormley, and the suits in the superior and appellate
courts, and charging fraud on Gormley's part, and threatened
irreparable injury; averring that Gormley was in possession of
petitioner's land, and about to destroy its market value by
procuring a vacation of the streets around it, and asking that
council and clerk be enjoined. Petitioner made the Village of
Glencoe, its council and clerk, Michael Gormley and wife, and
others who had claimed some interest in the property, parties, "and
all whom it may concern," and prayed that the ordinances of October
4, 1881, and January 3, 1882, be declared null and void and of no
effect whatsoever, and for a decree confirming and establishing his
title in fee simple to the lots and blocks mentioned as aforesaid,
and that he be put in possession, and that the village, its council
and clerk, be restrained from passing or posting any ordinance or
ordinances vacating streets or parts of streets adjoining
petitioner's lots and blocks. Many of the defendants defaulted, and
some answered, including Gormley and wife, upon whose answer the
only questions in issue here arise. Upon hearing, the court entered
a final decree in favor of Clark, adjudging that he was, at the
date of filing the petition, vested with title in fee simple
absolute to the premises in dispute and confirming and establishing
the same; that Gormley was estopped from claiming
Page 134 U. S. 342
any informality or defect in the plat of his addition to
Glencoe; that he and his wife had no homestead rights in any of the
lots and blocks decreed to Clark, or in any streets or parts
thereof on which any of the said lots or blocks abutted, as against
said Clark, his representatives, heirs, and assigns; that the
ordinance of January 3, 1882, was null and void; that title to that
portion of Adams Street, between Grove Street and Bluff Street, was
vested in Gormley, but subject to an easement in the use of it by
said Clark, his heirs, legal representatives, and assigns, as the
owner of lots or parts of lots abutting thereon; that said Gormley
and wife remove from that portion of Adams Avenue on or before a
date named, and in default of such removal the marshal remove the
buildings thereon located, and that possession of the property in
dispute be surrendered to petitioner. The decree dissolved a
preliminary injunction which had been granted against the village
and its authorities, and awarded no relief in respect to them.
From this decree Gormley appealed to this Court, and assigns as
errors (1) that the court erred in not dismissing the bill for want
of equity; (2) that petitioner had a complete and adequate remedy
at law, and a court of chancery had no jurisdiction; (3) that the
court erred in decreeing void the ordinance vacating said streets
in said Gormley's addition to Glencoe; (4) that the court erred in
decreeing that said Michael and Eliza Gormley remove their house,
barn, and shop from said portion of Adams Avenue between Grove and
Bluff Streets; (5) that the court erred in decreeing to the
petitioner an easement in the right of use of Adams Avenue, between
Grove and Bluff Streets, as a street, by said petitioner; (6) that
the court erred in decreeing the petitioner entitled to the
possession of said lots and blocks in said petition described; (7)
that the court erred in decreeing that the appellant surrender up
possession of said streets, lots, and blocks to the petitioner.
Page 134 U. S. 345
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the facts as above,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Upon the 8th and 9th of October, 1871, a memorable conflagration
destroyed a large part of the City of Chicago, including the
courthouse and the entire records of the County of Cook, in the
State of Illinois, in which the City of Chicago was situated. An
act was thereupon passed by the General Assembly of that state,
approved April 9, 1872, to remedy the evils consequent upon the
destruction of public records. Laws Illinois 1871-1872, p. 652,
which act is now chapter 116 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois. 2
Starr and Curtis 1993. That act provided that in case of such
destruction, the courts of the county wherein it occurred, having
chancery jurisdiction, should have power to inquire into the
condition of any title to or interest in any land in such county,
and to make all such orders, judgments, and decrees as might be
necessary to determine and establish said title or interest, legal
or equitable, against all persons, known or unknown, and all liens
existing on such lands, whether by statute, mortgage, deed of
trust, or otherwise; that it should be lawful for any person
claiming title to any lands in the county at the time of the
destruction of its records, and for all claiming under such person,
to file a petition in any court in the county having chancery
jurisdiction, praying for a decree establishing and confirming his
said title, which petition should set out the character and extent
of the estate in the land in question claimed by the complainant or
petitioner, and from whom and when and by what mode he derived his
title thereto, the names of all persons owning or claiming any
estate in fee in, or who should be in possession of, said lands, or
any part thereof, and also all persons to whom any such lands had
been conveyed, and the deed or deeds of such conveyance recorded in
the office of recorder of deeds since the time of destruction of
the records, and prior to the filing of the petition, and their
residences, so far as the same were known; that all persons so
named in the petition should be made defendants and notified of the
suit by summons or publication, in the same manner as required in
chancery proceedings
Page 134 U. S. 346
in the state, unknown owners or claimants to be brought in under
the designation of "to whom it may concern;" that any person
interested might oppose the petition, demur to or answer it, or
file a cross-petition, if he desired to do so, and that the decree
entered in the proceeding should be, as to the title found, forever
binding and conclusive, except against minors and insane persons,
and persons in possession or to whom the lands had been conveyed
and the deeds recorded since the destruction of the records, and
prior to the filing of the petition, and not made parties defendant
by name. The act also contained various provisions in protection of
married women, insane persons, and minors, and all defendants not
served with summons were given one year after entry of decree to
ask its vacation on petition, and the rules and regulations
governing courts of chancery in Illinois were declared to apply to
proceedings under the act, so far as not inconsistent
therewith.
By numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of
Illinois, it has been determined that a petition to establish title
under what is known as the "Burnt Records Act" need not show that
the petitioner was in possession of the land, or that it was vacant
and unoccupied, as required in a bill to quiet title, the act
authorizing the petitioner to make all parties in possession or
claiming an interest in the land parties defendant to the petition,
creating a clear and marked distinction between a case of this
character and such a bill; that the court is authorized and
required to investigate the interest of all the parties in the
premises in question and to decree in favor of the better title,
that all that is required in respect to adverse claimants or their
titles is that such claimant shall be named in the petition and
made defendant; that nothing more is required to give the court
jurisdiction under the statute to investigate the claims of title
to the premises, and by its decree establish and confirm the title
in the person in whom it is found to be vested, and to make all
such orders, judgments, and decrees as shall be necessary to that
end; that decrees so entered are, as to the title so found, forever
binding and conclusive between the parties; that the statute was in
effect a
Page 134 U. S. 347
statute of limitations, and under the circumstances was not
unreasonable, but demanded as a matter of safety in a great
emergency; that it was not open to the objection of
unconstitutionality because not providing for trial by jury or
otherwise, and that the question whether a jury should be allowed
could not arise unless a jury was demanded.
Gage v.
Caraher, 125 Ill. 447;
Heacock v. Hosmer, 109 Ill.
245;
Heacock v. Lubuke, 107 Ill. 396;
Robinson v.
Ferguson, 78 Ill. 538;
Bradish v. Grant, 119 Ill.
606;
Bertrand v. Taylor, 87 Ill. 235.
The subject received much consideration from Judge Blodgett,
holding the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in
Smith v. Gage, 12 F. 32, in which he announced
substantially the same conclusions. And he remarks
"that the court, on the final hearing of such a case, may, in
its discretion as a court of equity, where two conflicting titles
are presented, the validity of which can be determined in a court
of law, by the express terms of its decree, remit the parties
holding such titles to a court of law for a trial of their rights;
but this would be purely a matter of equitable discretion, and does
not limit the power of the court in this proceeding to settle the
entire title by its decree."
In
Gage v. Caraher, ubi supra, the Supreme Court of
Illinois says:
"Whatever may be the power of the court of chancery, where there
are controverted titles, to restore by its decree the evidences of
title in the respective parties as they were before the destruction
of the record, and then, in its discretion, remit the parties to a
court of law to there try their titles, it is manifest no such
course was contemplated by the statute, or necessary in cases under
it."
In
Ward v. Farwell, 97 Ill. 613, in passing upon the
right to demand a trial by jury in the particular instance there in
hand, it is justly observed:
"Where a new class of cases are, by legislative action directed
to be tried as chancery causes, it must appear that, when tested by
the general principles of equity, they are of an equitable
character, and can be more appropriately tried in a court of equity
than in a court of law. And if of this character, when brought in a
court of equity, they stand
Page 134 U. S. 348
upon the same footing with other causes, and the court will have
the right, as in other cases, to determine all questions of fact
without submitting them to a jury."
Upon the construction of the constitution and laws of a state,
this Court, as a general rule, follows the decisions of her highest
court, unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of some
provision of the federal Constitution, or of a federal statute, or
a rule of general commercial law.
Norton v. Shelby County,
118 U. S. 425,
118 U. S. 439.
And this is so where a course of those decisions, whether founded
on statutes or not, have become rules of property within the state;
also in regard to rules of evidence in actions at law, and also in
reference to the common law of the state, and its laws and customs
of a local character when established by repeated decisions.
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20;
Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad Company, 125 U.
S. 555. Substantially conclusive effect is given to such
decisions upon the construction of state statutes, as affecting
title to real estate within the state.
Ridings v. Johnson,
128 U. S. 212;
Bacon v. Northwestern Insurance Co., 131 U.
S. 258;
Hanrick v. Patrick, 119 U.
S. 156,
119 U. S. 169.
And while the rule is thoroughly settled that remedies in the
courts of the United States are at common law or in equity,
according to the essential character of the case, uncontrolled in
that particular by the practice of the state courts,
New
Orleans v. Louisiana Construction Co., 129 U. S.
45,
129 U. S. 46,
yet an enlargement of equitable rights by state statute may be
administered by the circuit courts of the United States as well as
by the courts of the state, and when the case is one of a remedial
proceeding, essentially of an equitable character, there can be no
objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction,
Broderick
Will Case, 21 Wall. 503,
88 U. S. 520;
Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15,
110 U. S. 25;
Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552,
121 U. S.
557.
Tested by the conclusions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, the
principal contention on appellant's behalf cannot be sustained. The
record of the patent and the deed from the patentee to Michael
Gormley had been destroyed, and the deed, which it turned out on
this hearing was in Gormley's possession,
Page 134 U. S. 349
had never been rerecorded. The petitioner was entitled to the
establishment of the record by the proceeding authorized under the
statute, and, when the court had once acquired jurisdiction, it
could go on and adjudicate upon all claims to the property in
controversy, as therein provided. The character of the litigation
sufficiently indicates that the petitioner legitimately invoked the
aid of the statute.
It is strenuously insisted that the remedy at law was adequate,
and that as the right of possession was purely a legal question,
and for a jury, the court of chancery should have declined
jurisdiction; but inasmuch as the case came within the provisions
of the statute, and equity could alone afford the entire relief
sought, the fact that legal questions were also involved could not
oust the court of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction in equity attaches
unless the legal remedy, both in respect to the final relief and
the mode of obtaining it, is as efficient as the remedy which
equity would afford under the same circumstances,
Kilbourn v.
Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505,
130 U. S. 514,
and it is quite clear that under this statute the restoration of
the record title is a matter essentially of equitable cognizance,
while the declaration of the invalidity of the ordinance of January
3, 1882, the removal of the cloud caused by recording a copy
thereof, and the abatement of the obstruction to the streets were
matters in respect to which, under the averments of the petition
and the evidence adduced at the hearing, the petitioner could
properly resort to a court of equity. Undoubtedly the rule that a
bill may be retained for the purpose of granting full relief when
jurisdiction exists should not be abused by being employed as a
mere pretext for bringing into chancery causes proper for a court
of law; but under the local law this could not be predicated of a
petition which the petitioner was entitled to file under the "Burnt
Records Act," and, as already stated, we administer, where diverse
citizenship gives us jurisdiction of a case, the equitable relief
which state legislation accords.
It is objected that there was error in the direction for the
removal of the buildings from the portion of Adams Street between
blocks 8 and 9, in disregard of the homestead
Page 134 U. S. 350
rights of appellant and his wife; but we do not think so.
Whether the plat was a statutory plat or not, as to which some
issue is made by the answer, the proofs establish such a dedication
as created an easement in the petitioner, the existence of which
Gormley was estopped to deny, and which the court was justified in
protecting.
Maywood Co. v. Village of Maywood, 118 Ill.
61;
Zinc. Co. v. City of La Salle, 117 Ill. 411;
Littler v. City of Lincoln, 106 Ill. 353;
Hamilton v.
Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad, 124 Ill. 235.
The right of way, as appurtenant to these blocks and lots,
passed to the purchasers under the sale upon the trust deed, which
was executed by Gormley and his wife, and by which both had
released the homestead claim, and the decree recognized the fee as
still in Gormley subject to the burden thus imposed.
Trickey v.
Schlader, 52 Ill. 78;
Kittle v. Pfeiffer, 22 Cal.
484.
As to the remaining errors assigned, we are of opinion that the
court correctly held the second ordinance duly annulled, and the
easement as existing in the petitioner, so far as respected the
property described in the first of the two ordinances referred to,
and properly granted the writ of assistance to put the petitioner
into possession of his blocks and lots as prayed; and, while the
bill did not specifically pray for similar relief in respect to the
streets in question, such relief was agreeable to the case made by
the bill, and could be awarded as within the prayer for general
relief. The writ of assistance was simply in effectuation of the
decree, and was in accordance with the recognized practice in
equity and the ninth equity rule. We are satisfied upon the whole
case that the circuit court committed no error, and the decree will
therefore be
Affirmed.
