Property of a debtor, brought within the custody of the circuit
court of the United States by seizure under process issued upon its
judgment, remains in its custody to be applied in satisfaction of
its judgment notwithstanding the subsequent death of the debtor
before the sale under execution.
The jurisdiction of a court of the United States, once obtained
over property by its being brought within its custody, continues
until the purpose of the seizure is accomplished, and cannot be
impaired or affected by any legislation of the state or by any
proceedings subsequently commenced in a state court.
Probate laws of a state which, upon the death of a party to a
suit in a federal court, withdraw his estate from the operation of
the execution laws of the state and place it in the hands of his
executor or administrator for the benefit of his creditors and
distributees do not apply when, previous to the death of the
debtor, his property has been seized upon execution and thus
specifically appropriated to the satisfaction of a judgment in that
court.
This case came from the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Louisiana. It arose out of the following
facts:
On the 5th of June, 1885, the Rio Grande Railroad Company, a
corporation, recovered a judgment in that court against a
co-partnership firm known as Gomila & Co., and against its
members, Anthony J. Gomila and Larned Torrey,
in solido,
for $26,731.99, with interest from January 1, 1884. Upon this
judgment execution was issued under which certain interests were
attached, or seized, as it is termed in the laws of Louisiana,
namely, a claim upon which, in February, 1885,
Page 132 U. S. 479
judgment was recovered in that court in favor of Gomila &
Co. against Culliford & Clark for $23,999.76, with interest at
the rate of five percent per annum from June 30, 1883, from which
judgment an appeal was at the time pending in the Supreme Court of
the United States; also a claim and judgment thereon in favor of
Gomila & Co. against John T. Milliken, rendered in a state
court of Louisiana, on the 27th of June, 1883, for $6,200, with
interest at the rate of eight percent per annum from February 27,
1883, and also a claim made by Gomila & Co. against Kehlor
Brothers, garnishees in the suit of Gomila $Co. against Milliken.
Under this execution, a parcel of real estate in the City of New
Orleans was also seized. The property, except the real estate, was
advertised by the marshal of the district for sale. Whilst thus
advertised, and before the day of sale designated, Gomila, of the
firm of Gomila & Co., died. The sale did not, therefore, take
place, and the representatives of Gomila were made parties to the
proceedings under the execution. Subsequently a new sale was
advertised. Before the day of sale arrived, the public
administrator, and as such dative testamentary executor of Gomila,
upon an affidavit that three-fourths of these assets belonged to
and were inventoried as of the succession of the deceased, and
should be administered with his other assets in the Probate Court
of the Parish of Orleans, moved the circuit court of the United
States for an order directing the marshal of the district to
discontinue and withdraw the advertisement of sale and desist from
making the sale as advertised or offering for sale the property
seized. To this motion the railroad company appeared and, by way of
exception and demurrer, pleaded, 1st, that the executor could not
proceed by motion if he had any cause of complaint, but must
proceed by an original bill in equity and, 2d, that the motion
presented issues of law and fact, which, if within the jurisdiction
of the law side of the court, should be tried in the ordinary way
by a jury. The company further stated that if the demurrer and
exception were overruled, it desired to set up in answer to the
motion the fact that the claims were seized and advertised for sale
before the death of Gomila, and were in the custody and
jurisdiction of
Page 132 U. S. 480
the court at the time of his death, and should not therefore be
transferred to the Probate Court of the parish. Upon the hearing,
which took place on the 5th of November, 1885, the court overruled
the exception and demurrer and ordered that the marshal discontinue
and withdraw the advertisement of sale, which had been fixed for
that day, and desist from making the sale until further order of
the court, reserving to the parties all the rights not therein
passed upon. This order merely operated to postpone the sale.
Subsequently another rule was taken out by the executor upon the
railroad company to show cause why the effects and property should
not be delivered to him, burdened with any liens in its favor which
might have resulted from their seizure, and be received and held by
him as executor for the purpose of administration under the orders
of the probate court. Upon the hearing which followed, the circuit
court, in December, 1885, adjudged and decreed that the rule be
made absolute and that the property described in the motion, then
in the possession and under the control of the marshal, be
delivered to the executor as the officer of the Probate Court for
the Parish of Orleans, the said property to pass into his
possession burdened with any liens in favor of the plaintiff which
might have resulted from its seizure, and that it be received and
held by the executor for the purpose of administration under the
orders of the probate court, and that the cost of the proceedings
be paid by the Rio Grande Railroad Company,
Rio Grande Railway
v. Gomila, 28 F. 337.
To reverse this judgment, the case was brought to this Court on
writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the facts as above, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
The question presented for our consideration is whether property
of a debtor, brought within the custody of the circuit
Page 132 U. S. 481
court of the United States by seizure under process issued upon
its judgment, remains in its custody to be applied in satisfaction
of the judgment notwithstanding the subsequent death of the debtor,
or is removed by such death from the jurisdiction of the circuit
court and passes under the control of the probate court of the
state, to be disposed of in the administration of the assets of the
deceased. To this question we have no doubt the answer must be that
the property remains in the custody of the circuit court of the
United States, to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment
under which it was seized. The jurisdiction of a court of the
United States, once obtained over property by being brought within
its custody, continues until the purpose of the seizure is
accomplished, and cannot be impaired or affected by any legislation
of the state or by any proceedings subsequently commenced in a
state court. This exemption of the authority of the courts of the
United States from interference by legislative or judicial action
of the states is essential to their independence and efficiency. If
their jurisdiction could in any particular be invaded and impaired
by such state action, it would be difficult to perceive any limit
to which the invasion and impairment might not be extended. To
sanction the doctrine for which the executor appointed by the
Probate Court of the Parish of Orleans contends, would be to
subordinate the authority of the federal courts in essential
attributes to the regulation of the state -- a position which is
wholly inadmissible.
The principle declared in
Freeman v.
Howe, 24 How. 450, and in
Buck v.
Colbath, 3 Wall. 334, both of which have, from
their importance, attracted special attention from the profession,
in effect determines the question presented here. In the first of
these cases, the marshal had levied a writ of attachment, issued
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Massachusetts, upon certain property which was subsequently taken
from his possession by the Sheriff of the County of Middlesex in
that state under a writ of replevin issued from a state court, and
the question presented was whether the sheriff was justified in
thus taking the property from the marshal's possession, or whether
the marshal had the
Page 132 U. S. 482
right to retain it. The court held that the property was, by its
attachment under process of the federal court, brought within the
custody of that court and under its jurisdiction, that it could not
be taken from that custody by any tribunal of the state, and that
if a conflict in the assertion of jurisdiction in such case arose,
the determination of the question rested with the federal court,
observing that
"no government could maintain the administration or execution of
its laws, civil or criminal, if the jurisdiction of its judicial
tribunals were subject to the determination of another."
In the second of the above cases --
Buck v.
Colbath, 3 Wall. 334 -- this Court referred to the
decision in
Freeman v. Howe and, after stating that when
first announced, it had taken the profession generally by surprise,
said that the Court was clearly satisfied with the principle upon
which the decision was founded -- "a principle," it added,
"which is essential to the dignity and just authority of every
court, and to the comity which should regulate the relations
between all courts of concurrent jurisdiction. That principle is
that whenever property has been seized by an officer of the court
by virtue of its process, the property is to be considered as in
the custody of the court and under its control for the time being,
and that no other court has a right to interfere with that
possession unless it be some court which may have a direct
supervisory control over the court whose process has first taken
possession, or some superior jurisdiction in the premises."
The doctrine of
Freeman v. Howe was thus reaffirmed,
with a statement of the limitation to which, in its application, it
was subject, by allowing suits against officers and others for
seizing the property of strangers, which did not invade the custody
of the court over the property. With the property in custody, so
long as it continues, no other tribunal can interfere, though but
for such custody, possession of it might be taken under process
from state courts.
Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.
S. 176.
In
Riggs v. Johnson
Co., 6 Wall. 166, which came from the Circuit Court
for the District of Iowa and was before us at December term, 1867,
this doctrine finds illustration. There the plaintiff had obtained
judgment in the circuit court against
Page 132 U. S. 483
the county upon certain of its bonds. Execution issued upon the
judgment was returned unsatisfied. Thereupon he applied to the
circuit court for a mandamus upon the supervisors of the county to
compel the levy of a tax for the payment of the judgment. An
alternative writ was issued commanding the supervisors to assess
the tax, or show cause to the contrary, on a day designated. The
supervisors appeared on the return day and alleged that they had
been enjoined by proceedings in a state court from assessing a tax
for that purpose, and that they could not do so without being
guilty of contempt and becoming liable to punishment. To this
return the plaintiff demurred on several grounds and, among others,
that the state court had no jurisdiction, power, or authority to
prevent him from using the process of the circuit court to collect
its judgment, and that the decree for an injunction rendered in the
state court was no bar to his application for relief. The court
overruled the demurrer and decided that the return was sufficient.
Judgment was thereupon rendered for the supervisors, and the
plaintiff brought the case to this Court by writ of error. Here the
judgment was reversed and the cause remanded with directions to
sustain the demurrer and take further proceedings in accordance
with the opinion of the court. In considering the grounds of the
demurrer, this Court held that the jurisdiction of a court is not
exhausted by the rendition of judgment, but continues until that
judgment is satisfied; that process subsequent to judgment is as
essential to jurisdiction as process antecedent to judgment,
observing that the judicial power would otherwise be incomplete and
entirely inadequate to the purposes for which it is conferred by
the constitution; that mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel
the levy of a tax to pay a debt contracted by a municipal
corporation, where judgment has been recovered for the debt, and
execution thereon has been returned unsatisfied, and that state
laws cannot control its process. "Repeated decisions of this
Court," was its language,
"have also determined that state laws, whether general or
enacted for the particular case, cannot in any manner limit or
affect the operation of the process or proceedings in the federal
courts."
And it concluded
Page 132 U. S. 484
its consideration of the subject by holding that the injunction
of the state court was
"inoperative to control or in any manner to affect, the process
or proceedings of a circuit court, not on account of any paramount
jurisdiction in the latter courts, but because, in their sphere of
action, circuit courts are wholly independent of the state
tribunals."
It is earnestly contended that this doctrine cannot apply where
the property brought under the control of the federal court has by
the subsequent death of the debtor become, under the statute of
Louisiana, the subject of administration in the probate courts of
the state. The doctrine, as declared in the cases cited, does not
admit of any exception to the jurisdiction of the circuit court of
the United States in such cases. Indeed, if an exception could be
made in cases in the probate court, it might be made in other
cases. Special jurisdiction in particular classes of cases might be
authorized, so as to take a large portion of subjects from the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. When property is seized to
satisfy a money judgment of the United States court, and thus
brought within its custody, it is appropriated to pay that
judgment, and the court cannot surrender its jurisdiction over the
property until it is applied to that judgment, or that judgment is
otherwise satisfied. Only the part remaining after such
appropriation goes, upon the death of the debtor, into the probate
court as his assets. All proceedings under a levy of execution have
relation back to the time of the seizure of the property.
Freeman v. Dawson, 110 U. S. 264,
110 U. S.
270.
We do not question the general doctrine laid down in
Yonley v.
Lavender, 21 Wall. 276,
88 U. S.
279-280, to the effect that the administration laws of a
state are not merely rules of practice for the courts, but laws
limiting the rights of the parties, and will be observed by the
federal courts in the enforcement of individual rights, and that
those laws, upon the death of a party, withdraw the estate of the
deceased from the operation of the execution laws of the state and
place them in the hands of his executor or administrator for the
benefit of his creditors and distributees. But that doctrine only
applies where the property has not been, previous to the death of
the debtor,
Page 132 U. S. 485
taken into custody by the federal court upon its process, and
thus specifically appropriated to the satisfaction of such
judgment. In this case, had Gomila died before the property in
question had been seized upon process issued upon a judgment
against him, the doctrine of the case cited might have been
applicable. We do not recall any case now where the federal courts
have not paid respect to the principle that all debts to be paid
out of the decedent's estate are to be established in the court to
which the law of his domicile has confided the general
administration of estates, and that judgments against the deceased,
unaccompanied by a seizure of property for their satisfaction,
stand in the same position as other claims against his estate, and
are to be paid in like manner. The jurisdiction of chancery to
enforce the equitable rights of a nonresident creditor in the case
of maladministration or nonadministration of the estate of a
decedent stands upon a different principle,
Payne v.
Hook, 7 Wall. 425; the rule prevailing, as stated
in
Hyde v. Stone,
20 How. 170,
61 U. S. 175,
that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States over
controversies between citizens of different states cannot be
impaired by the laws of the state which prescribe the modes of
redress in their courts or which regulate the distribution of their
judicial power.
Nor is there anything in the doctrine of the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal court to dispose of the property in its
custody without any intervention of the probate court, until its
judgment is satisfied, that in any way trenches upon that doctrine,
equally well established, that where a state and a federal court
have concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter, that
court which first obtains jurisdiction will retain it to the end of
the controversy, either to the exclusion of the other, or to its
exclusion so far as to render the latter's decision subordinate to
the other -- a doctrine which, with some exceptions, is recognized
both in federal and state courts.
Wallace v.
McConnell, 13 Pet. 136,
38 U. S. 143;
Taylor v.
Taintor, 16 Wall. 366,
83 U. S.
370.
Wallace v.
McConnell, 13 Pet. 136,
38 U. S. 143,
was a case brought in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Alabama, exercising the power of a circuit court,
upon the
Page 132 U. S. 486
promissory note of the defendant for $4,880. The defendant
appeared and pleaded payment and satisfaction and, issue being
joined, the case was continued until the succeeding term. The
defendant then interposed a plea of
puis darrien
continuance, alleging that as to $4,204 of the sum, the
plaintiff ought not to maintain his action because that sum had
been attached in proceedings commenced against him under the
attachment law of the state in which he was summoned as garnishee.
In those proceedings he had admitted his indebtedness beyond a
certain payment made, and the state court gave judgment against him
for the balance. To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and the
demurrer was sustained. The case being taken to this Court, it was
contended that the proceedings under the attachment law of Alabama
were sufficient to bar the action as to the amount attached, and
that therefore the demurrer ought to have been overruled. But the
Court said:
"The plea shows that the proceedings on the attachment were
instituted after the commencement of this suit. The jurisdiction of
the district court of the United States, and the right of the
plaintiff to prosecute his suit in that court having attached, that
right could not be arrested or taken away by any proceedings in
another court. This would produce a collision in the jurisdiction
of courts that would extremely embarrass the administration of
justice."
From the views expressed, it follows that the court below erred
in ordering the marshal to discontinue the advertisement for the
sale of the property seized and from proceeding with its sale, and
directing its delivery over to the executor of the deceased,
Gomila, for purposes of administration under the orders of the
Probate Court of the Parish of Orleans. Only so much of the
property or of its proceeds as may remain after the satisfaction of
the judgment under which the property was seized can be transferred
to such executor. The judgment of the court below must therefore
be
Reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to
discharge the rule.
