When an article is designated in a tariff act by a specific
name, and a duty imposed upon it by such name, general terms in a
later part of the same act, although sufficiently broad to
comprehend such article, are not applicable to it.
Under the Act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 489, embroidered linen
handkerchiefs are subject to a duty of thirty-five percent
ad
valorem as "handkerchiefs," and not to thirty percent
ad
valorem as "embroideries."
This was an action to recover duties alleged to have been
illegally exacted. Judgment for plaintiff, to which defendant sued
out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action brought to recover an alleged excess of duties
exacted by the collector at the port of New York. Defendants in
error had imported certain embroidered linen handkerchiefs, upon
which the collector, the plaintiff in error, assessed a duty of
thirty-five percent
ad valorem, under the eighth paragraph
of Schedule J of § 2502, Tit. 33, Rev.Stat., as enacted by § 6 of
the Act of March 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 489, 507, which reads:
"Brown and bleached linens, ducks, canvas, paddings, cot
bottoms, diapers, crash, huckabacks, handkerchiefs, lawns, or other
manufactures of flax, jute, or hemp, or of which flax, jute, or
hemp shall be the component material of chief value, not specially
enumerated or provided for in this act, thirty-five percentum
ad valorem."
The defendants in error paid this duty under protest,
claiming
Page 132 U. S. 159
that the goods were only liable to thirty percent
ad
valorem, under the eleventh paragraph of the same schedule, as
follows:
"Flax or linen laces, and insertings, embroideries, or
manufactures of linen, if embroidered or tamboured in the loom or
otherwise, by machinery, or with the needle or other process, and
not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, thirty
percentum
ad valorem."
Samples of the goods in question were produced in evidence, and
it appeared that the body of the cloth was linen cambric, that is,
made of flax; that the articles were known in trade as, and were in
fact embroidered handkerchiefs, and that the embroidery was a
substantial part of the handkerchief, and was done with cotton. All
the requirements as to protest, appeal, and time of bringing suit
having been complied with, the court directed a verdict for the
importers for the difference claimed, upon which judgment was
rendered, and the cause is brought here on writ of error.
The articles in controversy were embroidered linen
handkerchiefs, and it is contended in support of the judgment that
the provisions of the statute should be treated as if they read:
"On linen handkerchiefs, thirty-five percent
ad valorem,
but, if embroidered, thirty percent
ad valorem."
We cannot concur in this construction. The word "handkerchiefs"
is denominative, and not merely descriptive, and when an article is
designated by a specific name and a duty imposed upon it by such
name, general terms in a later part of the same act, although
sufficiently broad to comprehend such article, are not applicable
to it.
Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S. 112,
96 U. S. 113,
and cases cited. The eighth paragraph covers handkerchiefs, and
also "other manufactures of flax, jute, or hemp, or of which flax,
jute, or hemp shall be the component material of chief value," and
the eleventh paragraph applies to flax or linen laces, insertings,
embroideries, or manufactures of linen, if embroidered or
tamboured, and not specially enumerated or provided for in the
act.
Page 132 U. S. 160
Where manufactures of linen other than those enumerated in the
first provision are embroidered or tamboured, they are subjected to
the rate specified in the second provision. "The test of the rate
of duty is that of embroidery or not."
Arthur v. Homer,
96 U. S. 137,
96 U. S. 140.
In that case, certain linen embroidered dress patterns had been
imported into the port of New York, and were held dutiable at the
rate imposed on embroidered manufactures of linen. The Acts of
March 2, 1861, of July 14, 1862, and of June 30, 1864, and the
Revised Statutes of 1874, bearing upon the subject, were
considered. By none of these acts were such dress-patterns
specifically enumerated as subject to a different duty, but linen
handkerchiefs were, as by the act of 1883 they are, mentioned as
among the linen goods for which a certain rate was designated.
In
Solomon v. Arthur, 102 U. S. 208,
102 U. S.
211-212, MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, delivering the opinion of
the Court, makes the distinction between the use of a description
applicable to many kinds of goods having different names, and the
use of the specific name itself, entirely clear, and upon that
distinction the disposition of the case turned.
We consider that distinction applicable here, and hold that
these handkerchiefs, although embroidered, did not fall within the
second provision.
The judgment must be
Reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to grant
a new trial, and it is so ordered.