Searls, the appellee, filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Michigan against Worden
for infringement of letters patent. After hearing, a decree was
entered in that case in his favor for the recovery of $24,960.31
damages and costs. Worden appealed to this Court, but gave no
supersedeas bond. Thereupon execution issued on the decree, which
was levied on certain lots, the property of Ballard, the appellant.
Searls then filed his bill in the circuit court in aid of the
execution, praying to have a conveyance by Worden to Ballard of the
lots levied upon set aside, as made to defraud Worden's creditors.
On the final hearing of that case, the conveyance was set aside as
fraudulent, from which Ballard took this appeal. Meanwhile,
Worden's appeal in the patent suit was reached on the docket in
this Court, and, after hearing, the judgment below was reversed,
and the cause was remanded to the
Page 130 U. S. 51
circuit court with directions to dismiss the bill.
See
121 U. S. 121 U.S.
14. Thereupon Ballard moved in this case, on the records in the two
cases, and on affidavits to reverse the decree of the court below
and to remand this cause to the circuit court with direction to
dismiss the bill.
Held that if such a course could
properly be taken in any case, it would be improper to take it in
this case, but that, as the appellant might be subjected to great
injustice if the cause should go to hearing on the appeal in the
present condition of the record, the cause should be remanded with
instructions to the Circuit Court to allow the defendant below to
file such supplemental bill as he might be advised in the nature of
a bill of review, or for the purpose of suspending or avoiding the
decree upon the new matter arising from the reversal of the former
decree in
Worden v. Searls.
This was a motion to remand the cause with directions to the
circuit court to dismiss the bill. The case is stated in the
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant has made a motion that the decree appealed from in
this case, so far as it affects the said appellant, be reversed,
and that the cause may be remanded to the circuit court, with
direction to dismiss the bill. This motion proposes that the decree
be reversed without argument of the cause, in view of extrinsic
facts, which are made to appear by the records of this Court and of
the circuit court, and by affidavits. If such a course can be
properly taken in any case, we think
Page 130 U. S. 52
it would be improper in the present, since the decree may be
perfectly correct and free from objection on the facts of the case
as they appear upon the record, and it is possible to be correct
notwithstanding the facts alleged by the appellant. These facts,
however, are of such a character that the appellant may be
subjected to great injustice if the cause should go to hearing on
the appeal in the present condition of the record, and as they have
occurred since the appeal was taken, there seems to be no mode of
affording relief to the appellant except by sending the cause back
to the circuit court for the purpose of allowing supplementary
proceedings to be had in that court.
The facts as stated by the appellant, and not denied by the
appellee, are as follows:
"On the 12th day of July, 1880, Anson Searls, the appellee in
this cause, filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Michigan his bill of complaint against Alva
Worden and John S. Worden, for the infringement of a patent, and
such proceedings were had in the cause that on the 5th day of
September, 1883, a decree was entered in said cause in said circuit
court whereby it was decreed that the said Alva Worden and John S.
Worden infringed the patent, and should pay over to the said Anson
Searls $24,960.31."
"That upon the entry of said decree, the defendants appealed the
case to this Court. But the defendants Alva Worden and John S.
Worden were unable to give the necessary bond to operate as a
supersedeas bond upon said appeal."
"On the 17th of September, 1883, the complainant issued an
execution on his decree and placed it in the hands of the marshal
of said district."
"On the 18th of September, 1883, the marshal, under the
execution, levied upon certain lots in the City of Ypsilanti,
County of Washtenaw, and upon certain lands in the Town of Sumpter,
County of Wayne, all in the State of Michigan, in the Eastern
District thereof, the property of the said appellant, Harrison H.
Ballard, and on other lands in the City of Ypsilanti, belonging to
the said Alva Worden and John S.
Page 130 U. S. 53
Worden, but which were mortgaged to Mary Ann Andrews, Henry M.
Curtis, Henry Van Tuyl, and Charles King."
"That on the 10th day of October, 1883, the said Anson Searls,
in aid of his execution against the Wordens, filed in the said
Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of
Michigan his bill of complaint against Harrison H. Ballard, Mary A.
Andrews, Henry M. Curtis, Henry Van Tuyl, Charles King, Alva
Worden, and John S. Worden, to set aside as fraudulent and void, as
to the creditors of the said Alva Worden and John S. Worden, the
conveyances under which the said Harrison H. Ballard held the lands
so levied upon, and also the mortgages given by the said Alva
Worden and John S. Worden on the said lands belonging to them to
the said Mary Ann Andrews, Henry M. Curtis, Henry Van Tuyl, and
Charles King. That such proceedings were had in said last-mentioned
cause that the cause was brought to a final hearing, and a decree
entered on the 24th day of November, A.D. 1884, in which it was
decreed that the mortgages given by the said defendants Alva Worden
and John S. Worden to the said defendants Mary A. Andrews, Henry M.
Curtis, Henry Van Tuyl, and Charles King, were good and valid liens
upon the lands mentioned therein, and that the several conveyances
to Harrison H. Ballard were fraudulent and void as against the
creditors of the said Alva Worden and John S. Worden."
"Thereupon the said defendant Harrison H. Ballard prayed an
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse the
said decree as far as it related to him."
"That the said appeal was allowed, and the amount of the appeal
bond was fixed at the sum of $8,500. That the said bond was duly
executed and approved by one of the judges of the said circuit
court, and filed in the office of the clerk of said circuit court.
That on the 8th day of October, 1885, the clerk of the said Circuit
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan
transmitted the transcript of the record in the case of
Anson
Searls v. Harrison H. Ballard et al. to the clerk of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and that the said transcript
was filed in the office of the Clerk of
Page 130 U. S. 54
this Court on the 13th day of October, 1885, and now stands on
the docket for the October term, 1888, as No. 144."
"That since the appeal in this case, the appeal in the original
case of
Alva Worden and John S. Worden, appellants v. Anson
Searls has been heard in this Court, and a decree entered
thereon on the 27th of March, 1887, wherein and whereby it was,
among other things, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the final
decree of the said circuit court in this cause be, and the same is
hereby, reversed, with costs, and that the same be remanded to the
said circuit court with a direction to dismiss the bill with
costs."
"That on the 8th day of August, 1887, this Court issued its
mandate in the said case of
Alva Worden et al., appellants v.
Anson Searls to the said circuit court, in which, among other
things, the said Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Michigan was directed to dismiss the bill, with
costs."
"That said mandate was filed in the said circuit court on the 3d
day of October, 1887."
"That on the 3d day of September, 1888, a decree was entered in
pursuance of said mandate in the case of
Anson Searls v. Alva
Worden and John S. Worden (the original case), dismissing the
bill of complaint, with costs."
It is apparent from this statement that the whole basis and
foundation of the present suit has disappeared by the decree
rendered in the former case of
Worden v. Searls, reported
in
121 U. S. 14.
Surely there ought to be some mode of relieving a party in such a
case. The appellee is endeavoring to collect the amount recovered
by a decree which has been reversed, and in a case in which his
bill has been dismissed on the merits. The object of the present
suit is to aid the execution of that former decree by having
declared void certain conveyances of property by the defendants,
which the appellee has caused to be levied on for the satisfaction
of the decree. If the former decree had been reversed before the
taking of the present appeal, the appellant could have instituted
supplementary proceedings in the circuit court for obtaining the
benefit of that reversal. The conveyances sought
Page 130 U. S. 55
to be set aside were good as between the parties, and only void
as to creditors, and as the appellee, by the reversal of his
decree, ceased to be a creditor, his bill to have the conveyances
set aside had no longer any ground to stand on. A supplemental
proceeding of some kind therefore would have been the right of the
defendant, the present appellant. But, as the case had been removed
to this Court by appeal before that decree of reversal was
rendered, such a proceeding was out of his power. Nor could it be
taken in this Court, where the case was pending on appeal, for this
Court cannot entertain proceedings that require the exercise of
original jurisdiction, except in the few cases pointed out in the
Constitution.
The only course which can be properly pursued is to remand the
cause to the circuit court with instructions to allow the appellant
to file a supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill of review or a
bill to suspend or avoid the operation of the decree, according to
the mode pointed out by Lord Redesdale in his work on Equity
Pleading. He says, on page 86:
"But if a case were to arise in which the new matter discovered
could not be evidence of any matter in issue in the original case,
and yet clearly demonstrated error in the decree, it should seem
that it might be used as ground for a bill of review, if relief
could not otherwise be obtained."
And on page 95, he says:
"5. The operation of a decree signed and enrolled has been
suspended in special circumstances, or avoided by matter subsequent
to the decree, upon a new bill for that purpose,"
and he gives an instance occurring in the time of Charles II.
These views are adopted by Mr. Justice Story in his work on Equity
Pleading.
See § 415, and note, and § 428. We do not decide
what precise form such a proceeding should take. The appellant will
be advised by his counsel in this regard.
The appellee, in opposition to the appellant's motion, has
produced the certificates of the Marshal of the United States for
the Eastern District of Michigan showing that on the 10th day of
December, 1884, he sold the property in dispute, or some part
thereof, to certain persons under the execution issued upon the
decree in the case of
Anson Searls v. Alva Worden and John
Worden (which was reversed by this Court,
Page 130 U. S. 56
as before stated), and that the purchasers would be entitled to
a deed of said lands, and the sales would become absolute at the
expiration of fifteen months unless previously redeemed as
prescribed by the statute of Michigan.
It is possible that these sales may complicate the inquiry to be
made by the court upon the supplemental proceedings of the
appellant, but we do not see that they can preclude such
proceedings. It is not shown that the purchasers have advanced any
money on the faith of the purchases, and it is possible that the
appellant can show that they were made for the benefit of the
appellee. In either case, the sales would be liable to be set aside
on the reversal of the decree. Should the circuit court deem it
proper to require that the purchasers be made parties to the
supplemental proceedings, the facts of the case could be fully
elicited and right could be done without prejudice to any of the
parties.
Our decision is that the cause be remanded to the circuit
court with instructions to allow the appellant, defendant below, to
file such supplemental bill as he may be advised in the nature of a
bill of review or for the purpose of suspending or avoiding the
decree upon the new matter arising from the reversal of the decree
in the former case of Anson Searls v. Alva Worden and John Worden,
and that such proceedings be had thereon as justice and equity may
require, and it is so ordered.