The provision in the Code of Iowa, § 1289, which authorizes the
recovery of "double the value of the stock killed or damages caused
thereto" by a railroad when the injury took place at a point on the
road where the corporation had a right to erect a fence and failed
to do so, and when it was not "occasioned by the willful act of the
owner or his agent," is not in conflict with the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States either as
depriving the company of property without due process of law or as
denying to it the equal protection of the laws.
Corporations are persons within the meaning of the clauses in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution concerning the
deprivation of property, and concerning the equal protection of the
laws.
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,
118 U. S. 394, and
Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.
S. 181, followed.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not limit the
subjects in relation to which the police power of the state may be
exercised for the protection of its citizens.
Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U. S. 27,
Soon
Page 129 U. S. 27
Hinq v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, and
Missouri Pacific Railway v. Humes, 115 U.
S. 512, considered and followed.
The propriety and legality of the imposition of punitive damages
for a violation of duty have been recognized by repeated judicial
decisions for more than a century.
The case is stated in the opinion of the court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes before us from the Circuit Court of Kossuth
County, Iowa, the highest court of that state in which the
controversy between the parties could be determined. Rev.Stat. §
709. It was an action for the value of three hogs run over and
killed by the engine and cars of the Minneapolis and St. Louis
Railway Company, a corporation existing under the laws of Minnesota
and Iowa and operating a railroad in the latter state. The killing
was at a point where the defendant had the right to fence its road.
The action was brought before a justice of the peace of Kossuth
County. Proof having been made of the killing of the animals, and
of their value, and that notice of the fact, with affidavit of the
injury, had been served upon an officer of the company in the
county where the injury was committed more than thirty days before
the commencement of the action, the justice gave judgment for the
plaintiff against the company for $24, double the proved value of
the animals. The case was then removed to the Circuit Court of
Kossuth County, where the judgment was affirmed. To review this
latter judgment, the case is brought here on writ of error.
The judgment rendered by the justice was authorized by § 1289 of
the Code of Iowa, which is as follows:
"Any corporation operating a railway that fails to fence the
same against livestock running at large at all points where such
right to fence exists shall be liable to the owner of any such
stock injured or killed by reason of the want of such fence
Page 129 U. S. 28
for the value of the property or damage caused, unless the same
was occasioned by the willful act of the owner or his agent, and in
order to recover, it shall only be necessary for the owner to prove
the injury or destruction of his property, and if such corporation
neglects to pay he value of or damage done to such stock within
thirty days after notice in writing, accompanied by an affidavit of
such injury or destruction, has been served on any officer, station
or ticket agent employed in the management of the business of the
corporation in the county where the injury complained of was
committed, such owner shall be entitled to recover double the value
of the stock killed or damages caused thereto."
The validity of this law was assailed in the state court, and is
assailed here, as being in conflict with the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in
that it deprives the railway company of property without due
process of law so far as it allows a recovery of double the value
of the animals killed by its trains, and in that it denies to the
company the equal protection of the laws by subjecting it to a
different liability for injuries committed by it from that to which
all other persons are subjected.
It is contended by counsel as the basis of his argument, and we
admit the soundness of his position, that corporations are persons
within the meaning of the clause in question. It was so held in
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.,
118 U. S. 394,
118 U. S. 396,
and the doctrine was reasserted in
Pembina Mining Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181,
125 U. S. 189.
We admit also, as contended by him, that corporations can invoke
the benefits of provisions of the Constitution and laws which
guaranty to persons the enjoyment of property, or afford to them
the means for its protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously
affecting it.
We will consider the objections of the railway company in the
reverse order in which they are stated by counsel. And first, as to
the alleged conflict of the law of Iowa with the clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ordaining that no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
That clause does undoubtedly prohibit
Page 129 U. S. 29
discriminating and partial legislation by any state in favor of
particular persons as against others in like condition. Equality of
protection implies not merely equal accessibility to the courts for
the prevention or redress of wrongs and the enforcement of rights,
but equal exemption with others in like condition from charges and
liabilities of every kind. But the clause does not limit, nor was
it designed to limit, the subjects upon which the police power of
the state may be exerted. The state can now, as before, prescribe
regulations for the health, good order, and safety of society, and
adopt such measures as will advance its interests and prosperity.
And to accomplish this end, special legislation must be resorted to
in numerous cases providing against accidents, disease, and danger
in the varied forms in which they may come. The nature and extent
of such legislation will necessarily depend upon the judgment of
the legislature as to the security needed by society. When the
calling, profession, or business of parties is unattended with
danger to others, little legislation will be necessary respecting
it. Thus, in the purchase and sale of most articles of general use,
persons may be left to exercise their own good sense and judgment;
but when the calling or profession or business is attended with
danger, or requires a certain degree of scientific knowledge upon
which others must rely, then legislation properly steps in to
impose conditions upon its exercise. Thus, if one is engaged in the
manufacture or sale of explosive or inflammable articles, or in the
preparation or sale of medicinal drugs, legislation for the
security of society may prescribe the terms on which he will be
permitted to carry on the business and the liabilities he will
incur from neglect of them. The concluding clause of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment simply requires that such
legislation shall treat alike all persons brought under subjection
to it. The equal protection of the law is afforded when this is
accomplished. Such has been the ruling of this Court in numerous
instances where that clause has been invoked against legislation
supposed to be in conflict with it. Thus, in
Barbier v.
Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, it
was objected that a municipal ordinance of San Francisco
prohibiting washing and ironing
Page 129 U. S. 30
in public laundries within certain designated limits of the city
between the hours of ten at night and six in the morning was in
conflict with that amendment in that it discriminated between
laborers engaged in the laundry business and those engaged in other
kinds of business, and between laborers employed within the
designated limits and those without them. But the Court held that
the provision was merely a police regulation; that it might be a
necessary measure of protection in a city composed largely of
wooden buildings, like San Francisco, that occupations in which
fires are constantly required should cease during certain hours at
night, and of the necessity of such a regulation that municipal
body was the exclusive judge; that the same authority which directs
the cessation of labor must necessarily prescribe the limits within
which it shall be enforced, as it does the limits within which
wooden buildings must not be constructed, and that restrictions of
this kind, though necessarily special in character, do not furnish
ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons or
property under the same circumstances and conditions. "Class
legislation," said the Court,
"discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited,
but legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited
in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it
affects alike all persons similarly situated, is not within the
amendment."
In
Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.
S. 703, an objection was taken to a similar ordinance of
San Francisco that it made an unwarrantable discrimination against
persons engaged in the laundry business because persons in other
kinds of business were not required to cease from labor during the
same hours at night. But, the Court said, there may be no risks
attending the business of others, certainly not as great as where
fires are constantly required, and that specific regulations for
one kind of business, which may be necessary for the protection of
the public, can never be the just ground of complaint because like
restrictions are not imposed upon business of a different kind.
"The discriminations, which are open to objection," the Court
added,
"are those where persons engaged in the same business are
subjected to different restrictions,
Page 129 U. S. 31
or are held entitled to different privileges under the same
conditions. It is only then that the discrimination can be said to
impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of
the law."
In
Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Humes,
115 U. S. 512, a
statute of Missouri requiring every railroad corporation within it
to erect and maintain fences and cattle guards on the sides of its
roads where the same passed through, along, or a adjoining enclosed
or cultivated fields or unenclosed lands, and if it did not, making
it liable in double the amount of damages to animals caused thereby
was assailed as in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment on the
same grounds urged in the present case -- namely that it deprived
the defendant of property without due process of law so far as it
allowed a recovery of damages for stock killed or injured in excess
of its value, and also that it denied to the defendant the equal
protection of the laws by imposing upon it a liability for injuries
committed which was not imposed upon other persons. But the Court
said that authority for requiring railroads to erect fences on the
sides of their roads, so as to keep horses, cattle, and other
animals from going upon them, was found in the general police power
of the state to provide against accidents to life and property in
any business or employment, whether under the charge of private
persons or of corporations; that in few instances could that power
be more wisely or beneficently exercised than in compelling
railroad corporations to enclose their roads with fences having
gates at crossings, and cattle guards; that they are absolutely
essential to give protection against accidents in thickly settled
portions of the country; that the omission to erect and maintain
them, in the face of the law, would justly be deemed gross
negligence, and that if injuries to property are committed,
something beyond compensatory damages might be awarded in
punishment of it. Referring to the rule which prevails of allowing
juries to assess exemplary or punitive damages where injuries have
resulted from neglect of duties, the Court said:
"The statutes of nearly every state of the union provide for the
increase of damages where the injury complained of results
Page 129 U. S. 32
from the neglect of duties imposed for the better security of
life and property, and make that increase in many cases double, in
some cases treble, and even quadruple, the actual damages. And
experience favors this legislation as the most efficient mode of
preventing, with the least inconvenience, the commission of
injuries. The decisions of the highest courts have affirmed the
validity of such legislation. The injury actually received is often
so small that in many cases no effort would be made by the sufferer
to obtain redress if the private interest were not supported by the
imposition of punitive damages."
And as to the objection that the statute of Missouri denied to
the defendant the equal protection of the laws, the Court said that
it made no discrimination against any railroad company in its
requirement; that each company was subject to the same liabilities,
and from each the same security was exacted by the erection of
fences, gates, and cattle guards, when its road passed through,
along, or adjoining enclosed or cultivated fields or unenclosed
lands, and that there was no evasion of the rule of equality where
all companies are subjected to the same duties and liabilities
under similar circumstances.
In
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.
S. 205, a statute of Kansas providing that
"Every railroad company doing business in this state should be
liable for all damages done to any employee of such company in
consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any
mismanagement of its engineers or other employees, to any person
sustaining such damage"
was assailed on the ground that it was in conflict with the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in that it deprived the
company of its property without due process of law and denied to it
the equal protection of the laws. In support of the first position,
the company referred to the rule of law that prevailed previously
in Kansas and some other states exempting from liability an
employer for injuries to employees caused by the incompetency or
negligence of a fellow servant, and contended that the law of
Kansas, in creating on the part of the railroad company a liability
in such cases not previously existing, in the enforcement of
which
Page 129 U. S. 33
their property might be taken authorized the taking of property
without due process of law and imposed a special liability upon
railway companies that was not imposed upon other persons, and thus
denied to the former the equal protection of the laws. But the
Court answered that the law in question applied only to injuries
subsequently committed, and that it would not be contended that the
state could not prescribe the liabilities under which corporations
created by its laws should conduct their business in the future
where no limitation was placed upon its power in that respect by
their charters; that whatever hardship or injustice there might be
in any law thus applicable to the future must be remedied by
legislative enactment; that the objection that the railroad company
was denied the equal protection of the laws rested upon the theory
that legislation special in its character was within the
constitutional inhibition, but that, so far from such being the
fact, the greater part of all legislation was special, either in
the objects sought to be attained by it or in the extent of its
application; that when such legislation applied to particular
bodies or associations, imposing upon them additional liabilities,
it was not open to the objection that it denied to them the equal
protection of the laws if all persons brought under its influence
were treated alike under the same conditions; that the hazardous
character of the business of operating a railway called for special
legislation, with respect to railroad corporations, having for its
object the protection of their employees as well as the safety of
the public, which was not required by the business of other
corporations not subject to similar dangers to their employees, and
that the legislation in question met a particular necessity, and
all railroad corporations without distinction were subject to the
same liabilities.
From these adjudications it is evident that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not limit the subjects in relation to which the
police power of the state may be exercised for the protection of
its citizens. That this power should be applied to railroad
companies is reasonable and just. The tremendous force brought into
action in running railway cars renders it absolutely essential that
every precaution should be taken against
Page 129 U. S. 34
accident by collision not only with other trains, but with
animals. A collision with animals may be attended with more serious
injury than their destruction; it may derail the cars and cause the
death or serious injury of passengers. Where these companies have
the right to fence in their tracks and thus secure their roads from
cattle going upon them, it would seem to be a wise precaution on
their part to put up such guards against accidents at places where
cattle are allowed to roam at large. The statute of Iowa, in fixing
an absolute liability upon them for injuries to cattle committed in
the operation of their roads by reason of the want of such guards,
would seem to treat this precaution as a duty. It is true that, by
the common law, the owner of land was not compelled to enclose it
so as to prevent the cattle of others from coming upon it, and it
may be that in the absence of legislation on the subject, a railway
corporation is not required to fence its railway, the common law as
to enclosing one's land having been established long before
railways were known. But the obligation of the defendant railway
company to use reasonable means to keep its track clear, so as to
insure safety in the movement of its trains, is plainly implied by
the statute of Iowa, which also indicates that the putting up of
fences would be such reasonable means of safety. If, therefore, the
company omits those means, the omission may well be regarded as
evidence of such culpable negligence as to justify punitive damages
where injury is committed, and if punitive damages in such cases
may be given, the legislature may prescribe the extent to which
juries may go in awarding them.
The law of Iowa under consideration is less open to objection
than that of Missouri, which was sustained in the case cited above.
There, double damages could be claimed by the owner whenever his
cattle had strayed upon the track of the railway company for want
of fences on its sides, and had been killed or injured by the
railway trains. Here, such damages can be claimed for like injuries
to cattle only where the company has received notice and affidavit
of the injury committed thirty days before the commencement of the
action and has persisted in refusing to pay for the value of the
property
Page 129 U. S. 35
destroyed or the damage caused. There must be not merely
negligence of the company in not providing guards against accidents
of the kind, but also its refusal to respond for the actual damage
suffered. Without the additional amount allowed, there would be few
instances of prosecutions of railroad companies where the value of
the animals killed or injured by them is small, as in this case;
the cost of the proceeding would only augment the loss of the
injured party. As said in the Missouri case cited:
"The injury actually received is often so small that in many
cases no effort would be made by the sufferer to obtain redress if
the private interest were not supported by the imposition of
punitive damages."
The legislation in question has been sustained in numerous
instances by the Supreme Court of Iowa. In
Welsh v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 53 Ia. 632, which was an
action to recover double the value of a horse alleged to have been
killed by one of the defendant's engines at a point where it had
the right to fence the road, the court below instructed the jury
that it was the duty of the company to fence its road against
livestock running at large at all points where such right to fence
existed, and it was objected to this instruction that no such duty
existed, upon which the supreme court of the state, to which the
case was taken, said:
"While it is true the statute does not impose an abstract duty
or obligation upon railroad companies to fence their roads, yet as
to livestock running at large, a failure to fence fixes an absolute
liability for injuries occurring in the operation of the road by
reason of the want of such fence. The corporation owes a duty to
the owners of livestock running at large either to fence its road
or to pay for injuries resulting from the neglect to fence."
And in
Bennett v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway
Co., 61 Ia. 355, the same court said:
"We think the only proper construction of the statute is that in
order to escape liability, the company must not only fence, but
keep the road sufficiently fenced, and this has been more than once
ruled."
As it is thus the duty of the railway company to keep its track
free from animals, its
Page 129 U. S. 36
neglect to do so by adopting the most reasonable means for that
purpose -- the fencing of its roadway, as indicated by the statute
of Iowa -- justly subjects it, as already stated, to punitive
damages where injuries are committed by reason of such neglect. The
imposition of punitive or exemplary damages in such cases cannot be
opposed as in conflict with the prohibition against the deprivation
of property without due process of law. It is only one mode of
imposing a penalty for the violation of duty, and its propriety and
legality have been recognized, as stated in
Day v.
Woodworth, 13 How. 363,
54 U. S. 371,
by repeated judicial decisions for more than a century. Its
authorization by the law in question to the extent of doubling the
value of the property destroyed, or of the damage caused, upon
refusal of the railway company, for thirty days after notice of the
injury committed, to pay the actual value of the property or actual
damage cannot therefore be justly assailed as infringing upon the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Judgment affirmed.