Bonds issued by Franklin County, Illinois, to the Belleville and
Eldorado Railroad Company, in November, 1877, held invalid.
The vote of the people of the county in favor of subscribing to
the stock of the company was taken in September, 1869, the
subscription to be payable in bonds, which were to be issued only
on compliance with a specified condition as to the time of
completing the road through the county. At the time of the vote,
the Act of April 16, 1869, was in force authorizing the county to
prescribe the conditions on which the subscription should be made
and declaring that it should not be valid until such condition
precedent should have been complied with. The bonds were issued
without a compliance with the condition.
Held that, under
the Constitution of Illinois, which took effect July 2, 1870, the
issuing of the bonds was unlawful because it had not been
authorized by a vote of the people of the county taken prior to the
adoption of the constitution.
Before the bonds were issued, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in
Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 Ill. 292, had decided the
meaning of the Act of April 16, 1869, to be that bonds issued
without a compliance with such condition precedent were invalid
even in the hands of innocent holders without notice.
The fact that the bonds were registered by the state auditor
under the Act of April 16, 1869, did not make them valid.
In equity to have certain bonds issued by the appellee declared
void and to restrain the collection of taxes to pay them. Decree in
complainant's favor, from which the respondent appealed. The case
is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 128 U. S. 527
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity commenced on the 4th of August, 1880,
by a bill in equity filed in the Franklin County Circuit Court, of
the State of Illinois, by the County of Franklin, as plaintiff,
against the Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Company, the county
clerk of Franklin County, the sheriff and collector of that county,
the Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Illinois, the
treasurer of that state, four individuals alleged to be holders of
bonds issued by the county, and the unknown holders of others of
such bonds.
The bill was founded upon the alleged invalidity of the bonds.
It sought an injunction to restrain the auditor of the state and
the clerk of the county from taking measures to collect taxes to
pay the interest on the bonds, and to restrain the railroad company
and the holders of the bonds from bringing suit against the county
on any of the coupons, and to restrain the state treasurer from
paying the coupons, and to restrain the sheriff and collector of
the county from collecting any more taxes to pay the interest on
the bonds and from paying to the state treasurer any money already
collected to pay interest on them, and prayed for a decree
declaring an election held in the county on the 11th of September,
1869, on the question of a subscription by the county to the
capital
Page 128 U. S. 528
stock of the railroad company, to have been void, and a
subscription made by the county court of the county on the 6th of
November, 1869, to the capital stock of the company, and all
amendments, modifications, and alterations of such subscription, to
have been void, and a so-called subscription of $150,000 to the
capital stock of the railroad company, made on the 13th of
December, 1876, and an attempt made on the 12th of November, 1877,
to amend such subscription, and to contract for the building of the
railroad, to have been void, and the bonds and coupons to be void,
and for a decree requiring the holders of them to surrender them
for destruction, and for a perpetual injunction to the above
effect, and for general relief.
On the 27th of October, 1880, on due proof of personal service
of process on the railroad company, the county clerk of the county,
the sheriff and collector of the county, the auditor of public
accounts of the state, and the state treasurer, and on proof of due
publication as to the defendants named in the bill as holders of
the bonds, and as to the unknown holders of them, and there having
been no appearance for any defendant, the cause was heard on the
bill taken as confessed, and a decree made adjudging the invalidity
of the bonds, and granting the relief asked for in the bill.
On the 27th of October, 1881, the German Savings Bank, of
Davenport, Iowa, as the owner of nine of the bonds of the county,
of $1,000 each (and of eighteen others of the bonds, of $1,000
each, not involved in the present appeal) was, on a motion made to
the state court, permitted to defend the suit and to answer the
bill. It filed its answer in that court, setting up that it had
purchased the bonds in good faith, for a valuable consideration,
and without notice of any defense or objection to the validity of
any of them, before they were due and before any default had been
made in the payment of any interest on any of them, and before the
suit was brought, and that the bonds were valid. At the same time,
it filed a petition and a bond for the removal of the cause into
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
Illinois. A copy of the record from the state court was filed in
the
Page 128 U. S. 529
circuit court on the 21st of December, 1881, and the cause
afterwards proceeded therein.
A replication was filed to the answer of the savings bank,
various holders of the bonds were made defendants and answered, and
some of them filed cross-bills, proofs were taken, and it was
stipulated between the parties that each defendant was at the
commencement of the suit, a
bona fide holder of the bonds
specified in the respective answers, and that they purchased the
same for value, without any notice of defense.
The nine bonds held by the savings bank, involved in the present
appeal, are all alike except as to the number, and each one has
upon it a certificate of the Auditor of Public Accounts of the
State of Illinois, the bond and the certificate being in the form
following:
"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, STATE OF ILLINOIS"
"
No. 15 Franklin County, eight percent railroad bond
$1,000"
"Know all men by these presents that the County of Franklin, in
the State of Illinois, acknowledges itself to be indebted to the
Belleville and Eldorado Railroad Company, or bearer, in the sum of
one thousand dollars, which sum the said county, for value
received, promises to pay said company, or bearer, in the City and
State of New York, twenty years after date (payable at any time
after five years, and before this bond becomes due at the option of
said County of Franklin), with interest thereon from and after the
fifteenth day of November, A.D. 1877 at the rate of eight percent
per annum, payable semiannually on the first days of January and
July of each year, on the presentation and surrender at the place
in the said City of New York where the Treasurer of the State of
Illinois pays the interest and debt of said state, of the coupons
hereto attached, as they severally become due."
"This bond is one of a series of fifty of like tenor, for the
sum of one thousand dollars each, numbered from one to fifty,
inclusive, issued under the provisions of an act of the General
Assembly of the State of Illinois, entitled 'An act to authorize
cities and counties to subscribe stock to railroads,' approved
Page 128 U. S. 530
November 6th, A.D. 1849, and authorized by a majority of the
qualified voters of said County of Franklin at an election held in
said county on the 11th day of September, A.D. 1869, in accordance
with the provisions of said act."
"In testimony whereof, the said County of Franklin has executed
this bonds, by the chairman of the board of supervisors, under the
order of the board of supervisors of said county, signing his name
hereto, and by the clerk of said board, under the order thereof,
attesting the same, and affixing hereto the seal of said county.
This done at the office of the clerk of said board, this 13th day
of November, A.D. 1877."
"JOHN J. ST. CLAIR"
"
Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Franklin Co.,
Illinois"
"[Seal] EVAN FITZGERRELL"
"
Clerk of Board of Supervisors of Franklin Co.,
Illinois"
"AUDITOR's OFFICE, ILLINOIS"
"SPRINGFIELD, October 24th, 1879"
"I, Thomas B. Needles, Auditor of Public Accounts of the State
of Illinois, do hereby certify that the within bond has been
registered in this office this day pursuant to the provisions of an
act entitled 'An act to fund and provide for paying the railroad
debts of counties, townships, cities, and towns,' in force April
16th, 1869."
"In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my name, and affix
the seal of my office at Springfield, the day and year first above
written."
"[Seal] [Signed] T. B. NEEDLES"
"
Auditor Public Accounts"
The nine bonds involved in this appeal were purchased by the
savings bank at Davenport, Iowa -- four of them for 99 percent and
accrued interest, on the 13th of April, 1880, and five of them at
the same price, on the 15th of May, 1880. None of them, and none of
the coupons on them at the time of purchase, was overdue, and the
first installment of interest which fell due on them after they
were purchases by the Savings Bank was duly paid by the county.
Page 128 U. S. 531
A copy taken from the records in the office of the clerk of the
county, of all the proceedings of the county court and of the board
of supervisors of the county relative to the election and to the
subscription by the county to the stock of the railroad company,
was put in evidence. On final hearing, the circuit court made a
decree on July 3, 1883, adjudging that the nine bonds in question
were issued without authority of law and were void and awarding a
perpetual injunction in regard to them, as prayed in the bill. From
that decree the savings bank has appealed.
The record shows the following facts:
On the 24th of July, 1869, the County Court of Franklin County,
purporting to do so under the authority of an act of the General
Assembly of Illinois entitled "An act to incorporate the Belleville
and Eldorado Railroad Company," approved February 22, 1861, and an
Act of the General Assembly approved November 6, 1849, authorizing
counties to take stock in railroad companies, made an order
submitting to the voters of the county, to be voted upon on the
11th of September, 1869, a proposition to subscribe $200,000 to the
capital stock of that company, payable in county bonds at par, due
in 20 years from date, with interest, payable semiannually at the
rate of eight percent per annum, and to be of denominations of not
less than $1,000 each, the bonds to be issued upon certain
specified conditions, and not until they were complied with, one of
the conditions being
"that said railroad shall be commenced in the County of Franklin
within nine months from the date of said election and completed
through the county by the 1st day of June, 1872."
On the 6th of November, 1869, the county court made an order
reciting that the election had been held on the 11th of September,
1869, in pursuance of the order of July 24, 1869; that at such
election the qualified voters of the county did by a majority of
their votes (taking as a standard the number of votes cast for
county officers at the last general election previous to such vote
had upon the question of subscription) authorize the county court
of the county to subscribe the sum of $200,000 to the capital stock
of the railroad
Page 128 U. S. 532
company, and declaring that, by authority of such vote and of
the acts of February 22, 1861, and November 6, 1849, the County of
Franklin "does hereby subscribe" to the capital stock of the
company $100,000 by virtue of the Act of February 22, 1861, and the
further sum of $100,000 by virtue of the Act of November 6, 1849,
the stock to be payable in the bonds of the county, to be due in 20
years after the date thereof, and to draw interest, payable
semiannually at the rate of eight percent per annum, and to be of
the denomination of not less than $1,000 each. The order
proceeded:
"It is further ordered and considered by the court that said
bonds are to be issued upon the following conditions, and never
until they are complied with -- that is to say . . ."
One of the conditions specified was "that said railroad shall be
commenced in the County of Franklin within nine months from the
date of said election, and completed through the county by the 1st
day of June, A.D. 1872." There was nothing in that order of
November 6, 1869, which authorized or directed any person to make
any subscription to stock on behalf of the county on the books of
the railroad company, nor is there any evidence in the record
showing that that company ever assented to or accepted any
subscription under that order.
On the 6th of February, 1871, the county court made an order
reciting the fact of the subscription directed to be made by the
order of November 6, 1869, and that it required that the railroad
should be commenced in the County of Franklin within nine months
from the date of the election authorizing the subscription to be
made -- namely by the 11th of June, 1870, and be completed through
the county by the 1st of June, 1872 -- and that the time for
commencing the building of the road had expired, and it therefore
ordered that the time for commencing and completing the road be
extended, and that the subscription be made on the stock books of
the railroad company "upon the following terms and conditions, and
not until they are fully complied with," namely, the $200,000 to be
payable in the bonds of the county at par, to be due in 20 years
from the date thereof, and to draw interest, payable semiannually
at the rate of eight percent per annum, and to
Page 128 U. S. 533
be of the denomination of not less than $1,000 each; that the
railroad should be commenced in the County of Franklin on or before
January 1, 1872, and be completed through the county by the 1st of
January, 1874; with other conditions. This order of February 6,
1871, was the first order of the county court which authorized a
subscription to stock to be made on the books of the railroad
company; but the record contains no evidence that the subscription
so authorized by that order was ever made on the books of the
company or that the company assented to or accepted such
subscription.
On the 9th of March, 1871, the county court made an order
reciting the fact of the election of the 11th of September, 1869,
and that a majority of the legal voters of the county voted for the
subscription of $200,000 to the stock of the company, and it then
stated that the county did, by such order of the 9th of March,
1871, subscribe the sum of $200,000 for 2,000 shares of the capital
stock of the company, the stock to be subscribed and the bonds to
be issued "upon the following conditions, and not until they are
fully complied with," the stock to be paid for in Franklin County
bonds at par, payable in 20 years after date, with interest at
eight percent per annum, payable semiannually in New York, and to
be of the denomination of $1,000 each, with interest coupons
attached. It then specified when the bonds were to be delivered,
and one of the conditions prescribed was: "The said railroad to be
commenced within the county in one year, and completed through the
county within three years from the date of this subscription."
On the 13th of December, 1876, the board of supervisors of the
county, which had taken the place of the county court in respect to
the matter in question, made an order which recited the fact of the
election of September 11, 1869, and the result and terms of the
vote, and then proceeded to state that the board, by authority of
the vote and of the acts of February 22, 1861, and November 6,
1849, did thereby subscribe to the capital stock of the company
$150,000, being $75,000 by virtue of each of the two acts, payable
in bonds of the county at par, the bonds to be due in 20 years, and
to be payable after the expiration of five years from their date at
the option
Page 128 U. S. 534
of the county, and to draw interest at the rate of eight percent
per annum, payable semiannually, and to be of the denomination of
not less than $1,000 each; the bonds to be issued and placed in the
hands of a trustee, to be paid out on certain specified conditions,
one of which was that the railroad should be commenced within 30
days from the date of the order, and be completed by the 15th of
October, 1877.
There is nothing in the record to show that, down to the 13th of
December, 1876, any subscription to stock had been made on behalf
of the county on the books of the railroad company or that the
company had accepted or assented to any subscription by the county.
Nor is there anything in the record which shows that any
subscription was made on the books of the company before the 6th of
March, 1877, and it appears that the subscription made on the books
of the company was for $150,000 of stock.
On the 13th of September, 1877, the board of supervisors
extended the time for the building of the road until the 15th of
March, 1878.
On the 12th of November, 1877, the board of supervisors made an
order amending the order of December 13, 1876, subscribing $150,000
to the stock of the company, so as to read that the county, under
the Act of February 22, 1861, and in accordance with the vote of
September 11, 1869, subscribed $100,000 to the stock, payable in
bonds of the county at par, the bonds to be due 20 years after
their date, and payable at the option of the county, after 5 years,
and to bear interest at the rate of eight percent per annum,
payable semiannually, and to be of the denomination of $1,000 each,
and that the county, under the Act of November 6, 1849, and under
such vote, subscribed $50,000 to the stock of the company, payable
in bonds of the like tenor. The order directed the chairman of the
board and its clerk to execute 100 bonds of $1,000 each, and of the
above tenor, for the subscription under the act of February 22,
1861, and 50 bonds of $1,000 each, of the above tenor, for the
subscription under the Act of November 6, 1849; the bonds to be
placed in the hands of a trustee, and to be delivered to the
railroad company "only on the same conditions
Page 128 U. S. 535
and under the same restrictions as specified in the order" of
the board of December 13, 1876.
The bonds were issued bearing date November 13, 1877. The board
of supervisors subsequently extended the time for the completion of
the road to the 15th of September, 1878, and again to the 1st of
November, 1879. The evidence shows that no part of the road was
completed within Franklin County prior to January, 1877, and that
it was not completed through Franklin County until about the 1st of
November, 1879.
We are of opinion that the decree of the circuit court must be
affirmed. At the time the vote of September 11, 1869, was had, the
Act of the General Assembly of Illinois, which became a law on the
16th of April, 1869, entitled "An act to fund and provide for
paying the railroad debts of counties, townships, cities, and
towns," Laws of Illinois of 1869, p. 316, was in force. Section 2
of that act provided that bonds to be issued in payment of a debt
created by a county to aid in the construction of a railroad
should, in order to receive the benefits of that act, be registered
by the holder thereof at the office of the auditor of public
accounts, who should cause the same to be registered in a book kept
for that purpose. The same section provided that the registration
should show the date, amount, number, maturity, and rate of
interest of each bond, and under what act and by what county
issued, and that the auditor should, under his seal of office,
certify upon each bond the fact of such registration. Section 7 of
the same act was in these words:
"And it shall not be lawful to register any bonds under the
provisions of this act, or to receive any of the benefits or
advantages to be derived from this act, until after the railroad in
aid of the construction of which the debt was incurred shall have
been completed near to or in such county, township, city, or town,
and cars shall have run thereon, and none of the benefits,
advantages, or provisions of this act shall apply to any debt
unless the subscription or donation creating such debt was first
submitted to an election of the legal voters of said county,
township, city, or town, under the provisions of the laws of this
state, and a majority
Page 128 U. S. 536
of the legal voters living in said county, township, city, or
town were in favor of such aid, subscription, or donation, and any
county, township, city, or town shall have the right, upon making
any subscription or donation to any railroad company, to prescribe
the conditions upon which such bonds, subscriptions, or donations
shall be made, and such bonds, subscriptions, or donations shall
not be valid and binding until such conditions precedent shall have
been complied with. And the presiding judge of the county court, or
the supervisor of the township, or the chief executive officer of
the city or town that shall have issued bonds to any railway or
railways, immediately upon the completion of the same near to,
into, or through such county, township, city, or town, as may have
been agreed upon, and the running of the cars thereon, shall
certify under oath that all the preliminary conditions in this act
required to be done to authorize the registration of such bonds,
and to entitle them to the benefits of this act, have been complied
with, and shall transmit the same to the state auditor, with a
statement of the date, amount, number, maturity, and rate of
interest of such bonds, and to what company and under what law
issued, and thereupon the said bonds shall be subject to
registration by the state auditor, as is hereinbefore
provided."
The Constitution of Illinois, which took effect July 2, 1870,
provides as follows:
"No county, city, town, township, or other municipality, shall
ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or
private corporation, or make donation to, or loan its credit in aid
of, such corporation,
provided, however, that the adoption
of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of
any such municipality to make such subscriptions where the same
have been authorized, under existing laws, by a vote of the people
of such municipalities prior to such adoption."
In the present case, the only vote of the people of the County
of Franklin had prior to July 2, 1870, authorizing a subscription
to the capital stock of the railroad company was the vote of
September 11, 1869. By § 7 of the Act of April 16, 1869, then in
force, the county had the right, in
Page 128 U. S. 537
voting for the subscription, to prescribe the conditions upon
which the subscription should be made, and that section declared
that such subscription should not be valid and binding until such
conditions precedent should have been complied with. Under such
circumstances, any condition imposed by the vote as a condition
precedent to the issuing of the bonds in payment of the
subscription was a part of the vote, and a part of the authority
for the subscription, within the meaning of the proviso to the
article of the Constitution about cited. So also, any condition
prescribed by the vote as a condition precedent upon which the
bonds should be issued must have been complied with in order to
make the bonds valid and binding. In the present case, the vote of
September 11, 1869, as a vote in favor of the subscription of
$200,000 to the stock, payable in the bonds described in the order
of the county court of July 24, 1869, was a vote in favor of such
subscription, payable in the bonds, "said bonds to be issued" (in
the language of the order of July 24, 1869, directing the election
to be held) "upon the following conditions, and not until they are
complied with." One of those conditions was that the railroad
"should be commenced in the County of Franklin within nine
months from the date of such election, and completed through the
county by the 1st day of June, 1872."
The bonds in question were not issued until November, 1877, and
the road was not completed through the county until about the 1st
of November, 1879. No change was made in the conditions prescribed
by the vote prior to the second of July, 1870, and there was no
power after that to make any material change in those terms and
conditions.
The evident purpose of the provision of § 7 of the Act of April
16, 1869, was to prevent the issue of bonds in payment of
subscriptions to railroad companies until the conditions imposed by
the vote as conditions precedent had been complied with, and to
declare that the bonds, if issued in violation of such conditions
precedent, should not be valid and binding. When the savings bank,
in April and May, 1880, purchased the bonds in question, it was,
notwithstanding the recitals on the face of them, chargeable with
notice of the
Page 128 U. S. 538
provision of § 7 of the Act of April 16, 1869, which had been in
force for nearly five months before the date named on the face of
the bonds as the date of the election, and for more than eight
years before the date named on the face of the bonds as the date of
their issue. It was also required to take notice of the
construction given to such statutory provision by the Supreme Court
of Illinois at its September term, 1876, prior to the issue of
these bonds, in the case of
Town of Eagle v. Kohn, 84 Ill.
292.
That was a suit against the Town of Eagle, brought by innocent
holders for value, to recover on coupons cut from bonds issued by
the town to a railroad company December 1, 1870, in payment of a
subscription to stock, in pursuance of a vote of the people of the
town had November 2, 1869. In that vote, certain conditions as to
time had been prescribed upon which the bonds should be issued.
Those conditions had not been complied with. The question arose in
the case whether the declaration of the statute that the bonds
should not be valid and binding until such conditions precedent
should have been complied with was to be confined in its operation
to the railroad company to which the bonds should have been issued,
or whether it extended to innocent holders for value. The court
held that, although the statute did not declare that the bonds
should be void, its declaration that they should not be valid and
binding until the conditions precedent should have been complied
with was an imperative and peremptory declaration that the bonds
should not be valid and binding until the conditions named should
have been complied with, even in the hands of innocent holders
without notice, and it declared the bonds to be invalid in the
hands of the plaintiffs.
This interpretation of § 7 of the Act of April 16, 1869,
accompanied all bonds subsequently issued into the hands of whoever
took them, whether a
bona fide holder or not. This Court
must recognize this decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois as an
authoritative construction of the statute, made before the bonds
were issued and to be followed by this Court.
Douglass v.
County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677;
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20;
Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S. 104;
Page 128 U. S. 539
Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U.
S. 356. In the first of these cases, it was said:
"After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the
construction becomes, so far as contract rights acquired under it
are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text
itself,"
The ruling in
Town of Eagle v. Kohn was followed by the
Supreme Court of Illinois in
Richeson v. People, 115 Ill.
450, in January, 1886, and was applied by that court to the bonds
issued November 13, 1877, by the County of Franklin to the same
railroad company under the Act of February 22, 1861, purporting to
have been issued in pursuance of the same vote of September 11,
1869, as in the present case. The court, referring to its decision
in
Town of Eagle v. Kohn, made at September term, 1876,
said, p. 460:
"We there held that bonds in the hands of innocent purchasers
were not valid where the conditions upon which the subscription was
made have not been complied with. The language of the statute is
plain and explicit, and, unless it should be arbitrarily
disregarded, we perceive no ground upon which an innocent holder
can evade its provisions."
This view was held, as the court said, because when the vote was
taken, the seventh section of the Act of April 16, 1869, was in
force.
See also Parker v. Smith, 3 Bradwell, App.Ill..
356, 366-367.
In regard to the case of
Town of Eagle v. Kohn, it is
urged by the savings bank that it does not appear by the report of
that case that the bonds there in question had been registered by
the state auditor, as contemplated by the Act of April 16, 1869;
that the provisions of §§ 2 and 7 of the Act of April 16, 1869,
imply that the state auditor shall ascertain and determine whether
or not the evidence is sufficient to authorize him to register the
bonds, and to endorse thereon his certificate of registration; that
it must be presumed that the presiding judge of the county court,
whose duty it was, under § 7, to certify to the auditor that all
the preliminary conditions required by the act to be done to
authorize the bonds to be registered, and to entitle them to the
benefits of the act, had been complied with, had performed his
duty; that after such registration and the certificate of the
auditor on the
Page 128 U. S. 540
bonds had been made, and other persons have acquired rights in
the bonds so registered and certified, upon the faith of the
registration and certificate, those rights cannot be affected by
subsequently showing that some of the facts entitling the bonds to
registration did not exist; that although bonds issued after the
passage of the Act of April 16, 1869, were required to be
registered in order to entitle them to the benefits of that act, a
tribunal was provided to determine whether the conditions precedent
upon which the bonds were to be issued had been complied with; that
the decision of that tribunal, as evidenced by the registration of
the bonds, is conclusive, and that the legislative intention must
have been that the registration of the bonds should settle
definitively the question of compliance with the conditions
precedent.
The answer to these suggestions is that the preliminary
conditions required by § 7 of the Act of April 16, 1869, to exist
in order to authorize the registration of the bonds are only
that
"the railroad in aid of the construction of which the debt was
incurred shall have been completed near to or in such county,
township, city, or town, and cars shall have run thereon,"
and that the subscription creating the debt should have been
voted for by a majority of the legal voters of the county,
township, city, or town, living therein. Those preliminary
conditions are the only ones which are required to be certified to
by the presiding judge of the county court in order to authorize
the registration of the bonds. It is not required by § 7 that the
presiding judge of the county court shall make any certificate as
to a compliance with the terms and conditions of any subscription.
Section 7 requires, as a preliminary to registration, that the
railroad shall have been completed near to or in the county and
that cars shall have run thereon, but it does not require that the
road shall have been completed by any time prescribed as a
condition precedent in the vote. The registration of the bonds by
the state auditor has nothing to do with any of the terms or
conditions on which the stock was voted and subscribed. Neither the
registration nor the certificate of registry covers or certifies
any fact as to compliance with the conditions prescribed in
Page 128 U. S. 541
the vote, on which alone the bonds were to be issued. The
recital in the bonds does not contain any reference to the Act of
April 16, 1869, or certify any compliance with the provisions of
that act, and the certificate of registry merely certifies that the
bond has been registered in the auditor's office pursuant to the
provisions of the Act of April 16, 1869. The statute does not
require that the auditor shall determine or certify that the bonds
have been regularly or legally issued.
The case of
Lewis v. Commissioners, 105 U.
S. 739, does not aid the savings bank. In that case,
under an act of Kansas in regard to registry, the auditor had
certified that the bonds had been "regularly and legally" issued.
In
Dixon County v. Field, 111 U. S.
83, and in
Crow v. Oxford, 119 U.
S. 215, the first case arising in Nebraska, and the
second in Kansas, the certificate of the auditor in each case was
that the bonds were "regularly and legally" issued, but this Court
held in both cases that the municipality issuing the bonds was not
estopped by the registry or the certificate, and that no conclusive
effect was given by the registration statute to the registration or
to the certificate.
The cases of
Insurance Co. v. Bruce, 105 U.
S. 328;
Pana v. Bowler, 107 U.
S. 529, and
Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U. S.
74, are relied upon by the savings bank in this case to
sustain its view that the decree of the circuit court was
erroneous.
In the case of
Insurance Co. v. Bruce, the bonds were
issued by the Town of Bruce, in the State of Illinois, on the 1st
of December, 1870, in payment of a subscription to the capital
stock of a railroad company. The bonds recited upon their face that
they were issued by virtue of two statutes of the state, one of
which was the before-named Act of April 16, 1869, and the bonds
also certified on their face that at a special election held in the
township on the 7th of September, 1869, a majority of the legal
voters participating in the same had voted in favor of the
subscription and of the issue of the bonds. Certain of the
conditions as to time, imposed by the vote of the people, had not
been complied with, and the bonds were in the hands of
bona
fide holders
Page 128 U. S. 542
for value. In the opinion in that case, the terms of § 7 of the
Act of April 16, 1869, and the ruling in the case of
Town of
Eagle v. Kohn were considered, and the decision of this Court
in favor of the bondholder was placed upon the ground that the case
was distinguishable from that of
Town of Eagle v. Kohn in
that it did not appear from the latter case that the town had, by
the recitals in its bonds, estopped itself from asserting, as
against a
bona fide holder, the nonperformance of
conditions imposed by the vote of the people, while in the case
then before this Court, the Town of Bruce had, by the recitals in
its bonds, represented to the public that the bonds were issued in
all respects in conformity to law and that nothing remained to be
done which was essential to its liability thereon. The view taken
was that as the Town of Bruce had power, under the seventh section
of the Act of April 16, 1869, to make an unconditional subscription
and to issue and deliver its bonds in advance of the construction
of the road, and as the bonds recited that they were issued by
virtue of the Act of April 16, 1869, it was too late for the town,
as against
bona fide purchasers of the bonds, to claim
that they had been issued in violation of the special conditions.
In the case now before us, as before said, there is no reference in
the bonds to the Act of April 16, 1869, and no statement in the
bonds that they were issued by virtue of that act. Moreover, in the
case of
Insurance Co. v. Bruce, the bonds had been issued
on December 1, 1870, prior to the decision in
Town of Eagle v.
Kohn, which was made at September term, 1876.
In
Pana v. Bowler, the bonds were issued by the Town of
Pana, in Illinois, June 23, 1873, prior to the decision in
Town
of Eagle v. Kohn. The vote of the people of the township was
had on April 30, 1870, while the Act of April 16, 1869, was in
force, and the bonds, as in the case of
Insurance Co. v.
Bruce, recited on their face not only that they were issued in
compliance with the vote, but that they were issued in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of April 16, 1869. No point was
raised in that case that, the bonds having been issued after the
new Constitution of Illinois came
Page 128 U. S. 543
into force on July 2, 1870, in pursuance of a vote of the people
had on April 30, 1870, conditions prescribed by that vote had not
been complied with.
In
Oregon v. Jennings, the bonds were issued on the
31st of December, 1870, nearly six years before the decision was
made in
Town of Eagle v. Kohn, and the election was held
in the Town of Oregon, Illinois, on the 23d of June, 1870. Section
7 of the Act of April 16, 1869, appears to have been considered by
the Court in that case, and it held that the recitals in the bonds
estopped the town from taking the defense, as against a
bona
fide holder of the bonds, that the first division of the road
was not completed by the time specified in the vote of the people.
The Court observed that it had been referred to no decision of the
Supreme Court of Illinois made prior to the issuing of the bonds in
that case -- namely, December 31, 1870 -- which held to the
contrary of the views it announced. But in the present case, the
decision in
Town of Eagle v. Kohn was made prior to the
issue of the bonds.
In
County of Randolph v. Post, 93 U. S.
502, the bonds were issued by the County of Randolph, in
Illinois, January 1, 1872, under a vote of the people had June 6,
1870, which imposed a limitation of time as a condition precedent.
In October, 1871, the county court extended the time from December
27, 1871, to February 1, 1872. This Court held that it could do so,
notwithstanding the provision above cited in the constitution of
July 2, 1870. But the Act of April 16, 1869, does not appear to
have been before this Court, and the decision in
Town of Eagle
v. Kohn was not made until more than six years after the vote
was had, and more than four years after the bonds were issued, in
County of Randolph v. Post.
In
Concord v. Robinson, 121 U.
S. 165, this Court held that subscriptions and donations
in aid of railroads, voted by municipal corporations of Illinois
prior to July 2, 1870, such vote being authorized by laws in force
when it was taken, could be completed after that date, according to
the conditions attached to the vote. In that case, the vote of the
Town of Concord, Illinois, had been had on November 20, 1869,
in
Page 128 U. S. 544
favor of levying a tax to raise a sum of money as a donation to
a railroad company, provided the company should run the road
through two specified villages. The road was never constructed into
or through either of them, and the vote was not for the issue of
bonds, but for levying a tax; but bonds were issued in 1871, and
this Court held them void in a suit against the town on coupons cut
from them, the bonds reciting on their face that they were issued
under and by virtue of a specified law of Illinois, which law,
however, only authorized towns, including the town in question, to
make a donation in aid of the particular road in question, the
money to be raised by taxation.
Without considering other grounds on which our decision might be
rested, we are of opinion that the decree of the circuit court must
be
Affirmed.