To give this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment of a
state court under § 709, Rev.Stat. because of the denial by the
state court of any title, right, privilege or immunity, claimed
under the Constitution or any treaty or statute of the United
States, it must appear on the record that such title, right,
privilege or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" at the
proper time in the proper way.
An action of trespass on the case for damages by fire to the
plaintiff's vessel in a port of the United States, alleged to have
resulted from the negligence of the defendant's servant in cutting
a burning scow or lighter loose from a wharf and allowing it to
drift against the vessel is "a common law remedy" which the common
law "is competent to give," and which is saved to suitors by the
provisions of § 563 Rev.Stat., conferring admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction upon district courts of the United States.
Page 128 U. S. 133
Motion to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated in the
opinion of the court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Bradshaw recovered judgment December 6, 1887, against Chappell
in the Circuit Court for Howard County, Maryland, in an action of
trespass on the case, after a trial by jury upon a plea of not
guilty, for damages by fire to his (Bradshaw's) schooner, alleged
to have resulted from the negligence of Chappell's servants in
cutting a burning scow or lighter loose from Chappell's wharf and
allowing it to drift against Bradshaw's vessel. From this judgment
Chappell prosecuted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
by which tribunal the judgment was affirmed on the 14th day of
March, 1888. On the 27th of March, Chappell moved for a rehearing
upon the ground, which had not been up to that time presented in
any form, that the Circuit Court for Howard County should have
limited the measure of damages to the value of the scow which
occasioned the injury complained of, under the provisions of § 18,
c. 121, Act of Congress of June 26, 1884, 23 Stat. 57. The Court of
Appeals overruled the motion because, as the court states,
"this act of Congress was not before the circuit court when the
case was tried, nor before this court on appeal, and that no
reference to it or construction of it was made in either
court."
After an unsuccessful application therefor to the chief judge of
the Court of Appeals, a writ of error was finally allowed by one of
the Justices of this Court, and now comes before us upon a motion
to dismiss.
To give this Court jurisdiction to review the judgment of a
state court under § 709 of the Revised Statutes because of the
denial by a state court of any title, right, privilege, or
Page 128 U. S. 134
immunity claimed under the Constitution or any treaty or statute
of the United States, it must appear on the record that such title,
right, privilege, or immunity was "specially set up or claimed" at
the proper time in the proper way. "To be reviewable here," says
Waite, C.J., in
Spies v. Illinois, 123
U. S. 181,
"the decision must be against the right so set up or claimed. As
the supreme court of the state was reviewing the decision of the
trial court, it must appear that the claim was made in that court,
because the supreme court was only authorized to review the
judgment for errors committed there, and we can do no more."
Tested by this well settled rule, it is apparent that this writ
of error cannot be maintained, as it is conceded that the plaintiff
in error did not set up or claim in the trial court the limitation
the benefit of which he now insists should have been accorded
him.
As to the contention of plaintiff in error -- also not brought
forward below, but suggested for the first time when application
was made to the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals to allow the
writ of error -- that the state court had no jurisdiction because
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States is exclusive in
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and that this is
necessarily such a case, it is sufficient to say that as the action
as brought and defended was a common law action, without any of the
ingredients of an admiralty or maritime cause, it was, as such,
clearly within the provision of the ninth section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, as embodied in § 563 of the Revised Statutes, "saving
to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it."
The motion must be granted, and the writ dismissed, and it
is so ordered.