The Attorney General has authority under the Constitution to
file a bill in equity in the name of the United States to set aside
a patent of public land alleged to have been obtained by fraud or
mistake, when the government has a direct interest in the tract
patented or is under an obligation respecting the relief invoked by
the bill.
The United States are not bound by any statute of limitations,
nor barred by laches of their officers in a suit brought by them,
as sovereign, to enforce a public right or to assert a public
interest, but where they are formal parties to the suit, and the
real remedy sought in their came is the enforcement of a private
right for the benefit of a private party, and no interest of the
United States is involved, a court of equity will not be restrained
from administering the equities between the real parties by any
exemption of the government designed for the protection of the
rights of the United States alone.
This was a suit in equity brought by the Attorney General on
behalf of the United States to set aside and cancel certain patents
issued in favor of Roswell Beebe, in 1838 and 1839, for about 480
acres of land upon which the present City of Little Rock, Arkansas,
is partly built. Roswell Beebe having died many years ago, this
suit is prosecuted against his heirs and legal representatives. It
was brought in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas, the bill having been filed on the 31st of
January, 1883. The ground upon which it was asked that said patents
might be set aside and cancelled was that at the date of their
issue, and for a long time prior thereto, the United States did not
own the land embraced in them, but that, on the contrary, said land
was legally appropriated by other persons, and was therefore
segregated from the public domain; that said Roswell Beebe and
others fraudulently conspired together for the purpose of securing
said patents, and by false representations, pretenses, and undue
influence persuaded and "coerced
Page 127 U. S. 339
the Register" of the United States Land Office at Little Rock
into the belief that he (Beebe) was entitled to said patents, etc.,
and that by reason of said premises, said patents were fraudulent
and void.
The bill set out at considerable length and with much regard to
details a great array of alleged facts connected with the issue of
said patents, the former appropriation of the land, and the alleged
fraudulent acts and practices of said Beebe with reference to said
land. In substance they were as follows:
That said lands were formerly a part of the, Quapaw Indian
reservation, but were ceded to the United States by the Treaty of
August 24, 1818, and thereby became part of the public domain; that
afterwards, to-wit, in 1819 and 1820, they, with other lands not
involved in this controversy, were located with what is known as
"New Madrid Certificates" issued by the recorder of land titles at
St. Louis in November, 1815, under and in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of Congress approved February 17, 1815,
entitled " An act for the relief of the inhabitants of the late
County of New Madrid, in the Missouri Territory, who suffered by
earthquakes," 3 Stat. 211, c. 45; that by virtue of said locations,
all of said lands were surveyed, and the surveys were returned to
the recorder on the 17th of October, 1820, whereby said lands
became legally appropriated by the holders and owners of said
certificates, and thus severed from the mass of the public domain;
that the equitable title to said lands thus became vested in the
locators of said certificates and their assigns, and was
afterwards, by proper assignments and conveyances, transferred to
and became vested in one W. M. O'Hara, who subsequently conveyed
the lands in undivided moieties to Nathaniel Philbrook and Chester
Ashley; that in 1824 said Philbrook died intestate, seized and
possessed of an undivided half interest in said lands held under
the title aforesaid, and the same descended to his father,
Eliphalet Philbrook, a citizen of New Hampshire, and his sole heir
at law, who, dying in 1828, by last will and testament devised all
of his interest in and to said lands to Thomas H. Ellison and six
of his other children and grandchildren; that said devisees
Page 127 U. S. 340
and heirs of such as are deceased have, by proper deeds,
conveyed said lands to George V. Dietrich, Jabez C. Hurst, citizens
of Galesburg, Illinois, and John F. Calder, a citizen of Troy, New
York, in trust to apply for and obtain patents thereto from the
United States; that said trustees applied to the United States
Recorder of Land Titles at St. Louis, Missouri, for patent
certificates in support of said original "New Madrid" locations,
and, on the 10th day of September, 1875, that officer issued such
certificates in the names of the original locators and their legal
representatives for said lands, as he was authorized to do by the
said Act of February 17, 1815; that afterwards said trustees made
application for patents for said lands to the proper United States
authorities, but that such patents were refused because of the
existence of the outstanding patents issued to said Beebe as
aforesaid; that from the time of said locations, surveys, and
returns in 1819 and 1820 up until the issuance of the Beebe patents
in 1838 and 1839, the said New Madrid locations were the only
titles to said lands, and under them the Town of Little Rock was
laid out and built on said lands, was duly incorporated, and
contained hundreds of inhabitants prior to and at the time when
said patents were issued; that said Beebe patents were issued on
certain preemption float claims, all located about the year 1838
under the provisions of the second section of the Preemption Act of
May 29, 1830, and the Amendatory Act of July 14, 1832, 4 Stat. 420,
c. 208; 603, c. 246, but that such preemption locations were
fraudulent and void because the lands had already been appropriated
by the New Madrid certificates, were at that time occupied and
improved by actual settlers, and were consequently not subject to
preemption; that said Beebe never procured the consent of said
settlers to the location of said preemption floats, and the issue
of said patents, as required and provided by the said preemption
acts and the regulations of the General Land Office, but on the
contrary imposed upon the officers of the Land Department, and
induced them to believe that he had complied with the law and the
regulations in every respect, when in fact his every act in
procuring said patents was done in violation of law and was
Page 127 U. S. 341
part of a conspiracy to defraud the United States and the
holders under said New Madrid locations, and that in furtherance of
said conspiracy said Beebe entered into a so-called bond to convey
to the original holders and claimants of said lands the title which
he was to and did acquire by the issue of said patents on said
float claims, which he afterwards fraudulently failed and refused
to do, all of which was a fraud on the United States and other
claimants to and settlers upon said lands; that all defects of the
said New Madrid Act and of the locations thereunder had been cured
by subsequent acts of Congress and the opinions of the Attorney
General and decisions of the Department and by decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States construing the same, and that
said locations of said floats and the issuance of said Beebe
patents were allowed under a misconception of the law, procured by
undue means and in violation of the law, and the same were null and
void, and ought in equity and good conscience to be cancelled.
The defenses relied on in the court below by way of demurrers
and pleas were (1) the want of authority in the Attorney General to
file a bill for the annulment of a patent in a case like the
present, (2) that the claim is barred by the statute of
limitations, (3) that the claim sued upon is stale, (4) that the
plaintiff has no equity to maintain this suit, and that all this
appears upon the face of the bill itself. The demurrer to the bill
was sustained and the bill dismissed, from which decree of
dismissal an appeal on behalf of the United States brought the case
here.
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after stating the facts as above, delivered
the opinion of the Court.
The points involved in the pleadings and made before the court
below have been presented and urged with much earnestness both in
the brief and in the oral argument of counsel.
Page 127 U. S. 342
First. As to the right of the Attorney General to bring this
suit.
The authority of the Attorney General under the Constitution and
laws of the United States to institute a suit in the name of the
United States to set aside a patent alleged to have been obtained
by fraud or other mistake, whenever denied by a specific pleading
before this Court, has been uniformly maintained. And it may now be
accepted as settled that the United States can properly proceed by
bill in equity to have a judicial decree of nullity and an order of
cancellation of a patent issued in mistake or obtained by fraud
where the government has a direct interest or is under an
obligation respecting the relief invoked.
See the opinion
of the Court delivered by MR. JUSTICE MILLER in
San Jacinto Tin
Company v. United States, 125 U. S. 273,
decided this term of the Court.
Even if it had not been thus authoritatively settled, it would
have been difficult upon principle to reach any other conclusion.
The public domain is held by the government as part of its trust.
The government is charged with the duty and clothed with the power
to protect it from trespass and unlawful appropriation and, under
certain circumstances, to invest the individual citizen with the
sole possession of the title which had till then been common to all
the people as the beneficiaries of the trust. If a patent is
wrongfully issued to one individual which should have been issued
to another, or if two patents for the same land have been issued to
two different individuals, it may properly be left to the
individuals to settle by personal litigation the question of right
in which they alone are interested. But if it should come to the
knowledge of the government that a patent has been fraudulently
obtained and that such fraudulent patent, if allowed to stand,
would work prejudice to the interests or rights of the United
States or would prevent the government from fulfilling an
obligation incurred by it, either to the public or to an
individual, which personal litigation could not remedy, there would
be an occasion which would make it the duty of the government to
institute judicial proceedings to vacate such patent.
Page 127 U. S. 343
In the case before us, the bill avers that the patents whose
cancellation is asked for were obtained by fraud and imposition on
the part of the patentee, Beebe. It asserts that there exists on
the part of the United States an obligation to issue patents to the
rightful owners of the lands described in the bill, that they
cannot perform this obligation until these fraudulent patents and
annulled, and that they therefore bring this suit to annul these
fraudulent instruments whose existence renders the United States
incapable of fulfilling their said prior obligation.
The court below held that the bill in this case having been
filed on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Interior for
the declared purpose of having the questions which were being
pressed upon the Land Department, in connection with the claims of
the Philbrook heirs against the government, determined by the
judicial department, which claims were unsettled and important, the
appeal to the Court was proper. In this we think the learned judge
is in full accord with the principle laid down by MR. JUSTICE
MILLER in the
San Jacinto case, and within the following
language of the court in
Hughes v. United
States, 4 Wall. 236, which was a suit brought in
the name of the United States to set aside a patent for the benefit
of a private citizen entitled to the land covered by said patent.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, who delivered the opinion of the Court, speaking
of the patent to Hughes, said:
"Whether regarded in that aspect or as a void instrument, issued
without authority, it
prima facie passed the title, and
therefore it was the plain duty of the United States to seek to
vacate and annul the instrument to the end that their previous
engagement be fulfilled by the transfer of a clear title, the one
intended for the purchaser by the act of Congress."
Unless, therefore, it appears on the face of the bill that the
claim set up has no equity, or that there are valid defenses to the
suit, the jurisdiction of the court to entertain it cannot be
denied.
Next as to the defense of the statute of limitations, laches,
and lapse of time. The grounds on which the court below sustained
the demurrer were (1) that distinct from and
Page 127 U. S. 344
independent of the statute of limitations and the laches of the
public officers of the government, the lapse of time constitutes a
good defense to this suit upon those principles of equity which
would be administered as between two citizens litigating in this
tribunal, and (2) that the United States is bound by the same law.
The counsel for the complainant maintain that this conclusion, upon
which the decree of dismissal rests, is erroneous and contrary to
the decisions of this Court and of every circuit and district court
in the United States. The principle that the United States are not
bound by any statute of limitations nor barred by any laches of
their officers, however gross, in a suit brought by them as a
sovereign government to enforce a public right, or to assert a
public interest, is established past all controversy or doubt.
United States v. Railway Company, 118
U. S. 125, and cases there cited. But this case stands
upon a different footing, and presents a different question. The
question is are these defenses available to the defendant in a case
where the government, although a nominal complainant party, has no
real interest in the litigation, but has allowed its name to be
used therein for the sole benefit of a private person?
It has been not unusual for this Court, for the purposes of
justice, to determine the real parties to a suit by reference not
merely to the names in which it is brought, but to the facts of the
case as they appear on the record. Thus, in the case decided at
this term,
In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 492,
123 U. S. 493,
the Court held that the State of Virginia, though not named as a
party defendant, was the actual party in the controversy. MR.
JUSTICE MATTHEWS, who delivered the opinion, said:
"It is therefore not conclusive of the principal question in
this case that the State of Virginia is not named as a party
defendant. Whether it is the actual party . . . must be determined
by a consideration of the nature of the case as presented on the
whole record."
So, in the cases of
New Hampshire v. Louisiana and
New York v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76, the
Court looked behind and through the nominal parties on the record
to ascertain who were the real parties to the suit. CHIEF
Page 127 U. S. 345
JUSTICE WAITE, in delivering the opinion of the Court, used the
following language:
"No one can look at the pleadings and testimony in these cases
without being satisfied beyond all doubt that they were in legal
effect commenced and are now prosecuted solely by the owners of the
bonds and coupons. . . . The bill, although signed by the Attorney
General, is also signed, and was evidently drawn, by the same
counsel who prosecuted the suits for the bondholders in Louisiana,
and it is manifested in many ways that both the state and the
Attorney General are
only nominal actors in the
proceeding. The bond owner, whoever he may be, was the
promoter and is the manager of the suit. . . . And while the suits
are in the names of the states, they are under the actual control
of individual citizens, and are prosecuted and carried on
altogether by and for them."
In the case of
United States v. Nashville &c. Railway
Company, supra, in which it was decided that the statute of
limitations of the State of Tennessee was no defense to an action
of the United States upon certain negotiable bonds held by them for
public use, MR. JUSTICE GRAY is careful to say:
"This case does not present the question what effect the statute
may have in an action on a contract in which the United States have
nothing but the formal title, and the whole interest belongs to
others,"
and cites
Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.
S. 490;
Miller v. State, 38 Ala. 600.
In the former case, it was held that a suit in the name of a
state, for the benefit of parties interested, is to be regarded as
a suit in the name of the party for whose benefit it is brought.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
"The name of the state is used from necessity when a suit on the
bond is prosecuted for the benefit of a person interested, and in
such cases the real controversy is between him and the obligors on
the bond,"
and the case was decided upon a consideration of the merits as
if the party interested was alone named as plaintiff. And he cited
approvingly the following language in
McMutt v.
Bland, 2 How. 9:
"As the instrument of the state law, his [the governor's] name
is in the bond and to the suit upon it; but in no just view . . .
can he be
Page 127 U. S. 346
considered a litigant party. Both look to things, not names; to
the actors in controversies and suits, not to the mere forms or
inactive instruments used in conducting them in virtue of some
positive law."
In
Miller v. State, the other case cited by MR. JUSTICE
GRAY, the court said:
"As laches is not to be imputed to the government, the statute
of limitations does not apply to the state unless it be clear from
the act that it was intended to include the state. . . . In our
opinion, the rule that the statute of limitations does not run
against the state has no application to a case like the present,
when the state, though a nominal party on the record, has no real
interest in the litigation, but its name is used as a means of
enforcing the rights of a third party who alone will enjoy the
benefits of a recovery."
In
Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 118, which was a case
where a party was applying for a mandamus in the name of the state,
the court said:
"It is insisted that here the state is a party, moving the
contest and setting up a right to have this survey certified, and
that the tenant will not be protected by his possession, because
the statute of limitations does not run against the state. We have
decided, and the decision is sustained by unbroken masses of
authority, that the statute of limitations does not run against the
state. The answer, however, to this argument is this: the State of
Georgia is not the
real party to the proceeding. . . . The
process is
in the name of the state, but the right
asserted is a private right. The issue is between two of the
citizens of the state."
Applying these principles to this case, an inspection of the
record shows that the government, though in name the complainant,
is not the real contestant party to the title or property in the
land in controversy. It has no interest in the suit, and has
nothing to gain from the relief prayed for, and nothing to lose if
the relief is denied. The bill itself was filed in the name of the
United States, and signed by the Attorney General on the petition
of private individuals, and the right asserted is a private right,
which might have been asserted without the intervention of the
United States at all.
Page 127 U. S. 347
In his letter to the United States district attorney upon the
subject, the Attorney General directs that that officer shall sign
his (the Attorney General's) name to the bill when the attorneys
for the petitioners shall present such a bill, and file the same in
the proper court, and that after the suit is commenced, these
attorneys for the petitioners will have the management of the case.
Accordingly, the subsequent proceedings in the case have been
conducted exclusively by these attorneys, who in the pleadings
describe themselves as attorneys for the petitioners and
beneficiaries of the suit.
We are of the opinion that when the government is a mere formal
complainant in a suit, not for the purpose of asserting any public
right or protecting any public interest, title, or property, but
merely to form a conduit through whom one private person can
conduct litigation against another private person, a court of
equity will not be restrained from administering the equities
existing between the real parties by any exemption of the
government designed for the protection of the rights of the United
States alone. The mere use of its name in a suit for the benefit of
a private suitor cannot extend its immunity as a sovereign
government to said private suitor, whereby he can avoid and escape
the scrutiny of a court of equity into the matters pleaded against
him by the other party, nor stop the court from examining into and
deciding the case according to the principles governing courts of
equity in like cases between private litigants.
These principles, so far as they relate to general statutes of
limitation, the laches of a party, and the lapse of time, have been
rendered familiar to the legal mind by the oft-repeated enunciation
and enforcement of them in the decisions of this Court. According
to these decisions, courts of equity in general recognize and give
effect to the statute of limitations as a defense to an equitable
right when at law it would have been properly pleaded as a bar to a
legal right. They refuse to interfere to give relief when there has
been gross negligence in prosecuting a claim, or where the lapse of
time has been so long as to afford a clear presumption that the
witnesses to the original transaction are dead and the other means
of proof have disappeared.
Page 127 U. S. 348
We think the court below justly and wisely applied the principle
to the case under consideration in sustaining the demurrer and
dismissing the bill. The rights of the Philbrook heirs, the real
parties to this case, which are set up in this bill, originated in
1815. The acts of Beebe, perpetrating the alleged fraud, were prior
to 1838. The alleged illegal action of the Land Department occurred
in 1839. More than forty-five years ago, the complainants in this
bill could have instituted their action. The death of the parties
charged with the fraud, and also of most, if not all, of the
witnesses having personal knowledge of the transaction, the fact
that a city has been built upon the land in question, the
occupation of large portions of it by hundreds of innocent
purchasers, the homesteads of many families covering other portions
of it, the uninterrupted possession maintained for more than a
generation, all resting upon faith in the patent issued by the
United States government, constitute reasons more than sufficient
for the refusal of the court to set aside such patent at the suit
of a party who has so long slept upon his alleged rights. For the
reasons herein stated, the decree of the court below is
Affirmed.