In answer to a petition for a writ of mandamus to be issued to
the Secretary of State to compel him to pay to the petitioner part
of an award made by the Mexican Claims Commission, the Secretary
set up that he could not recognize the claim of the petitioner
without ignoring the conflicting claim of another person, between
whom and the petitioner litigation in respect to the award was
then, and had for a long time, been pending. On demurrer to the
answer,
held that it was sufficient.
The Secretary, in view of the litigation, was not bound to
decide between the conflicting claims.
Whether it was a good answer to the petition that the Secretary
was not invested with authority over the money independently of the
President, and that it was the opinion of the President that the
public interest forbade the making of payments to the petitioner in
the condition of things set forth in the answer
quaere.
This was an application for a mandamus against the Secretary of
State directing him to pay to the relator certain moneys received
by him, as awards, from the Republic of Mexico. The court below
ordered the writ to issue, to review which judgment this writ of
error was sued out. The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, brought by Thomas F. Bayard, Secretary of State of the
United States, to reverse a judgment rendered
Page 127 U. S. 247
by that court in general term on the 7th of March, 1887,
awarding to Stephen V. White a writ of mandamus commanding the
Secretary to pay to White certain sums of money, specifically on
hand, computed and set apart by the proper auditing officer of the
State Department on account of certain awards mentioned in the
petition for the mandamus, namely, on account of the Conrow award,
$1,806.06; on account of the Standish award, $1,519.55, and on
account of the Parsons award, $1,817.92.
The petition of White, which was filed April 23, 1886, sets
forth that under the joint convention between the United States and
Mexico concluded July 4, 1868, 15 Stat. 679, such proceedings were
had that an award was made to Mary Ann Conrow for $50,497.26,
another to S. Kearney Parsons for $50,828.76, and another to Sarah
Mildred Standish for $42,486.30; that before the payment of any
part of the awards, White became the assignee of one-half of each
of them; that the Department of State had recognized White as such
assignee, and had paid to him nine installments hitherto paid by
Mexico and distributed by the Secretary of State; that on the 31st
of January, 1886, a tenth installment was paid by Mexico to the
defendant, as Secretary of State of the United States, and he had
made a ratable distribution of it, having paid other claimants, and
especially Parsons and Conrow and Standish, the moieties which they
had not assigned to White; that by the first section of the Act of
June 18, 1878, c. 262, 20 Stat. 144, it was made the duty of the
Secretary to ratably apportion and pay to the claimants or their
assigns each installment of money when received from Mexico; that
of the tenth installment there was due to White, on account of the
Conrow award, $1,806.06, on account of the Standish award,
$1,519.55, and on account of the Parsons award, $1,817.92, which
sums were specifically on hand, and the amounts had been computed
and set apart by the proper auditing officers of the State
Department, but the defendant refused to pay to White those sums of
money.
The material provisions of the joint convention referred to, and
of the Act of June 18, 1878, are set forth in the case of
Porter V. White, ante, p.
127 U. S. 235.
Page 127 U. S. 248
The answer of the Secretary of State to the petition is as
follows:
"This respondent, answering, saith that it is true that awards
were made by the commission established by the treaty between the
United States and Mexico of the 4th of July, 1868, for the amounts
and in favor of the parties named in the said petition, and this
respondent is advised that the said relator, Stephen V. White, doth
claim an interest in the one-half part of each of the said awards,
and this respondent doth admit that the rights and interests
claimed by said White as aforesaid were recognized by one, although
not recognized by another, of the predecessors of this respondent,
and payments made to him accordingly, but this respondent saith
that he finds it impossible, as the matter now stands, to recognize
the claims and pretensions of the said White to the moieties of the
said awards without ignoring the conflicting claims and pretensions
of a certain Richard H. Porter, between whom and the said White
litigation in respect to the said awards is now, and for a long
time has been, pending. And this respondent further saith that he
hath always been, and is now, willing to pay whatever sum or sums
may be due on the said moieties out of moneys received under the
said treaty, from the Republic of Mexico, on an order and
acquittance signed by all the rival claimants of the said moieties,
which your respondent respectfully submits is as much as could be
done by him without embroiling the United States in a litigation in
which it has no interest whatever. And this respondent, further
answering, saith that the several sums of money mentioned in said
petition, and claimed to be due and payable to the relator, are
held by him subject to the order and control of the President of
the United States, and are disposable by this respondent at the
discretion of the President only, and that, as this respondent is
advised and believes, there is no law, as hath been mistakenly
supposed by the said relator, by which this respondent is invested
with authority over the said sum of money independent of the
President of the United States, and, it being the opinion of the
President that the public interests forbid the making of payments
to the said relator in the present condition of things, as
Page 127 U. S. 249
hereinbefore set forth, this respondent submits that he is not
subject to the process of mandamus in the premises, and he
therefore prays that he may be discharged from the said rule, with
his proper costs in this behalf sustained."
To this answer White demurred, assigning, in the demurrer, the
following reasons for the insufficiency of the answer:
"1. It does not deny that the relator, S. V. White, is assignee
of the moieties of the awards in controversy."
"2. The President did not have any supervisory power under the
Act of June 18, 1878, except in the two cases named in the fifth
section thereof, known as the 'La Abra' and the 'Weil' cases. On
the hearing of the demurrer, the judgment above mentioned was
entered. The opinion of the general term is reported in 5 Mackey
428."
We are of the opinion that the demurrer to the answer should
have been overruled, that the answer showed sufficient cause for a
refusal to issue the writ, and that the petition should have been
dismissed.
The answer sets forth that the Secretary of State
"finds it impossible, as the matter now stands, to recognize the
claims and pretensions of the said White to the moieties of the
said awards without ignoring the conflicting claims and pretensions
of a certain Richard H. Porter, between whom and the said White
litigation in respect to the said award is now, and for a long time
has been, pending,"
and that he has
"always been and is now willing to pay whatever sum or sums may
be due on the said moieties out of moneys received under the said
treaty from the Republic of Mexico, on an order and acquittance
signed by all the rival claimants of the said moieties,"
which he "submits is as much as could be done by him without
embroiling the United States in a litigation in which it has no
interest whatever." This is adequate ground for a refusal on the
part of the Secretary of State to pay the money in question to
White. The answer alleges that the claims and pretensions of Porter
to the moieties of the awards conflict with the claims and
pretensions of White to the same. This is a sufficient averment
that the claims of Porter are of the same character and extent with
those of
Page 127 U. S. 250
White. The answer also avers that litigation in respect to such
awards was then pending between White and Porter. This allegation
necessarily implies that the litigation was in respect to the
conflicting claims of the two parties to the moieties of the
awards, inasmuch as the petition states that White is the assignee
of one-half of each of the awards. The Secretary of State, in view
of such litigation, was not bound to decide between such
conflicting claims, after he had notice of them, and that they were
in litigation, and when his decision might, perhaps, be a different
one from what that of the court would be in the litigation. The
writ of mandamus is a remedy to compel the performance of a duty
required by law where the party seeking relief has no other legal
remedy, and the duty sought to be enforced is clear and
indisputable.
Knox Co. v.
Aspinwall, 24 How. 376,
65 U. S. 383.
Both requisites must concur in every case.
It is urged that the answer to the petition, so far as it refers
to the conflicting claims of White and Porter as a ground for not
recognizing the claim of White, is insufficient as a pleading. But
no such ground is taken in the demurrer to the answer, and
independently of this, we think that the answer was sufficient.
We express no opinion as to the validity of the second ground of
defense set up in the answer, that the Secretary of State is not
invested with authority over the moneys in question independently
of the President and that it is the opinion of the President that
the public interests forbid the making of payments to White in the
condition of things set forth in the answer.
The decree of the general term is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the court below with a direction to dismiss the
petition for the writ.