It appearing that, before reaching and deciding the federal
question discussed here, the Supreme Court of South Carolina had
already decided that the plaintiff's action could not be sustained
according to the meaning of the provisions of the statute of that
state under which it was brought, this Court dismisses the writ of
error for want of jurisdiction, under the well settled rule that to
give this Court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state court,
it must appear affirmatively not only that a federal question was
presented for decision to the highest court of the state having
jurisdiction, but that its decision was necessary to the
determination of the cause, and that it was actually decided, or
that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without
deciding it.
When a state grants a right of remedy against itself or against
its officers in a case in which the proceeding is in fact against
the state, it may attach whatever limitations and conditions it
chooses to the remedy, and its own interpretation and application
of its statutes on that subject, given by its own judicial
tribunals, are conclusive upon the parties seeking the benefits of
them.
The Court stated the case as follows:
The complaint in this case, filed in the Court of Common Pleas
in the County of Charleston, South Carolina, alleged
Page 127 U. S. 217
that the plaintiff was the owner and holder of three bonds of
the State of South Carolina, two designated by the numbers 850 and
851, for $500 each, and one by the number 2,290, for $1,000; that
thereby the State of South Carolina promised to pay to the bearers
the sums therein named on the 1st day of July, 1893, with interest
at the rate of six percent per annum, payable semiannually, on the
1st day of January and July of each year, on the presentation of
the proper coupons thereto annexed, bearing the signature of the
state treasurer, said coupons being receivable in payment of all
taxes due the state during the year in which they mature, except
for the tax levied for the public schools, the words following
being endorsed on each of the said bonds,
viz.,
"The payment of the interest and the redemption of the principal
of this bond is secured by the levy of an annual tax of two mills
upon the entire taxable property of the state. The faith, credit,
and funds of the state are hereby solemnly pledged for the punctual
payment of the interest and redemption of the principal of this
bond by the Act of General Assembly approved December 22,
1873."
And upon each of said coupons was endorsed the following: "State
of South Carolina. Receivable in payment of all taxes except school
tax." That the plaintiff became the holder for value of the three
bonds mentioned in the year 1878, and of all the coupons thereto
annexed, including the coupon which matured on each, respectively,
on the 1st day of January, 1882; that notwithstanding the contract
of the state expressed in the Act of December 22, 1873, recited in
said consolidation bonds, the General Assembly of South Carolina,
by an act entitled "An act to raise supplies and make
appropriations for the fiscal year commencing November 1, 1881,"
approved February 9, 1882, has prohibited the county treasurers of
the state from receiving the coupons of said bonds in payment of
the taxes levied by the said act, which last-mentioned act the
plaintiff charges to be void as repugnant to Article I, Section 10,
of the Constitution of the United States, forbidding the states to
pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.
The complaint further alleges that the defendant is the
Page 127 U. S. 218
County Treasurer for Charleston County, whose duty it is to
collect and receive the taxes due to the State of South Carolina
upon the property situate in that county; that the plaintiff is the
owner of property in said county upon which taxes were levied under
the provisions of the act to raise supplies for the fiscal year
commencing November 1, 1881, in the sum of $153.86, of which sum
$29.34 were levied by the said act for the public schools; that on
the 18th day of December, 1882, the plaintiff tendered to the
defendant, as county treasurer, in payment of said taxes, $131.97
in cash, and the remainder,
viz., $60, in the coupons of
the said consolidated bonds Nos. 850, 851, and 2,290, which matured
on the 1st day of January, 1882; that the defendant wrongfully and
illegally refused to receive the said coupons, and assigned as a
reason therefore that he was forbidden so to do by the provisions
of the said act, whereupon the plaintiff paid to the defendant,
under protest, the sum of $191.97 in legal tender notes of the
United States in pursuance of the provisions of an Act of the
General Assembly of said state, approved the 24th of December,
1878, entitled "An act to facilitate the collection of taxes."
Plaintiff therefore demands judgment
"that it be adjudged that the amount of sixty dollars in United
States currency, paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on the 18th
day of December, 1882, was wrongfully and illegally collected, and
ought to be refunded, and that a certificate of record thereof be
issued accordingly to the plaintiff; that he have such further
relief in the premises as the nature of the case may require, and
to the court may seem meet and proper."
The answer of the defendant sets forth the history of the
legislation of the State of South Carolina on the subject
subsequent to the passage of the Act of December 22, 1873, known as
the "Consolidation Act," as follows:
"II. Defendant, further answering, alleges that subsequent to
the passage of said act, the General Assembly of the said state, by
a 'joint resolution to raise a commission to investigate the
indebtedness of the state,' approved June 8, 1877, provided a
commission to make a complete and thorough investigation of
Page 127 U. S. 219
the entire amount of consolidated bonds and certificates of
stock which had been issued under the 'Consolidation Act'
aforesaid, and of the bonds, coupons, and certificates of stock
which had been surrendered to the state treasurer in exchange for
the consolidated bonds and certificates of stock issued under said
act, and to report to the General Assembly any illegality or
nonconformity to law in the issue of consolidated bonds and
certificates of stock, and the grounds of the same, which
commission is known as the 'Bond Commission.'"
"That the said commission made a report to the General Assembly
of the result of the investigation made by them under the joint
resolution aforesaid, with schedules annexed showing the different
classes of bonds and certificates of stock which had been
surrendered in exchange for consolidated bonds and certificates of
stock, Schedule 6 showing the consolidated bonds and certificates
of stock which, in the judgment of the said commission, were not
issued in accordance with law and were not authorized to be
consolidated under the 'Consolidation Act.'"
"And thereupon the General Assembly, by a 'joint resolution,
providing a mode of ascertaining the debt of the state, and of
liquidating the same,' approved March 22, 1878, created a special
court, known as the 'Court of Claims,' to hear and determine any
case or cases made up or brought to test the validity of any of the
consolidated bonds or certificates of stock, or of any of the
various classes of bonds or certificates of stock, mentioned in the
said report of the 'bond commission' as not issued in accordance
with law."
"It was further provided by the joint resolution aforesaid that
there should be the same right of appeal from the said 'Court of
Claims' to the Supreme Court of South Carolina as from the circuit
courts of the said state, and with a right of appeal, by writ of
error or otherwise, as provided by law to the Supreme Court of the
United States."
"That said special court should have the same right to enter
judgment, issue execution, punish for contempt, and enforce its
mandates as was then possessed by the circuit courts of the State
of South Carolina. "
Page 127 U. S. 220
"That the state should be represented in said special court by
the Attorney General and two associate counsel to be selected by
the joint vote of the General Assembly."
"That the Attorney General and his associates, with the consent
of the creditors of the state, or so many of them as shall be
necessary, might make up a case or cases to be heard and determined
in said court, in which, if practicable, the state should be the
defendant, to test the validity of the said consolidated bonds,
coupons, and certificates of stock mentioned in Schedule 6 of the
report of the 'bond commission,' bringing before the court the
various classes of vouchers which it is stated in the said report
impair the validity of the said consolidated bonds, coupons, or
certificates of stock, or any of them."
"The said joint resolution further provided for the levy for the
current year of a tax sufficient to pay the coupons and interest
orders maturing on the outstanding consolidated bonds and
certificates of stock during the said fiscal year, the interest on
the consolidated bonds and certificates of stock mentioned in
Schedule 5 of the report of the 'bond commission' as subject to no
valid objection to be paid, and the payment of the interest on the
several classes of consolidated bonds and certificates of stock
mentioned in Schedule 6 of said report, whenever there should be a
final adjudication as to the validity of the several classes of
bonds and stocks in the manner therein provided, and none
other."
"That in pursuance of the provision of the said joint
resolution, actions in which the State of South Carolina was the
defendant were, with the consent of the Attorney General and his
associates, brought in the said 'Court of Claims' on coupons of the
bonds of the various classes mentioned in Schedule 6 of the report
of the 'bond commission.'"
"That after trial and hearing of the said causes the said 'Court
of Claims' rendered judgment in favor of the state."
"From the judgments of the 'Court of Claims' in these several
cases, appeals were taken to the Supreme Court of the State of
South Carolina, as provided in the joint resolution establishing
the said 'Court of Claims.' "
Page 127 U. S. 221
"That upon the hearing of the said appeals, the Supreme Court of
the State of South Carolina, at the April term, 1879, in the cases
entitled '
G. M. Walker, Cashier, Appellant v. The State of
South Carolina, Respondent,' and '
F. J. Pelzer, Appellant
v. The State of South Carolina, Respondent,' decreed and
adjudged:"
"First. That all the bonds issued under the 'Consolidation Act'
are valid obligations of the State of South Carolina except as
follows:"
"1st. Such as were issued in exchange for bonds issued under the
Act entitled 'An act to authorize a loan for the relief of the
Treasury,' approved February 17, 1869, or for the coupons of such
bonds; the said act being repugnant to § 7, article IX, of the
Constitution of the State of South Carolina in that it purports to
create a debt which was not 'for the purpose of defraying
extraordinary expenditures,' and the debt sought to be created not
being 'for some single object,' and such object not being
'distinctly specified therein,' as required by the said section and
article of the constitution."
"2d. Such as were issued in exchange for the second issue of
bonds under an act entitled 'An act to authorize a state loan to
pay interest on the public debt,' and which were endorsed, 'Issued
under act approved August 26, 1868,' or the coupons of such bonds,
the said bonds and coupons being absolutely void, even in the hands
of
bona fide holders, because issued without any authority
whatever."
"3d. Such as were issued in exchange for those conversion bonds
which were issued in exchange for either of the bonds or coupons of
the two classes mentioned."
"Second. That if any consolidated bond rests wholly upon any of
the three objectionable classes of bonds therein mentioned, then it
is wholly void; but if it rests only in part upon such
objectionable bonds and coupons, then it is void only to the extent
which it does rest upon such objectionable bonds or coupons, and
for the balance it is a valid obligation of the state."
"Third. That the burden of proof is upon the state to shown that
any particular bond which may be brought into
Page 127 U. S. 222
question does rest either in whole or in part upon such
objectionable bonds and coupons, and if in part only, then the
state must show what part is so affected."
"III. Defendant further alleges that by an act entitled 'An act
to provide for the settlement of the consolidated debt of the state
in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of the State
of South Carolina,' approved December 23, 1879, after reciting the
legislation and the decision of the Supreme Court of the State of
South Carolina in relation to the consolidated debt of the state
hereinbefore set forth, and that it is to the interest of the state
and her creditors that the principles established in the said
decision of the supreme court should be accepted as final, and
forthwith applied in the elimination from the consolidated debt of
the state of all invalid material, a special commissioner was
appointed to ascertain and establish the exact percentage and
amount of the invalidity of each and every consolidated bond and
certificate of stock of the state consolidated debt, and of the
interest thereon, in accordance with the principles laid down in
the said decision of the supreme court of the state."
"And it was therein further provided that the said special
commissioner should at least once in each month during the period
of said ascertainment make a detailed report to the state treasurer
setting forth therein by their numbers the consolidated bonds,
coupons, certificates of stock, and interest orders investigated by
him during the previous month; also whether the same, under the
decision of the supreme court aforesaid, be wholly valid or only
partially valid, and where only partially valid in each case, he
should also set forth the exact percentage, amount, and character
of the invalidity; that he should continue to make such detailed
reports to the state treasurer until he should have investigated
and reported upon the entire consolidated debt of the state."
"It was further therein provided that every holder of any
consolidated bond or certificate of stock, or of the interest
thereon reported by said special commissioner as partially invalid
shall have the right to surrender to the state treasurer for
cancellation such bonds, certificates of stock, and interest,
Page 127 U. S. 223
and upon such surrender and cancellation he shall be entitled to
receive from the state treasurer, who is authorized and required to
issue the same, a new bond or certificate of stock equal in amount
to the exact amount of the valid portion of such bond, certificate
of stock, coupon, or interest order, such new bonds and
certificates of stock to be in all respects similar and of like
validity to, and having the same benefits and privileges as, those
provided for in the 'consolidation act,' approved 22d December,
1873, saving and except that the first coupon or interest to mature
thereon shall mature on the 1st of January, 1879, and the same
rights and privileges are likewise given to the holders of detached
coupons and interest orders."
"And it was further thereby declared"
"that the bonds and stocks reported by the special commissioner
as valid, and the portions of the bonds and stocks also reported by
him as valid, but exchanged by their holders, as hereinbefore
provided, for new consolidated bonds or stocks, are hereby declared
to be valid and unquestioned obligations of the state."
"(And the bonds and stocks so declared to be unquestionable
obligations of the state are designated and known as 'brown
consols.')"
"That the special commissioner appointed under the act aforesaid
did perform the duties required of him by said act, and did make to
the state treasurer from time to time the report of his
investigations until he had investigated and reported upon the
entire consolidated debt of the state, as required by the said act,
which reports of the said special commissioner remain in the office
of the state treasurer."
"That by an act entitled 'An act to extend the time for funding
the unquestionable debt of the state,' approved December 24, 1880,
the comptroller general of the state is required to examine into
the character and material of all consolidated bonds and
certificates of stock of the state issued since the first day of
January, 1866, together with the coupons and interest orders
thereon, which may be presented to him for this purpose by the
holders thereof, and to report to the state treasurer how the said
bonds, certificates of stock, coupons, and interest orders are
affected by the decision
Page 127 U. S. 224
of the supreme court of the state hereinbefore stated, and the
exact percentage of invalidity in the material reported upon as
established by the said decision."
"And the state treasurer is authorized and required, in lieu of
the bonds, stocks, coupons, and interest orders so surrendered, to
issue consolidated bonds and certificates of stock for fifty
percent of the face value of valid material surrendered."
"That the state has since provided for the levy of an annual tax
upon the taxable property of the state, and for the payment by the
state treasurer, from the proceeds of said tax, of the interest on
the entire consolidated debt of the state, ascertained and reported
by the special commissioner aforesaid to be valid, in accordance
with the decision of the supreme court aforesaid, and also upon
such portions of the same as shall have been ascertained and
reported by said special commissioner to be valid and justly due by
the state, as the same shall appear from the certificates of the
said special commissioner filed in the office of the state
treasurer."
"That by joint resolution approved 9th February, 1882, it was
resolved as follows:"
"Whereas, the consol bonds bear upon their face the contract of
the state to receive the coupons of the same for taxes, and
whereas, from the fact that the green consols outstanding are more
or less tainted with invalidity, varying with each security (which
has been established by the courts and acquiesced in by the
holder), the coupons from this class of bonds cannot be received by
the tax collector, but can only be paid at the state treasury,
where access to the registry permits the amount of invalidity in
each coupon to be ascertained. Now therefore, in order to hasten
the process now going on of the conversion of green consols into
brown consols, which latter represent the unquestioned consol debt
of the state, and the coupons from which are now being received in
payment for taxes,"
"Be it resolved that on and after the first day of January,
1883, the interest upon the
Page 127 U. S. 225
green consol bonds and stocks of the state shall not be paid at
the treasury until said securities have been converted into brown
consol bonds and stocks."
The answer then proceeds to set forth the particulars in which
it is claimed that the consolidated bonds described in the
complaint are not valid obligations of the State of South Carolina,
and further alleges
"That the holders of the bonds Nos. 850, 851, and 2,290,
mentioned in the complaint, did not bring the same before the
special 'court of claims,' and that they have never surrendered the
same to the commissioner, or the comptroller general, or the state
treasurer, to ascertain and establish the exact percentage and
amount of the invalidity of the said bonds in accordance with the
principles laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court of the
State of South Carolina aforesaid, as provided by law, and have
never received new consolidated bonds or certificates of stock
equal in amount to the valid portions of said bonds, as provided by
law, known as 'brown consols.'"
The answer further alleges that the act entitled "An act to
raise supplies and make appropriations for the fiscal year
commencing November 1, 1881," approved February 9, 1882,
"provides that all taxes assessed and payable under the said act
shall be paid in the following kinds of funds, and no other: gold
and silver coin, United States currency, national bank notes, and
coupons which shall become payable during the year 1882 on the
valid consolidated bonds of the state known as 'brown consols,'
provided however the jury certificates and the
per diem of
state witnesses in the circuit courts shall be received for county
taxes, not including school taxes,"
and the defendant admits and justifies under the terms of said
act his refusal, as County Treasurer of Charleston County, to
receive the coupons tendered by the plaintiff in payment of
taxes.
The cause came on for trial before a jury, who, under the
instructions of the court to that effect, found a verdict for the
defendant, on which judgment was accordingly rendered. On appeal to
the supreme court of the state, this judgment was affirmed. To
review that judgment, the present writ of error has been sued
out.
Page 127 U. S. 226
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS, after stating the facts as above,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action is not brought against the defendant in his
individual capacity for a trespass or wrong alleged to have been
committed by him as a natural person upon the property or personal
rights of the plaintiff; it is brought against him in his official
capacity as Treasurer of the County of Charleston, to recover
judgment for a sum of money voluntarily paid by the plaintiff,
though under protest, demanded and received by the defendant in his
official capacity, contrary, as the plaintiff alleges, to law. The
judgment sought is not a personal judgment against the defendant,
but for a judicial declaration that the money paid was wrongfully
and illegally collected, and ought to be refunded in order that a
certificate of record thereof may be issued accordingly, to the end
that the amount might be repaid out of the state treasury.
The action is founded expressly on the provisions of the Act of
the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina approved
December 24, 1878, entitled "An act to facilitate the collection of
taxes." The first section of that act provides
"That in all cases in which any state, county, or other taxes
are now or shall hereafter be charged upon the books of any county
treasurer of the state against any person, and such treasurer shall
claim the payment of the taxes so charged or shall take any step or
proceeding to collect the same, the person against whom such taxes
are charged or against whom such step or proceeding shall be taken
shall, if he conceives the same to be unjust or illegal for any
cause, pay the said taxes notwithstanding, under protest, in such
funds and moneys as the said county treasurer shall be authorized
to receive by the act of the General Assembly levying the same,
and
Page 127 U. S. 227
upon such payment's being made, the said county treasurer shall
pay the taxes so collected into the state Treasury, giving notice
at the time to the comptroller general that the payment was made
under protest, and the person so paying said taxes may at any time
within thirty days after making such payment, but not afterwards,
bring an action against the said county treasurer for the recovery
thereof in the court of common pleas for the county in which such
taxes are payable, and if it be determined in said action that such
taxes were wrongfully or illegally collected for any reason going
to the merits, then the court before whom the case is tried shall
certify a record that the same were wrongfully collected and ought
to be refunded, and thereupon the comptroller general shall issue
his warrant for the refunding of the taxes so paid, which shall be
paid in preference to other claims against the treasury,
provided that the county treasurers shall be required to
receive jury and witness tickets for attendance upon the circuit
courts of the state receivable for taxes due the county in which
the said services are rendered."
The section of the act prohibits any other remedy
"in any case of the illegal or wrongful collection of taxes or
attempt to collect taxes, or attempt to collect taxes in funds or
moneys which the county treasurer shall be authorized to receive
under the act of the General Assembly levying the same, being other
than such as the person charged with said taxes may tender or claim
the right to pay, than that provided in § 1 of this act."
It expressly provides that
"No writ of mandamus shall be granted or issued from any court,
or by the judge of any court, directing or compelling the reception
for taxes of any funds, currency, or bank bills not authorized to
be received for such taxes by the act of the General Assembly
levying the same,"
and directs that
"No writ, order, or process of any kind whatsoever staying or
preventing any officer of the state charged with a duty in the
collection of taxes from taking any step or proceeding in the
collection of any tax, whether such tax is legally due or not,
shall in any case be granted by any court, or the judge of any
court, but in all cases whatsoever the person against whom any
taxes shall
Page 127 U. S. 228
stand charged upon the books of the county treasurer shall be
required to pay the same in such funds and moneys as the said
county treasurer shall be authorized to receive by the act of the
General Assembly levying the said taxes, in manner and form as
above provided, and thereupon shall have his remedy under the
provisions of the first section of this act, and in no other
manner."
The third section of the act is as follows:
"That in all cases in which any person against whom any taxes
stand charged upon the books of any county treasurer of the state
has heretofore tendered in payment of the same any funds, currency,
or bank bills, other than such as the said treasurer was authorized
to receive by the act of the General Assembly levying said taxes,
the said treasurer shall receive from such person the said taxes
without penalty in funds or moneys authorized to be received by the
act of the General Assembly levying the same,
provided
that such taxes shall be so paid within sixty days from the passage
of this act, and any person so paying the same may do so under
protest, and thereupon shall be entitled to all the benefits of the
remedy provided in § 1 of this act."
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in rendering the judgment
now under review, 21 S.C. 560, referred in its opinion to the
legislation of the state on the subject of its bonded indebtedness,
an abstract of which is given in the pleadings, beginning with the
joint resolution adopted June 8, 1877, and declared that it
"was manifestly designed to ascertain judicially, by the rules
and principles of law which regulate contracts between individuals,
what was the valid debt of the state, and to make ample provision
for the prompt and punctual payment of the interest on the debt so
ascertained."
After tracing the history of this legislation and of the
judicial and other proceedings taken thereunder, the opinion of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina proceeds as follows:
"In pursuance of these provisions, a very large amount of the
original consolidation bonds, which were colored green, and are
usually designated as 'green bonds' or 'green consols,'
Page 127 U. S. 229
were exchanged for the new consolidation bonds, colored brown,
and are usually designated as 'brown bonds' or 'brown consols,' and
represent the valid unquestioned debt of the state, the coupons on
which are received for taxes or are promptly paid on presentation.
But as it was impossible to tell whether a 'green bond' represented
in whole or in part, and, if so, what part, any portion of the
valid debt of the state without an examination of the records of
the office of the treasurer of the state, where the various reports
of the special commissioner above mentioned were filed, the various
county treasurers of the state are not allowed to receive the
coupons of the 'green bonds' in payment of taxes until they have
been examined, and any invalidity which they may contain
eliminated, and the valid portion converted into 'brown
bonds.'"
"It seems, therefore, that the scope and effect of this
legislation was not to impair the obligation of any contract
entered into by the state with its bondholders, whereby the state
had agreed to receive the coupons of certain bonds in payment of
taxes, but was simply to provide a mode of proceeding by which it
could be definitely and easily ascertained whether a coupon offered
in payment of taxes represented any portion of the valid debt of
the state, for unless it did, there certainly was no contract on
the part of the state that it should be received in payment of
taxes. . . . It certainly cannot be pretended that because a
taxpayer tenders in payment of his taxes a coupon of a bond
purporting to be a consolidation bond of the state, colored green,
that the state and its fiscal officers are bound to receive it
without question as to whether it is valid or invalid, and as the
state cannot be sued except with its own consent, and then only in
the mode which it permits, it follows necessarily that the only
mode by which the validity of the coupon so offered in payment of
taxes can be tested is that which has been prescribed by the
state."
In answer to the objection that the present plaintiff was not a
party to any of the actions instituted in the Court of Claims to
test the validity of his bonds and that he is not bound by any
adjudication therein, the opinion says:
"This
Page 127 U. S. 230
position might possibly be very well maintained if the defense
here was based simply on the doctrine of
res adjudicata,
but that is not the ground upon which the defense rests. The true
ground is that, as the state could not be sued except with its own
consent, and then only in the mode which it had seen fit to
prescribe, and as the state did prescribe a mode by which it could
be sued, and the validity of its debt tested upon the same
principle by which the contracts of individuals are tested, and
having invited all persons having claims against it whose claims
were disputed to come in and assert and establish their claims, one
who has failed to avail himself of the opportunity thus offered
cannot afterwards, in another proceeding not permitted by the
state, maintain an action against the state or against any of its
officers for refusing to do that which the laws of the state
forbid."
The Supreme Court of South Carolina then proceeds to examine the
contention on the part of the plaintiff, that the Act of the 24th
of December, 1878, entitled "An act to facilitate the collection of
taxes," 16 Stats.South Carolina 785, expressly authorizes an action
against the county treasurer when such coupons as his have been
tendered for taxes, and refused. Upon that point, its opinion is
expressed as follows:
"This position is, we think, based upon a total misconception of
the true meaning of that act. It certainly never was designed to
afford an opportunity to a bondholder to reopen the question as to
the validity of any portion of the state debt, which it was
supposed had been determined by the decision of this court in the
'
Bond Debt Cases,' from which no intimation of appeal had
been given. The very object of the legislation of the state
hereinbefore considered was, as we have seen, to obtain a final
determination of the question of the validity of the state debt,
and certainly the legislature, by an act passed nearly a year
before such final determination was reached, never intended to
afford the means of reopening any of the questions thus finally
determined. In addition to this, the phraseology of the act shows
that it was never designed to afford a remedy to the bondholder in
case his
Page 127 U. S. 231
coupons were refused when tendered for taxes, but was intended
solely to afford a remedy in case bills of the bank of the state
were refused when tendered for taxes. But even if it should be
conceded that the terms of the act to facilitate the collection of
taxes were broad enough to cover a case in which coupons of bonds
purporting to be bonds of the state are refused when tendered for
taxes, as well as a case in which taxes are tendered and refused in
other 'funds and moneys' than the collecting officers are
authorized by the act levying such taxes to receive, we do not see
how these actions can be maintained. By the express terms of the
act, it must be made to appear that the county treasurer has
illegally and
wrongfully refused to receive
payment of the taxes assessed against the plaintiff in anything
else but gold and silver coin, United States currency, national
bank notes, and coupons which shall become payable during the year
1882 on the valid consolidation bonds of this state, known as
'brown bonds,' as required to do by the seventh section of the 'Act
to raise supplies and make appropriations for the fiscal year
commencing November 1, 1881,' approved February 9, 1882, 17
Stats.South Carolina 1070. Practically, this last-mentioned act
forbids county treasurers from receiving in payment of taxes any
coupons of bonds which have not been ascertained in the manner
prescribed by the legislation hereinbefore mentioned to be valid
obligations of the state. Now if, as we have seen, the state had
the right to prescribe the mode by which the validity of any bond
purporting to be an obligation of the state should be tested and
determined, and if, as we have also seen, such mode was prescribed,
and the validity of all the various classes of bonds purporting to
be obligations of the state was passed upon and finally determined,
it would seem to follow necessarily that the state had a perfect
right to forbid its officers charged with the collection of its
revenue from receiving in payment of taxes any coupons or other
form of obligation which had not only not been adjudged to be a
valid obligation of the state, but which, on the contrary, had been
expressly adjudged to be invalid. There certainly can be nothing
illegal or wrongful in an officer of the state
Page 127 U. S. 232
yielding obedience to a law of the state passed in the usual
form in pursuance of a judgment of its highest judicial tribunal,
from which there had been no appeal to the tribunal of last resort,
though express provision had been made for such appeal."
After having thus decided that the present action was not
maintainable under the provisions of the Act of December 24, 1878,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina proceeds to review the grounds
of its prior decisions in the
Bond Debt Cases, 12 S.C.
263, 294, and restates and reaffirms the same, going at large into
the question of the validity of the bonds held by the plaintiff as
obligations of the state, adjudging them to be invalid. The
conclusion follows and is declared that the act of the General
Assembly entitled "An act to raise supplies and make appropriations
for the fiscal year commencing November 1, 1881," approved February
9, 1882, alleged by the plaintiff to be void as impairing the
obligation of the state contained in the bonds and coupons, is a
valid and constitutional law, and justified the defendant, as
county treasurer, in refusing to receive the coupons in payment of
taxes when tendered.
It thus appears that in point of fact the Supreme Court of the
State of South Carolina, in its opinion in this case, passed upon
the federal question sought to be raised by the plaintiff as the
foundation of his case, and decided it adversely to him, but the
analysis of the case which we have made shows clearly that the
decision of that question was not necessary to the judgment. Before
reaching that question, the supreme court had already decided that
the action of the plaintiff could not be sustained, according to
the meaning of the provisions of the statute under which it was
brought. The decision of that point was final, and was fatal to the
plaintiff's right of recovery. That question is not a federal
question; it does at arise under the Constitution of the United
States or of any law or treaty made in pursuance thereof. It is not
a question, therefore, which, under this writ of error, we have a
right to review. We are not authorized to inquire into the grounds
and reasons upon which the supreme court proceeded in its
construction
Page 127 U. S. 233
of that statute. It is a state statute conferring certain rights
upon suitors choosing to avail themselves of its provisions upon
certain conditions in certain cases. Who may sue under it, and
when, and under what circumstances are questions for the exclusive
determination of the state tribunals, whose judgment thereon it not
subject to review by this Court. It was competent for the State of
South Carolina either to grant or withhold the right to bring suits
against the officers of the state for the recovery of money alleged
to have been illegally exacted and wrongfully paid. If granted, the
action is in substance, though not in name, an action against the
state itself, just as an action permitted by the acts of Congress
on the subject against a collector of customs, for the recovery of
duties alleged to have been illegally exacted and paid under
protest is an action against the United States, though nominally
against the collector. In such cases, as the state may withhold all
remedy, it may attach to the remedy it actually gives whatever
conditions and limitations it chooses, and its own interpretation
and application of its statutes on that subject, given by its own
judicial tribunals, are conclusive upon the parties seeking the
benefit of them. No right secured by the Constitution of the United
States to any citizen is affected by them unless they are framed or
administered so as in some particular case to deprive the party of
his property without due process of law or to deprive him of the
equal protection of the laws. No such question is or can be made in
reference to the statute of South Carolina under consideration. It
authorizes, in certain enumerated cases, parties found to be within
its terms to bring a prescribed action against the state in the
name of one of its officers. According to the decision of its
highest tribunal, the plaintiff in this action is not within the
class entitled to sue. To review that judgment is not within the
province of this Court, because it does not deny or injuriously
affect any right claimed by the plaintiff under the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
It is a well settled rule, limiting the jurisdiction of this
Court in such cases, that
"Where it appears by the record that the judgment of the state
court might have been based either
Page 127 U. S. 234
upon a law which would raise a question of repugnancy to the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States or upon some
other independent ground, and it appears that the court did in fact
base its judgment on such independent ground, and not on the law
raising the federal question, this Court will not take jurisdiction
of the case even though it might think the position of the state
court an unsound one."
Klinger v.
Missouri, 13 Wall. 257,
80 U. S. 263,
per MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY. And it has been repeatedly decided under §
709 of the Revised Statutes that to give this Court jurisdiction of
a writ of error to a state court, it must appear affirmatively not
only that a federal question was presented for decision to the
highest court of the state having jurisdiction, but that its
decision was necessary to the determination of the cause, and that
it was actually decided, or that the judgment as rendered could not
have been given without deciding it.
Brown v. Atwell,
92 U. S. 327;
Citizens' Bank v. Board of Equalization, 98 U. S.
140;
Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U.
S. 200;
Adams County v. Burlington & Missouri
Railroad, 112 U. S. 123;
Detroit City Railway v. Guthard, 114 U.
S. 133;
New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana
Sugar Refining Co., 125 U. S. 18.
Inasmuch, therefore, as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
State of South Carolina sought to be brought in review by this writ
of error does not involve any question necessarily arising under
the Constitution of the United States or the laws and treaties made
in pursuance thereof, we must refuse to take jurisdiction in the
case.
The writ of error is accordingly dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.