Tissue paper, mainly if not exclusively used for making
letterpress copies of letters or written matter, when imported into
the United States, is not subject to duty as "printing paper" under
Schedule M, § 2504 Rev.Stat., but as "other paper not otherwise
provided for."
This was an action to recover duties alleged to have been
exacted in excess of law upon an importation of tissue paper.
Judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. The
case is stated in the opinion.
Page 127 U. S. 114
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Southern District of New York.
The plaintiffs in error, Benjamin and Phineas Lawrence, brought
suit in the court below against Edwin A. Merritt, the former
collector of the port of New York, for the recovery of an alleged
excess of duties levied by him and paid by them upon an importation
of what is called "tissue paper." Schedule M of § 2504 of the
Revised Statutes provides for the imposition of the following
duties:
"Paper, sized or glued suitable only for printing paper,
twenty-five percentum
ad valorem; printing, unsized, used
for books and newspapers exclusively, twenty percentum
ad
valorem; manufactured of, or of which paper is a component
material, not otherwise provided for, thirty-five percentum
ad
valorem; sheathing paper, ten percentum
ad
valorem."
The collector classified the paper under the following clause on
the same page:
"Paper hangings and paper for screens or fireboards; paper,
antiquarian, demy, drawing, elephant, foolscap, imperial letter,
and all other paper not otherwise provided for -- thirty-five
percentum
ad valorem."
The plaintiffs thereupon protested that the paper which they had
imported, instead of being assessed as it was by the collector,
under this latter clause at 35 percent
ad valorem, should
have been assessed under the former clause as "paper, . . .
printing, unsized, used for books and newspapers exclusively," at
20 percent
ad valorem. From the testimony, it appears that
it was what is generally called "tissue paper," and was mainly if
not exclusively used for making letterpress copies of letters or
written matter. This is a well known process by which, after a
letter has been written on ordinary paper, it is placed between the
leaves of a book filled with this kind of paper; the pages upon
which the copy is desired being usually dampened somewhat for that
purpose, after which such book is subject to great pressure by
means of a hand or other press. One or more impressions
Page 127 U. S. 115
may thus be made of the written matter upon the leaves of this
tissue paper.
The judge of the circuit court, in speaking of the character of
this paper, said to the jury:
"I do not think that the words used in the statute have any
technical meaning. You must take the statute as you find it, and a
common sense view of the case, and say whether or not this paper
which has been produced here is paper which is used exclusively for
books and newspapers, and whether the lawmakers intended when they
used this language that such paper as has been described to you
should come in and pay duty under that clause of the statute which
provides for paper used exclusively for books and newspapers."
He also said that if they found that it was not printing paper
used exclusively for books and newspapers, and should not come
under this clause, then their verdict should be for the defendant.
At the request of the attorney for the defendant he also charged
the jury that if they found upon the evidence that the phrase
"printing paper," as used in the trade, has a technical
signification, and if the plaintiffs' importation in this case does
not come within that signification, they should find a verdict for
the defendant.
The verdict and the judgment were for the defendant.
We are of opinion that the charge of the court was correct, and
that the verdict and judgment which followed it are without error.
It is very obvious from the face of the statute that "printing
paper, unsized, used for books and newspapers exclusively," does
not include the kind of paper in question in this case, and that it
therefore falls within the class of manufactures of paper not
otherwise provided for, so that it was properly chargeable with a
duty of 35 percentum
ad valorem. An ingenious argument is
made by plaintiffs' counsel to show that the process of
transferring the writing made upon sheets of the ordinary writing
paper used for that purpose, by causing the ink with which it was
written to soak or penetrate through one or more thicknesses of the
kind of tissue paper which this is said to be, after the same have
been
Page 127 U. S. 116
properly dampened, is printing within the meaning of the
statute, and therefore this paper, being used for that purpose, is
"printing paper." We, however, think it is perfectly clear that
this process is not printing, and that the use of this kind of
paper, which is in controversy here, for that purpose, does not
make it "printing paper."
The words of the statute, "paper, sized or glued, suitable only
for printing paper," and "printing, unsized, used for books and
newspapers exclusively," evidently have reference to the various
kinds of paper which are used for printing by means of type or
plates, which make an impression only upon the face of the paper
presented to them, and not to these kinds of tissue paper, so
characterized on account of their thinness, used for the purpose of
transferring writing by the penetration or soaking through of the
liquid used therefor, so that the copy is read upon the side of the
paper opposite to that presented to the original writing. The words
of the statute cannot comprehend this species of tissue paper,
which is merely used for the multiplication or copying of letters
or other writings. Not being included within the true meaning of
these phrases above quoted, it must then belong to that other and
larger class of "all other paper not otherwise provided for." This
is taxable at the rate of 35 percentum
ad valorem, the
amount which was actually levied and collected in this case.
We think the charge of the circuit judge on this subject, in
connection with the testimony, was sound, and that it cannot be
made much clearer by amplification.
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore
Affirmed.