"Goat's hair goods," composed of 80 percent of goat's hair and
20 percent of cotton, used chiefly for women's dresses, and which
were imported into the United States between January 24, 1874, and
June 25, 1874, were subject to the duty imposed by the Act of July
14, 1870, 16 Stat. 264, c. 255, § 21, upon "manufactures of hair
not otherwise herein provided for," as modified by the Act of June
6, 1872, 17 Stat. 231, and
Page 125 U. S. 71
not to the duty imposed by the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat.
561, c.197, § 2, upon
"women's and children's dress goods and real or imitation
Italian cloths, composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the
hair of the alpaca, goat, or other like animals,"
it being found by the jury that they were not known in commerce
among merchants and importers as "women's and children's dress
goods."
In the absence of a settled designation of a cloth by merchants
and importers, its designation as hair, silk, cotton, or woolen for
the purposes of customs revenue depends upon the predominance of
such article in its composition, and not upon the absence of any
other material.
The words "not otherwise herein provided for" in a section in a
customs revenue act mean not otherwise provided for in that
act.
To place an article among those designated as "enumerated," so
as to take it out of the operation of the similitude clause of the
customs revenue laws, Rev.Stat. § 2499, it is not necessary that it
should be specifically mentioned.
The words "manufactures of hair " are a sufficient designation
to place such manufactures among the enumerated articles.
This was an action at law to recover customs duties alleged to
have been illegally exacted. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued
out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion of the
Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought by the plaintiffs below to recover of
the late collector of the port of New York certain sums of money
alleged to have been illegally exacted as duties on goods imported
by them. It was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Southern District of New York, where the plaintiffs recovered a
verdict, and to review the judgment entered thereon the executors
of the collector, since deceased, have sued out this writ of error.
The complaint describes the goods imported, in general terms, as
manufactures of hair. There were fourteen importations between the
24th of January and the 25th of June, 1874. Upon the goods, which
were styled "goat hair goods," the
Page 125 U. S. 72
collector assessed duties under provisions of the Act of March
2, 1867, § 2, 14 Stat. 561, "to provide increased revenue from
imported wool and for other purposes," relating to women's and
children's dress goods and real or imitation Italian cloths
composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, the hair of the
alpaca, goat, or other like animals at six cents a square yard and
thirty-five percentum
ad valorem upon such as were valued
at not more than twenty cents a square yard, and at eight cents a
square yard and forty percentum
ad valorem upon such as
were valued at more than twenty cents a square yard.
The plaintiffs contended that this assessment of duties was
erroneous; that the duties should have been assessed under the
twenty-first section of the Act of July 14, 1870, "to reduce
internal taxes, and for other purposes," 16 Stat. 264, c. 255, §
21, as the goods were, within its terms, "manufactures of hair not
otherwise provided for," and that a reduction thereon should be
made of ten percentum under the Act of June 6, 1872, 17 Stat. 231.
That section provides that
"After the thirty-first day of December, eighteen hundred and
seventy, in lieu of the duties now imposed by law on the articles
hereinafter enumerated or provided for, imported from foreign
countries, there shall be levied, collected, and paid the following
duties and rates of duties, that is to say: . . . On hair cloth of
the description known as 'hair seating,' eighteen inches wide or
over, forty cents per square yard; less than eighteen inches wide,
thirty cents per square yard. On hair cloth known as crinoline
cloth,
and on all other manufactures of hair not otherwise
provided for, thirty percentum
ad valorem."
By the joint resolution of January 30, 1871, this clause was
amended by the insertion of the word "herein," between the words
"otherwise" and "provided." 16 Stat. 592.
The reduction of ten percent under the Act of June 6, 1872, was
made upon such of the invoices as were produced, but most of the
invoices had been mislaid. It was not therefore shown that such
reduction had been made upon all of them. On the trial, it appeared
that the "goat hair goods" are
Page 125 U. S. 73
fabrics manufactured of cotton, and the hair of the angora or
other goat, the warp being cotton, and the woof being goat's hair;
that their chief use is for women's dresses; that they are known in
the trade under such specific names as "brilliantines,"
"lustrines," "alpacas," and "mohairs;" that the goat's hair of
which they are composed in part constitutes eighty percent of the
whole value and the cotton twenty percent.
It also appeared that crinoline cloth is made of cotton and
hair, the long hair being from the tail or mane of the horse and
woven into a cotton warp, the width being governed by the length of
the hair, and that it is used for ladies' underwear; that hair
seating is a similar fabric to crinoline cloth, the only difference
being that it is more closely woven, and is used mainly for
upholstering purposes.
Evidence was offered by the defendant tending to show that the
goat hair goods are generally known in the trade and commerce of
the country under the name of "women's dress goods," but on this
point the evidence was conflicting, some of the witnesses stating
that they were known by their specific names as "brilliantines" and
"alpacas," and some that they were at the time of importation known
as "women's dress goods."
It was stipulated for the purpose of the trial that if the jury
should render a verdict for the plaintiff, it should be subject to
adjustment as to formal requisites and amounts at the custom house,
under the direction of the court, and, to raise the questions
involved, it was also stipulated, as to one of the importations,
that the plaintiffs had paid the duties assessed, and in due time
filed their written protest, appealed to the Secretary of the
Treasury, and brought this action.
When the evidence was closed, the court was requested to direct
a verdict for the defendant on the ground that such goat hair goods
were:
1st. Women's dress goods, composed wholly or in part of the hair
of the alpaca, goat, or other like animal;
2d. That they were not manufactures of hair, but were
manufactures of mixed materials, and by the similitude clause were
liable to duty as manufactures of cotton, the latter being assessed
at a higher rate of duty than that prescribed for manufactures of
hair, and
Page 125 U. S. 74
3d. That under the act of 1870, the terms, "all other
manufactures of hair not otherwise provided for" meant other
manufactures of hair, like those enumerated in the same section --
namely crinoline cloth or hair seating, and that there was no
evidence that the goat hair goods were like them.
The court overruled the motion, and the defendant excepted. It
then instructed the jury in substance as follows:
That under the act of 1867, which remained in force until 1870,
there was assessed a certain duty on women's and children's dresses
composed wholly or in part of wool, worsted, hair of the alpaca,
goat, and other like animals; that in 1870 the law was changed in
some respects, so as to make the duty assessable on hair cloth
known as "crinoline cloth," and all other manufactures of hair at a
less rate; that the goods upon which the duties were assessed in
this case were manufactures principally of hair; that the principal
value of them was of hair; that, according to the evidence, eighty
percent was of hair and twenty percent of cotton; that the general
language of the act of 1870 would control and guide in the
assessment of duties upon them unless they had, before the passage
of the act, come to be specifically known as "dress goods" among
merchants and importers; that the question therefore was whether
they had acquired such a name in the trade and commerce of the
country as to be specifically known by it instead of the general
name of "manufactures of hair;" that if they had not acquired such
specific name and were not known by it, they would come under the
general name of "manufactures of hair," and the plaintiffs would be
entitled to recover, and that, on the other hand, if they had
acquired such specific name and were known by it in trade and
commerce, the defendant would be entitled to a verdict.
The defendant took various exceptions to this charge, and in
this Court presents anew the questions raised upon the instructions
refused.
The instructions were in our opinion properly refused, and the
case was presented to the jury as fully as was required for their
appreciation of the question involved. The goods were composed of
eighty percent of hair, and there is no provision
Page 125 U. S. 75
of law to which our attention has been drawn that takes goods
thus composed, not having a specific commercial designation, from
the general designation as "manufactures of hair." The finding of
the jury is conclusive that they were not known in commerce, among
merchants and importers, as women's and children's dress goods. It
is well settled that a designation of an article of commerce by
merchants and importers, when clearly established, determines the
construction of a revenue law when that article is mentioned. It
was so held in
Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U. S.
108, and in many other cases which are cited in the
opinion of the Court in that case. In
Elliott v.
Swartwout, 10 Pet. 151, the Court said that
"Laws imposing duties on importations of goods are intended for
practical use and application by men engaged in commerce, and hence
it has become a settled rule in the interpretation of statutes of
this description to construe the language adopted by the
legislature, and particularly in the denomination of articles
according to the commercial understanding of the terms used. This
rule is fully recognized and established by this Court in the case
of
Two Hundred Chests of
Tea, reported in 9 Wheat. 438."
The fact that twenty percent of cotton entered into the
composition of the goods and only eighty percent of them are of
hair does not change their character as manufactures of hair within
the meaning of the act of 1870. Crinoline and hair seating, both of
which are in that act specifically designated as "hair cloth," have
also cotton in their composition. The designation of a cloth as
hair, silk, or cotton depends on the predominance of such article
in its composition, and not upon absence of any other material.
The twenty-first section of the act of 1870 having been, as
mentioned above, amended in 1871 by the insertion of the word
"herein" between "otherwise" and "provided," the clause of the
section is to be construed as though its language was that
"After the 31st of December, 1870, in lieu of the duties now
imposed by law on the articles hereinafter enumerated or provided
for imported from foreign countries, there shall be levied,
collected, and paid the following duties and rates of duties --
Page 125 U. S. 76
that is to say: . . . On hair cloth of the description known as
'hair seating,' eighteen inches wide or over, forty cents per
square yard; less than eighteen inches wide, thirty cents per
square yard. On hair cloth known as 'crinoline cloth,'
and on
all other manufactures of hair not otherwise herein provided
for, thirty percentum
ad valorem."
The words "all other manufactures of hair not otherwise herein
provided for" mean not otherwise provided for in the act of which
they are a part.
Smythe v.
Fiske, 23 Wall. 374. There is no provision in that
act for other manufactures of hair than crinoline and hair seating.
It therefore necessarily follows that if the goat hair goods in
question are to be deemed manufactures of hair, the duties are to
be assessed in conformity with that act, and not according to the
provisions of any other act.
The construction of the clause for which the government
contends, if admitted, would lead to great embarrassment, if not
insurmountable difficulty, in determining the duties to be assessed
on many articles. Its position is that by "all other manufactures
of hair not otherwise provided for" is meant all other manufactures
of hair similar to crinoline cloth and hair seating. If this be
correct, it would be impossible to say at what rate of duty such
other manufactures of hair are to be assessed -- whether by the
square yard rate or the
ad valorem rate. The two rates
could not be indifferently applied. The natural meaning of the
section is that on crinoline cloth, an
ad valorem duty
shall be assessed, and a similar duty on all other manufactures of
hair not otherwise provided for in the act.
The similitude clause can have no bearing on the question. That
clause only provides that there shall be levied on each
nonenumerated article which bears a similitude, either in material,
quality, texture, or the use to which it may be applied, to any
article enumerated as chargeable with duty, the same rate of duty
which is levied on the enumerated article which it most resembles
in any of the particulars mentioned. Rev.Stat. § 2499. To place
articles among those designated as enumerated, it is not necessary
that they should be specifically mentioned. It is sufficient that
they are designated in any way to distinguish them from other
articles. Thus, the
Page 125 U. S. 77
words "manufactures of which steel is a component part," and
"manufactures of which glass is a component part" have been held a
sufficient designation to render the goods enumerated articles
under the statute, and take them out of the similitude clause.
Arthur v. Sussfield, 96 U. S. 128. Upon
the same principle, "manufactures of hair" must be held a
sufficient designation to place such manufactures among the
enumerated articles.
Judgment affirmed.