Congress enacted August 7, 1882, 22 Stat. 734,
"that the Quartermaster General of the United States is hereby
authorized to examine and adjust the claims of Julia A. Nutt, widow
and executrix of Haller Nutt, deceased, late of Natchez, in the
State of Mississippi, growing out of the occupation and use by the
United States Army during the late rebellion of the property of
said Haller Nutt during his lifetime, or of his estate after his
decease, including livestock, goods, and moneys, taken and used by
the United States or the armies thereof, and he may consider the
evidence heretofore taken on said claim, as far as applicable,
before the Commissioners of Claims, and such other evidence as may
be adduced before him on behalf of the legal representatives of
Haller Nutt or on behalf of the United States, and shall report the
facts to Congress to be considered with other claims reported by
the Quartermaster General."
The Quartermaster General made the examination and reported to
Congress
Page 125 U. S. 651
the aggregate value of the property taken.
Held that
this reference of the claim did not constitute a submission to
arbitration on the part of Congress, and that the finding of the
Quartermaster General was neither an award nor the equivalent of an
account stated between private individuals.
Sometime after this report of the Quartermaster General,
Congress appropriated sundry amounts to various persons named in
the bill as
"an allowance of certain claims reported by the accounting
officers of the United States Treasury Department, . . . the same
being in full for, and the receipt for the same to be taken and
accepted in each case as a full and final discharge of the several
claims examined and allowed."
Among these amounts was an appropriation to Mrs. Nutt of an
amount much less than that reported by the Quartermaster General,
which reduced amount she accepted.
Held that this did not
amount to an adoption by Congress of the report of the
Quartermaster General, and that there was no inference that the
appropriation actually made was intended to be a recognition of a
larger amount as due.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the Court.
An act of Congress, approved August 7, 1882, for the relief of
Julia A. Nutt, widow and executrix of Haller Nutt, deceased, 22
Stat. 734, declared:
"That the Quartermaster General of the United States is hereby
authorized and directed to examine and adjust the claims of Julia
A. Nutt, widow and executrix of Haller Nutt, deceased, late of
Natchez, in the State of Mississippi, growing out of the occupation
and use by the United States Army during the late Rebellion of the
property of the said Haller Nutt during his lifetime, or of his
estate after his deceased, including livestock, goods, and moneys
taken and used by the United States or the armies thereof, and he
may consider the evidence heretofore taken on said claim, so far as
applicable, before the Commissioners of Claims, and such other
legal evidence as may be adduced before him in behalf of the legal
representatives of Haller Nutt, deceased, or in behalf of the
United States, and shall
Page 125 U. S. 652
report the facts to Congress to be considered with other claims
reported by the Quartermaster General,
provided that no
part of said claims upon which said Commissioners of Claims have
passed on the merits shall be considered by the Quartermaster
General."
On December 22, 1882, the Quartermaster General, acting under
and pursuant to this act, reported to Congress, through the
Secretary of War, that he had examined the claims of Mrs. Julia A.
Nutt, as widow and executrix, and the nature and manner of his
investigation, and the circumstances and evidence relating to the
same. He further reported as follows:
"All the evidence considered, as well as the additional
information I have been able to gather, warrants me in recommending
that Julia A. Nutt be paid the following items, which, in my
judgment, are sufficiently proved by the evidence,
viz., .
. ."
He then states various items of property, with their value, the
total amounting to $256,884.05. This report was transmitted direct
by the Secretary of War to Congress, but was not transmitted to or
acted upon by the accounting officers of the Treasury. On July 5,
1884, Congress passed an act, 23 Stat. 552, "for the allowance of
certain claims reported by the accounting officers of the United
States Treasury Department, and for other purposes." This statute
enacts
"That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby,
authorized and required to pay, out of any money in the Treasury
not otherwise appropriated, to the several persons in this act
named, the several sums mentioned herein, the same being in full
for, and the receipt of the same to be taken and accepted in each
case as a full and final discharge of, the several claims examined
and allowed by the proper accounting officers under the provisions
of the Act of July 4, 1864, since January 6, 1883, namely . .
."
Then follows a list of the names of the persons, with the amount
payable to each, under the head of the several states of Tennessee,
Kentucky, West Virginia, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland,
Missouri, District of Columbia, Colorado, Illinois, Indian
Territory, Iowa, Kansas, and, finally, under the head of
Mississippi,
Page 125 U. S. 653
as follows: "To Julia A. Nutt, widow and executrix of Haller
Nutt, deceased, of Adams County, the sum of $35,556.17." This
amount was paid to and accepted by the claimant. The payment and
receipt of this sum under the Act of July 5, 1884, however, it is
contended, does not operate as a full and final discharge of her
claim against the government, because it is not within the
description contained in the act of "claims examined and allowed by
the proper accounting officers under the provisions of the Act of
July 4, 1864." The right to recover the full amount of the claim,
after deducting this payment, is rested by counsel for the claimant
upon the Act of August 7, 1882, and is based upon the following
proposition:
1st. The reference of the claim by Congress, with the consent of
the claimant, to the Quartermaster General constituted, under the
special provisions of the act of reference, a submission to
arbitration, and the Quartermaster General's conclusion or finding
was an award pursuant to arbitration, upon which suit can be
maintained.
2d. If the reference to the Quartermaster General, and the
finding by him, do not constitute an arbitration and award, they
are at least the equivalent of an account stated between private
individuals.
3d. Even if of itself the finding of the Quartermaster General
did not constitute an account stated, it became such by its
acceptance by Congress and the appellant.
There is nothing, however, in the language of the Act of August
7, 1882, to justify the inference that the finding reported by the
Quartermaster General is an award in pursuance of an arbitration.
On the contrary, the terms of the act distinctly negative that
idea. There is no recital of a mutual submission by the parties of
any controversy to an arbitrator. The Quartermaster General was
authorized and directed by Congress to examine and adjust the
claims in question, but not for the purpose of settling and
adjudging any controversy in relation thereto between the United
States and the claimant. He was required to report the facts to
Congress, not to publish an award to the parties, and the object
for which his report
Page 125 U. S. 654
was required was that the claim should be "considered with other
claims reported by the Quartermaster General." This report
evidently is purely for the information of Congress itself, in
order that it, being thus advised, might thereafter deal with the
claim as in its judgment should seem best.
On this point, the language of this Court in
Gordon v.
United States, 7 Wall. 188,
74 U. S. 195,
is applicable. It was there said:
"The various acts and resolutions of Congress in this case
emanated from a desire to do justice and to obtain the proper
information as a basis of action, and were not intended to be
submissions to the arbitrament of the accounting officer. They were
designed as instructions to the officer by which to adjust the
accounts, Congress reserving to itself the power to approve,
reject, or rescind, or to otherwise act in the premises as the
exigencies of the case might require. In other words, these
references only require the officer to act in a ministerial, not a
judicial, capacity."
To the same effect is the case of
Chorpenning v. United
States, 94 U. S. 397,
94 U. S. 398.
It was there said:
"The resolution relied upon by the appellant was wholly
unilateral. It contained no stipulation of payment, express or
implied. Congress, for its own reasons, simply directed an
examination and adjustment. It gave no promise, and came under no
obligation to the other party, and asked and received none from
him. The government and the claimant stood, and continued to stand,
wholly independent of each other. The government could at any time
before payment recall what it had done, and the claimant was at
liberty up to the same period to refuse concurrence and assert
aliunde his legal rights, if any he had. Prior to that
time, there could be no vested right and no commitment of either
party, not subject to the exercise thereafter of such discretion,
affirmative or negative, as might be deemed proper. The case
presents the same legal aspect as if it were between individuals.
If a merchant should direct his clerk or other agent to investigate
and adjust the claim of a third party upon a prescribed basis, and
the adjustment was made accordingly, can it be doubted that the
merchant might thereafter, because he had come to the conclusion
that the claim was
Page 125 U. S. 655
tainted with fraud, or had been already fully paid, or for any
other reason, or as a matter of choice, without assigning any
reason, decline to recognize what had been done as of any validity,
and withdraw the authority under which the proceeding had been
taken? The reason of the right would be that there was no binding
mutuality of assent, no consideration, and hence no legal
obligation resting upon either party."
The same reasons dispose of the second proposition, and show
that the report of the Quartermaster General is no more an account
stated between the parties than it is an arbitration and award. In
order to constitute an account stated between individuals, the
statement of the account must be adopted by one party and submitted
as correct to the other. But here Congress did not adopt the report
of the Quartermaster General as its statement of what was due from
the United States; nor was the report submitted to the claimant as
a correct statement of indebtedness.
The acceptance by Congress and the appellant referred to in the
third proposition can only mean the appropriation made by Congress
in the Act of July 5, 1884, but certainly that cannot be considered
an adoption of the report of the Quartermaster General. It does not
purport to be an appropriation of a partial payment as a credit
upon a larger sum admitted to be use. Even though it be admitted
that the language of the act in its first clause, declaring that
the receipt of the money appropriated in each case shall be taken
as a full and final discharge of the several claims, does not
apply, yet there is no inference that the appropriation actually
made was intended to be a recognition of a larger amount in fact
due. The presumption is the other way, and the right conclusion is
that Congress appropriated all that it meant to acknowledge.
The judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the petition is
therefore
Affirmed.