Upon the proofs in this case, the court finds that the
settlement which the bill seeks to set aside was a prudent and fair
one, made deliberately and under advice of competent counsel, and
that, independently of any question of laches, no ground is shown
for maintaining this suit.
The original suit was a bill in equity, filed May 7, 1884, by
Florence W. Hays, the widow of John J. Hays, against Frank E.
DeWolf and wife and Horace M. Barnes, to set aside a deed of real
estate from DeWolf and wife to Barnes, and to compel a conveyance
to the plaintiff. Upon a hearing on pleadings and proofs, the
circuit court entered a decree for the plaintiff, and the
defendants appealed to this Court. The case is stated in the
opinion.
Page 125 U. S. 615
MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question upon which the decision of this case turns is one
of fact, and upon full consideration of the evidence, we are unable
to adopt the conclusion of the circuit court.
Hays and wife and DeWolf and wife, connections by marriage, and
intimate friends, took up their residence in California in 1871.
Hays was in ill health, and DeWolf had the confidence of Hays and
wife, and often transacted business for them. In 1872, DeWolf and
wife owned a ranch of 4,160 acres in Fresno County, California, and
at his suggestion Mrs. Hays purchased an undivided half of the
tract for the price of $23,425, part of which she paid out of her
separate funds, and for the rest of which she gave them her
promissory note for $10,135, secured by mortgage of the land.
It is alleged in the bill and shown by the evidence that
afterwards DeWolf and wife, without consideration, assigned the
note and mortgage to one Haggin, and he commenced an action of
foreclosure, which was dismissed upon the plaintiff's executing and
delivering to Haggin a deed of the land; that in 1877, the same was
conveyed, without consideration, by Haggin to one Dimmock, and by
him to Mrs. DeWolf, and that in all these transactions Haggin, as
well as Dimmock, acted as agent of the DeWolfs.
The bill alleges, and the answers deny, that the plaintiff
executed and delivered the deed to Haggin
"at the urgent solicitation of her husband, who was at the time
an invalid, unable to attend to business, and who importuned the
plaintiff to make said deed, urging as a reason that he was
unwilling to die and leave her involved in a litigation which might
result in her pecuniary ruin, and the plaintiff, yielding to his
entreaties and persuasions, consented to and did make said
deed,"
and that DeWolf and wife, at the time of the execution of that
deed,
"well knew that the same was made by the plaintiff under the
influence of her said husband and because of his persuasion and
solicitation, and was not her free and voluntary act."
In March, 1884, DeWolf and wife conveyed the land to
Page 125 U. S. 616
Barnes. The bill alleges that this conveyance was made "for the
purpose of covering up and concealing their title to the same, the
better to cheat and defraud the plaintiff." The answers deny that
it was made with that or any other fraudulent or wrongful
purpose.
It appears by the evidence that at and before the time of the
making of the deed to Haggin, Mrs. Hays and her husband had very
little other property, while Haggin and DeWolf were wealthy, and
that her husband was very ill of consumption, complicated with
other diseases (of which he died a year afterwards), and was, as
his attending physician testified, "extremely nervous and
sensitive, and easily affected by almost everything surrounding
him," and less fit to transact business than he had previously
been. Mrs. Hays testifies that she was induced to make the deed by
the persuasions and entreaties of her husband, who was greatly
worried by the fear of leaving her without means in a network of
legal trouble.
But the other circumstances preceding and attending the
execution of the deed which are clearly established by the evidence
give a different color to the matter. In May, 1876, Mrs. Hays
brought an action in a court of the state against DeWolf and wife,
alleging that she had been induced to make her original purchase by
their fraudulent representations as to the value of the property
and demanding damages for the fraud, as well as that the note and
mortgage might be declared void. Haggin's action to foreclose the
mortgage was brought in November, 1876.
Mr. Rearden, a counselor at law whose integrity and veracity are
not impugned and who had long been acquainted with Hays and wife
and their affairs and was one of her counsel, testifies that while
those two suits were pending, the question of a compromise and
settlement was discussed between himself and the opposing counsel,
by which of them first suggested he did not remember; that he had
conversations on the subject at his office in San Francisco with
Hays alone, and afterwards with him in the presence of his wife at
their residence in Redwood; that "they stated a number
Page 125 U. S. 617
of facts which, if proved, might possibly be defenses to the
note and mortgage;" that the reasons Hays gave him for wanting to
settle the matter were that
"they were practically without means to carry on any extensive
litigation which seemed to be opening up, and his health was bad,
and he did not want to risk his labor and time on the great
uncertainties of this business,"
and that he carefully suggested to Hays various items of the
possible expenses of the litigation, and, among other things, that
one of the pending suits "would possibly cost him all the way from
$1,500 to $2,500."
It was after Hays had talked with Rearden that, as Mrs. Hays
testifies, he entreated her and she consented "to wipe out the
whole thing -- the DeWolf suit and the Haggin suit and everything
-- if they could just get out of it, and not continue in it at
all."
Mrs. Hays further testifies that at Rearden's request, she went
without her husband to San Francisco, "to see the DeWolfs in
relation to this matter of the deed and the suit," and negotiations
were had at Rearden's office between Mrs. Hays and Rearden, on the
one side, and DeWolf and his counsel, on the other, lasting a great
part of two days, before a settlement was effected. The only
evidence of any knowledge on the part of the defendants that Mrs.
Hays was acting under the influence of her husband is her testimony
that she then told DeWolf
"that she wanted to wipe out the whole thing on account of her
husband's ill health, and that she did it because it was a wife's
duty -- in other words, to do what he told her to do."
The terms of the settlement, as then agreed upon and some days
afterwards carried out, were that the mortgage note was delivered
up to Mrs. Hays, two debts of hers of about $1,200 were paid by
DeWolf, and Hays and wife executed the deed conveying the land to
Haggin, and a deed of release of all claims against the DeWolfs.
These deeds were dated January 16, 1877, and annexed to each of
them was a certificate of a notary public to its acknowledgment by
Hays and wife, and that she, upon being examined apart from her
husband, and made acquainted with its contents, acknowledged her
execution, and did not wish to retract it.
Page 125 U. S. 618
The plaintiff, in her present bill, filed in 1884, does not
allege any fraud or undue influence in the original transaction in
1872, by which she purchased the property, and gave the note and
mortgage for part of the price, but, on the contrary, claims title
under that purchase, and offers to pay the amount of the mortgage
note and interest, deducting any rents and profits received by the
defendants. The uncontradicted testimony of well informed witnesses
proves that at the time of the settlement in 1877, the value of the
undivided half of the land did not exceed the amount of the
mortgage, although it has since greatly increased because of the
introduction of irrigation. In the state of facts then existing,
the settlement appears to have been a prudent and fair one, made
deliberately and under advice of competent counsel. Independently
of any question of laches, therefore, no ground is shown for
maintaining this suit.
Decree reversed, and case remanded to the circuit court,
with directions to dismiss the bill.