The act of Congress of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 244, § 10 of
which authorized a bridge to be constructed across the Missouri
River at the City of Kansas, required that the distance of one
hundred and sixty feet between the piers of the bridge, which was
called for by the act, should be obtained by measuring along a line
between said piers drawn perpendicularly to the faces of the piers
and the current of the river, and as such a line drawn between the
piers of the bridge of the plaintiff in error measures only one
hundred and fifty-three feet and a fraction of a foot, instead of
the required one hundred and sixty feet, it is not a lawful
structure within the meaning of that act.
When there is any doubt as to the proper construction of a
statute granting a privilege, that construction should be adopted
which is most advantageous to the interests of the government, the
grantor.
A decision by the highest court of a state upon the question
whether the mere fact that a bridge, constructed under authority
derived from the Act of Congress of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat. 244,
had not been constructed as required by the statute rendered the
owner liable for injuries happening by reason of its existence to a
steamboat navigating the river, irrespective of the question
whether the accident was the result of the improper construction,
presents no federal question for the decision of this Court.
This was an action brought in a state court of Missouri to
recover damages for injuries to steamboats of the plaintiff below
caused by striking upon the piers of a bridge across the Missouri
River constructed by the defendant. Verdict and judgment for
plaintiff, which was affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the
opinion of the court.
Page 125 U. S. 261
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of
Missouri to review a judgment of that court affirming a judgment of
the Circuit Court of Jackson County in said state against the
plaintiff in error. The action was brought in February, 1875, in
the Circuit Court of Jackson County by the Missouri River Packet
Company, plaintiff below, against the Hannibal and St. Joseph
Railroad Company, defendant below, to recover damages for injuries
done to two of the plaintiff's steamboats by a railroad bridge,
which had been erected and maintained by defendant over the
Missouri River at Kansas City, Missouri, the piers of which, and
two certain structures connected therewith, it is alleged
unlawfully obstructed the navigation of said river.
The petition contained two counts, the first of which was as
follows:
"Plaintiff states that it is and for the five years last past
has been a corporation organized and created under and by virtue of
the laws of the State of Missouri, and during said period has been
and still is the owner and proprietor of numerous steamboats,
including the steamboat named
Alice, hereinafter
mentioned, with which it has, as such corporation, during said
period been engaged in navigating the waters of the Missouri River,
and conveying and transporting by means thereof passengers and
freight between the various towns and cities situated on the banks
of said river in the States of Missouri and Kansas."
"That the defendant is, and for the last twenty years has been,
a railroad corporation organized under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of Missouri."
"That the Missouri River, for a long distance above the City of
Kansas, in the County of Jackson and State of Missouri, and below
said city to the mouth of said river, is a navigable stream; that
prior to the 4th day of March, 1874, the defendant had erected, and
prior thereto and on said day did keep and maintain in the said
river and the channel thereof near the southern bank thereof and
near the foot of the street
Page 125 U. S. 262
known as Broadway, in said City of Kansas, a certain structure
composed of heavy timbers and lumber fastened together, and long
prior to said day, the defendant had erected, kept, and maintained,
and did on said day keep and maintain, in the channel of said
river, in a point in said Jackson County and opposite said City of
Kansas, nearer the center of said river than the structure first
above named, a certain other structure, towit, a crib or box built
of heavy timbers filled with stone, which said crib or box extended
from the bed of said river upward to a height of 30 feet or more
above the surface thereof; that both of said structures were and
always have been obstacles in the way of vessels passing by the
same up and down said river, and have prevented and rendered the
navigation of said river dangerous and unsafe; that said structures
were so erected, kept, and maintained by the defendant wrongfully,
willfully, and in flagrant disregard and violation of the rights of
plaintiff and others, to the free and unobstructed use of said
river as a highway of commerce; that before the erection of said
structures, the current of said river, at and above and below the
point where the same were located and erected, had been in a line
nearly parallel to the faces of said structure, and the navigation
of the same easy and safe."
"But plaintiff states that the structure first above mentioned
had, on said 4th day of March, 1874, caused the current of the
river at that point to change, so that it rushed with great
velocity from the point of the location of said structure in a
direction nearly at right angles to its former course towards and
against said crib or box."
"And plaintiff states that on said 4th day of March, 1874, it
was, in the course of its business, navigating said river with its
said steamboat
Alice and while attempting, in the exercise
of due care and caution, to run said boat by and between said
structures, said boat was, without any fault of this plaintiff, by
the current of the river so changed as aforesaid, hurled violently
against said crib or box, and the waterwheel, wheelhouse, and other
parts of said boat broken, injured, and damaged. "
Page 125 U. S. 263
"That plaintiff was compelled to, and did, expend large sums of
money in repairing said injuries to said boat, and was, on account
of the injuries thereto, wholly deprived of the use of the same and
of the earnings thereof for the period of thirteen days, to
plaintiff's damage in the sum of twentyfive hundred dollars, for
which, with interest from the 1st day of April, 1874, plaintiff
prays judgment against the defendant."
The second count was in substantially the same form, and alleged
an injury to the
St. Luke, another of plaintiff's vessels,
occurring on the 15th day of September, 1874, and prayed judgment
on account thereof in the sum of $3,000.
To this petition the defendant below first interposed a plea to
the jurisdiction of the court, alleging that the structures
complained of, and each of them, were, at the time of the injuries
alleged in plaintiff's petition, and still are, a part of a bridge
across the Missouri River at Kansas City authorized by the Act of
Congress approved July 25, 1866, and constructed under and in
accordance with the terms and provisions of said act by the Kansas
City and Cameron Railroad Company, of which the defendant company
below is the successor; that said bridge was wholly situated at the
time of the injuries alleged in plaintiff's petition, and still is
wholly situated, within the jurisdiction of the District Court of
the United States for the Western District of Missouri, and that by
reason of the premises stated, said district court has exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action.
This plea having been overruled by the court and exceptions duly
saved, the defendant answered. The answer consisted of (1) a
general denial, and (2) a special defense, which latter was pleaded
as a full and complete bar to the cause of action alleged in the
petition, and is in substance as follows:
That at the time of the injury complained of in plaintiff's
petition, the defendant was, for a long time prior thereto had
been, and still is, a corporation duly organized under the laws of
the State of Missouri, and, as such corporation, acting as it was
authorized to do by the terms of its charter, it had constructed a
railroad from the Town of Hannibal, in the State of Missouri, to
the Town of St. Joseph, in said state, and has been
Page 125 U. S. 264
ever since maintaining and operating said railroad; that the
Kansas City and Cameron Railroad Company, a corporation duly
organized under the laws of the State of Missouri, as it was
authorized to do by the terms of its charter, had constructed a
railroad from the north bank of the Missouri River, opposite said
City of Kansas, to Cameron, on the Hannibal and St. Joseph
Railroad; that Congress, by an Act approved July 25, 1866,
authorized the construction of a bridge across the Missouri River
at or near Kansas City, and the Kansas City and Cameron Railroad
Company, availing itself of this privilege, between the passage of
said Act of Congress and the 4th day of July, 1869, did construct
such bridge at Kansas City; that the Kansas City and Cameron
Railroad Company afterwards, towit, on the 4th day of February,
1870, consolidated with the defendant company, whereby the
defendant became the owner and proprietor of said bridge; that said
bridge was and is a pivot drawbridge, with a draw over the main
channel of said Missouri River at an accessible and navigable
point, and with spans of 160 feet in the clear on each side of the
pivotpier of the draw, and the next adjoining spans to the draw
were and are 30 feet above lowwater mark, and 10 feet above
highwater mark, measuring to the bottom chord of said bridge, and
the piers of said bridge were, at the times of location and
construction thereof, parallel with the current of the said river;
that the obstacles and obstructions (the structures) described in
plaintiff's petition, and each of them, were at that time and still
are parts and parcels of said bridge, and were and are necessary to
the safe and secure maintenance of said bridge; that said bridge,
ever since its completion, has been a post route; and that, by
reason of the premises aforesaid, said bridge, ever since its
completion, has been and still is a lawful structure and, if
plaintiff has sustained any damage in consequence thereof, it has
been without any fault on the part of defendant, and the defendant
is not legally liable therefor. Plaintiff in its reply specifically
denied every material allegation set up in the special defense of
the defendant, and upon this state of the pleadings the case was
tried by a jury, resulting
Page 125 U. S. 265
in a verdict for plaintiff below on the first count in its
petition for $2,400, and on the second, for $2,900 -- in all,
$5,300 -- upon which judgment was rendered.
Plaintiff thereupon excepted, and appealed to the Supreme Court
of the State of Missouri, relying mainly upon the question of
jurisdiction in the court below and upon certain alleged improper
and illegal instructions given to the jury. The supreme court of
the state, upon the questions material to a review of the case by
this Court, held (1) that the Circuit Court of Jackson County, in
which this action was commenced, had concurrent jurisdiction with
the District Court of the United States for the Western District of
Missouri in the case, and that therefore the plea to the
jurisdiction was properly overruled by the circuit court; (2) that
while the piers of the bridge were constructed parallel with the
current of the river, as required by the act of Congress, in
determining whether the spans of the bridge on each side of the
pivotpier were 160 feet in length in the clear, as required by the
act, the measurement should be made at right angles with the
current, and not along the structure itself, or on the line of the
structure, and, inasmuch as the spans so measured were but 153 feet
and a fraction in length, that therefore the structure causing the
accident was not a lawful one.
The Act of Congress approved July 25, 1866, giving permission
for the construction of the bridge under consideration, is found in
14 Stat. 244, and the sections thereof material to a correct
determination of the issue here are quoted in full below.
Section 1 provides for the erection of a bridge across the
Mississippi River at Quincy, Illinois, and for the laying of
railroad tracks on and over the same, etc.
"And in case of any litigation arising from any obstruction to
the free navigation of said river, the cause may be tried before
the district court of the United States of any state in which any
portion of said construction or bridge touches."
"SEC. 2.
And be it further enacted that any bridge
built under the provisions of this act may, at the option of the
company building the same, be built as a drawbridge, with a
pivot
Page 125 U. S. 266
or other form of draw, or with unbroken or continuous spans,
provided that if the said bridge shall be made with
unbroken and continuous spans, it shall not be of less elevation in
any case than fifty feet above extreme highwater mark, as
understood at the point of location, to the bottom chord of the
bridge; nor shall the spans of said bridge be less than two hundred
and fifty feet in length, and the piers of said bridge shall be
parallel with the current of the river, and the main span shall be
over the main channel of the river, and not less than three hundred
feet in length,
and provided also that if any bridge built
under this act shall be constructed as a drawbridge, the same shall
be constructed as a pivot drawbridge, with a draw over the main
channel of the river at an accessible and navigable point and with
spans of not less than one hundred and sixty feet in length in the
clear on each side of the central or pivot pier of the draw, and
the next adjoining spans to the draw shall not be less than two
hundred and fifty feet, and said spans shall not be less than
thirty feet above lowwater mark, and not less than ten above
extreme highwater mark, measuring to the bottom chord of the
bridge, and the piers of said bridge shall be parallel with the
current of the river,
and provided also that said draw
shall be opened promptly upon reasonable signal for the passage of
boats whose construction shall not be such as to admit of their
passage under the permanent spans of said bridge, except when
trains are passing over the same; but in no case shall unnecessary
delay occur in opening the said draw during or after the passage of
trains."
"SEC. 3.
And be it further enacted that any bridge
constructed under this act and according to its limitations shall
be a lawful structure, and shall be recognized and known as a post
route, upon which also no higher charge shall be made for the
transmission over the same of the mails, the troops, and the
munitions of war of the United States than the rate per mile paid
for their transportation over the railroads or public highways
leading to the said bridge."
"SEC. 10.
And be it further enacted that any company
authorized by the Legislature of Missouri may construct a
Page 125 U. S. 267
bridge across the Missouri River at the City of Kansas upon the
same terms and conditions provided for in this act."
The material facts in this case, as set forth clearly and
distinctly in the frank and able brief of counsel for plaintiff in
error, are as follows:
"The undisputed evidence showed that the bridge was a pivot
drawbridge; that its piers were parallel with the current of the
river, but that they were not at right angles with the current, and
ranged diagonally across it; that as a consequence, the
superstructure of the bridge, erected on the piers, ran diagonally
across the current of the river at an angle of 18 degrees; that
measuring the spans between the piers along the line or chord of
the bridge gave a distance of over 160 feet; that the open space
between the piers at lowwater mark, measured on the line of the
bridge structure, was also over 160 feet, but that a line measured
at right angles with the current was only 153 feet and a fraction.
It also appeared that the drawbridge, when swinging open to permit
the passage of boats, rested upon two timber structures, called
upper and lower draw rests, which had for their foundation cribs
sunk in the river and filled with rock. There was also an ice
breaker in front of the upper draw rest, and forming a part of it.
The draw rests were connected with the pivotpier by cribs sunk in
the water. These draw rests, thus connected with the pivotpier,
were situated near the middle of the river, parallel with the
current, and all taken together extended up and down the river
about the length of the draw, and were necessary parts of the
structure. The upper draw rest, with its ice breaker attached, was
what the petition designated as 'a certain other structure, towit,
a crib or box, built of heavy timbers filled with stone,' and was
the structure with which the steamer came in collision. The
evidence also tended to show that near the river bank on the south
side of the south draw opening, a row of pontoons was placed,
extending from pier No. 1 up the river about 340 feet to the shore,
pier No. 1 being about sixtyfive feet from the Kansas City shore,
and being the pier on which the south end of the draw rested when
in position. These pontoons were constructed
Page 125 U. S. 268
of a number of flatboats from fiftythree to sixtyfive feet in
length, and from eighteen to twenty feet in width, chained together
so that their outer edge presented a straight line next to the
channel. On the trial it was not claimed that these pontoons were
any part of the bridge. They constituted what the petition called
'a certain structure composed of heavy timbers and lumber fastened
together,' near the southern bank of the river. It further appeared
that the pontoons remained floating and in position until the
latter part of the winter of 187374, when they sank. The evidence
for the plaintiff tended to show that they sank transversely, or in
a direction quartering out into the river; that there was a
crosscurrent, starting from near the south shore, above the head of
the pontoons, and running diagonally across the river in the
direction of the upper draw rest, and that while the boats were
attempting to pass the drawbridge, in charge of skillful pilots
exercising ordinary care and skill, they were caught by the
crosscurrent and hurled against the upper draw rest and injured
thereby. On the other hand, the testimony for the defendant tended
to show that no such crosscurrent existed and that the injury to
the boats occurred solely by reason of want of due care and skill
of the pilots in the management of the boats."
The Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, in affirming the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, also ruled clearly
that the distance of 160 feet between the piers of the bridge
required by the act of Congress should be obtained by measuring
along a line between said piers drawn perpendicular to the faces of
the piers and the current of the river, and that, as such line
would measure but 153 feet and a fraction, instead of 160 feet, as
required, the bridge was not a lawful structure within the meaning
of the act.
The substance of the errors assigned and relied on here relate
(1) to the construction given by the state court to the second
section of the act of July 25, 1866, and (2) to the ruling of the
supreme court of the state, approving the giving of plaintiff's
instruction No. 1. The plaintiff in error makes no contention here
as to the question of jurisdiction
Page 125 U. S. 269
urged in its behalf in the state courts; but, on the contrary,
expressly states that it agrees with the decision of the supreme
court of the state upon that question. The sole question,
therefore, for our decision relates to the construction given by
the state court to that part of the act of Congress defining the
manner in which the bridge should be built --
i.e., that
the distance of 160 feet between the piers of the bridge required
by said act should be obtained by measuring along a line between
said piers drawn perpendicularly to the faces of the piers and the
current of the river, and that as such line would measure but 153
feet and a fraction, instead of 160 feet, as required, the bridge
was not a lawful structure.
It is strenuously urged by the counsel for plaintiff in error
that the bridge we are considering meets the express requirements
of the statute; that the word "spans," as used in the statute,
means the structures or parts of the bridge which span the river on
each side of the pivotpier, and it is these spans which the statute
says shall measure 160 feet in length in the clear on each side of
the central or pivot pier of the draw, and that, the bridge having
been constructed according to the requirements of the statute, in
its own words, is therefore a legal structure; that the Supreme
Court of Missouri, in declaring that
"we must look to the spirit and reason of the act, the purpose
of which manifestly was to reserve for the purposes of navigation
160 feet of open space in the clear, wholly unobstructed, and
available for the passage of vessels,"
ignored the plain language of the provision, and inferred an
intention contrary to that language; that there was nothing
whatever in the statute to show any intention on the part of
Congress to reserve "160 feet of open space in the clear, wholly
unobstructed," and that the act nowhere defines the precise
direction of the bridge, but entrusted that direction to the
discretion of the company.
We do not consider this sound reasoning. The statement that
there is nothing whatever in the statute to show any intention on
the part of Congress to reserve "160 feet of open space in the
clear, wholly unobstructed" is repelled by every provision in the
act specifying the dimensions of the various
Page 125 U. S. 270
parts of the structure. The fact that Congress prescribed in
said act such minute details concerning the manner in which the
proposed bridge should be built -- the requirement that it should
be constructed with a draw over the main channel of the river at an
accessible and navigable point, the provision that the piers of
said bridge should be parallel with the current of the river, that
prescribing the height of the spans above the surface of the water,
and the very rigid directions as to the opening of the draw upon
reasonable signals, without delay, for the passage of boats -- show
how careful Congress was in preserving these navigable rivers as
highways of commerce and in guarding the interests of the public,
and especially of those engaged in navigating the rivers that would
be spanned by the structures authorized by said act.
We concur with the court below that we must look to the spirit
and reason of this provision of the law, and construe it with
reference to its evident purpose to connect with the exercise of
the privileges therein granted such limitations as will guaranty
protection to the navigating interests affected by the proposed
legislation. Can it be said that the object and purpose of the law
was simply that a bridge should be built across the Missouri River
at Kansas City for the benefit of the railroad company alone?
Manifestly not, for in that case it would have been only necessary
to grant the privilege of building a bridge at the place
designated, without any limitation or condition as to its mode of
construction except such as the discretion of the company might
determine.
In what we have said, we do not wish to be understood as
assenting to the proposition that the strict letter of the statute
supports the contention of the plaintiff in error. The word "span"
does not, even in architecture, always mean a part of a structure.
It is perhaps as often used to denote the distance or space between
two columns. Such is the obvious import of the term as used in the
act under consideration -- not merely as a part of the structure
itself, but the measure of the distance between the piers of the
bridge -- the measure of the space left open for navigation
purposes. A similar provision to this may be found in an act of the
Illinois Legislature authorizing
Page 125 U. S. 271
the construction of a bridge across a river, and the word
"space" is used, where in this act we have the word "span."
It is said that the act nowhere defines the precise direction of
the bridge, but leaves that to the discretion of the company. The
answer to this is that by the express terms of the act of Congress,
the piers of the bridge across the river are required to be placed
parallel with the current. To the word "across," unless it is
qualified by some prefix, as "diagonally" or "obliquely," there is
attached in ordinary use but one meaning, and that is a direction
opposite to length. This is especially true when it is used in
connection with parallel lines. When the piers are placed parallel
with the current of the river, they are parallel with one another,
and the faces of the piers may properly be considered as so many
parallel planes. The spans of the bridge are to be not less than
160 feet in length in the clear on each side of the pivotpier of
the draw -- that is, from the face of the central pier to the face
of the next adjacent pier must be a distance of not less than 160
feet in the clear. Now it is an elementary principle of mathematics
that "the distance between two parallel planes is measured on a
perpendicular to both."
But if there be any doubt as to the proper construction of this
statute, (and we think there is none), then that construction must
be adopted which is most advantageous to the interests of the
government. The statute, being a grant of the privilege, must be
construed most strongly in favor of the grantor.
Gildart v.
Gladstone, 11 East, 675;
Charles River Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 544;
Dubuque
& Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66;
The Binghampton
Bridge, 3 Wall. 75;
Rice v.
Railroad Co., 1 Black 358,
66 U. S. 380;
Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston Railroad v. United
States, 92 U. S. 733;
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.
S. 660.
As persuasive authority in support of the conclusion we have
reached with reference to this bridge may be cited the case of
Columbia Insurance Co. v. Bridge Co., 6 McLean, 70; also
the case of
Missouri River Packet Co. v. Hannibal & St.
Joseph Railroad, 1 McCrary 281, the latter being a
decision
Page 125 U. S. 272
of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western
District of Missouri in a case between the identical parties to
this suit and concerning this identical bridge.
In this last case, Judge McCrary says:
"If it be granted that a measurement along a line which deviates
from a course directly across the channel is the proper one, then
it would follow that the actual passageway might be less than that
required by the act. The greater the deviation from such a direct
line, the less would be the available space between the piers. Such
a construction of the act would defeat the main purpose which
Congress had in view in its enactment."
We are therefore of the opinion that the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri committed no error in its construction of the act
of Congress under consideration.
A reversal of the judgment brought here for review is also asked
upon the ground that the Supreme Court of Missouri erred in
sustaining the Circuit Court of Jackson County in giving to the
jury what is called "Plaintiff's Instruction No. 1." This
instruction is as follows:
"The jury are instructed that unless the bridge mentioned in the
answer had piers which were parallel with the current of the river,
and spans of not less than 160 feet in the clear on each side of
the pivotpier, then said bridge is an illegal structure, and an
unlawful obstruction to the navigation of the Missouri River, and
if the jury believe from the evidence that it was not such a
bridge, and further believe that the plaintiff's boats,
Alice and
St. Luke, or either of them, while
attempting to pass through the draw of the bridge in charge of
pilots exercising usual and ordinary care, struck the draw rest of
the bridge, and were thereby damaged, then the jury will find their
verdict for the plaintiff as to such boat or boats."
It is said that by sustaining this instruction, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that the mere fact that the bridge had not
been constructed as required by the statute rendered the railroad
company liable, irrespective of the question whether the improper
construction caused the accident, and it is urged that such holding
is erroneous.
This, however, does not present any federal question for
Page 125 U. S. 273
the consideration of this Court, and therefore we decline to
examine into its merits.
Murdock v. City of
Memphis, 20 Wall. 590;
Allen v. McVeigh,
107 U. S. 433.
Upon the only questions in this case cognizable by this Court,
the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri is
Affirmed.