The Treaty of February 8, 1861, with the Dominican Republic
(art. 9) provides that
"No higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation
into the United states of any article the growth, produce, or
manufacture of the Dominican Republic, or of her fisheries, than
are or shall be payable on the like articles the growth, produce,
or manufacture of any other foreign country or of its
fisheries."
The Convention of January 30, 1575, with the King of the
Hawaiian Islands provides for the importation into the United
States, free of duty, of various articles, the produce and
manufacture of those islands (among which were sugars), in
consideration of certain concessions made by the King of the
Hawaiian Islands to the United States.
Held that this
provision in the treaty with the Dominican Republic did not
authorize the admission into the United States, duty free, of
similar sugars, the growth, produce, or manufacture of that
republic as a consequence of the agreement made with the King of
the Hawaiian Islands, and that there was no distinction in
principle between this case and
Bartram v. Robertson,
122 U. S. 116.
By the Constitution of the United States, a treaty and a statute
are placed on the same footing, and if the two are inconsistent,
the one last in date will control, provided the stipulation of the
treaty on the subject is self-executing.
This was an action to recover back duties alleged to have been
illegally exacted. Verdict for the defendant and judgment on the
verdict. The plaintiffs sued out this writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs are merchants doing business in the City of New
York, and in August, 1882, they imported a large quantity
Page 124 U. S. 191
of "centrifugal and molasses sugars," the produce and
manufacture of the Island of San Domingo. These goods were similar
in kind to sugars produced in the Hawaiian Islands, which are
admitted free of duty under the treaty with the King of those
islands and the act of Congress passed to carry the treaty into
effect. They were duly entered at the custom house at the port of
New York, the plaintiffs claiming that by the treaty with the
Republic of San Domingo, the goods should be admitted on the same
terms -- that is, free of duty -- as similar articles the produce
and manufacture of the Hawaiian Islands. The defendant, who was at
the time collector of the port, refused to allow this claim,
treated the goods as dutiable articles under the acts of Congress,
and exacted duties on them to the amount of $21,936. The plaintiffs
appealed from the collector's decision to the Secretary of the
Treasury, by whom the appeal was denied. They then paid, under
protest, the duties exacted, and brought the present action to
recover the amount.
The complaint set forth the facts as to the importation of the
goods; the claim of the plaintiffs that they should be admitted
free of duty, because like articles from the Hawaiian Islands were
thus admitted; the refusal of the collector to allow the claim; the
appeal from his decision to the Secretary of the Treasury, and its
denial by him, and the payment, under protest, of the duties
exacted, and concluded with a prayer for judgment for the amount.
The defendant demurred to the complaint, the demurrer was
sustained, and final judgment was entered in his favor; to review
which the case is brought here.
The treaty with the King of the Hawaiian Islands provides for
the importation into the United States, free of duty, of various
articles, the produce and manufacture of those islands, in
consideration, among other things, of like exemption from duty on
the importation into that country of sundry specified articles
which are the produce and manufacture of the United States. 19
Stat. 625. The language of the first two articles of the treaty,
which recite the reciprocal engagements of the two countries,
declares that they are made in consideration
Page 124 U. S. 192
"of the rights and privileges," and "as an equivalent therefor,"
which one concedes to the other.
The plaintiffs rely for a like exemption of the sugars imported
by them from San Domingo upon the ninth article of the treaty with
the Dominican Republic, which is as follows:
"No higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation
into the United States of any article, the growth, produce, or
manufacture of the Dominican Republic, or of her fisheries, and no
higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the
Dominican Republic of any article, the growth, produce, or
manufacture of the United States, or their fisheries, than are or
shall be payable on the like articles, the growth, produce, or
manufacture of any other foreign country, or its fisheries."
15 Stat. 475.
In
Bartram v. Robertson, decided at the last term,
122 U. S. 116, we
held that brown and unrefined sugars, the produce and manufacture
of the Island of St. Croix, which is part of the dominions of the
King of Denmark, were not exempt from duty by force of the treaty
with that country, because similar goods from the Hawaiian Islands
were thus exempt. The first article of the treaty with Denmark
provided that the contracting parties should not grant "any
particular favor" to other nations in respect to commerce and
navigation which should not immediately become common to the other
party, who should "enjoy the same freely if the concession were
freely made, and upon allowing the same compensation if the
concession were conditional." 11 Stat. 719. The fourth article
provided that no "higher or other duties" should be imposed by
either party on the importation of any article which is its produce
or manufacture into the country of the other party than is payable
on like articles, being the produce or manufacture of any other
foreign country. And we held in the case mentioned that
"Those stipulations, even if conceded to be self-executing by
the way of a proviso or exception to the general law imposing the
duties, do not cover concessions like those made to the Hawaiian
Islands for a valuable consideration. They were pledges of the two
contracting parties, the United States and the King of
Page 124 U. S. 193
Denmark, to each other that, in the imposition of duties on
goods imported into one of the countries which were the produce or
manufacture of the other, there should be no discrimination against
them in favor of goods of like character imported from any other
country. They imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid
hostile legislation in that respect, but they were not intended to
interfere with special arrangements with other countries founded
upon a concession of special privileges."
The counsel for the plaintiffs meet this position by pointing to
the omission in the treaty with the Republic of San Domingo of the
provision as to free concessions, and concessions upon
compensation, contending that the omission precludes any
concession, in respect of commerce and navigation, by our
government to another country without that concession's being at
once extended to San Domingo. We do not think that the absence of
this provision changes the obligations of the United States. The
ninth article of the treaty with that republic, in the clause
quoted, is substantially like the fourth article in the treaty with
the King of Denmark, and as we said of the latter, we may say of
the former -- that it is a pledge of the contracting parties that
there shall be no discriminating legislation, against the
importation of articles which are the growth, produce, or
manufacture of their respective countries, in favor of articles of
like character imported from any other country. It has no greater
extent. It was never designed to prevent special concessions, upon
sufficient considerations, touching the importation of specific
articles into the country of the other. It would require the
clearest language to justify a conclusion that our government
intended to preclude itself from such engagements with other
countries which might in the future be of the highest importance to
its interests.
But independently of considerations of this nature, there is
another and complete answer to the pretensions of the plaintiffs.
The act of Congress under which the duties were collected
authorized their exaction. It is of general application, making no
exception in favor of goods of any country. It was passed
Page 124 U. S. 194
after the treaty with the Dominican Republic, and, if there be
any conflict between the stipulations of the treaty and the
requirements of the law, the latter must control. A treaty is
primarily a contract between two or more independent nations, and
is so regarded by writers on public law. For the infraction of its
provisions, a remedy must be sought by the injured party through
reclamations upon the other. When the stipulations are not
self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation
to carry them into effect, and such legislation is as much subject
to modification and repeal by Congress as legislation upon any
other subject. If the treaty contains stipulations which are
self-executing -- that is, require no legislation to make them
operative -- to that extent they have the force and effect of a
legislative enactment. Congress may modify such provisions so far
as they bind the United States, or supersede them altogether. By
the Constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made
of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared
by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no
superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two
relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to
construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be done
without violating the language of either; but if the two are
inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided
always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is
self-executing. If the country with which the treaty is made is
dissatisfied with the action of the legislative department, it may
present its complaint to the executive head of the government and
take such other measures as it may deem essential for the
protection of its interests. The courts can afford no redress.
Whether the complaining nation has just cause of complaint or our
country was justified in its legislation are not matters for
judicial cognizance. In
Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis 454,
459, this subject was very elaborately considered at the circuit by
Mr. Justice Curtis of this Court, and he held that whether a treaty
with a foreign sovereign had been violated by him; whether the
consideration of a particular stipulation of the treaty had been
voluntarily withdrawn by
Page 124 U. S. 195
one party so that it was no longer obligatory on the other;
whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign had given just
occasion to the legislative department of our government to
withhold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty, or to
act in direct contravention of such promise were not judicial
questions; that the power to determine these matters had not been
confided to the judiciary, which has no suitable means to exercise
it, but to the executive and legislative departments of our
government, and that they belong to diplomacy and legislation, and
not to the administration of the laws. And he justly observed as a
necessary consequence of these views that if the power to determine
these matters is vested in Congress, it is wholly immaterial to
inquire whether by the act assailed it has departed from the treaty
or not, or whether such departure was by accident or design, and if
the latter, whether the reasons were good or bad.
In these views we fully concur. It follows, therefore, that when
a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be assailed
before the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a
previous treaty not already executed. Considerations of that
character belong to another department of the government. The duty
of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest
expression of the sovereign will. In
Head Money Cases,
112 U. S. 580, it
was objected to an act of Congress that it violated provisions
contained in treaties with foreign nations, but the Court replied
that so far as the provisions of the act were in conflict with any
treaty, they must prevail in all the courts of the country, and
after a full and elaborate consideration of the subject it held
that
"so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign
nation can be the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of
this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for
its enforcement, modification, or repeal."
Judgment affirmed.