A policy of life insurance contained questions to the applicant
with his answers, and provisions that the answers were warranted to
be true, and that the policy should be void if they were in any
respect false or fraudulent. Among these questions and answers were
the following:
"5. Q. Are the habits of the party sober and temperate?"
"A. Yes."
"6. Q. Has the party ever been addicted to the excessive or
intemperate use of any alcoholic stimulants or opium, or does he
use any of them often or daily?"
"A. No."
It also contained a provision that if the applicant should
become so far intemperate as to impair health or induce
delirium tremens, it should become void. After the death
of the assured, the insurer defended against an action on the
policy by setting up (1) that the answers to these questions were
false, and (2) that the deceased, after the issue of the policy,
became intemperate, impaired his health thereby, and induced
delirium tremens.
Held:
(1) That an instruction to the jury as to question 6 that they
could not find the answer to be untrue unless the assured had,
prior to the issue of the policy, been addicted to the excessive or
intemperate use of alcoholic stimulants or opium, or at the time of
the application, habitually used some of them often or daily, was a
correct
Page 123 U. S. 740
construction of the language of question 6, as interpreted in
connection with question 6.
(2) That if the death was substantially caused by the excessive
use of alcoholic stimulants, not taken for medical purposes or
under medical advice, the assured's health was impaired by
intemperance within the meaning of the policy, although he might
not have had
delirium tremens, and although he had not
indulged in strong drink for such a long period of time or so
frequently as to become habitually intemperate, and that it was for
the jury to determine whether the death was so caused.
This was an action in the nature of assumpsit upon a policy of
insurance. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant sued out this writ of
error. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
By its policy, issued July 16, 1878, the Aetna Life Insurance
Company insured the life of William A. Davey in the sum of ten
thousand dollars, payable to his wife, the present defendant in
error, within ninety days "after due notice and proof of the death"
of the insured during the continuance of the policy. Among the
questions in the application for the policy were the following:
"5. Are the habits of the party sober and temperate?"
"6. Has the party ever been addicted to the excessive or
intemperate use of any alcoholic stimulants or opium, or does he
use any of them often or daily?"
To the first question the answer was "Yes;" to the second, "No."
The application, which by agreement was made the basis of the
contract, contained a warranty of the truth of the answers to the
above and other questions, and that the policy should be void if
they were in any respect false or fraudulent.
The policy was issued and accepted upon the following among
other conditions: 1. that the answers, statements, representations,
and declarations contained in or endorsed upon the application,
made part of the contract, are warranted
Page 123 U. S. 741
to be true in all respects, and that the policy should be
absolutely null and void if obtained by or through any fraud,
misrepresentation, concealment, or false statement; 2. That if the
insured
"shall become so far intemperate as to impair his health or
induce
delirium tremens, of if his death shall result from
injuries received while under the influence of alcoholic
liquor,"
the policy should be null and void except as provided in the
eighth section of the conditions. The latter section is in these
words:
"In every case when the policy shall cease, be or become void
(except by fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or any false
statement), if the premiums for three entire years shall have been
paid, the amount which by the seventh section of these conditions
would be applied to the purchase of a paid-up policy shall not be
forfeited to the said company, but the same shall be due and
payable in ninety days after the due notice and proof of death of
the said insured."
The insured died August 6, 1881, while on a visit at Alexandria
Bay. The company having received due notice and proof of his death
and having refused to pay the amount named in the policy, this
action was brought by his widow. The company, besides pleading the
general issue, made these special defenses: that, contrary to the
statements made in his application, the insured, for a long time
prior to the issuing of the policy was addicted to the excessive
and intemperate use of alcoholic stimulants, and had used them
often and daily, and that, in violation of one of the conditions of
the contract, he became,
after the issuing of the policy,
so far intemperate as greatly to impair his health and to induce
delirium tremens.
At the trial, evidence was introduced tending to establish both
of these special defenses. But there was also evidence tending to
show that the insured was not, prior to the issuing of the policy,
addicted to the excessive or intemperate use of alcoholic
stimulants, and that he did not after that date become so far
intemperate as to impair his health or induce
delirium
tremens.
There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the sum
named in the policy, with damages to the amount of $1,419.82.
Page 123 U. S. 742
Upon the issue as to the truth or falsity of the answer to the
sixth question in the application for the policy, the court
instructed the jury, in substance, that they could not find the
answer to be untrue unless the insured had, prior to the issuing of
the policy, been addicted to the excessive or intemperate use of
alcoholic stimulants or opium, or at the time of the application
habitually used some of them often or daily. The charge, upon this
point, followed almost the identical words of the question
propounded to the insured, and is unobjectionable unless, as is
contended, the court erred in using the word "habitually," implying
thereby that the answer of "No" was a fair and true one, if the use
by the insured of stimulants at the time the policy was issued, was
not so frequent or to such an extent as to indicate in that respect
a fixed, settled course or habit of life. We are of opinion that
the question put to the insured was properly interpreted by the
court. The inquiry as to whether the insured had ever been addicted
to the excessive or intemperate use of alcoholic stimulants, and
whether at the time of the application he used alcoholic stimulants
"often or daily," was, in effect, an inquiry as to his habit in
that regard; not whether he used such stimulants or opium at all,
but whether he used any of them habitually. If he was addicted to
the excessive use of them, he was habitually intemperate, and to
use them often or daily is, according to the ordinary acceptation
of those words, to use them habitually. That this is the correct
interpretation of the words is partly shown by the fifth question
-- "Are the habits of the party sober and temperate?"
But we are of opinion that the court below erred in its
interpretation of the words in the policy which refer to the use of
strong drinks by the insured after he obtained it. Having secured
his agreement and warranty that he was not at that time, nor ever
had been, habitually intemperate, the company sought to protect
itself against an improper use by him, in the future, of alcoholic
stimulants by the provision that the policy should become null and
void "if he shall become so far intemperate as to impair health or
induce
delirium tremens." The court instructed the
jury:
"The impairment of health
Page 123 U. S. 743
contemplated by this condition of the policy is not necessarily
permanent or irremediable, nor is it the temporary indisposition or
disturbance usually resulting from a drunken debauch; but it is the
development of disease or the impairment of constitutional vigor by
the use of intoxicating beverages in such a degree and for such a
time as is ordinarily understood to constitute intemperance."
The defendant then asked the court to say to the jury that the
words in the policy "become so far intemperate as to impair health"
do not necessarily imply habitual intemperance, and that an act of
intemperance producing impairment of health was within the
conditions of the policy and rendered it null and void except as
provided where the premiums for three entire years had been paid,
and the policy had ceased upon other grounds than fraud,
misrepresentation, concealment, or false statement of the insured.
The court declined to so instruct the jury, and said:
"The words of the condition are to be expounded according to the
common and popular acceptation of their meaning. In this sense of
them, a single excessive indulgence in alcoholic liquors is not
intemperance; but there must be such frequency in their use,
continued for a longer or shorter period, as indicates an injurious
addiction to such indulgence."
The effect of these and other instructions was that the
condition that the policy should be void if the insured became so
far intemperate as to impair his health was not broken unless
intemperance became the habit or rule of his life after the policy
was issued. The jury may have believed, and there was some, we do
not say conclusive, evidence to justify them in so believing, that
the efficient, controlling cause of the death of the insured was an
excessive and continuous use of strong drinks for several days and
nights immediately preceding his death; yet they were not at
liberty, under the instructions, to find that he became so far
intemperate as to impair his health unless it further appeared that
his intemperance in the use of alcoholic stimulants covered such a
period of time as to constitute the habit of his life. This
construction of the contract is, in our judgment, erroneous. If the
substantial cause of the death of the insured was
Page 123 U. S. 744
an excessive use of alcoholic stimulants not taken in good faith
for medical purposes or under medical advice, his health was
impaired by intemperance within the meaning of the words "so far
intemperate as to impair his health," although he may not have had
delirium tremens, and although, previously to his last
illness, he had not indulged in strong drink for such a long period
of time or so frequently as to become habitually intemperate.
Whether death was so caused is a matter to be determined by the
jury under all the evidence.
It is supposed by the plaintiff that the instructions of the
court are sustained by
Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Muskegon
Bank, 122 U. S. 502.
In that case, the insured answered "Yes, occasionally," to the
question whether he then was or had ever been "in the habit of
using alcoholic beverages or other stimulants," and stipulated in
the application that he was not then, and would not become,
"habitually intemperate." The policy contained a provision, not
fully set out in the report of the case, that it should be null and
void if the insured "shall become either habitually intemperate
or so far intemperate as to impair health or induce
delirium tremens." No question was made or could have been
made in this Court in respect to the meaning of the words "so far
intemperate as to impair health," because the jury were instructed
at the request of the company that if the insured, Comstock, became
so far intemperate as to impair his health, they must find for the
defendant. The contest in this Court was as to what constituted
habitual intemperance, and as to the rulings in the court below
upon that point. Indeed, it was assumed at the trial of that case
as well as in this Court that there was, or might be, a difference
between habitual intemperance and intemperance that impaired
health. There was consequently no occasion for this Court in that
case to decide what construction was to be put upon the words "so
far intemperate as to impair health" when standing alone in a
policy. The jury having found under proper instructions that the
insured had not become so far intemperate as to impair his health,
that finding was not open to review here. It is clear, therefore,
that there is nothing in
Northwestern Insurance Co. v. Muskegon
Bank that concludes the present case or that militates against
our interpretation of the policy here in suit.
Page 123 U. S. 745
Other questions have been discussed by counsel, but, as they may
not arise upon another trial or in the precise form in which they
are now presented, we will not consider them. For the reasons
stated,
The judgment must be reversed with directions for another
trial in accordance with the principles of this opinion. It is so
ordered.