Stryker v. Goodnow, ante, 123 U. S. 527,
applied as to the effect of
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Co., 5 Wall. 681.
The plaintiff in error's intestate was not a party to
Homestead Company v. Valley Railroad, nor in privity with
those who were parties, and was not bound by the proceedings, and,
as estoppels, to be good must be mutual, the Homestead Company and
its assignees were not bound.
This was a suit to recover taxes paid under circumstances which
are set forth in
Stryker v. Goodnow, ante, 123 U. S. 527. The
cause was argued with
Stryker v. Goodnow. The case is
stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by Edward K. Goodnow, assignee of the Iowa
Homestead Company, in his lifetime, against Grace H. Litchfield, in
her lifetime, to recover the amount of taxes for the years 1864 to
1871, both inclusive, paid by the Homestead Company on certain
tracts of Des Moines River lands held and owned by her by and
through conveyances from the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad
Company. For a general statement of the facts, reference is made to
Stryker v. Crane, ante, 123 U. S. 527. The
taxes were paid before the decree in
Homestead
Page 123 U. S. 550
Company v. Valley Railroad, 17 Wall. 153, and the
assignment was made to Goodnow afterwards. As defenses to the
action, the prior adjudication in that case was pleaded in bar and
also the statute of limitations, based on the decision as to title
in
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Company, 5 Wall. 681, the same as in
Stryker v.
Crane. Both these defenses were overruled by the supreme court
of the state, and judgment was entered in that court for the amount
of taxes paid, and interest.
Goodnow v. Litchfield, 63 Ia.
275. As to the federal question arising on the statute of
limitations, it is only necessary to refer to what was said on that
subject in
Stryker v. Crane, ante, 123 U. S. 527.
There was no error in the decision of the court below on that
point.
The defense of prior adjudication is disposed of by the fact
that Mrs. Litchfield was not a party to the suit in which the
adjudication relied on was had. At the time of the commencement of
the suit, she was the owner of her lands, and they were described
in the bill, but neither she nor anyone who represented her title
was named as a defendant. She interested herself in securing a
favorable decision of the questions involved as far as they were
applicable to her own interests, and paid part of the expenses, but
there was nothing to bind her by the decision. If it had been
adverse to her interest, no decree could have been entered against
her personally, either for the lands or the taxes. Her lands were
entirely separate and distinct from those of the actual parties. A
decree in favor of or against them and their title was in no legal
sense a decree in favor of or against her. She was indirectly
interested in the result, but not directly. As the questions
affecting her own title and her own liability for taxes were
similar to those involved in the suit, the decision could be used
as a judicial precedent in a proceeding against her, but not as a
judgment binding on her and conclusive as to her rights. Her rights
were similar to, but not identical with, those of the persons who
were actually parties to the litigation.
Greenleaf, in his treatise on the Law of Evidence, Vol. I, ยง
523, states the rule applicable to this class of cases thus:
Page 123 U. S. 551
"Under the term
parties, in this connection, the law
includes all who are directly interested in the subject matter and
had a right to make defense or to control the proceedings and to
appeal from the judgment. This right involves also the right to
adduce testimony and to cross-examine the witnesses adduced on the
other side. Persons not having these rights are regarded as
strangers to the cause. But to give full effect to the principle by
which parties are held bound by a judgment, all persons who are
represented by the parties and claim under them or in privity with
them are equally concluded by the same proceedings. We have already
seen that the term 'privity' denotes mutual or successive
relationship to the same rights of property. The ground, therefore,
upon which persons standing in this relation to the litigating
party are bound by the proceedings to which he was a party is that
they are identified with him in interest, and whenever this
identity is found to exist, all are alike concluded. Hence, all
privies, whether in estate, in blood, or in law, are estopped from
litigating that which is conclusive on him with whom they are in
privity."
The correctness of this statement has been often affirmed by
this Court,
Lovejoy v.
Murray, 3 Wall. 1,
70 U. S. 19;
Robbins v. Chicago
City, 4 Wall. 657,
71 U. S. 673,
and the principle has been recognized in many cases; indeed, it is
elementary,
Hale v. Finch, 104 U.
S. 261,
104 U. S. 265;
Railroad Company v. National Bank, 102 U. S.
14,
102 U. S. 22;
Butterfield v. Smith, 101 U. S. 570.
In the condition of parties to the record during the whole
course of the litigation between the Homestead Company and those
who were named as defendants, Mrs. Litchfield had no right to make
a defense in her own name; neither could she control the
proceedings, nor appeal from the decree. She could not, in her own
right, adduce testimony or cross-examine witnesses. Neither was she
identified in interest with anyone who was a party. She owned her
lands; the parties to the suit owned theirs; her rights were all
separate and distinct from the rest, and there was no mutual or
successive relationship between her and the other owners. She was
neither a party to the suit nor in privity with those who were
parties;
Page 123 U. S. 552
consequently she was in law a stranger to the proceedings and in
no way bound thereby. As she was not bound, the Homestead Company
and its assigns were not. Estoppels, to be good, must be mutual.
This was in effect the decision of the court below, and it was
right.
It follows that there is no error in the record, and the
judgment is
Affirmed.