While the judgment of this Court in
Wolcott v.
Des Moines Company, 5 Wall. 681, may be referred to
by parties as a judicial precedent, it is not
Page 123 U. S. 541
an estoppel as against the defendant in error.
Stryker v.
Goodnow, ante, 123 U. S. 527,
affirmed to this point.
The Supreme Court of Iowa having given full effect to the case
of
Homestead Co. v. Valley
Railroad, l7 Wall. 153, as a bar to the recovery in
this suit as it stood originally, but having held that a new cause
of action had arisen out of acts of the plaintiffs in error, which
were equivalent to an election by them to treat the payments of
taxes made by the Homestead Company as payments by themselves, and
which implied a new promise of reimbursement for the advancement
made, and it appearing that that was the real ground for the
decision of the Supreme Court of Iowa, and that it was not used to
give color to a refusal to allow the bar of the decree in
Homestead Company v. Valley Railroad, no federal question
on that point is raised by the record.
If a federal question is fairly presented by the record, and its
decision is necessary to the determination of the case, a judgment
which rejects the claim but avoids all reference to it is as much
against the right, within the meaning of Rev.Stat. § 709, as if it
had been specifically referred to and the right directly refused,
but if a decision of such a question is rendered unnecessary by the
view which the court properly takes of the rest of the case within
the scope of the pleadings, the judgment is not open to review
here.
These were suits to recover taxes under circumstances in the
main similar to those set forth in
Stryker v. Goodnow,
ante, 123 U. S. 527. The
cause was argued with
Stryker v. Goodnow. The case is
stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These are writs of error for the review of two judgments of the
Supreme Court of Iowa, one against Richard B. Chapman and the other
against John Stryker, in suits brought by Edward K. Goodnow,
assignee of the Iowa Homestead Company, in his lifetime, to recover
money paid by the Homestead Company for taxes levied by the County
of Webster on "Des Moines River lands" belonging to Chapman and
Stryker, respectively, for the years 1864 to 1871, both inclusive.
For a statement of the general facts on which the right of
recovery
Page 123 U. S. 542
depends, reference is made to the case of
Stryker v. Crane,
ante, 123 U. S. 527. The
Homestead Company assigned its claims against these owners after
the decree in the suit of
Homestead Company v. Valley
Railroad, 17 Wall. 153, was rendered.
The suits were begun August 5, 1876, and in each case a demurrer
was filed to the original petition January 19, 1877. On the 12th of
February, 1879, the County of Webster appeared in each of the suits
and filed a petition therein, setting forth
"That the taxes mentioned in said petition [that of Goodnow]
were duly and legally assessed and levied by said county upon the
lands therein mentioned at the times, for the years, and amounts,
and in the manner and form alleged and set forth in said petition,
and that the said taxes at the times of the said several
assessments became and were and still are a valid and binding lien
upon said lands in favor of said county,"
that Chapman and Stryker were the owners in fee of the several
tracts by them respectively claimed at the times of the levies,
"and in duty bound to pay said taxes to said county," that the said
taxes had never been paid, and the "whole thereof is still due to
said county from the said defendant." Each of these petitions
concluded with a prayer for judgment against the defendant for the
amount of the taxes, and the enforcement of a lien on the lands for
the payment thereof.
On the 5th of April, 1879, Goodnow filed an amendment to his
original petition in each of the cases in which he alleged that
when the Homestead Company paid the taxes to the county,
"it was agreed and understood that if the said county should
receive or collect the said taxes of and from the said defendant,
the said county would repay the taxes so collected to"
he company and "that said county would sue defendant in its own
name for the taxes mentioned in said petition, and in case it
should collect the same, would pay them to" the company. And
further he alleged
"that if said defendant refuses to pay said taxes to said
county, and claims that said taxes have been paid to said county
through or by means of the plaintiff's assignor's [the Homestead
Company] having given or delivered the same to the county, then the
defendant is bound to repay the same to plaintiff. "
Page 123 U. S. 543
The defendant in each case answered the original and amended
petition of Goodnow by denying every allegation therein, setting up
the statute of limitations, and charging that the Homestead
Company
"paid said taxes to said county voluntarily and without the
request, knowledge, or consent of the defendant, and with full
knowledge of the facts and circumstances upon which the defendant's
title to said lands was founded."
To the petition of the county the defendant in each case filed
an answer and, in addition to the defenses set up to the petition
of Goodnow, claimed that the county was not a party to the suit and
not entitled to relief. He also further said
"that all of said taxes mentioned in said petition were duly
paid by the Iowa Homestead Company as soon as the same became due,
and said defendant is no longer liable therefor."
Afterwards, on the third of June, 1881, each of the defendants
filed in his own case an amended answer, setting up the decree in
the case of
Homestead Company v. Valley Railroad as a bar
to the action, and also insisting that the "question of title and
ownership of the lands . . . was distinctly decided and determined"
in the case of
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Company, 5 Wall. 681. The Circuit Court of Webster
county, in which the suit was originally begun, gave judgment for
the defendants, but on appeal to the supreme court of the state
that judgment was reversed on the grounds stated in an opinion,
which is as follows:
"I. The defendant pleaded as one of its additional defenses that
the plaintiff's right of recovery is barred by a prior
adjudication, to-wit, an adjudication in the case of
Iowa
Homestead Company v. Des Moines Navigation & Railroad
Company, reported in 17 Wall. 153. To this plea the
plaintiff replies in substance that if it should be conceded that
the court made an adjudication in that case denying a right of
recovery for the taxes in question in this case, yet this action is
not barred, because a right of recovery has arisen since that time.
The fact relied upon as giving such right of recovery is that the
defendant now claims, as he did not then, the benefit of the
payments made by the Homestead
Page 123 U. S. 544
Company. After this action was instituted, a petition was filed
in the case by Webster County averring, among other things, that
the taxes in question have never been paid by anyone, and that the
same are now due to the county from the defendant. To this petition
the defendant answered, averring 'that all of said taxes mentioned
in said petition were duly paid by the Iowa Homestead Company, . .
. and said defendant is no longer liable therefor.' The question
presented is as to whether, if the payments in the first instance
were officious, as we may assume was held, and the defendant for
that reason was not liable, the subsequent adoption of the payments
for the purpose of escaping liability to the county should be
regarded as an adoption of the payment as between the defendant and
plaintiff."
"If the plaintiff's assignor had made the payments in the name
of the defendant as his assumed agent, any act of the defendant
indicating an intention to claim the benefit of the payments would
constitute a ratification of the acts by which the payments were
made. But the defendant contends that the case is different where a
person pays another person's debt not under a claim of action for
such person, but under the mistaken supposition that the debt is
due from himself. The defendant's position is that in such case
there is no act of assumed agency to ratify. It must be conceded,
we think, that in one sense this is so. The plaintiff's assignor
did not hold himself out as the defendant's agent; nevertheless,
when the defendant claims the benefit of the payments, he elects to
treat the acts of payment as done for himself. Having elected to so
treat the acts, he ought not to complain if the court treats them
in the same way. Natural justice certainly requires that if the
defendant has the benefit of payments as discharging his liability
to the county, he should reimburse the plaintiff whose assignor
made the payments. If we were to take any other view, it appears to
us that we should attach more importance to the form than the
substance of things. We do not overlook the fact that under
ordinary circumstances, every taxpayer has the right, as between
himself and third persons, to pay his own taxes in his own way and
to pay them to the county to
Page 123 U. S. 545
which they are due, and not be compelled to run after a
self-substituted creditor and make payment to him. Where,
therefore, such payment is made by a third person, the taxpayer has
a right to ignore the payment if he chooses to do so. But if he
chooses not to ignore but to claim the benefit of it, we see no
reason why we may not regard him as treating the act of payment as
done for him, and if we do so regard him, there is no difficulty in
finding an implied promise to reimburse the payer or his
assignee."
"We ought perhaps to say in this connection that the doctrine
has been announced that there can be no ratification of an act not
done avowedly for the principal. Story on Agency § 251;
Fellows
v. Commissioners, 36 Barb. 655, but the case before us is
peculiar. The act done was such that it necessarily inured to
defendant's sole benefit. Besides, the circumstances under which
the act was done should not be overlooked. The defendant neglected
the payment of the taxes, which was a duty of public concern. He
allowed the plaintiff's assignor, under an honest claim of title to
the land, to discharge this duty for several years in succession.
Now, while the plaintiff is not allowed, by reason of the prior
adjudication, to set up these facts as alone sufficient to create a
liability on the part of the defendant, they may be considered, we
think, in connection with the fact that the defendant has since
claimed the benefit of the payments as sufficient to render such
claim of benefit a ratification, if it otherwise would not be."
Goodnow v. Stryker, 61 Ia. 261.
The cause was then remanded to the circuit court, where a
judgment was rendered, in accordance with the opinion of the
supreme court, against the defendant for the amount of the taxes
paid, without interest, but on a second appeal to the supreme
court, this judgment was modified so as to make it include
interest, and a new judgment was entered in that court accordingly.
Upon that judgment the writ of error in the case of Stryker was
sued out.
In the case of Chapman, a judgment was also rendered by the
circuit court in favor of the defendant, but on appeal to the
supreme court that judgment was reversed on the same
Page 123 U. S. 546
ground stated in the opinion in the case of Stryker, and a final
judgment was entered in that court for the amount of the taxes paid
and interest.
Goodnow v. Chapman, 64 Ia. 602. For the
review of that judgment the writ of error was sued out in the case
of Chapman. In each of the cases, the supreme court has certified
that upon the hearing the defendant claimed immunity from the
entire demand on account of the prior adjudication between him and
the assignor of Goodnow in the case of
Homestead Company v.
Valley Railroad, which was denied, and also on account of the
judgment in the case of
Wolcott v. Des Moines Company,
which was also denied. These rulings are assigned for error
here.
As to the effect of judgment in
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Company on the rights of the parties to this suit, it is only
necessary to refer to what was said on that subject in the other
case of
Stryker v. Crane [Goodnow's Administrator], which
has just been decided. The cases are identical so far as this
question is concerned, and there was no error in the ruling of the
supreme court thereon.
As to the decree in the case of
Homestead Company v. Valley
Railroad, the court held, in effect, that it was a bar to a
recovery on the cause of action as it stood originally and at the
time of the decree, but that since then a new cause of action had
arisen, because both Chapman and Stryker had adopted the payments
made by the Homestead Company as payments made on their account,
and from this the law implied a promise to repay what had been paid
for their use. The theory of the court seems to have been that
Chapman and Stryker, as owners of the land, were bound in law to
the county for the payment of the taxes notwithstanding what had
been done by the Homestead Company. When, therefore, the county
sued them for the taxes, and they set up the payment by the company
as a defense, they made the acts of the company their own, and thus
became obligated to repay what had been paid for them.
Whether this was the true legal effect of what was done is not a
federal question. All we have to consider is whether
Page 123 U. S. 547
it was the real ground of decision, and not used to give color
only to a refusal to allow the bar of the decree. It cannot be
doubted that if Chapman and Stryker had, after the rendition of the
decree, got from the Homestead Company permission to use its
payments as a defense to the actions brought against them for the
taxes, and in consideration thereof had promised to repay what had
been advanced for that purpose, a new cause of action would have
arisen to which the decree would not have been a bar. That is in
substance what the supreme court held was done. The county sued
Chapman and Stryker for the taxes which had been levied on their
lands, assuming that the payments made by the Homestead Company did
not discharge them from their liability as the true owners. To this
suit Goodnow, as the assignee of the Homestead Company, was a
party, and in his pleadings he insisted that if they refused to pay
the county because his assignor had already made the payment, then
they would be bound to him for the amount advanced by the company
for that purpose. Such being his claim on the record, Chapman and
Stryker, each in his own suit, set up as a defense "that all of
said taxes . . . were duly paid by said Iowa Homestead Company as
soon as the same became due, and said defendant was no longer
liable therefor." This the court held to be equivalent to an
election by Chapman and Stryker to treat the payments by the
company as payments by themselves, and to imply a promise of
reimbursement for the advances made. Whether this conclusion was
correct or not depends on the tax laws of the state and the
principles of general law applicable to such facts, and not on the
Constitution or laws or authority of the United States. What was
done was not affected by the decree, because it was done
afterwards. It was in the opinion of the court a new promise, as
the money of the Homestead Company was in effect used by the
defendants themselves to meet their own liabilities. The fact that
the company gave the money to the county for the taxes could not,
of itself, be made a ground of action against the defendants,
because the court in the other case, to which they and the company
were parties, had decided otherwise, and there had been at the time
no election by them
Page 123 U. S. 548
to treat this act of the company as done for them. It was only
when this election was made that the liability arose, and as that
was after the decree, the new liability was not affected by what
had been adjudicated before. The court did not refuse to give faith
and credit to the decree, but it acted upon a new cause of action
with which the decree had no legal connection. That decree is a bar
to the cause of action upon which it was based, but not to a
different cause of action arising afterwards.
Neither can we consider whether the court below erred in
allowing the county to come in as a party to the suit and in giving
judgment upon the new cause of action which arose after the
original suit was begun. The question presented by the new
pleadings was a real question in the case, as adjudged by the
court, and the manner of getting it in is no more the subject of
review here than the decision upon it afterwards.
We are aware that a right or immunity set up or claimed under
the Constitution or laws of the United States may be denied as well
by evading a direct decision thereon as by positive action. If a
federal question is fairly presented by the record and its decision
is actually necessary to the determination of the case, a judgment
which rejects the claim but avoids all reference to it is as much
against the right, within the meaning of § 709 of the Revised
Statutes, as if it had been specifically referred to and the right
directly refused. But if a decision of such a question is rendered
unnecessary by the view which the court properly takes of the rest
of the case, within the scope of the pleadings, the judgment is not
open to review here.
Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U.
S. 200;
Adams Co. v. Burlington & Missouri
Railroad, 112 U. S. 123,
112 U. S. 127.
Such, in our opinion, were these cases, so far as the question
arising out of the prior adjudication in
Homestead Company v.
Valley Railroad is concerned. The federal question involved in
that decree lay behind the alleged new promise, and as the new
promise was sustained and a judgment given against the defendants
on that account, the effect of the decree did not necessarily enter
into the determination of the cause.
Inasmuch, therefore, as there is no federal question
presented
Page 123 U. S. 549
by this branch of the cases, and there was no error in the
decision of that involved in the other, the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Iowa in each of the cases is
Affirmed.