Upon the record in this case, the question whether the lands of
the plaintiffs in error were taxable is not a federal question, but
is one on which
Page 123 U. S. 528
the decision of the highest court of the Iowa is conclusive, and
it is not reviewable here.
Homestead Company v. Valley
Railroad, 17 Wall. 153, is a judicial precedent
which might have been referred to as a reason for holding that
taxes paid, under the circumstances in which the payments of taxes
in contention in these snits were made, cannot be recovered by the
party paying them from the true owners of the land; but it is no
bar as an estoppel to the recovery in these cases.
The judgment of this Court in
Wolcott v.
Des Moines Company, 5 Wall. 681, while it may be
referred to by the parties in this suit as a judicial precedent,
does not operate as an estoppel against the defendant in error.
The filing of a brief in a suit by a person interested in the
question to be decided, but not a party to the suit, does not estop
him in a suit of his own from presenting the same question.
In equity in a state court of Iowa to recover from the
plaintiffs in error, defendants below, sums of money alleged to
have been paid by defendant in error on lands in Iowa adjudged to
be the property of the plaintiffs in error, and also to leave the
several amounts of the taxes decreed to be special liens on the
lands. Decrees awarding the relief asked for by the plaintiff
below, to review which these writs of error were sued out. The
case, and
what was claimed to make the federal question are
stated in the opinion.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
These suits all grew out of the delay which attended the
settlement of the controversies in reference to the Des Moines
River improvement land grant made by Congress to the Territory of
Iowa August 8, 1846, which will be hereafter referred to as the
"River Grant." 9 Stat. 77. The character of those controversies may
be seen by referring to the cases of
Dubuque
& Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66;
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Company, 5 Wall. 681;
Williams
v.
Page 123 U. S. 529
Baker, 17 Wall. 144;
Homestead
Company v. Valley Railroad, 17 Wall. 153, and
Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S. 755. At
first it was supposed, both by the officers of the United States
and of the state, that the grant embraced lands above the Raccoon
Fork of the river, and the State of Iowa made conveyances to the
Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, under which John
Stryker, Richard B. Chapman, Grace H. Litchfield, Edwin C.
Litchfield, J. B. Plumb, and William B. Welles each claimed title
to separate tracts in that locality as
bona fide
purchasers.
On the 15th of May, 1856, Congress made another grant of lands
to the state to aid in the construction of railroads. 11 Stat. 9,
c. 28. This grant conflicted with the river grant if the last-named
grant extended above the Raccoon Fork. The title of the state under
the railroad grant to some of the lands above the Fork was
transferred to the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company, and that
company, on the 25th of October, 1859, began a suit in ejectment
against Edwin C. Litchfield to recover possession of one of the
tracts. In that suit it was decided by this Court, April 9, 1860,
that the river grant did not extend above the Fork.
Dubuque
& Pacific Railroad v. Litchfield, ubi supra. Thereupon
Congress, on the second of March, 1861, passed a joint resolution
relinquishing the interest of the United States in the lands above
the Fork to the state for the benefit of
bona fide
purchasers under the river grant.
The Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, holding title
from the state to the lands above the Fork under the river grant,
conveyed one of the tracts, on the 8th of August, 1859, to Samuel
G. Wolcott, by deed, with full covenants of warranty. In 1865,
Wolcott brought suit against the navigation and railroad company in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of
New York to recover damages for a breach of the covenants in that
deed, alleging that the title had failed. In that case it was
decided by this Court, May 13, 1867, that the railroad grant in
1856 did not include any of the lands above the Raccoon Fork which
had been claimed under the river grant, and that the title of
Wolcott
Page 123 U. S. 530
under this deed from the navigation and railroad company had not
failed.
Wolcott v. Des Moines Co., ubi supra. While that
cause was pending in this Court, the attorney of the Dubuque and
Pacific Railroad Company was allowed to file a brief in support of
the claim of Wolcott that the title was in that company and not in
the navigation company.
The title which the Dubuque and Pacific Railroad Company claimed
from the state under the railroad grant passed to the Dubuque and
Sioux City Railroad Company in the month of August, 1861, and that
company afterwards paid the taxes assessed and levied on the lands
in dispute for the years 1861, 1862, and 1863. Those for the year
1861 were paid October 31, 1866; those for 1862, December 9, 1863,
and those for 1863, January 20, 1864. On the 12th of November,
1863, the railroad company conveyed to the Iowa Homestead Company,
an Iowa corporation, its title to the lands in dispute between the
railroad company and the claimants under the river grant. The
Homestead Company afterwards paid the taxes on the lands for the
years 1864, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870, and 1871.
On the 12th of October, 1869, the Homestead Company began a suit
in equity in the District Court of Webster County, Iowa, to quiet
its title to the lands, making the Des Moines Navigation and
Railroad Company, Samuel G. Wolcott, William B. Welles, Roswell S.
Burrows, Edwin C. Litchfield, William J. McAlpine, Richard B.
Chapman, Albert H. Tracy, Francis W. Tracy, Harriet Tracy, Electus
B. Litchfield, Edward Wade, John Stryker, the Des Moines Valley
Railroad Company, Thomas Colter, Jacob Crouse, and John P.
McDermott defendants. In the bill it was alleged that the Homestead
Company had been in possession of the lands since 1861, and
that
"they have paid taxes thereon to the State of Iowa since, . . .
and if their title has failed, they are entitled to have their
taxes refunded since 1861 by the holder of the legal title, who has
not paid them."
As to the defendants Wolcott, Welles, Burrows, Edwin C.
Litchfield, McAlpine, Chapman, Albert H. Tracy, Francis W. Tracy,
Harriet Tracy, Electus B. Litchfield, Wade, and Stryker,
Page 123 U. S. 531
it was alleged that they held title to certain parcels of the
lands under the river grant. The defendants Colter, Crouse, and
McDermott were alleged to be preemption claimants. The Des Moines
Navigation and Railroad Company was the corporation to which the
state transferred the river grant, and from which the other
defendants, who hold under that grant, got their respective titles.
The Des Moines Valley Railroad Company was made a defendant because
of its claim of title to lands involved in the suit, but which did
not pass to the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company under
the river grant. The prayer of the bill as to the several claimants
under the river grant was that the Homestead Company might be
quieted in its title, and
"that, in the event of a decree that the plaintiff's present
title, or any part of it, has failed, the Des Moines Navigation and
Railroad Company and its assigns may be decreed to repay to the
plaintiff all taxes which he has paid on said lands, and interest
thereon."
Afterwards, on the 13th of October, 1868, Edwin C. Litchfield,
Electus B. Litchfield, and John Stryker, three of the defendants,
and citizens of New York, filed their petition for the removal of
the suit to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District
of Iowa, under the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 558, c. 196, on
the ground of "prejudice or local influence." This petition was
accepted by the state court and an order entered "that this cause
be transferred to the said circuit court . . . as to said
defendants
in re." Under this order, the petitioning
parties entered a copy of the record in the circuit court on the
17th of March, 1869, and during the summer or fall of that year the
defendants, the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, the
Tracys, the Litchfields, Wolcott, Chapman, McAlpine, Welles, Wade,
and Stryker, all answered, setting up their titles under the river
grant to the specific tracts of land held by them respectively,
and, as to the taxes paid by the Homestead Company, averring that
they were paid "voluntarily, with a knowledge of all the facts, and
that the complainant is not entitled to have the same or any part
thereof refunded."
On the 13th of May, 1870, the following entry was made by the
circuit court in the cause:
Page 123 U. S. 532
"The Iowa Homestead Company, Complainant"
"v."
"The Des Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, Samuel G.
Wolcott, Wm. B. Welles, Roswell S. Burrows, Edwin C. Litchfield,
Wm. J. McAlpine, Richard B. Chapman, Albert H. Tracy, Francis W.
Tracy, Harriet Tracy, Electus B. Litchfield, Edward Wade, John
Stryker, et al., Defendants"
"This action was commenced in the District Court of Webster
County, Iowa, at the October term of said district court. The
defendants Edwin C. Litchfield, Electus B. Litchfield, and John
Stryker filed their affidavit, bond, and petition asking the
removal of this action from said district court to this court under
the provisions of the Act of Congress approved March 2, 1867,
entitled 'An act to amend an act for the removal of causes in
certain cases from the state courts,' approved July 27, 1866."
"And it appearing to said district court that said Edwin C.
Litchfield, Electus B. Litchfield, and John Stryker were
nonresidents of the State of Iowa and residents of the State of New
York, and that their application for the removal of this cause to
this court in all respects conformed to the requirements of said
act of Congress, the said district court at the October term
thereof, in the year 1868, made the usual order transferring and
removing this cause to this court as to the defendants Edwin C.
Litchfield, Electus B. Litchfield, and John Stryker, and this cause
as to said defendants was removed to this court for trial. And it
appearing that the defendants Samuel G. Wolcott, Wm. B. Welles,
Roswell S. Burrows, Wm. J. McAlpine Richard B. Chapman, Albert H.
Tracy, Francis W Tracy, Harriet Tracy, and Edward Wade, are, each
and every of them, nonresidents of the State of Iowa and district
of Iowa, and under the statute above referred to are also entitled
to a removal of this cause from the state court, and that said
defendants, with the express consent and approval of the plaintiff,
have appeared and answered the bill herein, and asked to be
made
Page 123 U. S. 533
parties defendant, and that their rights may be heard and
determined in this court and on the trial of this action."
"And it further appearing to this court that the defendants so
asking to be made parties defendant hold under the same title as
the defendants Edwin C. Litchfield, Electus B. Litchfield, and John
Stryker, and that their defense is in all respects identical with
the said plaintiff consenting. It is ordered that said Samuel G.
Wolcott, Wm. B. Welles, Roswell S. Burrows, Wm. J. McAlpine,
Richard B. Chapman, Albert H. Tracy, Francis W. Tracy, Harriet
Tracy, and Edward Wade, and each and every of them, be made parties
defendant herein; that the answer filed by said persons be taken
and deemed their answer to the complainant's bill, and that by
their appearance and answer herein the said persons be deemed and
treated as defendants herein, and their rights in the premises
adjudicated in and by this court in this action."
Afterwards the case came to this Court in due course on appeal,
where, on the 28th of April, 1873, it was decided that the
defendants holding under the river grant had the better title, and
that the Homestead Company could not recover for the taxes because
they were paid voluntarily, without any request from the owners of
the land and with a full knowledge of all the facts. A decree was
thereupon entered affirming a decree of the circuit court
dismissing the bill.
Homestead Company v. Valley
Railroad, 17 Wall. 153.
The Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company assigned to Edward
K. Goodnow, then in life, all its claims against the owners of the
lands in dispute for taxes paid, and he, on the 26th of July, 1880,
brought suits in the Circuit Court of Webster County, one against
John Stryker, one against the executor of Edwin C. Litchfield, one
against Richard B. Chapman, one against Grace H. Litchfield, and,
on the 30th of June, 1881, another against the executor and
grantees of William B. Welles, to recover from them respectively
the amounts due for the taxes of 1861, 1862, and 1863, paid by the
railroad company on their several tracts of land.
As defenses to the actions each of the defendants set up in his
answer:
Page 123 U. S. 534
1. That as to the taxes of 1861 and 1862, the lands belonged at
the time of the levies respectively to the United States,
"that the title thereto was in the United States, and that said
lands were not subject to taxation by Webster County for any
purpose for said years, and that if any taxes were assessed and
levied thereon for the years aforesaid, the same were not a valid
or binding lien upon said lands"
2. That Goodnow and his assignor were estopped by the decree in
the suit of the Homestead Company against the Des Moines Navigation
and Railroad Company and others from a recovery in this action,
that suit having been brought, among other things, for the same
taxes, and having been prosecuted under the advice and direction of
the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company before its assignment
to Goodnow.
In the suits against Chapman, Welles, the executor of Edwin C.
Litchfield, and Grace H. Litchfield, an additional defense was
made, to-wit, that the decision of this court at December term,
1866, in the case of
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Company, 5 Wall. 681, was a final determination of
the disputed questions as to the title and ownership of the lands
above the Raccoon Fork in controversy between the Dubuque and Sioux
City Railroad Company and the Des Moines Navigation and Railroad
Company and its grantees under their respective claims, and that,
as these suits were not brought within either five or six years
after that decision, they were barred by the statute of
limitations.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, on appeal from the decree of the
Webster Circuit Court in each of the cases, overruled these
defenses, denied to the defendants the rights, privileges, and
immunities by them respectively set up and claimed under the laws
and authority of the United States, and gave judgment against them
for the taxes sued for. To reverse those judgments these writs of
error were brought. The cases are reported as
Goodnow v.
Stryker, 62 Ia. 221;
Goodnow v. Chapman, 64 Ia. 602;
Goodnow v. Litchfield, 67 Ia. 692;
Goodnow v.
Wells, 67 Ia. 654.
The federal questions relied on in argument are:
1. That as the title to the lands remained in the United
Page 123 U. S. 535
states until March 2, 1861, and as by the Act of March 3, 1845,
c. 48, ยง 7, 5 Stat. 743, admitting Iowa into the union as a state,
it was provided that the state should not levy any tax on public
lands within its limits "while the same remained the property of
the United States," the taxes for the year 1861 were illegal and
void, because levied in violation of that act of Congress.
2. That the decree in the case of
Homestead Company v.
Valley Railroad was in its legal effect a bar to the recovery
in this action, and as the supreme court of the state decided
otherwise, it failed to give full faith and credit to the judicial
proceedings of this Court acting under the authority of the United
States.
3. That the judgment of the Court in the case of
Wolcott v.
Des Moines Company was a final determination on the 13th of
May, 1867, against the right of the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad
Company to claim the lands on which the taxes were levied in these
cases, and that the legal effect of that judgment was to bar the
right of the railroad company, and Goodnow as its assignee, to
recover in this action, because the action was not commenced within
the time prescribed by the statute of limitations after the
rendition of that judgment.
These will be considered in their order.
1. As to the taxes of 1861. It is not contended that these taxes
were actually levied upon the lands until after the title had
passed out of the United States; but the claim is that by the laws
of Iowa in force at the time,
"government lands entered or located, or lands purchased from
the state, shall not be taxed for the year in which the entry,
location, or purchase was made,"
and that, as these taxes were levied within the year after the
title passed out of the United States, they were illegal.
Whether the lands were taxable within a year after the title
passed out of the United States is not a federal question. There
was nothing in the act of Congress admitting Iowa into the union,
or in any other act of Congress to which our attention has been
directed, which in any manner interfered with the power of the
state to tax lands as soon as they ceased to
Page 123 U. S. 536
be the property of the United States. The only prohibition was
against taxation while the United States were the owners.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has decided that the statute of the
state referred to does not apply to these cases, because these
lands were neither "entered" nor "located" within the meaning of
those terms as applied to the acquisition of lands from the
government. Consequently there was nothing in the laws of Iowa to
prevent the levy of the taxes for 1861 as soon as the resolution of
March 2, 1861, went into effect.
Goodnow v. Wells, 67 Ia.
654. This, it was said, is in accordance with previous cases
bearing on the same question, among which
Stryker v. Polk
County, 22 Ia. 131, and
Litchfield v. Hamilton
County, 40 Ia. 66, were referred to. With the correctness of
this decision we have nothing to do. It relates only to the
construction of a state statute which is in no way in conflict with
the Constitution or any law of the United States. The judgment of
the state court on that question is final, and not reviewable
here.
We are referred, however, to
Litchfield v. County of
Hamilton, 101 U. S. 781, as
an authority to the contrary of this. That was a suit in equity
brought by Edwin C. Litchfield against the County of Hamilton, in a
court of the state, to restrain the collection of taxes for the
years 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, and 1865 on lands owned
by him in that county and held under a title similar to that in
these cases. The supreme court of the state decided (
Litchfield
v. County of Hamilton, 40 Ia. 66) that the taxes for all the
years were collectible, and to reverse a decree to that effect the
case was brought here upon a writ of error. It was submitted on
printed arguments when it was reached in the regular call of the
docket. A few days before this submission was made, an appeal in
the suit of
Edwin C. Litchfield v. County of Webster,
brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District
of Iowa, to enjoin the collection of taxes levied by the County of
Webster for the same years on lands similarly situated in that
county, was submitted under Rule 20, and the two cases were before
us for consideration at the same time. We decided unanimously that
the lands were not taxable for
Page 123 U. S. 537
the years 1859, 1860, and 1861, and the principal opinion was
prepared in the case of
Webster County, 101 U.
S. 773, which, being here on appeal from the circuit
court, was open for consideration upon its merits without any
reference to the limitation of our authority for the review of the
judgments of the courts of the states. There was no doubt of our
jurisdiction in that case to decide as to the taxes of 1861, and in
doing so we held that, as under the statute of Iowa government
lands could not be taxed during the year they were entered or
located, these lands were exempt for that year. The case of
Hamilton County involved precisely the same questions in
the state courts as did that of
Webster County in the
circuit court. The two cases were argued here substantially in the
same way, and in that of
Hamilton County, our attention
was not specially directed to any difference in the federal
question presented by the tax for 1861 from that involved in the
taxes for 1859 and 1860. The ground of decision in the court below
was the same for all the years, and, without noticing the
distinction which is now made as to our right to decide in that
case upon the validity of the tax of 1861, we allowed the judgment
to follow that in the case of
Webster County, the two
cases being exactly the same on their merits. It now appears we
were in error in taking jurisdiction and reversing the judgment in
the
Hamilton County case for the tax of 1861. The supreme
court of the state has also decided in the case of
Goodnow v.
Wells, ubi supra, that we erred in the decision of the
question involved in the tax of 1861 on its merits, because we held
that lands acquired from the United States by the title which was
then and now under consideration came within the statutory
exemption from taxation in the state for one year after the United
States ceased to be the owners, having been misled, as is supposed,
by an incorrect statement of the law in
McGregor &c.
Railroad Co. v. Brown, 39 Ia. 655, to the effect that
"government lands are not taxable until a year after they are
patented." We may remark also that in our opinion the conclusion
then reached by us received further support from the cases of
Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railway v. Cherokee
Page 123 U. S. 538
County, 37 Ia. 483;
Goodrich v. Beaman, 37 Ia.
563, and
Iowa Falls & Sioux City Railway v. Woodbury
County, 38 Ia. 498. But whether we were right then on this
question or not it is unnecessary now to consider, as upon the
present record we are clearly of opinion that the decision of the
court below, to the effect that the lands were taxable for the year
1861, is not reviewable here. That question is one on which the
decision of the highest court of the state is conclusive.
2. As to the estoppel by the decree in the case of
Homestead
Company v. Valley Railroad.
That suit did not embrace the taxes for the years 1861, 1862,
and 1863 paid by the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad Company. The
Homestead Company did not acquire title to the lands until November
12, 1863, and it only paid the taxes for 1864 and thereafter. The
conveyance by the railroad company to the Homestead Company did not
profess to transfer the claim of the railroad company against the
holders of the river grant title for taxes paid or to be paid. The
suit of the Homestead Company was for the land, or the taxes it had
paid. There was no reference in the pleadings to taxes paid by the
railroad company, and no claim was made for anything except the
payments by the Homestead Company itself. The Homestead Company did
not profess to sue as trustee for the railroad company. It is true
that the railroad company, as warrantor of the title of the
Homestead Company, aided in the prosecution of that suit, and that
the decree may be conclusive evidence of a failure of title in a
suit brought by the Homestead Company against the railroad company
to recover damages for a breach of the covenants of warranty in the
deed for the lands; but as the taxes paid by the railroad company
were in no way involved in the suit, neither the railroad company
nor the defendants in that suit were concluded as to them by
anything contained in the decree. The decision may be referred to
as a judicial precedent for holding that taxes paid under the
circumstances in which these were paid could not be recovered by
the party paying them from the true owners of the land, but it is
in no sense a
Page 123 U. S. 539
judgment in a suit between the same parties upon the same cause
of action as is here involved, and therefore a bar to the recovery
in these cases. In our opinion, the court below did not fail in its
decision to give full faith and credit to that decree.
3. As to the effect of the judgment in
Wolcott v. Des Moines
Company upon the operation of the statute of limitations in
these cases.
That was a suit between a purchaser of a single half section of
the river lands above the Raccoon Fork against his vendor, the Des
Moines Navigation and Railroad Company, to recover damages for a
breach of the covenants of warranty in the deed of conveyance to
him. There was no party to the suit except Wolcott and the
navigation company. Wolcott claimed nothing under the railroad
grant or under the railroad company. It is true that the ground of
his action was the superior title of the railroad company as
against that of the navigation company at the time of the
conveyance of the latter company to himself, but he was neither
suing for the railroad company nor representing it in the action,
so far as anything appears in these records or in that. His suit
was nothing more or less than to recover damages from the
navigation company for a breach of covenants of warranty with
himself, in which neither the railroad company nor anyone claiming
under it had any interest. The judgment in the action was
conclusive as between him and the navigation company upon the cause
of action involved, but as to no one else. It settled no title
between the navigation company or its grantees and the railroad
company or those claiming under that company. That decision is
indeed referred to in the case of
Homestead Company v. Valley
Railroad, ubi supra, as "settling" "the question of title to
the Des Moines river lands," but that was only in the way of
judicial authority as a precedent, and not as an estoppel. The
legal operation and effect of the judgment as an estoppel was
confined to the title of the parties in that suit to the particular
half section of land then in controversy. As to any other tract of
the river lands, and as to any other parties, it stood, in the
language of MR. JUSTICE MILLER in
Williams
Page 123 U. S. 540
v. Baker, 17 Wall. 144, only as an "authoritative
exposition" of the views of the court on a question which "was
argued fully by parties deeply interested on both sides" and which
"received attentive consideration," and was therefore "entitled to
the same weight as other well considered cases." The judgment can
be referred to by the parties to this suit as a precedent, but not
as an estoppel.
We have not overlooked the fact that a brief was filed at the
hearing in this Court on behalf of the railroad company to support
the claim of Wolcott that the title of that company was the best.
Such a proceeding did not make the railroad company a party to the
suit or bind it by the decree. Being interested in the question to
be decided, the company was anxious to secure a judgment that could
not be used as a precedent against its own claims in any litigation
that might thereafter arise in respect to its own property. It is
not an uncommon thing in this Court to allow briefs to be presented
by or on behalf of persons who are not parties to the suit, but who
are interested in the questions to be decided, and it has never
been supposed that the judgment in such a case would estop the
intervenor in a suit of his own which presented the same questions.
It could be used as a precedent, but not as an estoppel, in the
second suit.
We find no error in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa
upon any of the federal questions involved in these cases, and each
of the judgments is consequently
Affirmed.