Each letter or packet put in or taken out from the Post Office
of the United States in violation of the provisions of Rev.Stat. §
5480 constitutes a separate and distinct violation of the act.
Three separate offenses (but not more) against the provisions of
Rev.Stat. § 5480, when committed within the same six calendar
months, may be joined, and when so joined, there is to be a single
sentence for all; but this does not prevent other indictments for
other and distinct offenses under the same statute committed within
the same six calendar months.
This was a motion for a rule to show cause why a writ of habeas
corpus should not issue. The motion for leave to move for the rule
was filed on the 11th of October, 1887. On the 17th of October,
leave was granted, and also leave to file a
Page 123 U. S. 373
brief in support of it. On the 10th of November, this motion was
filed. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a motion for a rule to show cause why a writ of habeas
corpus should not issue as prayed for. The case made by the
petition is this:
Section 5480 of the Revised Statutes is as follows:
"If any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud, or be effected by either opening or
intending to open correspondence or communication with any other
person, whether resident within or outside of the United States, by
means of the post office establishment of the United States, or by
inciting such other person to open communication with the person so
devising or intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or
artifice, or attempting so to do, place any letter or packet in any
post office of the United States, or take or receive any therefrom,
such person so misusing the post office establishment shall be
punishable by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and by
imprisonment for not more than eighteen months, or by both such
punishments. The indictment, information, or complaint may
severally charge offenses to the number of three when committed
within the same six calendar months, but the court thereupon shall
give a single sentence, and shall proportion the punishment
especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post office
establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme
and device."
Henry, the petitioner, was indicted in the District Court of the
United States for the Western District of South Carolina on the
11th of September, 1886, for a violation of this statute. The
indictment charged three separate and distinct offenses, all
alleged to have been committed within the same six calendar months.
Under this indictment he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to
imprisonment in the South Carolina Penitentiary at Columbia for the
term of twelve months.
Page 123 U. S. 374
Afterwards, at the same term of the court but on a different
day, he was indicted for three other and different offenses under
the same statute, committed within the same six calendar months. To
this indictment he pleaded his conviction upon the first indictment
in bar. This plea was overruled, and upon a trial he was convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment in the Albany Penitentiary, New York,
for the term of fifteen months upon the termination of his sentence
under the first indictment. He has served out his term under the
first sentence, and is now confined in the penitentiary at Albany
under the second. From this imprisonment he seeks to be discharged
on habeas corpus because, as he alleges, the court had no
jurisdiction to inflict a punishment for more than one conviction
of offenses under this statute committed within the same six
calendar months.
We have carefully considered the argument submitted by counsel
in behalf of the petitioner, but are unable to agree with him in
opinion that there can be but one punishment for all the offenses
committed by a person under this statute within anyone period of
six calendar months. As was well said by the district judge on the
trial of the indictment,
"the act forbids not the general use of the post office for the
purposes of carrying out a fraudulent scheme or device, but the
putting in the post office of a letter or packet or the taking out
of a letter or packet from the post office in furtherance of such a
scheme. Each letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate
and distinct violation of the act."
It is not, as in the case of
In re Snow, 120 U.
S. 274, a continuous offense, but it consists of a
single isolated act, and is repeated as often as the act is
repeated.
It is indeed provided that three distinct offenses committed
within the same six months may be joined in the same indictment;
but this is no more than allowing the joinder of three offenses for
the purposes of a trial. In its general effect, this provision is
not materially different from that of § 1024 of the Revised
Statutes, which allows the joinder in one indictment of charges
against a person "for two or more acts or transactions
Page 123 U. S. 375
of the same class of crimes or offenses," and the consolidation
of two or more indictments found in such cases. Under the present
statute, three separate offenses committed in the same six months
may be joined, but not more, and when joined, there is to be a
single sentence for all. That is the whole scope and meaning of the
provision, and there is nothing whatever in it to indicate an
intention to make a single continuous offense, and punishable only
as such, out of what without it would have been several distinct
offenses, each complete in itself.
The motion for a rule is denied and the petition
dismissed.