The Court of Claims has jurisdiction of an action by a state
against the United States for a demand arising upon an act of
Congress.
The action of a state in the Court of Claims to recover moneys
received by the United States from sales of swamp lands granted to
the state by the Act of September 28, 1850, is not barred by the
statute of limitations until six years after the amount is
ascertained from proofs of the sales before the Commissioner of the
General Land Office.
The direct tax laid by the Act of August 5, 1861, did not create
any liability on the part of the states in which the lands taxed
were situated to pay the tax.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 123 U. S. 33
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought in the Court of Claims by the State of
Louisiana against the United States to recover two demands,
amounting in the aggregate to the sum of $71,385.83. The first of
these demands arises upon the Act of Congress of February 20, 1811,
2 Stat. 641, c. 21, "to enable the people of the Territory of
Orleans to form a constitution and state government," the fifth
section of which declared that five percent of the net proceeds of
the sales of lands of the United States, within her limits, after
the first day of January next ensuing, should be applied to laying
out and constructing public roads and levees in the state as its
legislature might direct. Pursuant to the authority thus conferred,
the people of the Territory of Orleans, represented in a convention
called for that purpose, formed themselves into a state by the name
of Louisiana and adopted a constitution under which the state was
admitted into the union. The five percent of the net proceeds of
sales of lands of the United States, made between July 1, 1882, and
June 30, 1886, and due to the state by the United States, as found
by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, amounted to
$47,530.79. The second of these demands arises upon the Act of
Congress of September 28, 1850, "to enable the State of Arkansas
and other states to reclaim the swamp lands within their limits,"
(9 Stat. 519, c. 84), and the Act of March 2, 1855, 10 Stat. 519,
c. 84, "for the relief of purchasers and locators of swamp and
overflowed lands,". The Act of September 28, 1850, granted to the
states then in the union all the swamp and overflowed lands, made
unfit thereby for cultivation, within their limits which at the
time remained unsold. The second section made it the duty of the
Secretary of the Interior, as soon as practicable after the passage
of the act, to prepare a list of the lands
Page 123 U. S. 34
described and transmit the same to the Governor of the state,
and at his request to cause a patent to be issued therefor. It
would seem that this duty was not discharged, and notwithstanding
the grant was one
in praesenti, many of the lands falling
within the designation of swamp and overflowed lands were sold to
other parties by the United States. The Act of March 2, 1855, was
designed to correct, among other things, the wrong thus done to the
state. It provided that upon due proof of such sales by the
authorized agent of the state before the commissioner of the
General Land Office, the purchase money of the lands should be paid
over to the state. Such proof was not made, but equivalent proof
was submitted to the commissioner as to the character of the lands
from the field notes of the surveyor general of the state. This
mode of proof was accepted by the commissioner in other cases as
early as 1850. The amount found in this way by the commissioner on
the thirtieth of June, 1885, to be due to the state from the United
States on account of sales of swamp lands to individuals made prior
to March 3, 1857, was $23,855.04.
It does not appear that there was any serious contest in the
Court of Claims either as to the validity or the amount of these
demands, but it was objected that the demand arising upon the Acts
of September 28, 1850, and of March 2, 1855, was barred by the
statute of limitations, and that both demands were set off by the
unpaid balance of the direct tax levied under the Act of August 5,
1861, 12 Stat. 292, which was apportioned to the State of
Louisiana. The first Comptroller of the Treasury had at different
times previous to the commencement of this action admitted and
certified that the sums claimed were due to the state on account of
the five percent net proceeds of sales of the public lands and on
account of sales of swamp lands within the state purchased by
individuals, but had directed the amounts to be credited to the
state on account upon the claim of the United States against her
for the unpaid portion of the direct tax mentioned.
It was also objected in the Court of Claims, and the objection
is renewed here, that that court had no jurisdiction under the
Constitution and laws of the United States to hear
Page 123 U. S. 35
and determine a cause in which the state is a party in a suit
against the United States. This objection therefore must first be
examined, for if well taken, it will be unnecessary to consider the
other questions presented.
The Constitution declares that
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish,"
and
"That the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their
authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be
a party; to controversies between two or more states;, between a
state and citizens of another state;, between citizens of different
states;, between citizens of the same state claiming lands under
grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens
thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects."
This clause was modified by the Eleventh Amendment, declaring
that
"The judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by citizens of another state or by citizens or subjects of
any foreign state."
As thus modified, the clause prescribes the limits of the
judicial power of the courts of the United States. The action
before us, being one in which the United States have consented to
be sued, falls within those designated to which the judicial power
extends, for, as already stated, both of the demands in controversy
arise under laws of the United States. Congress has brought it
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims by the express terms
of the statute defining the powers of that tribunal, unless the
fact that a state is the petitioner draws it within the original
jurisdiction of the supreme court. The same article of the
Constitution which defines the extent of the judicial power of the
courts of the United States declares that
"In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, and
those in which a state shall be a party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction; in all the
other
Page 123 U. S. 36
cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both
as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations
as the Congress shall make."
Although the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court where a
state is a party, as thus appears, is not in terms made exclusive,
there were some differences of opinion among the earlier judges of
this Court whether this exclusive character did not follow from a
proper construction of the article. In a recent case,
Ames v.
Kansas, 111 U. S. 449,
this question was very fully examined, and the conclusion reached
that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases where
a state is a party is not made exclusive by the Constitution, and
that it is competent for Congress to authorize suits by a state to
be brought in the inferior courts of the United States. In that
case, it is true, the action was commenced by the state in one of
her own courts, and on motion of the defendant was removed to the
circuit court of the United States, and the question was as to the
validity of this removal. The case having arisen under the laws of
the United States, it was one of the class which could be thus
removed if the circuit court could take jurisdiction of an action
in which the state was a party. It was held that the circuit court
could take jurisdiction of an action of that character, and the
removal was sustained. The Judiciary Act of 1789, it is true,
declares that
"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies of a civil nature where a state is a party except
between a state and its citizens or between a state and citizens of
other states, or aliens, in which latter cases it shall have
original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction."
This clause, however, cannot have any application to suits
against the United States, for such suits were not then authorized
by any law of Congress. There could, then, be no controversies of a
civil nature against the United States cognizable by any court
where a state was a party. The Act of March 2, 1875, in extending
the jurisdiction of the circuit court to all cases arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States, does not exclude any
parties from being plaintiffs. Whether the state could thereafter
prosecute the United States upon any demand in the circuit court or
the Court
Page 123 U. S. 37
of Claims depended only upon the consent of the United States,
they not being amenable to suit except by such consent. Having
consented to be sued in the Court of Claims upon any claim founded
upon a law of Congress, there is no more reason why the
jurisdiction of the court should not be exercised when a state is a
party than when a private person is the suitor. The statute makes
no exception of this kind, and this Court can create none.
The statute of limitations does not seem to us to have any
application to the demand arising upon the swamp land acts. The act
of 1850 contemplates that the Secretary of the Interior will
identify the lands described, and although the state could not be
deprived of her rights by the inaction of that officer,
Wright
v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488,
121 U. S. 501,
she was not obliged to proceed in their assertion in the absence of
such identification. By the act of 1855, which provided for the
payment to the state of moneys received by the United States on the
sales of swamp lands within her limits, the payment was made to
depend upon proof of the sales by the authorized agent of the state
before the Commissioner of the General Land Office. No such proof
was ever made or offered, and therefore, until in some other
equally convincing mode the swampy character of the lands sold was
established to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, no definite
ascertainment of the amount due to the state was had, so as to
constitute a ground of action for its recovery in the Court of
Claims. The method of proving the character of such lands by having
recourse to the field notes of the public surveys of the surveyor
general of the state was adopted by the Commissioner as early as
1850, and was followed by him in this case in 1885. On the 30th of
June of that year, he found in this mode and certified that there
was due to the state from such sales the amount stated above. From
that date, only the six years within which the action could be
brought in the Court of Claims began to run, and this action was
commenced in September of the following year.
Nor do we regard the unpaid portion of the direct tax laid by
the Act of Congress of August 5, 1861, which was apportioned
Page 123 U. S. 38
to Louisiana, as constituting any debt to the United States by
the state in her political and corporate character, which can be
set off against her demands. 12 Stat. 292, c. 45. That act imposed
an annual direct tax of twenty millions "upon the United States,"
and apportioned it to the several states of the union. It directed
that the tax should "be assessed and laid on the value of all lands
and lots of ground, with their improvements and dwelling houses."
Section 13. It was assessed and laid upon the real property of
private individuals in the states. Public property of the states
and of the United States was exempted from the tax. Its
apportionment was merely a designation of the amount which was to
be levied upon and collected from this property of individuals in
the several states respectively. The provisions of the act are
inconsistent with any theory of the obligation of the states to pay
the sums levied. It provides for the appointment of officers to
assess the property to the different holders, and to collect the
tax, and directs with minute detail the proceedings to be taken to
enforce the collection, either by a distraint and sale of the
personal property of the owners or, that failing, by a sale of the
real property taxed. It allows, it is true, the different states to
assume the amounts apportioned to them respectively, and to collect
the same in their own way by their own officers. Many of the states
did thus assume the amounts, and in such cases it may well be
considered that for the sums assumed they became debtors to the
United States, and, so far as any portion of those sums has not
been paid, that they still remain debtors. But unless such
assumption was had, no liability attached to any state in her
political and corporate character. The liability was upon the
individual land owners within her limits. The act declares that the
amount of the taxes assessed
"shall be and remain a lien upon all lands and other real estate
of the individuals who may be assessed for the same during two
years after the time it shall annually become due and payable."
Section 33. Louisiana never assumed the payment of the taxes
apportioned to her or of any portion of them. She allowed the
government to proceed by its officers to collect the tax from the
property
Page 123 U. S. 39
holders. The amount apportioned to her was $385,886.67; the
amount collected from the owners of land was $314,500.84, leaving
only a balance of $71,385.83. It is not for us to suggest in what
way this balance may be collected. After the war, the Secretary of
the Treasury was authorized to suspend the collection of the tax in
any of the states previously declared in insurrection until
January, 1868, and subsequently this authority was extended to
January, 1869. 14 Stat. 331, ยง 14, 15 Stat. 260, c. 69. The
Secretary acted upon this authority and suspended the collection.
It is stated that since 1869, no attempts have been made by the
Executive Department to enforce its collection in those states. Be
that as it may, it is enough for the disposition of the present
case that the unpaid balance of the tax apportioned to Louisiana
constitutes no debt on the part of the state in her political and
corporate character to the United States.
We perceive no error in the judgment of the court below, and it
is therefore
Affirmed.