There is no rule of law to restrict railroad companies as to the
curves it shall use in its freight stations and its yards, where
the safety of passengers and of the public are not involved.
The engineering question as to the curves proper to be made in
the track of a railroad within the freight stations or the yards of
the railroad company is not a question to be left to a jury to
determine.
Brakemen and other persons employed by a railroad company within
the freight stations and the yards of the company, when they accept
the employment assume the risks arising from the nature of the
curves existing in the track, and the construction of the cars used
by the company, and they are bound to exercise the care and caution
which the perils of the business demand.
When a servant, in the execution of his master's business,
receives an injury which befalls him from one of the risks incident
to the business, he cannot hold the master responsible, but must
bear the consequences himself.
This was an action for negligence resulting in the death of
plaintiff's husband and intestate, Orson Tuttle, a brakeman in the
defendant's employment. The declaration contained three counts, the
first of which charged that on or about the 30th of October, 1882,
the said Tuttle was in the employ of the defendant in the City of
Detroit at the "Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee yards," and,
in the course of his ordinary employment, was ordered to couple
some cars standing on a certain track known as "BootJack Siding;"
that said siding is a doublecurve track containing a very sharp
curve; that in compliance with the order, he proceeded to couple
certain cars on said siding, which were near a certain boat slip,
and, while he was endeavoring to couple said cars, the drawheads of
the cars failed to meet, and passed each other, allowing the said
cars to come so close together that he was
Page 122 U. S. 190
crushed to death; that there were no bumpers nor other device on
either of the said cars to prevent them from going together, in
case said drawheads failed to meet and passed each other, and that
the only device on said cars for the purpose of keeping them apart,
and to receive the concussion in coupling, was the drawheads
aforesaid. The charge of negligence was that the defendant,
disregarding its duty, neglected, in the construction of its said
cars, to provide any means to prevent injuring its said employee in
case the drawheads of its cars so constructed should fail to meet
or pass each other under circumstances set forth; and that the said
defendant, in the construction of said "boot jack siding," so
called, negligently and unskillfully constructed the same with so
sharp a curve that the drawheads of the said cars failed to meet
and passed each other, thereby causing the death of the said Orson
Tuttle while in the act of coupling said cars as aforesaid without
fault or negligence on his part.
The third count was substantially the same as the first. The
second count, which charged a defective construction of the car in
not supplying it with bumpers or other means of preventing the
drawheads from passing each other, was abandoned at the trial. As
stated in the brief of the plaintiff's counsel,
"The first and third counts allege that boot jack siding was
negligently and unskillfully constructed by the defendant with so
sharp a curve that the drawheads of the cars in use by it would
pass each other, and cause the cars to crush any one who attempted
to make a coupling thereon,"
and this alleged faulty construction of the track was the
principal matter of contest on the trial, the plaintiff contending
that the defendant was bound, in duty to its workmen and employees,
to construct a track that would not expose them to the danger which
existed in this case, while the defendant contended and offered
evidence to prove that the track was constructed according to the
requirements of the situation, a sharp curve being necessary at
that place in order to place the cars, when loading, alongside of
the dock or slip; that such curves are not uncommon in station
yards; that in such conditions the drawheads of cars quite often
pass each other
Page 122 U. S. 191
when the cars come together; that this must be presumed to have
been well known to Tuttle, the deceased, who was an experienced
yardman; that he accepted the employment with a full knowledge of
its risks, and must be held to have assumed them; and that it was
negligence on his part to place himself in such a situation as to
incur the danger and suffer the injury complained of. It appeared
by the evidence that when trying to make the coupling, the deceased
stood on the inside of the curve where the corners of the cars come
in contact when the drawheads pass each other, and will crush a
person caught between them, whereas on the outside of the curve
they are widely separated and there is no danger. The defendants
contended that the position thus taken by Tuttle was contributory
negligence on his part. On the other hand, the plaintiff offered
evidence tending to show that it was usual for the brakeman, in
coupling cars on a curve, to stand on the inside, so as to see the
engineer and exchange signals with him for stopping, backing, or
going forward. The defendants contended, and offered evidence
tending to show, that this was not necessary, as there were always
the yardmaster or others standing by and cooperating, by whom the
signals could by given.
This statement of the pleadings and of the leading issues raised
on the trial is sufficient for properly understanding the question
of law presented to the court. Upon the evidence adduced, the judge
directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, holding that
Tuttle wantonly assumed the risk of remaining upon the inside of
the drawbar when he should have gone on the other side, and that
the defendant ought not to be held in this action.
Page 122 U. S. 194
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
We have carefully read the evidence presented by the bill of
exceptions, and although it appears that the curve was a very sharp
one at the place where the accident happened, yet we do not think
that public policy requires the courts to lay down any rule of law
to restrict a railroad company as to the curves it shall use in its
freight depots and yards, where the safety of passengers and the
public is not involved, much less that it should be left to the
varying and uncertain opinions of juries to determine such an
engineering question. For analogous cases as to the right of a
manufacturer to choose the kind of machinery he will use in his
business,
see Richards v. Rough, 53 Mich. 213;
Hayden
v. Smithville Mfg. Co., 29 Conn. 558. The interest of railroad
companies themselves is so strongly in favor of easy curves, as a
means of facilitating the movement of their cars, that it may well
be left to the discretion of their officers and engineers in what
manner to construct them for the proper transaction of their
business in yards, etc. It must be a very extraordinary case,
indeed, in which their discretion in this matter should be
interfered with in determining their obligations to their
employees. The brakemen and others employed to work in such
situations must decide for themselves whether they will encounter
the hazards incidental thereto, and if they decide to do so, they
must be content to assume the risks. For the views of this court in
a cognate matter,
see Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad, 109 U. S. 478,
109 U. S. 483,
where it was said:
"A railroad yard, where trains are made up, necessarily has a
great number of tracks and switches close to one another, and any
one who enters the service of a railroad company connected with the
moving of trains assumes the risk of that condition of things."
It is for those who enter into such employments to exercise all
that care and caution which the perils of the business in each
Page 122 U. S. 195
case demand. The perils in the present case, arising from the
sharpness of the curve, were seen and known. They were not like the
defects of unsafe machinery which the employer has neglected to
repair, and which his employees have reason to suppose is in proper
working condition. Everything was open and visible, and the
deceased had only to use his senses and his faculties to avoid the
dangers to which he was exposed. One of these dangers was that of
the drawbars' slipping and passing each other when the cars were
brought together. It was his duty to look out for this and avoid
it. The danger existed only on the inside of the curve. This must
have been known to him. It will be presumed that, as an experienced
brakeman, he did know it, for it is one of those things which
happen, in the course of his employment, under such conditions as
existed here.
Without attempting, therefore, to give a summary of the
evidence, we have no hesitation in saying that the judge was right
in holding that the deceased, by voluntarily assuming the risk of
remaining on the inside of the drawbar, brought the injury upon
himself, and the judge was right, therefore, in directing a verdict
for the defendant. We are led to this conclusion not only on the
ground that the deceased, by his own negligence, contributed to the
accident, but on the broader ground, already alluded to, that a
person who enters into the service of another in a particular
employment assumes the risks incident to such employment. Judge
Cooley announces the rule in the following terms: "The rule is now
well settled," says he,
"that in general, when a servant, in the execution of his
master's business, receives an injury which befalls him from one of
the risks incident to the business, he cannot hold the master
responsible, but must bear the consequences himself. The reason
most generally assigned for this rule is that the servant, when he
engages in the employment, does so in view of all the incidental
hazards, and that he and his employer, when making their
negotiations -- fixing the terms and agreeing upon the compensation
that shall be paid to him -- must have contemplated these as having
an important bearing upon their stipulations. As the servant then
knows that he
Page 122 U. S. 196
will be exposed to the incidental risk, 'he must be supposed to
have contracted that as between himself and the master, he would
run this risk.'"
The author proceeds to show that this is also a rule of public
policy, inasmuch as an opposite doctrine would not only subject
employers to unreasonable and often ruinous responsibilities,
thereby embarrassing all branches of business, but it would be an
encouragement to the servant to omit that diligence and caution
which he is in duty bound to exercise on behalf of his master to
protect him against the misconduct and negligence of others in the
same service and in exercising such diligence and caution he would
have a better security against injury to himself than any recourse
to the master for damages could afford.
This accurate summary of the law supersedes the necessity of
quoting cases, which are referred to by the author and by every
recent writer on the same subject. Its application to this case is
quite clear. The defendant, as we have seen, had a right to
construct its side track with such curves as its engineers deemed
expedient and proper, and as to the drawheads and the absence of
bumpers, the plaintiff herself abandoned all claim founded upon any
supposed misconstruction of the cars in relation thereto. Then it
was clearly shown to be a not uncommon accident, especially on
sharp curves, for the drawheads of cars to slip by and pass each
other. Tuttle, the deceased, entered into the employment of the
defendant as a brakeman in the yard in question with a full
knowledge (actual or presumed) of all these things -- the form of
the side tracks, the construction of the cars, and the hazards
incident to the service. Of one of these hazards he was
unfortunately the victim. The only conclusion to be reached from
these undoubted facts is that he assumed the risks of the business,
and his representative has no recourse for damages against the
company.
This view of the subject renders it unnecessary to examine the
various particular instructions which the plaintiff's counsel
requested the court to give to the jury. The only one that need be
noticed is the following, namely:
"If the jury find that Tuttle had no notice or knowledge
Page 122 U. S. 197
of the fact that the drawheads would pass on a portion of this
siding, and that the fact itself would not be noticed or discovered
by a careful and prudent man while engaged in coupling cars on said
siding, then it cannot be said that he was guilty of contributory
negligence unless it had already come to his knowledge that the
drawheads would pass."
On this point, the judge stated in his charge that
"he [the deceased] knew, as he was an experienced man, that
drawbars do slip sometimes, even upon a straight track, as it has
been testified to, and the sharper the curve, the greater was the
danger of their slipping."
In making this statement, the judge was fully borne out by the
testimony, and there was no evidence to contradict it.
We find no error in the judgment, and it is therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER, with whom was MR. JUSTICE HARLAN,
dissenting.
I dissent from this judgment, and especially the proposition
that the railroad company owed no duty to its employees in regard
to the sharpness of the curves of the track in the yards in which
they are employed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN unites in this dissent.
