When the language of a contract is ambiguous, the practical
interpretation of it by the parties is entitled to great, if not
controlling, influence.
In this case, the Court holds that a contract made by the
parties in 1870 is still in force, and that under its terms, the
appellee is entitled to make use of the combinations covered by the
patent to John A. Topliff, one of the appellants, of August 24,
1875, without the payment of royalty and without being charged with
liability as an infringer.
Bill in equity to restrain alleged infringements of letters
patent. Decree dismissing the bill, from which complainants
appealed. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 122 U. S. 122
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellants, complainants below, on the 28th of February,
1880, filed their bill in equity to restrain the alleged
infringement by the defendant of letters patent No. 166,950,
granted August 24, 1875, to John A. Topliff for a new and useful
improvement in bow sockets for buggy tops. As stated in the
specification,
"This invention has relation to bow sockets for buggy tops, and
consists in placing a filling of wood in the tubes of the bow
sockets to strengthen the same; also in extending the strip of
steel which is inserted in the wood filling far enough down to
enable it to be welded or otherwise fastened to the slat iron."
Among other grounds of defense, the defendant in his answer sets
out the following:
He alleges that sometime prior to the 27th day of December,
1870, he invented a new and useful invention denominated an
improvement in carriage bows consisting, in the main, in
constructing the straight part of carriage bows out of tapering
tubes made of sheet iron with soldered seams and lower ends
flattened, forming a part of the hinge, in conjunction with the
bows made of wood, shaped and fitted into the upper ends of the
tubes; that this invention was secured to him by letters patent
dated December 27, 1870, No. 110,513; that this patent was reissued
as reissued letters patent No. 9,026, January 6, 1880, and that he
obtained another patent, No. 114,885, dated May 16, 1871, for a new
and improved carriage bow cover and slat iron combined; that soon
after he invented his first improvement in carriage bows, for which
he obtained the patent dated December 27, 1870, and pending the
application therefor, a contract in writing was entered into on or
about the first day of September, 1870, between himself and the
complainants, as follows:
"This agreement, made and concluded this ___ day of _____, A.D.
1870, by and between Isaac N. Topliff, of the first part, and John
A. Topliff and George H. Ely, of the second part, witnesseth:"
"1. The said party of the first part is the sole owner of a
certain patent for tubular iron bows used
Page 122 U. S. 123
in manufacturing carriage and buggy tops, which patent was
issued the ___ day of _____, A.D. _____."
"Now, in consideration of the agreements of said party of the
second part to be by them performed, the said party of the first
part hereby gives, grants, sells, and conveys to the said party of
the second part the exclusive right of manufacturing and of selling
the above-mentioned article throughout the United States for five
years from the date of this agreement, it being understood that at
the expiration of five years, the said party of the first part
shall have the right to have the above-named articles manufactured
at not more than two other places, to be sold at prices adopted by
said party of the second part, but in all other respects the rights
and privileges of the said party of the second part shall continue
during the entire life of the patent."
"2. The parties mutually agree that they will share the expense
of maintaining the right of the patent against infringements and
other patents in the following proportion: the first party to pay
one-third, and the second party to pay two-thirds. It is also
further agreed that any improvement made on these articles by
either party shall be for the mutual benefit of the parties."
"3. In consideration of the above grant, the said party of the
second part hereby agree to pay to the said party of first part
fifteen percent on the wholesale selling prices of above-named
articles, as royalty on all sold by them, it being understood that
these prices shall at all times be settled by mutual agreement
between both parties. The said party of the second part further
agree that they will advertise thoroughly the above-named article
in such ways as may seem best, and do all in their power to
introduce and extend the sale of said articles. They also agreed
that they will make them of quality and finish to meet the
approbation quality and finish to meet the approbation of said
party of the first part."
"In witness whereof the parties have set their hands and seals
to duplicates the day and year first above written."
"I. N. TOPLIFF [Seal]"
"J. A. TOPLIFF [Seal]"
"GEORGE H. ELY [Seal]"
Page 122 U. S. 124
"That, in pursuance of this agreement, the complainants entered
upon the manufacture and sale of carriage bows, the defendant being
in their employment as traveling salesman, and as such devoted his
time largely to the introduction and sale of said carriage bows
throughout the United States, and also his time, thought, and
attention to making improvements therein, knowledge of which was
communicated by him to the complainants from time to time; that
some of these improvements made by him were covered by the patent
bearing date May 16, 1871; that the business was carried on by the
complainants in this was under said contract for more than eight
years, to their great gain and profit."
The defendant further alleges that,
"after the issuing to him of the last-mentioned letters patent,
he made some slight changes and improvements in the manufacture of
carriage bows, and communicated the same to said complainants,
especially to said John, and requested that in the manufacture of
carriage bows under his patent aforesaid, that the said
complainants should construct and manufacture them in accordance
with his said suggestions and improvements, which improvements were
communicated by this defendant to the said complainants on or about
the first day of June, 1873. That thereupon his said suggestion and
invention was adopted by the said complainants in the manufacture
of carriage bows by the said complainants, and afterwards the said
John A. Topliff, for the purpose of securing the same to the
complainants and to this defendant for their mutual use and
benefit, in accordance with the terms of said contract, made
application for a patent thereon, and secured the alleged patent in
the complainants' bill of complaint described, and this defendant
alleges and says that if, in reality, there is anything new or
useful embraced in the said letters patent, issued to the said John
A. Topliff, that he was and is the true inventor and rightful owner
thereof, and that the said John A. Topliff was not and is not the
true and original inventor and discoverer thereof, and this
defendant alleges that whether said patent, so issued in the name
of said complainants, is or is not valid, that he, by the terms of
his said contract entered into
Page 122 U. S. 125
with said complainants, is entitled to use the same to the same
extent that the complainants, are entitled to use the same; that by
the terms of said contract, such right is expressly granted and
conveyed to him, and that the complainants have so interpreted said
contract, and have had upon their part the free use and benefit of
the invention, discovery, and improvement made by this defendant
and secured to him by letters patent dated May 16, 1871, as
aforesaid, and other considerations therefor, as agreed, and that,
relying upon said contract, he communicated to the said
complainants the information and instructions in regard to
manufacturing under his said patents and other improvements above
named, upon which the said John A. Topliff made the application,
and secured to the said complainants the letters patent said to be
owned by them, and this defendant denies that he has made other use
of the letters patent issued to the complainants than such as he
was authorized to make by the terms of the contract aforesaid
between the complainants and himself."
The defendant further says that he has established a manufactory
of carriage bows in the City of Cleveland, but not in any other
place or places, and that by the terms of his contract with the
complainants he is entitled so to do, and in said business to use
the alleged improvements covered by the patent described in the
bill.
The case was heard on the pleadings and proofs, when the circuit
court being satisfied that under the contract set up in the answer
each party had a right to use without the payment of royalty, the
patent issued to the complaints, a decree was entered dismissing
the bill. The complainants took the present appeal.
It is now contended, on the part of the appellants 1st, that at
the time when the bill was filed the contract set up in the answer
was not in force, having been previously rescinded by the parties,
and 2d, that, if the contract is in force, it does not secure to
the appellee the right to the use of the improvement covered by the
patent to John A. Topliff of August 24, 1875, belonging to the
appellants.
The circumstances which, according to the contention of
Page 122 U. S. 126
the appellants, constitute the rescission of the contract, are
claimed to be as follows:
They allege that when the contract in question was entered into
the application of the appellee for his patent was pending; that a
sample specimen of the carriage bow intended to be covered by the
patent was shown by the appellee to the appellants; that the
appellee represented to them that the patent would cover the use of
tubular carriage bows; that, in point of fact, the original
application made the following claims:
"1. The upright part of carriage bows, constructed of tubular
sheet metal A, in combination with the wooden bow B, put together
in the manner and for the purposes set forth and described."
"2. The tube A, with elongated flat portion
c, to form
a solid joint with the bow socket D in the manner described."
"3. The scallop-edged sheet iron bow socket, D, to be used in
connection with the tubes A and A' in the manner described."
That these claims were rejected in the Patent Office, and in
lieu of them the claim of the patent as issued on December 27,
1870, was substituted, as follows:
"The straight part of the bow A, tubular and flattened at the
lower end, the bow socket D, consisting of two concave scalloped
pieces, and the bent part of the bow B, all combined, constructed,
and arranged as and for the purposes set forth."
That the appellants were not aware of the rejection of the
original claims until some time in the year 1879; that during that
period they acted under the impression that they were secured in
the exclusive right to use carriage bows containing the tubular
uprights; that they had no knowledge to the contrary until the fact
was disclosed by an examination of the records of the Patent
Office; that, immediately upon discovering it, they gave notice to
the appellee that the consideration for the contract between them
had thus failed, the patent being of no avail to them, and that
they would no longer regard it as obligatory, and that thereupon
the appellee acquiesced in this rescission of the contract by them,
and resumed his ownership of the original patent, surrendered the
same, and obtained a reissue thereof on January 6, 1880, the claims
of which are as follows:
Page 122 U. S. 127
"1. A carriage bow, the side or upright portions A A of which
are tubular, substantially as and for the purpose shown."
"2. A carriage bow consisting of the bent wooden section B and
the tubular sections A A, the latter constituting the vertical
sides or arms of the bow, the opposite ends of the bent portion B
being secured to the upper ends of the tubular sections A A
substantially as set forth."
"3. A carriage bow consisting of the bent wooden sections B and
the metallic tubular sections A A, the latter constituting the
straight or vertical sides of the bow, substantially as set
forth."
"4. A carriage bow consisting of the bent wooden section B and
the tubular sections A A, the latter constituting the straight or
vertical sides of the bow and constructed at their lower ends to be
attached to a socket or carriage seat, substantially as set
forth."
On the other hand, it appears from the testimony in the case
that the manufacture of the carriage bows, as contemplated under
the application for the original patent, was abandoned by the
parties before the patent was in fact issued, experience showing
that the bows so made were not practically useful in the trade;
that the original patent of December 27, 1870, soon after it was
issued, was delivered to the appellants, and kept in their
possession until it was lost or destroyed in December, 1873, and
that thereby they had abundant opportunity of knowing, from an
examination of its contents the actual extent of its claims, and
that subsequently the patent of May 16, 1871, was issued to the
appellee for a new and improved carriage bow cover and slat iron
combined, which embodied important improvements on the carriage bow
as previously made.
Under this patent, all the parties continued to carry on the
business of making and selling carriage bows, the articles of
manufacture being from time to time improved and rendered more
valuable and salable by the suggestion and adoption of improvements
made from time to time by both parties. To cover some of the
improvements thus invented and adopted, the appellant, John A.
Topliff, applied for and obtained his
Page 122 U. S. 128
patent of August 24, 1875. The claims of that patent are as
follows:
"1. In combination with the back tubes of bow sockets and wood
bows or fillings, a steel or other hard metal plate welded or
otherwise fastened within the tube to the slat iron, substantially
as and for the purpose specified"
"2. The combination, with the metal tubes of bow sockets, of a
wooden filling, substantially as and for the purpose set
forth."
John A. Topliff states, as a witness in the case, that his
improvement consisted
"in placing a filling of wood in the tubes of the bow sockets to
strengthen the same, and also in extending the strip of steel,
which is inserted in the wood filling, far enough down to enable it
to be welded or otherwise fastened to the slat iron."
After the issue of this patent, the business was continued by
the parties as before, the carriage bows and bow sockets being made
with all the improvements added, the appellants continuing
regularly to account to the appellee, according to the terms of the
contract between them, for his share of the proceeds of the sales
of the manufactured articles, being fifteen percent of the
wholesale selling prices of all actually sold. These sums amounted,
in the aggregate, to $40,000 or $50,000, and the payments were made
regularly until in August or September, 1879.
In reference to John A. Topliff's patent of August 24, 1875, the
appellee claimed that the idea of a wooden filling in the tubes of
the bow sockets was suggested by him, and that of welding the steel
plate to the slat iron was suggested by his brother. On that point
he says in his testimony:
"Sometime in 1874 or 1875, I think it was, I came home and my
brother said that they had concluded to patent that device of
welding the steel to the slat iron, and he said that he thought
that they had better take out a patent, or make one claim for the
filling also. I told him that the filling, of course, was my
improvement, and I did not know that it would be right to insert it
into his patent. He said it would make no difference, as our
contract would cover it all. He said that it would make no
difference which took out the patent, whether
Page 122 U. S. 129
it was in his name or my name, and I made no further objection
to it; but I always claimed, and he never disputed it that time,
that the device was mine as far as the filling was concerned."
This statement of the appellee as a witness is not contradicted
by the testimony of either John A. Topliff or George H. Ely, the
appellants, the only other witnesses examined in the cause.
In 1879, the appellee left the employment of the appellants, and
made preparations to establish a business of his own in the
manufacture of carriage bows and bow sockets in Cleveland, claiming
the right to do so under the terms of his contract, when the
present controversy arose between them. In explanation of their
continuing to pay royalty under the contract as late as in 1879,
John A. Topliff states in his testimony as follows:
"We paid royalty from the fact that we supposed that we were
working under his original patent; we did not know to the contrary.
The original patent was somewhere, perhaps in our office, and was
burned up in 1873, I think -- I think that was the time of the
fire, and we had not seen it for a long time, and supposed that we
were working under the original patent until we finally received
the file wrappers from Washington, informing us to the contrary,
and when we received them, together with the patent, we found out
that we were not working under his patent, and refused to pay
further royalty."
This explanation cannot be accepted. It is inconsistent with the
facts testified to by the same witness, as well as others, that the
manufacture of the bows and bow sockets under the original patent
ceased early in 1870, before, in fact, that patent was issued, and
that the business was actually carried on under Isaac N. Topliff's
patent of May 16, 1871, and the subsequent improvements patented to
John A. Topliff under the patent of August 24, 1875. The fact,
therefore, that the patent of December 27, 1870, was of no
practical value in the business was well known and perfectly
understood from a very early period in its prosecution, and the
patent of May 16,
Page 122 U. S. 130
1871, was accepted by the parties as a substitute for it. The
appellants therefore cannot claim that they made the first
discovery of its inutility in 1879, and had a right by reason
thereof to rescind the contract for a failure of consideration. It
was equally immaterial that Isaac N. Topliff subsequently thereto,
in 1880, surrendered that patent, and obtained the reissue. If the
reissue is void, the situation of the parties is not changed; if it
is valid and useful, it inures to the benefit of the appellants as
well as to that of the appellee by virtue of the express terms of
the agreement between them.
The second proposition of the appellants is that if the contract
set up in the answer is in force, it does not secure to the
appellee the right to the use of the improvement covered by the
patent sued on. The language of the agreement is this: "It is also
further agreed that any improvement made on these articles by
either party shall be for the mutual benefit of the parties."
It is contended by the appellants that the articles referred to
in this clause of the contract are those mentioned in the former
part of the agreement as meaning articles to be manufactured under
the original patent of Isaac N. Topliff of December 27, 1870, and
that the improvement which is to inure, by virtue of the clause
quoted, to the mutual benefit of the parties, must be an
improvement upon the patented article. This, however, it seems to
us, is too narrow and restricted a meaning to be placed on the
language of the parties, and fails to secure their actual
intention. The subject of the contract is the manufacture and sale
of bows and bow sockets for carriage and buggy tops, in which the
parties were to have mutual interests, as defined in the contract.
It was supposed, and this undoubtedly was the original basis of the
agreement, that the appellee had secured the exclusive right to a
valuable improvement in the manufacture of this description of
articles. His application for the patent was then pending; the
patent was in fact subsequently issued. In the meantime, the
article as proposed was manufactured and put on sale, and
ascertained by experience not sufficiently to answer the purpose.
By mutual suggestion and assent, improvements in the manufacture
were
Page 122 U. S. 131
adopted, and some of them embraced in the second patent to the
appellee of May 16, 1871. The article made under that patent was
treated as the article intended by the contract. Other improvements
were subsequently devised and adopted for perfecting the same
article, and these were embraced in the patent to John A. Topliff
of August 24, 1875. The operations of the parties in the
manufacture and sale of the article were carried on, and continued
to enlarge and prosper, and became profitable, and the parties
throughout acted upon the assumption and understanding that the
article thus manufactured was the article contemplated by the
contract between them. If there were any doubt or ambiguity arising
upon the words employed in the clause of the contract under
consideration they would be effectually removed by this practical
construction continuously put upon them by the conduct of the
parties for so long a period.
"In cases where the language used by the parties to the contract
is indefinite or ambiguous, and hence of doubtful construction, the
practical interpretation of the parties themselves is entitled to
great, if not controlling, influence. The interest of each
generally leads him to a construction most favorable to himself,
and when the difference has become serious and beyond amicable
adjustment, it can be settled only by the arbitrament of the law.
But in an executor contract, and where its execution necessarily
involves a practical construction, if the minds of both parties
concur, there can be no great danger in the adoption of it by the
court as the true one."
Chicago v.
Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50,
76 U. S. 54, per
Mr. Justice Nelson.
In our opinion, the contract between the parties set up in the
answer continued in force notwithstanding what was done by the
appellants in 1879 with the intention to put an end to it, and, by
virtue of its terms, the appellee is entitled to manufacture, in
Cleveland, carriage bows and bow sockets, using therein the
combinations covered by the patent to John A. Topliff of August 24,
1875, without royalty and without being charged with liability as
an infringer.
The decree of the circuit court in dismissing the bill, which is
its whole legal effect, was therefore right, and is hereby
Affirmed.