As it appears that the right of the State of California to have
the lands which are in dispute in this action listed is admitted,
it is held that this Court is without jurisdiction over the
judgment of the Supreme Court of California upon the adverse claims
of the parties.
Hastings v. Jackson, 112 U.
S. 233, affirmed.
This was an action to try the title to a tract of land listed to
California under § 8 of the Act of September 24, 1841. The facts
which were claimed to make a federal question are stated in the
opinion of the Court.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit begun by Mace, the plaintiff in error, against
Merrill, the defendant in error, in the District Court of Los
Page 119 U. S. 582
Angeles County, California, pursuant to a reference by the
surveyor general of the state, under § 3414 of the Political Code
of that state, which is as follows:
"When a contest arises concerning the approval of a survey or
location before the surveyor general, or concerning a certificate
of purchase or other evidence of title before the register, the
officer before whom the contest is made may, when the question
involved is as to the survey, or one purely of fact, or whether the
land applied for is a part of the swamp or overflowed lands of the
state, or whether it is included within a confirmed grant, the
lines of which have been run by authority of law, proceed to hear
and determine the same; but when, in the judgment of the officer, a
question of law is involved, or when either party demands a trial
in the courts of the state, he must make an order referring the
contest to the district court of the county in which the land is
situated, and must enter such order in a record book in his
office."
The record shows that the S.E. 1/4 of Sec. 21, township 2 S., R.
13 W., S.B. M., was listed to the State of California by the
Secretary of the Interior on the 21st of March, 1876, as part of
the 500,000 acres of land selected by the state under § 8 of the
Act of Congress approved September 24, 1841, 5 Stat. 455, c. 16,
for the purpose of internal improvements. On the 17th of November,
1874, Mace applied to the surveyor general of the state for the
purchase of this tract. His application was on file when the land
was listed. Merrill, the defendant in error, also claimed the same
tract from the surveyor general. His claim was based on an alleged
location of the tract under the laws of California, and a payment
therefor to the state in school warrants on the 23d of June, 1857.
Such being the case, he insisted that the title of the state inured
to his benefit under the provisions of §§ 1 and 3 of the Act of
July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 218, c. 219, "to quiet land titles in
California." Mace set up no title in himself under any statute or
authority of the United States. His application was to the state,
and he claimed under state authority only. It is true that if the
state had the right to sell, he might have the right to buy, but
that right to buy would come not from the United States, but
Page 119 U. S. 583
from the state. The court below decided that the state could not
sell, because it had already sold to Merrill, and that all the
title it had was held in trust for him.
Mace, in his petition, did indeed aver that he entered into the
possession of the land in 1869 with the intention of acquiring
title from the United States by preemption, and that in 1873 he
filed in the proper office his declaratory statement and offered
the necessary proof, but his claim in this case is not based on any
such right, the prayer of his petition being only that it may be
adjudged that he "has the better right to purchase." If his rights
under the preemption laws are superior to the title of Merrill
under the state's selection, it may perhaps be made a subject of
litigation in another suit, where his title can be set up against
that of Merrill; but in this suit, which is only to establish his
right to buy from the state, no such question can arise. His right
to buy has no connection whatever with his claim of preemption,
for, as he says in his petition,
"he made application to the Surveyor General of the State of
California, under the provisions of title eight of the Political
Code of the state, to purchase, . . . which said application was in
all respects made in conformity with the requirements of the code
aforesaid, and which said application has been ever since the date
last aforesaid, and now is, on file in the office of the surveyor
general aforesaid,"
and "the plaintiff is the owner of a school land warrant, and
under which he claims the benefit of the location of said
quarter-section." Had this suit been instituted by Mace to
establish a right superior to that of the state growing out of his
preemption claim and to charge the state as his trustee on that
account, the case would have been different, for then he would have
set up a right under the preemption laws of the United States, and,
with a decision against him, he might be in a condition to have a
review by this Court. Instead of that, however, he has contented
himself with seeking to buy from the state that which it has been
decided the state had no right to sell.
It is possible also that by the practice in California, Mace
might have contested the title of the state before the surveyor
general, and had the case referred to the district court for
the
Page 119 U. S. 584
purpose of determining that title and having a trust declared in
his favor under the listing which had been made. The cases of
Tyler v. Houghton, 25 Cal. 27, and
Thompson v.
True, 48 Cal. 608, indicate that this might be done, but such,
as we have seen, is not the purpose of this suit. For all the
purposes of the present inquiry, the right of the state to have the
lands listed under the act of 1841 must be considered as admitted,
and the litigation confined to the contest between the parties as
to which has the better right to buy from the state. According to
the respective claims of the parties, Merrill did buy in 1857, and
Mace made application to buy in 1874. Both claim under the state.
If Merrill actually did buy, as he says he did, the title of the
state inured to his benefit under the act of Congress as soon as it
passed from the United States. If he did not, then, so far as the
record discloses, Mace might have had the right to buy when he made
application for that purpose. The determination of this question,
as the case comes here, involves no federal right in Mace which has
been denied him by the decision of the court below. We consequently
have no jurisdiction, and the cases of
Romie v. Casanova,
91 U. S. 379;
McStay v. Friedman, 92 U. S. 723, and
Hastings v. Jackson, 112 U. S. 233, are
directly to that effect. Indeed, the case of
Hastings v.
Jackson is strikingly like this in its material facts.
The writ of error is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.