Final judgments at law cannot, by proceedings taken after the
close of the term at which they were entered, be reversed or
annulled for errors of fact or law by the court which rendered
them, except that clerical mistakes, and such mistakes of fact not
put in issue or passed upon as may be corrected by writ of error
coram vobis (or on motion in place of that writ where such
practice prevails), and a mistake in the dismissal of a cause, may
be corrected after that time; the same rule applies in equity
excepting, further, the right to take jurisdiction of bills for
review.
Page 117 U. S. 666
The appropriate remedy to set aside or enjoin the execution of
judgments at law, wrongfully obtained, is by bill in equity.
So far as the rule prevails in Maryland that judgments may at a
term subsequent to that at which they were entered, be amended in
essential matters, reversed, or annulled by the court which
rendered them, that rule, whether founded on a construction of the
Maryland statute of 1787 by the highest court of the state or on an
interpretation of the common law, is not binding on the courts of
the United States in the District of Columbia.
Error to review an order vacating a judgment. After the cause
was docketed here, plaintiff in error died and his executors were
admitted to prosecute the writ of error.
The facts material to a determination of the questions arising
in the cause were as follows:
Philip Phillips sued the defendant Negley, in the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, on August 29, 1874, to recover $4,368
alleged to be due upon a certain order in writing, signed by Simon
Witkowski and by the defendant, as attorney for Mrs. Witkowski,
addressed to Charles F. Peck and Charles E. Hovey, and by them
accepted, payable out of money received by them from the United
States arising from a judgment in the Court of Claims in favor of
Witkowski. A copy of the order was attached to the declaration.
Process was served personally on the defendant on the same
day.
On October 26, 1874, Negley filed an affidavit of defense
denying his liability on the ground that the order was signed by
him only as the agent and on behalf of Mrs. Witkowski, alleging
that the plaintiff was not in fact holder of the same for value,
and denying notice of nonpayment and any indebtedness whatever.
On May 3, 1877, the plaintiff joined issue on these pleas, and
on April 3. 1879, the defendant not appearing, a jury was called
who found a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum demanded, with
interest, and judgment was rendered thereon.
On September 4, 1882, the defendant filed his motion
"to vacate the judgment and set aside the verdict entered herein
ex parte on the 3d day of April, 1879, because of
irregularity, surprise, fraud and deceit in the procurement of said
verdict and judgment and the negligence of defendant's attorney,
the
Page 117 U. S. 667
particulars of which appear in the affidavit of the defendant
filed herewith and in the record and papers on file in this
case."
In support of this motion, the affidavits of the defendant
Negley and of Richard Harrington were filed. In that of the
defendant, he denies his personal liability on the order and says
that when served with process in the cause, he was temporarily in
Washington, being at the time and always since a resident of
Pittsburgh; that he employed Harrington as his attorney and filed
his affidavit of defense, and received no further notice or
information in reference to the suit from the fall of 1874 until
about July 26, 1882, when he was served with process in a suit
brought on the judgment in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; that
after he filed his affidavit of defense in the original suit --
that is, from October 26, 1874 -- the plaintiff "seemed to have
abandoned the case, and thereby to mislead affiant's attorney;"
that the plaintiff took no notice of the plea until May 3, 1877,
when he joined issue, but gave no notice of trial; that in the
meantime, without defendant's knowledge, Harrington had removed
from the City of Washington, as was well known to the plaintiff and
his counsel, leaving the defendant without an attorney; that on
April 3, 1879, without any notice to the defendant, the case was
called for trial, and in his absence the plaintiff, with knowledge
that the defendant was ignorant of the proceedings, called for a
jury, and without other proof than the production of the order sued
on procured the verdict and obtained the judgment thereon, and that
by reason of the premises, the said proceedings and judgment are a
fraud upon him.
Harrington states in his affidavit that he understood that the
plaintiff had abandoned his suit, and that he believes he so
informed his client, the defendant, and that he, Harrington,
removed from the District of Columbia in March, 1875, and has not
since resided or practiced law therein, and that on such removal he
undertook to notify all his clients, but having considered this
cause at an end by reason of the plaintiff's failure to join issue
or take action on the plea therein, as required by the rules of the
court, he did not notify the defendant, and that the plaintiff and
his attorney well knew when said cause was
Page 117 U. S. 668
set down for trial that the affiant had removed to Dover,
Delaware. Notice of this motion was served upon the plaintiff in
the judgment, who appeared and filed counter-affidavits of himself
and of his attorney, William F. Mattingly. The latter states that
he mailed notices of the trial of the issues in the action for the
May term, 1877, in due time, to what he understood to be the post
office address both of Harrington and of the defendant, and that
the cause stood for trial from thence until the January term, 1879.
The plaintiff, in his affidavit, denies all charges of fraud and
says that on the trial of the action the verdict was taken upon
testimony showing that after the delivery to the plaintiff of the
order sued on, the defendant obtained possession of the fund out of
which the same was to have been paid, and failed to make the proper
application of the same.
On December 2, 1882, the Supreme Court of the District, holding
a special term and circuit court, entered the following order:
"Philip Phillips, Pl'ff"
"v. At Law. No. 12,890"
"James S. Negley, Def't"
"This cause coming on to be heard upon the defendant's motion to
vacate the judgment and set aside the verdict entered herein
ex
parte on the 3d day of April, 1879, because of irregularity,
surprise, fraud, and deceit, and the same having been argued by
counsel on both sides and duly considered, it is considered by the
court that said verdict and judgment be and the same is hereby
vacated, set aside, and for nothing held, and a new trial
granted."
From this order, an appeal was taken to the court in general
term, December 9, 1882, and on February 15, 1883, the defendant
moved the court to dismiss the appeal on the ground that an appeal
would not lie from such an order made at the circuit court or
special term. The proceedings in general term resulted in the
following order, entered February 19, 1883:
Page 117 U. S. 669
"Now come here as well the plaintiff as the defendant, by their
respective attorneys, whereupon, because it appears to the court
here that there is no error in the record and proceedings of the
special term, therefore the court remands the case to the special
term, there to be proceeded with as if no appeal had been taken
from its order of December 2, 1882, which appeal is hereby
dismissed with costs, to be taxed by the clerks. The plaintiff
gives notice that he will prosecute a writ of error, and the
penalty of his supersedeas bond is fixed at $500."
To reverse these proceedings and orders, this writ of error has
been prosecuted.
Page 117 U. S. 671
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS, after stating the case as above reported,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
There appears to be an ambiguity, if not an inconsistency, in
the terms of the order or judgment of the general term. It affirms
that there is no error in the record and proceedings of the special
term, but does not affirm its order which was appealed from, but in
fact dismisses the appeal, as though it had no jurisdiction either
to affirm or reverse the order brought up by the appeal.
Interpreting the judgment of the general term by the opinion of the
learned judge who spoke for the court,
Phillips v. Negley,
2 Mackey 236, we must infer that it was intended to dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction to entertain it, on the ground that
the order of the special term, vacating its own judgment rendered
at a previous term, was not only within the power of that court,
but was so purely discretionary that it was not reviewable in an
appellate court. The same consideration is urged upon us as a
ground for dismissing the present writ of error for want of
jurisdiction in this Court, it being alleged that the order of the
Supreme Court of the district at special term is one not only
within the discretion of that court, but that, as it merely vacates
a judgment for the purpose of a new trial upon the merits of the
original action, it is not a final judgment, and therefore not
reviewable on writ of error. If properly considered the order in
question was an order in the cause which the court had power to
make at the term when it was made, the consequence may be admitted,
that no appellate tribunal has jurisdiction to question its
propriety, for if it had power to make it, and it was a power
limited only by the discretion of the court making it, as in other
cases of orders setting aside judgments at the same term at which
they were rendered and granting new trials, there would be nothing
left for the jurisdiction of an appellate court to act upon. The
vacating of a judgment and granting a new trial, in the exercise of
an acknowledged jurisdiction, leaves no judgment in force to be
reviewed. If, on
Page 117 U. S. 672
the other hand, the order made was made without jurisdiction on
the part of the court making it, then it is a proceeding which must
be the subject of review by an appellate court. The question of the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the present writ of error
therefore necessarily involves the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the District, both at special and general term, and the
nature and effect of the order brought into review, so that the
question of our jurisdiction is necessarily included in the
question of the validity of the proceeding itself.
The legal proposition involved in the judgment complained of,
and necessary to maintain it, is that the Supreme Court of this
District at special term has the same discretionary power over its
judgments rendered at a previous term of the court, without any
motion or other proceeding to that end made or taken at that term,
to set them aside and grant new trials of the actions in which they
were rendered, which it has over judgments when such proceedings
are taken during the term at which they were rendered, and that,
this being true, the proceeding and order of the court, in the
exercise of this jurisdiction and discretion, cannot be reviewed on
appeal or writ of error. This proposition, it is argued, may be
deduced from the inherent and implied powers of all courts of
record according to the course of the common law, and, if that
fails, is supplied by the law of Maryland, as to the Supreme Court
in the District of Columbia, adopted by the Act of Congress of 27th
February, 1801, 2 Stat. 103.
The first branch of this proposition is conclusively negatived
for this Court in regard to the powers of the courts of the United
States by the decision in
Bronson v. Schulten,
104 U. S. 410,
which is an authority directly upon the point. It was there said by
MR. JUSTICE MILLER, speaking for the Court:
"In this country, all courts have terms and vacations. The time
of the commencement of every term, if there be half a dozen a year,
is fixed by statute, and the end of it by the final adjournment of
the court for that term. This is the case with regard to all the
courts of the United States, and if there be
Page 117 U. S. 673
exceptions in the state courts they are unimportant. It is a
general rule of the law that all the judgments, decrees, or other
orders of the courts, however conclusive in their character, are
under the control of the court which pronounces them during the
term at which they are rendered or entered of record, and they may
then be set aside, vacated, modified, or annulled by that court.
But it is a rule equally well established that after the term has
ended, all final judgments and decrees of the court pass beyond its
control unless steps be taken during that term, by motion or
otherwise, to set aside, modify, or correct them, and if errors
exist, they can only be corrected by such proceeding by a writ of
error or appeal as may be allowed in a court which by law can
review the decision. So strongly has this principle been upheld by
this Court that, while realizing that there is no court which can
review its decisions, it has invariably refused all applications
for rehearing made after the adjournment of the Court for the term
at which the judgment was rendered. And this is placed upon the
ground that the case has passed beyond the control of the
Court."
The opinion then notices an exception to this rule founded upon
the common law writ of error
coram vobis, by which errors
of fact might be corrected, limited generally to the facts that one
of the parties to the judgment had died before it was rendered, or
was an infant and no guardian had appeared or been appointed, or
was a
feme covert, and the like, or error in the process
through the fault of the clerk, for which writ, as was said in
Pickett's Heirs v.
Legerwood, 7 Pet. 144, in practice, a motion is now
substituted, heard in a summary manner upon affidavits. And it is
then added that this remedy by motion has been extended in some
states so as to embrace some of the cases where equitable relief
had been administered by courts of chancery. "This practice," it
was said,
"has been founded in the courts of many of the states on
statutes which conferred a prescribed and limited control over the
judgment of a court after the expiration of the term at which it
was rendered. In other cases, the summary remedy by motion has been
granted as founded in the inherent power of the
Page 117 U. S. 674
court over its own judgments, and to avoid the expense and delay
of a formal suit in chancery."
But it is added:
"The question relates to the
power of the courts, and
not to the mode of procedure. It is whether there exists in the
court the authority to set aside, vacate, and modify its final
judgments after the term at which they were rendered, and this
authority can neither be conferred upon nor withheld from the
courts of the United States by the statutes of a state or the
practice of its courts."
Although the opinion also shows that, upon the facts of that
case, the action of the circuit court in vacating its judgment
after the term could not be justified upon any rule authorizing
such relief, whether by motion or by bill in equity, nevertheless
the decision of the case rests upon the emphatic denial of the
power of the court to set aside a judgment upon motion made after
the term and grant a new trial except in the limited class of cases
enumerated as reached by the previous practice under writs of error
coram vobis or for the purpose of correcting the record
according to the fact, where mistakes have occurred from the
misprision of the clerk. We content ourselves with repeating the
doctrine of this recent decision, without recapitulating previous
cases in this Court, in which the point has been noticed for the
purpose of showing their harmony. It has been the uniform doctrine
of this Court. "No principle is better settled," it was said in
Sibbald v. United
States, 12 Pet. 488,
37 U. S.
492,
"or of more universal application than that no court can reverse
or annul its own final decrees or judgments for errors of fact or
law after the term in which they have been rendered, unless for
clerical mistakes,
Cameron v. McRoberts, 3
Wheat. 591;
Bank of Kentucky v. Wistar,
3 Pet. 431, or to reinstate a cause dismissed by mistake,
The
Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, from which it follows that no
change or modification can be made which may substantially vary or
affect it in any material thing. Bills of review, in cases in
equity and writs of
error coram vobis at law are
exceptions which cannot affect the present motion."
And see 47 U. S. Moss,
6 How. 31,
47 U. S. 38;
Schell v. Dodge, 107 U. S. 629.
It is equally well established by the decisions of this
Court
Page 117 U. S. 675
that the appropriate remedy for relief against judgments at law
wrongfully obtained is by a bill in equity, and the cases in which
that remedy is applicable have been clearly defined. That rule was
formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in a case arising in this
district, of
Marine Insurance Company of
Alexandria v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332, and more
tersely stated by Mr. Justice Curtis in
Hendrickson v.
Hickley, 17 How. 443, as follows:
"A court of equity does not interfere with judgments at law
unless the complainant has an equitable defense of which he could
not avail himself at law, because it did not amount to a legal
defense, or had a good defense at law, which he was prevented from
availing himself of by fraud or accident unmixed with negligence of
himself or his agents."
This rule is supported by
Creath v.
Sims, 5 How. 192, and
Walker v.
Robbins, 14 How. 584, and was followed in
Crim
v. Handley, 94 U. S. 652. In
Brown v. County of Buena Vista, 95 U. S.
157, and
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S.
3, where it was considered and applied in a case in
which the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, having enjoined
proceedings in that state upon a judgment of the Supreme Court of
this District for causes not sufficient in law to have authorized
the latter to set it aside, the judgment of the Connecticut court
was reversed, although no question was made of the right of that
court to entertain the jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings upon the
judgment in question, equally with that of the court by which it
was rendered. This independent jurisdiction in equity over
judgments at law, by implication, negatives the remedy at law in
the same courts where they are rendered, for the same causes,
because that equitable jurisdiction is resorted to only because
there was no adequate remedy at law, the jurisdiction of the courts
of law over the cause and the parties having been exhausted when
the judgment became final.
But it is argued that the power exercised in the present
instance is vested in the Supreme Court of this District by virtue
of the laws of Maryland in force February 27, 1801, adopted by the
act of Congress of that date.
The statute of Maryland supposed to confer this power is an
Page 117 U. S. 676
act of 1787, c. 9, 2 Kilty, Laws, Thomp. Dig. 173, relating to
continuances, the sixth section of which is as follows:
"In any case where a judgment shall be set aside for fraud,
deceit, surprise, or irregularity in obtaining the same, the said
courts respectively may direct the continuances to be entered from
the court when such judgment was obtained until the court such
judgment shall be set aside, and may also continue such cause for
so long a time as they shall judge necessary for the trial of the
merits between the parties, not exceeding two courts after such
cause has been reinstated, unless,"
etc.
This statutory provision, it will be observed, is entirely
silent as to the mode according to which a judgment may be set
aside at a subsequent term, whether by a writ of error coram vobis
or
coram nobis, bill in equity, or other procedure, and
does not, either in express terms or by any necessary implication,
provide that it may be done by a motion and summary proceedings
thereon, and also that it seems to proceed upon the idea that
continuances should regularly be entered to show that the
proceeding, if at law, to set a judgment aside, in theory at least,
ought to originate at the same term at which the judgment was
rendered.
The remedy by writ of error
coram nobis continued in
force and in use in Maryland.
Hawkins v. Bowie, 9 G. &
J. 437;
Bridendolph v. Zeller's Executors, 3 Md. 325. And
in the first of these cases, it was held that a reversal of a
judgment upon such a writ was a final judgment from which an appeal
would lie. The court said:
"Now if reversing the original judgment and awarding costs to
the plaintiff in error in this proceeding in error
coram
nobis, was not so far final as to fall within that class of
judicial acts from which an appeal will lie to this Court, we
cannot see the reason, nor can we well conceive of any remedy the
parties would have if the county courts were to undertake to vacate
and annul all the judgments in their records."
This remark equally applies whether the result is reached by
this writ or by the more summary mode of a motion. It was so
decided in
Graff v. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation
Co., 18 Md. 364, and
Craig v. Wroth, 47 Md. 281. In
the last-named case, it was said by the
Page 117 U. S. 677
court:
"The power to set aside judgments upon motion for fraud, deceit,
surprise, or irregularity in obtaining them is a common law power
incident to courts of record in this state, and was not
conferred upon them by the act of 1789, c. 9, § 6, which
is partially but not fully embodied in § 38, art. 75, of the Code.
This legislation
assumes that the power resides in the
courts, and provides for the entering of continuances when it is
put in force. In deciding such motions made after the term is past,
the court acts in the exercise of its
quasi-equitable
powers, and will therefore properly consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, and require that the party making the
application shall appear to have acted in good faith and with
ordinary diligence. Relief will not be granted when he has
knowingly acquiesced in the judgment complained of, or has been
guilty of
laches and unreasonable delay in seeking his
remedy."
This seems to be the settled doctrine of the Maryland courts, as
shown by a series of decisions, all of which, however, have been
made since the cession of the present territory within the District
of Columbia.
Kemp v. Cook, 18 Md. 130;
Montgomery v.
Murphy, 19 Md. 576. In
Kemp v. Cook, the court
said:
"The power of setting aside judgments upon motion is a common
law power incident to courts of record, and usually exercised under
restraints imposed by their own rules, and rarely after the term in
which the judgment was rendered. . . . The judgment records of the
state are the highest evidences of debt known to the law. They are
presumed to have been made up after the most careful deliberation,
upon trial or hearing of both parties. To permit them to be altered
or amended without the most solemn forms of proceeding would be
contrary to law and good policy."
It appears also from the case of
Kearney v. Sascer, 37
Md. 264, that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, upon a
bill in equity, to grant relief against a judgment on equitable
grounds, constitutes part of the remedial system in that state,
notwithstanding the practice to set aside judgments on motion made
after the term, and in that case the court quoted and adopted the
rule regulating the measure of relief, and the circumstances
justifying the court in granting it, as
Page 117 U. S. 678
declared by Chief Justice Marshall in
Marine
Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 336.
It thus appears that in Maryland prior to 1801, the only statute
in existence referring to the subject, while it assumes the
existence of a power in the courts to set aside their judgments
after the term in which they were rendered for certain causes, does
not specify the modes in which that relief may be administered, and
does not enumerate a summary proceeding by motion as one of them;
that the cases in which that relief has been administered in that
way have all arisen and been decided since the date of the cession
to the United States of the territory constituting the District of
Columbia; that these decisions are based not upon the statute as
creating or conferring such power, but upon an interpretation of
the common law by which all courts of record are assumed to be
possessed of it, as inherent in an incident to their constitution
as courts of justice; that, in whatever form, the proceedings are
regarded, not as interlocutory steps in the original case, but as
independent applications to a legal discretion governed by fixed
rules, and therefore terminating in final judgments, subject, as in
other cases, to review or error in a court of appeal, and that the
jurisdiction of chancery by a plenary suit in equity is not
excluded, but is maintained and exercised in conformity with the
general principles of equity jurisprudence.
It follows from this statement that these decisions of the
Maryland courts, being founded upon general principles, and made
since the organization of the District of Columbia, are not binding
upon the courts of the District as authorities, though entitled to
all the respect due to the opinions of the highest court of the
state, a rule acted upon in this Court in
Ould v. Washington
Hospital, 95 U. S. 303, and
approved in
Russell v. Allen, 107 U.
S. 163,
107 U. S. 171.
We feel at liberty, therefore, to follow our own convictions as to
the power of the courts of the District over their judgments, and
are of opinion, and so decide, that after the term at which they
were rendered, the power of the court over the parties and over its
record remains only in the excepted cases already noticed, when, on
motion, it may be purged of clerical errors, or the judgment
reversed by
Page 117 U. S. 679
proceedings for errors in fact in analogy to the practice in
cases of writs of error
coram vobis, unless it is invoked
by a formal bill in equity upon grounds recognized as furnishing a
title to relief. We are therefore of opinion that the Supreme Court
of the District, both at special and general term, in entertaining
and granting the motion to set aside the judgment in the present
case, committed error, and the proceedings and judgment thereon
are
Reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss
the motion of the defendant, but without prejudice to his right to
file a bill in equity.
