Section 6 of the Act of July 1, 1862, in aid of the construction
of the railroads to the Pacific, required them to transport mails,
troops, supplies, etc., for the government "at fair and reasonable
rates of compensation, not to exceed the amounts paid by private
parties for the same service." The Union Pacific Railway Company
filed its petition in the Court of Claims setting forth the
performance of such services for the government and its charges for
the same and averring that the several amounts were according to
rates fixed by it both as respects the government and the public
which were fair and reasonable, and not exceeding the amounts paid
by private parties for the same kind of service. The government
denied the reasonableness of the rates, and averred that less
amounts allowed by it were fair and reasonable. The Court of
Claims, after hearing proof, found
"that the amounts allowed and retained by the Treasury
Department for transportation of mails as aforesaid are a fair and
reasonable compensation for the service and not in excess of the
rates paid by private parties for the same service."
Held: That this was a proper form of finding.
The provisions of § 6 of the Act of July 1, 1822, respecting
rates for transportation done by the Union Pacific Railway Company
for the United States, govern such transportation over its bridge
between Council Bluffs and Omaha.
The service rendered by a railway company in transporting a
local passenger from one point on its line to another is not
identical with the service rendered in transporting a through
passenger over the same rails.
The findings in this case were before the Court on a motion for
a certiorari, reported in
116 U. S. 116 U.S.
402. After that motion was denied, the cause came on for hearing
and decision on the merits. The case is stated in the opinion of
the Court.
Page 117 U. S. 356
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the case of
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. United
States, 104 U. S. 662, on
appeal from the Court of Claims, it was decided that the railroad
company, by virtue of the sixth section of the Act of July 1, 1862,
12 Stat. 489, c. 120, was entitled to be paid by the government for
services rendered in the transportation of the mails over its road,
and of the employees accompanying them, compensation at fair and
reasonable rates, not to exceed the amounts paid by private parties
for the same kind of service, and not such rates as were or might
be prescribed by general laws regulating the compensation for
similar service by other railway companies, and for the purpose of
ascertaining and awarding the amount due for such services as had
been rendered, and for which the suit had been brought, the
judgment was reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of
Claims.
In that court, the cause was consolidated with two others
between the same parties having similar objects, and an amended
petition was substituted in which the Union Pacific Railway Company
was plaintiff, that being the name of the consolidated corporation
composed of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Kansas Pacific
Railway Company, and the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph
Company. In that petition, the plaintiff alleged claims against the
government for compensation for transportation of troops, mails,
munitions of war, supplies, public stores, passengers, mail agents,
and clerks and the transmission of dispatches, the details of which
were set out in schedules attached thereto. Of these, the sum of
$3,768,568.60 was alleged to have accrued for services rendered by
the Union Pacific Railroad Company prior and up to June 30, 1878,
one-half of which, it was admitted, should be retained by the
government and applied, as required by § 5 of the Act of July 2,
1864, to the payment of
Page 117 U. S. 357
bonds issued by the United States in aid of the construction of
the road; an additional sum of $1,415,415.25 was claimed to be due
and payable in cash, for services rendered by the Kansas Pacific
Railway Company for similar services, and the further sum of
$94,206.20 for like services rendered by the Denver Pacific Railway
and Telegraph Company. It was also averred that the several amounts
charged for the services so performed were according to the rates
therefor which the railroad company had determined and fixed, both
as respects the government and the public, and of which the
government and the several departments were duly notified, which
rates were fair and reasonable, and not exceeding the amounts paid
by private parties for the same kind of service.
The United States filed an answer to this complaint denying
generally all its allegations, and with it a counterclaim for the
recovery of the sum of $11,500,000, alleged to be due as follows:
$1,000,000, being five percent on the net earnings of the Kansas
Pacific Railway Company on the subsidized portion of its road from
November 2, 1868, to December 31, 1882; $1,500,000, being five
percent of the net earnings of the Union Pacific Railroad Company
from November 6, 1875, to June 30, 1878, and $9,000,000, as being
twenty-five percent of the gross earnings of the Union Pacific
Railroad Company from June 30, 1878, to December 31, 1882, after
deducting the necessary expenses actually paid within the year in
operating and keeping the same in a state of repair, and also the
sum paid within the year in discharge of interest on the first
mortgage bonds.
To this counterclaim the plaintiff answered in substance that
the twenty-five percent of the earnings referred to were required
by law to be paid into a sinking fund for the benefit of the
plaintiff, and to be used in liquidation of its obligations; that
the amount so to be paid is such a sum, not exceeding the sum of
$850,000 in any one year, as, added to the amount earned by the
company for transportation for the defendants, will amount to
twenty-five percent of the net earnings of said company, no money
being required to be paid into said sinking fund unless the
compensation for transportation
Page 117 U. S. 358
shall not equal twenty-five percent of said net earnings; that
during the period mentioned in the counterclaim, to-wit, from June
30, 1878, to December 31, 1882, the United States became and is
still indebted to the plaintiff, on transportation account, in the
sum of $7,158,166.06, as shown in schedules exhibited, one-half of
which amount, $3,579,083.03, is applicable to bond and interest
account, and the other half to the sinking fund account, which said
last-mentioned sum is equal to and a full satisfaction of all the
demands of the defendant and of the obligation of the plaintiff to
pay the said twenty-five percent of its net earnings during the
said period.
On these issues, the Court of Claims ascertained from the
evidence the facts in dispute, which are set forth in special
findings, and on these findings its conclusions of law, that the
plaintiff is entitled to be paid, on account of the matters set
forth in the claim, the sum of $2,910,124.08; that the defendants,
on account of the counterclaim, are entitled to be paid the sum of
$4,487,807.39, and that the United States are consequently entitled
to judgment for the difference, amounting to $1,577,683.31, and
judgment was so entered.
The United States appealed from so much of this judgment as
allowed to the plaintiff the sum of $2,910,124.08 on its claim.
The plaintiff appealed from the whole judgment.
And the case is now here for determination on these
cross-appeals.
The only question of law made upon its appeal by the plaintiff
below is that the Court of Claims failed in its finding of facts as
to compensation claimed for transportation of the mails to meet the
actual issue made by the pleadings. This issue, it is said, was an
affirmation on the part of the plaintiff and a denial on the part
of the defendant that the rates of transportation fixed and
determined by the railway company, of which notice has been given
to the proper department of the government, were fair and
reasonable and not in excess of what was paid by private parties
for the same kind of service, whereas the finding of fact by the
Court of Claims was
"that
Page 117 U. S. 359
the amounts allowed and retained by the Treasury Department for
transportation of mails as aforesaid are a fair and reasonable
compensation for the service, and not in excess of the rates paid
by private parties for the same kind of service."
A distinction is thus sought to be made between a
quantum
meruit, ascertained according to the rate prescribed by the
act, and rates determined and fixed in the first instance by the
railway company, not to be disturbed if they are found not to be in
excess of the limit prescribed by the statute. But as it seems to
us, this is a distinction without a difference. It is quite
immaterial whether the amount actually found to be due for
transportation of the mails, "at fair and reasonable rates of
compensation, not to exceed the amounts paid by private parties for
the same kind of service," as required by the sixth section of the
Act of July 1, 1862, is ascertained upon evidence comparing them
with the rates previously determined and fixed by the company, or
with those allowed by the accounting officers of the government.
The only material thing is to adjudge what is due according to the
rule prescribed by the statute. That the Court of Claims has done.
In doing so, it has virtually decided the point of the issue, for
if the company has charged rates producing a different amount, they
are thereby declared not to be fair and reasonable, because
whatever differs from the amount found by the court to answer this
description cannot be supposed to fulfill it. There cannot be two
differing rates for such compensation which will both correspond
with the conditions prescribed by the act of Congress.
We come now to consider the appeal of the United States.
The first question arising upon this appeal relates to the
charges which may be lawfully made to the government for
transportation services over the bridge of the Union Pacific
Railway Company between Council Bluffs and Omaha. On this subject,
the finding of the Court of Claims is as follows:
"The company's uniform rate, during the time covered by this
suit, for the transportation of passengers between Council Bluffs
and Omaha over its bridge and approaches, a distance of 3.97 miles,
was 50 cents each, which sum was included in the price
Page 117 U. S. 360
of tickets sold for longer or shorter distances. That was a fair
and reasonable rate of compensation to be paid by the defendants,
and not in excess of the rates paid by private parties for the same
kind of service."
"The Treasury Department did not allow 50 cents for each
passenger so transported for the defendants, but in each case,
ascertaining over what railroad or public highway the passenger
reached Council Bluffs or Omaha, and the rate per mile paid by him
over such part of said railroad or public highway as he had thus
traveled, the company was allowed only the same rate per mile for
transporting such passenger between Council Bluffs and Omaha as he
had so paid on the road leading to the bridge. On the roads leading
to said bridge, the rates per mile are different, and the rates on
the same road differ according to distance traveled."
"The difference between the amounts so allowed by the Treasury
Department for the transportation of such passengers for the
defendants and that which the company should be allowed if it has a
right to charge 50 cents for each passenger so transported during
the time above specified is $3,693.31."
"Similar rules were applied by the Treasury Department to the
transportation of freight over said bridge, and the disallowance
resulting therefrom amounted to $10,885.34. The rate claimed by the
company for transportation of freight over said bridge was fair and
reasonable, and not in excess of the rates paid by private parties
for the same kind of service."
The contention of the government in support of the allowances
made by the Treasury Department thus adjudged to be insufficient is
based on the Act of February 24, 1871, 16 Stat. 430, c. 67, under
which it is claimed the bridge was built, which provides that
"Said bridge may be so constructed as to provide for the passage
of ordinary vehicles of travel, and said company may levy and
collect tolls and charges for the use of the same, and, for the use
and protection of said bridge and property, the Union Pacific
Railway Company shall be empowered, governed, and limited by the
provisions of the act entitled 'An act to authorize the
construction of certain bridges, and to establish
Page 117 U. S. 361
them as post roads,' approved July 25, 1866, so far as the same
is applicable thereto."
The act thus referred to is chapter 246 of 1866, 14 Stat. 245,
of which section 3 is as follows:
"Any bridge constructed under this act, and according to its
limitation, shall be a lawful structure, and shall be recognized
and known as a post route, upon which, also, no higher charge shall
be made for the transportation over the same of the mails, the
troops, and the munitions of war of the United States than the rate
per mile paid for the transportation over the railroads or public
highways leading to the said bridge."
It is argued that this limitation, made by reference a part of
the act of 1871, applies to charges to be made by the Union Pacific
Railway Company for transportation over the bridge, considered as
part of its railway line, and supersedes the legislative contract
contained in § 6 of the Act of July 1, 1862, whereby it was
authorized to receive compensation at fair and reasonable rates,
not in excess of those charged to private parties for similar
service.
The Court of Claims held otherwise, and we think rightly. The
Omaha bridge of the Union Pacific Railway Company was not
constructed under the act of 1866. It was constructed under the
original acts incorporating the company -- the acts of July 1,
1862, and of July 4, 1864, and the Act of February 24, 1871, and
the reference in the last-named act to the act of 1866 was for the
purpose of extending the provisions of the latter so far as
necessary to confer additional powers upon the railway company for
the use and protection of the bridge, and contains no evidence of
any intent on the part of Congress to change the rule as to rates
of transportation over the line of the railway company as
prescribed by section six of the Act of July 1, 1862. In the case
of
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Hall, 91 U. S.
343, it was decided that the bridge in question became
part of the railroad of the company, and that the company was bound
to run and operate its whole road, including the bridge, as one
connected and continuous line. The bridge therefore, as part of the
railroad, became subject to the provisions of the Act of July 1,
1862, as to the rates to be paid
Page 117 U. S. 362
by the government for transportation service over it, and there
is nothing in the act of 1871 that changes the application of the
rule fixing these rates.
The next question arising on the appeal of the United States
relates to items charged for the transportation of passengers, on
account of the government, traveling between Council Bluffs and
Ogden.
The findings of facts on the subject by the Court of claims is
as follows:
"The company's uniform rate for the transportation of passengers
between Council Bluffs and Ogden, when said passengers purchase
tickets at either of those places, is $78.50 each, but, by
contracts with connecting railroad companies, the claimant receives
from said companies, who sell through tickets at reduced rates from
New York, San Francisco, and other places over their own and the
claimant's road, $54 only for each passenger carried between said
Council Bluffs and Ogden upon said through tickets, as its
proportion of money paid for the whole through distance."
"In computing the compensation set out in Finding IX, the
Treasury Department allowed the claimant only $54 for each
passenger carried for the defendants when said passenger did not
have a through ticket over its own and other roads, but took the
train at Council Bluffs or Ogden upon an order from the defendants'
authorized officers to proceed over the road between those places
at the charge of the government."
"The difference between $54 allowed as aforesaid and $78.50
claimed by the company for each passenger so transported by the
claimant is $2,855.38 for the period covered by this suit."
"The court finds that $78.50 is a fair and reasonable rate of
compensation to be paid by the defendants for the transportation of
a passenger taking a train at Ogden or Council Bluffs and passing
over the road between those places without a through ticket
purchased of other roads as aforesaid and not in excess of the
rates charged private parties for the same kind of service."
"In some instances, the requisition for transportation presented
to the agents of the company stated on its face that the
Page 117 U. S. 363
passenger was bound from seaboard to seaboard, and in others the
requisition furnished no information on the subject."
"How much of the sum disallowed was for one and how much for the
other kind of requisition is not shown, but the company concedes
the reduction in the former cases."
The contention on the part of the United States is that local
passengers carried on its account between Council Bluffs and Ogden
shall be carried at the same rates as are charged for through
passengers passing between those points, as part of a journey over
the whole line, although a difference is made in respect to all
other persons. But the Court of Claims has found as a fact that the
amount found by it is based on rates between those points which are
fair and reasonable and not in excess of those charged to private
persons for the same service. We cannot review this finding of
fact, and no question of law arises upon it unless it be one
whether the service rendered in transporting a local passenger
between the two points is in law identical with that rendered in
transporting a through passenger between the same points as part of
the transit over the distance of the whole line. This we cannot
affirm.
As the United States did not appeal from that part of the
judgment of the Court of Claims finding the amount due on account
of the counterclaim, no question arises thereon.
We find no error in the judgment, and it is accordingly
Affirmed.