The pleadings in a suit
in rem brought by the United
States in a circuit court of the United States in Kentucky for the
forfeiture of property after its seizure for the violation of the
internal revenue laws, are not required by section 914 of the
Revised Statutes, to be governed by the statute of Kentucky in
regard to pleadings in civil actions, but are to be, as before the
enactment of section 914, according to the course in Admiralty.
This was a petition for a rehearing of the cause reported
116 U. S. 116 U.S.
427. The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the 18th of January last, a decision was made in this case,
116 U. S. 116 U.S.
427, affirming the judgment below, rendered on an information
in rem, filed for the forfeiture to the United States of
certain personal property seized for a violation of the internal
revenue laws. There was a trial by jury and a verdict for the
United States. The claimant, in his answer, had set up in bar that
a criminal information had been filed against him in the same court
alleging as offenses the same matters averred in the information in
the civil suit, and that he had pleaded guilty and been adjudged to
pay a fine. There was no demurrer or reply to this answer. After
verdict, the claimant moved in arrest of judgment, alleging as
cause the judgment in the criminal proceeding, but the motion was
overruled. There was no bill of exceptions and no exception to the
overruling of the motion.
On the hearing in this Court, the claimant contended that as
there was no traverse of the answer, it must be taken to be true.
But this Court held that no reply or replication to the answer was
necessary to raise an issue of fact on the matters averred in it;
that the proceedings, so far as the pleadings were concerned,
Page 117 U. S. 234
were kindred to those in a suit in admiralty
in rem;
that the general rules of pleading in regard to admiralty suits
in rem apply to suits
in rem for a forfeiture
brought by the United States, after a seizure on land, as laid down
in the cases of
The Sarah, 8
Wheat. 391,
Union Ins. Co. v. United
States, 6 Wall. 759,
73 U. S. 765,
Armstrong's
Foundry, 6 Wall. 766,
73 U. S. 769,
and
Morris'
Cotton, 8 Wall. 507,
75 U. S. 511;
that Rule 22 of the Rules in Admiralty prescribes regulations for
the form of informations and libels of information on seizures for
the breach of the laws of the United States on land or water; that
by Rule 51 in Admiralty, new matter in an answer is considered as
denied by the libellant; that the issue of fact as to the former
conviction must be held to have been found against the claimant, by
the general verdict, and that no question in regard to the defense
set up could be raised.
An application is now made by the claimant for a rehearing on
the ground that, as to the pleadings, the case must be governed by
section 914 of the Revised Statutes, which is a reenactment of � 5
of the Act of June 1, 1872, c. 255, 17 Stat. 197, and is in these
words:
"The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in
civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes in the circuit
and district courts shall conform as near as may be to the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at
the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state within
which such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court
to the contrary notwithstanding."
It is urged that this is a civil cause, but not an equity or an
admiralty cause, and that the provisions of sections 126 and 386 of
the Civil Code of Practice of Kentucky, which took effect January
1, 1877, apply to it. Those sections are as follows:
"§ 126 [153]. Every material allegation of a pleading must, for
the purposes of the action, be taken as true unless specifically
traversed."
"§ 386 [416]. Judgment shall be given for the party whom the
pleadings entitle thereto, though there may have been a verdict
against him."
The practice as to the pleadings in suits
in rem like
the present having been well settled prior to the passage of the
Act of June 1, 1872, the question is whether it was changed by
that
Page 117 U. S. 235
act. In
Union Ins. Co. v. United
States, 6 Wall. 759,
73 U. S. 764,
where land was seized and proceeded against as forfeited to the
United States under a confiscation act, it was held, that while
either party had a right to demand a trial by jury, the proceedings
were to be "in general conformity to the course in admiralty." A
like ruling was made, in a like case, in
Armstrong's
Foundry, 6 Wall. 766,
73 U. S. 769,
and in a case of the seizure of personal property on land, in
Morris'
Cotton, 8 Wall. 507,
75 U. S. 511.
Section 914 prescribes a conformity to the practice in the courts
of the state only "as near as may be," and only "in like causes."
It is a proper construction of this section to hold that while the
provisions of the Code of Kentucky in regard to pleadings in civil
suits
in personam apply to like causes in the federal
courts in Kentucky, they do not apply to suits
in rem by
the United States for the forfeiture of property after its seizure
for the violation of a revenue law, because there are no "like
causes" known to the laws of Kentucky. Such suits
in rem
are peculiar in their practice, pleadings, and forms of procedure,
and, so long as there is ample scope for the operation of section
914 of the Revised Statutes in regard to civil suits
in
personam and no intention is manifest to change the
established practice in such suits
in rem and any change
in practice is limited to "like causes," we must continue to regard
the former practice as applicable to the present suit.
The question of the scope of operation of section 914 has been
considered by this Court in
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S.
426;
Indianapolis Railroad Co. v. Horst,
93 U. S. 291;
Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U. S. 581; and
Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713. In
Newcomb v. Wood, it was held that the section did not
abrogate the established rule in the courts of the United States
that to grant or refuse a new trial was a matter of discretion,
which could not be reviewed on a writ of error, and that a state
law entitling a party to a second trial in an action to recover the
value of personal property did not entitle him to a second trial in
such an action in a federal court. No decision has been made by
this Court in conflict with the views above indicated as applicable
to this case, and
The application for a rehearing is denied.