Inadvertent expressions in an opinion of the Court which are not
material to the decision of the case are not decisions of the Court
within the general rule that what is decided in a cause on appeal
is not open to reconsideration in the same case on a second appeal
on similar facts.
In the construction of land grant acts in aid of railroads,
"granted lands" are those falling within the limits specially
designated, the title to which attaches as of the date of the act
of Congress, when the lands are located by an approved and accepted
survey of the line of the road filed in the Land Department, but
"indemnity lands" are lands selected in lieu of parcels lost by
previous disposition or reservation for other purposes, the title
to which accrues only from the time of their selection.
The provision in § 3 of the Act of March 3, 1861, that any lands
granted to Minnesota by the Act of March 3, 1857, which might be
located within the limits of the extension made by said act of 1865
to the original grant made by said act of 1857, should be deducted
from the full quantity of lands granted by the act of 1865 applies
to "granted lands" of the prior grant falling within the six-mile
limit, and not to possible indemnity lands which might be
subsequently acquired.
Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co. v. Barney,
113 U. S. 618,
explained.
This case was before the Court at October Term, 1884,
113 U. S. 113 U.S.
618. The questions which arose in the execution of the mandate, and
which were brought up by the second appeal, are stated in the
opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was before us at the October term, 1884. By an Act of
Congress passed March 3, 1857, a grant of land was made to
Minnesota, then a territory, to aid in the construction of certain
railroads, including one from Winona, a town
Page 117 U. S. 229
on the Mississippi River, to a point on the Big Sioux River, in
the present Territory of Dakota. 11 Stat. 195. The grant was of
every alternate section, designated by odd numbers, for six
sections in width on each side of the road, subject to certain
exceptions not important to be here mentioned, with a right to
select indemnity lands within fifteen miles from the line of the
road. In May following, the legislature of the territory authorized
a company, previously incorporated, to construct and operate this
road, and, to aid in its construction, granted to the company the
interest and estate, present and prospective, of the territory and
future state in the lands ceded by the act of Congress, together
with the rights, privileges, and immunities conferred by it.
In 1858,
* the territory
became a state and was admitted into the Union, and under
proceedings for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the
company, it became, before March, 1862, reinvested with the estate
in the lands and the rights and privileges it had granted. In
March, 1862, its legislature passed an act transferring the lands,
property, franchises, and privileges, with which it had thus become
reinvested to the Winona and St. Peter Railroad Company, which soon
afterwards commenced the construction of the road. By the Act of
Congress of March 3, 1865, the quantity of land granted by the act
of 1857 was increased to ten sections per mile, with an enlargement
of the limits within which indemnity lands might be selected, from
fifteen to twenty miles. 13 Stat. 562. The third section provided
that any lands which had been granted to Minnesota for the purpose
of aiding in the construction of any railroad which might be
located within the limits of the extension should be deducted from
the "full quantity" granted by the act. The full quantity was the
four additional sections, and we held that the reservation was
merely a legislative declaration of that which the law would have
pronounced independently of it, inasmuch as a prior grant of
the
Page 117 U. S. 230
same property must necessarily be deducted from a subsequent one
in which it is included.
In October, 1867, the company agreed with the plaintiffs, upon
sufficient consideration, to convey to them as many acres of land,
previously granted by Congress to Minnesota, as it should receive
from the state by reason of the construction of its road already
made, estimated to be 105 miles, but in fact only 102 miles and a
fraction of a mile. This suit was brought to enforce the specific
performance of this contract, and the only question between the
parties was as to the quantity of land to be conveyed under it.
By the act of 1857, lands were also granted to Minnesota to aid
in the construction of the road of the Minnesota, [Minneapolis,]
and Cedar Valley Railroad Company, afterwards of the Minnesota
Central Railroad Company (Laws of Minnesota, Extra Session, 1857,
20, and Special Laws of 1863, 137), and that road intersected the
road of the defendant between Rochester and Waseca, and lands of
that company at the intersection, were located within the limits of
the extension of four sections made by the act of 1865.
The court below, however, held that for the part of the
defendant's road constructed after the act of 1865, the plaintiffs
were entitled, under their contract, to ten full sections per mile,
without any deduction for the lands which were located at the
intersection of the road with the road of the Minnesota Central
Railroad Company and within the grant for the construction of the
latter. It was accordingly adjudged that the plaintiffs were
entitled, in addition to what had been voluntarily conveyed to
them, to a conveyance of 197,111 acres and a fraction of an acre,
and a decree to that effect was entered. The case being brought to
this Court, that decree, at the October term, 1884, was reversed
and the cause sent back to the court below in order that the proper
deduction might be made by reason of the interference of the two
grants and the elder grant be deducted from the extension made by
the act of 1865 so far as it was located within that extension.
113 U. S. 113 U.S.
618,
113 U. S. 629.
In speaking of the two grants, we said of the first one, that of
1857 --
Page 117 U. S. 231
and not one of quantity. It was of particular parcels of land
designated by odd numbers for six sections on each side of the road
-- that is, of particular parcels of land lying within certain
defined lateral limits to the road and described by numbers on the
public surveys. The grant of the four additional sections by the
act of 1865 was also a grant of land in place. The intention of
Congress was to enlarge the first grant from six to ten sections
per mile, the additional four to be taken in like manner as the
original six, and subject to the same limitations, and to others
that had been or might be prescribed, with a right to select
indemnity lands within twenty miles instead of fifteen. The act did
not purport to change the character of the first grant, but to
increase its quantity. We said, however, that the grant of these
additional sections might be regarded as one of quantity -- an
inadvertence for which the writer of that opinion, who it also the
writer of this one, is alone responsible. The statement was not at
all material to the decision, which was that a deduction should
have been made by reason of the intersection of the two grants so
far as the prior grant was located within the extension.
We recognize the rule that what was decided in a case pending
before us on appeal is not open to reconsideration in the same case
on a second appeal upon similar facts. The first decision is the
law of the case, and must control its disposition, but the rule
does not apply to expressions of opinion on matters the disposition
of which was not required for the decision. When the case went
back, the court below seems to have been embarrassed by the
erroneous description of the character of the grant of the four
additional sections, and to have felt obliged to deduct from the
amount originally decreed the number of acres which, prior to March
3, 1865, had passed to Minnesota within the designated limits of
the grant to aid the construction of the road of the Minnesota
Central Railroad Company, and also the number of acres which had
been taken beyond them within the indemnity limits of fifteen
miles. In this construction of the reservation made by the third
section of the act of 1865 we think the court erred. The
reservation from the four sections was of land previously granted
which
Page 117 U. S. 232
was located within them. The previous grant was of lands in
place, for it was of alternate sections, designated by odd numbers,
for six sections in width on each side of the road, and that
portion of it was reserved from the subsequent grant which fell
within the four new sections, also land in place.
In the construction of land grant acts in aid of railroads there
is a well established distinction observed between "granted lands"
and "indemnity lands." The former are those falling within the
limits specially designated, and the title to which attaches when
the lands are located by an approved and accepted survey of the
line of the road filed in the Land Department as of the date of the
act of Congress. The latter are those lands selected in lieu of
parcels lost by previous disposition or reservation for other
purposes, and the title to which accrues only from the time of
their selection. It is these "granted lands" of the prior grant
falling within the six-mile limit that, in our opinion, are
reserved, and not the possible indemnity lands which might be
subsequently acquired. These granted lands of the prior grant,
being in place, could be readily deducted from the four sections,
also in place, whenever the roads of the two companies intersected,
and the lands fell within the four sections. The quantity thus
granted is found by the special masters appointed by the court to
be 15,000 acres and 45/100 of an acre. This quantity only, in
addition to the lands used for the track of the road of the Winona
and St. Peter Railroad Company, and for depots and other purposes
necessary and incident to its operation, should therefore be
deducted from the number of acres to a conveyance of which from the
company the plaintiffs, by the decree of the court below at its
December term, 1880, were adjudged to be entitled.
The decree will therefore be reversed and the cause be
remanded with directions to enter a new decree conformable to this
opinion.
* In the opinion in
113 U. S. 113
U.S. 621, the admission, by a misprint, is stated to have been in
1857. The constitution of the state was adopted in that year, but
the admission was on May 11, 1858. 11 Stat. 285.