A suit cannot properly be dismissed by a circuit court of the
United States as not substantially involving a controversy within
the jurisdiction of the court unless the facts, when made to appear
on the record, create a legal certainty of that conclusion.
Where exemplary damages beyond the sum necessary to give a
circuit court of the United States jurisdiction are claimed in an
action for a malicious trespass, the court should not dismiss the
case for want of jurisdiction simply because the record shows that
the actual injury caused to the plaintiff by the trespass was less
than the jurisdictional amount.
It is settled in this Court that in an action for a trespass
accompanied with malice, the plaintiff may recover exemplary
damages in excess of the amount of his injuries if the
ad
damnum is properly laid.
Page 116 U. S. 551
This is an action of trespass brought by the plaintiff in error.
The declaration sets out the cause of action as follows:
"Robert P. Barry, plaintiff, complains of E. G. Edmunds,
defendant, of a plea of trespass on the case, for this to-wit:"
"That the plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Fauquier
County, Virginia. That he owns property in said county, and that he
was duly and lawfully assessed with the sum of fifty-six dollars
and thirty-four cents as taxes upon said property, to be paid to
the State of Virginia for the year 1884. That said taxes, by the
laws of said state, were not leviable for prior to the first day of
December, 1884, but if not paid prior to said last-named date were
leviable for after said date."
"That by a further provision of the laws of said state, if the
taxes assessed for the year 1884 are not paid on or before the
first day of December, 1884, the person owing the same becomes
liable to pay, in addition thereto, a further sum of five percent
upon the amount of the tax so due."
"That the plaintiff did not pay his said tax prior to the first
day of December, 1884, and thereby became liable to pay an
additional sum of two dollars and eighty-one cents, making the
plaintiff thus liable after the 1st day of December, 1884, for the
sum of ($59.15) fifty-nine dollars and fifteen cents."
"That the defendant is the Treasurer of Fauquier County, in the
State of Virginia, and as such it is made his duty by the laws of
Virginia to collect all taxes due to the said state by residents of
said county. That in the month of June, 1885, the plaintiff
tendered to the defendant, in payment of his said taxes, fifty-nine
15/100 dollars, in coupons and lawful money of the United States,
the two together constituting the full amount due for said taxes.
That each one of the said coupons was cut from a bond issued by the
State of Virginia, under the authority of the provisions of an Act
of her General Assembly approved March 28, 1879, entitled 'An act
to provide a plan of settlement of the public debt.' That each one
bore upon its face the contract of the State of Virginia that it
should be received in payment of all taxes, debts, and demands due
to said state, and that each one was due and past maturity."
"That the defendant refused the said coupons and money in
Page 116 U. S. 552
payment of the plaintiff's taxes. That he refused to receive the
same in payment of his taxes because an Act of the General Assembly
of the State of Virginia, approved January 26, 1882, entitled"
"An act to provide for the more efficient collection of the
revenue, to support government, maintain the public schools, and to
pay interest upon the public debt,"
"forbade him to receive them, and because another Act of the
General Assembly of said state, approved January 14, 1882, entitled
'An act to prevent frauds upon the common wealth and the holders of
her securities in the collection and disbursement of revenue,'
likewise forbade him to receive them."
"That on the __ day of June, 1885, the defendant, unlawfully,
maliciously, and against the will of the plaintiff, entered upon
the premises of the plaintiff, situated and being in the County of
Fauquier, Virginia, with force and arms, and against the will of
the plaintiff, and, acting as said treasurer aforesaid, did levy on
and forcibly seize and carry away valuable personal property
belonging to the said plaintiff, to-wit, one valuable horse, of the
value of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, for the purpose of
selling the same, and thus compelling the plaintiff to pay his
taxes in another medium than that already offered by the
plaintiff."
"That on the day when the defendant so levied on the plaintiff's
property, and before he did so, the plaintiff again tendered to the
defendant the said coupons and money in payment of his said taxes,
but the defendant refused to receive the same in payment thereof,
and the plaintiff was always ready and willing, up to the moment of
said levy, to deliver to the defendant the said coupons and money
in payment of his said taxes, but the defendant always refused so
to receive the same."
"That the defendant levied on the plaintiff's said property and
carried the same away, because the 18th section of the Act of the
General Assembly of Virginia approved April 1, 1879, which is
chapter 60 of the acts of the special session of 1879, commanded
him so to levy upon the plaintiff's property notwithstanding said
tender."
"That, by reason of the contract of the State of Virginia set
forth upon the face of said coupons, the plaintiff had a right
to
Page 116 U. S. 553
pay his said taxes with said coupons and money, and after he
tendered the same to said treasurer his said taxes were, in point
of law, paid and extinguished, and he held the said coupons and
money for the defendant as his agent in that behalf
thereafter."
"That when the defendant so levied upon and seized the
plaintiff's property, he knew that the Supreme Court of the United
States had decided at its October term, 1884, in the case of
Poindexter v. Greenhow, that a tender by a taxpayer of the
state's tax receivable coupons, such as those tendered by the
plaintiff in payment of taxes due the state, pays and extinguishes
said tax, and that any and all laws of said state commanding her
treasurers to refuse the same, and commanding them to levy after
said tender, are repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States, and are therefore null and void."
"That the defendant so knowing the law levied on and seized the
plaintiff's property in contempt of and defiance of the law and
with the deliberate intention of defying the Constitution of the
United States and the judicial powers thereof."
"That there exists in the State of Virginia a very great
political party, which comprises a majority of the voters in said
state, which has for its aims and purpose to enact laws that will
defeat and destroy the effect of the judgment of the Supreme Court
of the United States in said case of
Poindexter v.
Greenhow and will defeat and destroy the protection afforded
by the Constitution of the United States to taxpayers who seek to
pay their taxes with said tax receivable coupons."
"That said party, being in control of the legislature of the
said state, has enacted a great number of statutes which are
intended to have that effect, and it openly proclaims that it
intends to enact all other and further statutes which shall be
necessary to make it impossible for taxpayers to pay their taxes
with said coupons."
"That the defendant is a member of said political party, and
sympathizes with and shares in its aims and purposes, and actively
cooperates in every way in his power in every attempt to make it
impossible for taxpayers to pay taxes due to said state with said
coupons."
"That when he refused to receive said coupons in payment
Page 116 U. S. 554
of plaintiff's taxes, and when he levied on plaintiff's property
as aforesaid, he did it for the purpose of aiding and assisting his
said political party in its attempts to defy and nullify the
Constitution of the United States. That he intended thereby to
intimidate the plaintiff and make him afraid to rely upon the
Constitution of the United States and the judicial power thereof
for protection in those rights guaranteed to the plaintiff by said
Constitution. That he intended to make an example of the plaintiff,
and thereby deter him and all others from relying upon the
Constitution of the United States and the judicial power thereof
for the protection in those rights guaranteed by the said
Constitution. That in contempt of and defiance of the said
Constitution and said judicial power, the defendant made public
advertisement in many parts of the County of Fauquier that he had
levied on and seized plaintiff's property, because plaintiff was
delinquent as a taxpayer, and that he would sell the same at public
auction on a day named at the courthouse of said county. That on
the day named, he did expose the said property to sale at public
auction at said courthouse, in the presence of many of plaintiff's
neighbors, friends and fellow countrymen, and publicly proclaimed
that plaintiff was a defaulter and delinquent taxpayer. That by
reason thereof, plaintiff's credit and standing were greatly
injured and his feelings cruelly wounded and mortified."
"That the defendant well knew when he made said levy and sale
that they were forbidden by the Constitution of the United States,
but he did so trusting and believing that his said political party
would enact statutes of its State of Virginia that would shield and
protect him from all harm. That he made said levy and sale
maliciously, and with the purpose and intent to trample on the
plaintiff's rights under the law, and do him all the injury in his
power."
"And the said plaintiff further says that he is a citizen of
Fauquier County, Virginia. That he owns property in said county,
and that he was duly and lawfully assessed upon said property with
the sum of fifty-six dollars thirty four cents, as taxes to be paid
to the State of Virginia for the year 1884,
Page 116 U. S. 555
which taxes by the laws of Virginia were not leviable for prior
to the first day of December, 1884, but the same, if not paid prior
to said last-named date, were leviable for after the said date.
That by a further provision of the laws of said state, if the taxes
assessed for the year 1884 are not paid on or before the first day
of December, 1884, the person owing the same becomes liable to pay
in addition thereto a further sum of five percent upon the amount
of the tax so due. That the plaintiff did not pay his said tax
prior to the first day of December, 1884, and thereby became liable
to pay an additional sum of $2.81, making the plaintiff thus liable
after December 1, 1884, for the sum of $59.15. That the defendant
is the Treasurer of Fauquier County, in the State of Virginia, and
as such it is made his duty, by the laws of Virginia, to collect
all taxes due to the said state by residents and owners of property
in said county."
"That in the month of June, the plaintiff tendered to the
defendant, in payment of his said taxes, coupons for $_____ each,
and $_____, in lawful money of the United States, the two together
constituting the sum of $59.15. That each one of said coupons was
cut from a bond issued by the State of Virginia, under the
authority and provisions of an act of her General Assembly,
approved March 28, 1879, entitled 'An act to provide a plan of
settlement of the public debt.' That each one bore upon its face
the contract of the State of Virginia that it should be received in
payment of all taxes and demands due said state, and that each one
was overdue and past maturity. That the defendant refused to
receive the said coupons and money in payment of the plaintiff's
taxes. That he refused to receive the same in payment of his taxes
because an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Virginia
approved January 26, 1882, entitled"
" An act to provide for the more efficient collection of the
revenue, to support government, maintain the public schools, and to
pay interest upon the public debt,"
"forbade him to receive them, and because another Act of the
General Assembly of the State of Virginia, approved January 14,
1882, entitled 'An act to prevent fraud upon the common wealth and
the holders of her securities in the collection of
Page 116 U. S. 556
revenue,' likewise forbade him to receive them."
"That on the __ day of June, in the year eighteen hundred and
eighty-five, the defendant, unlawfully and against the will of the
plaintiff, entered upon the premises of the plaintiff, situate and
being in the County of Fauquier, Virginia, with force and arms, and
against the will of the plaintiff, and, acting as said treasurer
aforesaid, he levied on and forcibly seized and carried away
valuable personal property belonging to the plaintiff, to-wit, one
horse, to the value of $125, for the purpose of selling the same,
and thus compelling the plaintiff to pay his taxes in another
medium than that already offered by the plaintiff. That on the day
when the defendant so levied on the plaintiff's property and before
he did so, the plaintiff again tendered to the defendant the said
coupons and money in payment of said taxes, but the defendant
refused to receive the same in payment thereof, and the plaintiff
was always ready and willing, up to the moment of said levy, to
deliver to the defendant the said coupons and money in payment of
his said taxes, but the defendant always refused to receive the
same."
"That the defendant levied on the plaintiff's said property and
carried the same away because the 18th section of the Act of the
General Assembly of Virginia approved April 1, 1879, which is
chapter 60 of the acts of the special session of 1879, commanded
him so to levy upon the plaintiff's property not withstanding said
tender. That by reason of the contract of the State of Virginia set
forth upon the face of said coupons, the plaintiff had a right to
pay his said taxes with said coupons and money, and after he
tendered the same to the said treasurer, his said taxes were in
point of law paid and extinguished, and he held the said coupons
and money for the defendant as his agent in that behalf thereafter.
That when the defendant so levied upon and seized the plaintiff's
property, he knew that the Supreme Court of the United States had
decided at its October term, 1884, in the case of
Poindexter v.
Greenhow, that a tender by a taxpayer of the state's tax
receivable coupons such as those tendered by the plaintiff in
payment of taxes due the state pays and extinguishes said tax, and
that any and all laws of said state commanding her treasurer to
Page 116 U. S. 557
refuse the same and commanding them to levy after said tender
are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and are
therefore null and void."
"That the defendant, so knowing the law, levied on and seized
the plaintiff's property in contempt of and defiance of the law,
and with the deliberate intention of defying the Constitution of
the United States and the judicial power thereof."
"That in contempt of and defiance of the said Constitution and
judicial power, the defendant made public advertisement in many
parts of the County of Fauquier that he had levied on and seized
plaintiff's property because plaintiff was delinquent as taxpayer,
and that he would sell the same at public auction, on a day named
at the courthouse in said county. That on the day named, he did
expose the said property to sell at public auction at said
courthouse, in the presence of many of the plaintiff's neighbors
and friends and fellow citizens and countrymen, and publicly
proclaimed that the plaintiff was a defaulter and delinquent
taxpayer."
"That by reason thereof, plaintiff's credit and standing were
greatly injured, and his feelings cruelly wounded and mortified.
That while the said defendant was unlawfully and wrongfully upon
the plaintiff's premises as aforesaid, he did many other wrongs and
injuries to the plaintiff of a malicious nature, by all which
wrongs and injuries the plaintiff has been injured and damaged six
thousand dollars. And therefore he brings his suit."
To this declaration the defendant filed a plea to the
jurisdiction of the circuit court, alleging that, as the plaintiff
and defendant were both citizens of the State of Virginia, the
courts of that state had exclusive jurisdiction of the alleged
cause of action.
The record shows the following action and judgment of the
court:
"This cause came on this day to be considered by the court upon
a motion made by the plaintiff to set a day for argument of a
demurrer to the special plea filed herein. Upon consideration
whereof, the court is of opinion that this suit does not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within
Page 116 U. S. 558
the jurisdiction of this Court, for the reason that the amount
of taxes due by the plaintiff to the State of Virginia was less
than one hundred dollars, and the property levied on and seized by
the defendant was worth less than two hundred dollars, and
therefore that the matter in dispute in this cause does not exceed,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars
($500)."
"And it appearing to the court that this being an action for
damages, if the jury should render a verdict for ($500) five
hundred dollars damages such verdict would be excessive, and the
court would feel compelled to set it aside; the court is further of
opinion that this court is for that reason also without
jurisdiction of this suit."
"The court is therefore, for each of the aforesaid reasons, of
opinion that it is required to dismiss this suit by the Act of
Congress approved March 3, 1875, 'to determine the jurisdiction of
the circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the
removal of causes from the state courts, and for other purposes,'
and this suit is accordingly hereby dismissed and stricken from the
docket of the court, with costs."
The plaintiff below sued out this writ of error to review that
judgment. The case was argued with
Chaffin v. Taylor,
post, 116 U. S. 567,
Royall v. Virginia, post, 116 U. S. 572, and
Sands v. Edmunds, post, 116 U. S. 585.
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the Court. After
stating the facts in the language reported above, he continued:
It is not questioned but that the declaration discloses a cause
of action within the jurisdiction of the circuit court if the
amount or value of the matter in dispute exceeds $500, exclusive of
costs, for it is a suit of a civil nature arising under the
Constitution of the United States, and therefore within the words
of § 1 of the Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat.
Page 116 U. S. 559
470;
Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U.
S. 669;
White v. Greenhow, 114 U.
S. 307.
The ground on which the suit was dismissed was that, within the
meaning of § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1875, it did not "really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction" of the circuit court, and that conclusion was founded
on the facts stated in the declaration that the amount of taxes due
by the plaintiff to the State of Virginia was less than $100, and
the properly levied on and seized by the defendant was worth less
than $200, and on the proposition of law, that it followed from
these facts that the matter in dispute did not exceed, exclusive of
costs, the sum or value of $500, so that a verdict for any amount
beyond that would be excessive, and for that reason to be set
aside.
The order of the circuit court dismissing the cause on this
ground is reviewable by this Court on writ of error by the express
words of the act. In making such an order, therefore, the circuit
court exercises a legal and not a personal discretion, which must
be exerted in view of the facts sufficiently proven and controlled
by fixed rules of law. It might happen that the judge, on the trial
or hearing of a cause, would receive impressions amounting to a
moral certainty that it does not really and substantially involve a
dispute or controversy within the jurisdiction of the court. But
upon such a personal conviction, however strong, he would not be at
liberty to act unless the facts on which the persuasion is based,
when made distinctly to appear on the record, create a legal
certainty of the conclusion based on them. Nothing less than this
is meant by the statute when it provides that the failure of its
jurisdiction on this account "shall appear to the satisfaction of
said circuit court." This is quite consistent with what was said in
Smith v. Greenhow, 109 U. S. 669,
109 U. S. 671.
There, the value of the property taken was stated in the
declaration to be $100, while the damages for the alleged trespass
were laid at $6,000, and no circumstances of malice or of special
damage were averred. It was said by the Court:
"We cannot, of course, assume as a matter of law that the amount
laid, or a less amount, greater than $500, is not
Page 116 U. S. 560
recoverable upon the case stated in the declaration, and cannot
therefore justify the order remanding the cause on the ground that
the matter in dispute does not exceed the sum or value of $500. But
if the circuit court had found as matter of fact that the amount of
damages stated in the declaration was colorable, and had been laid
beyond the amount of a reasonable expectation of recovery for the
purpose of creating a case removable under the act of Congress, so
that, in the words of the 5th section of the act of 1875, it
appeared that the suit 'did not really and substantially involve a
dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said
circuit court,' the order remanding it to the state court could
have been sustained."
It is true indeed that in some cases it might appear as matter
of law, from the nature of the case as stated in the pleadings,
that there could not legally be a judgment recovered for the amount
necessary to the jurisdiction, notwithstanding the damages were
laid in the declaration at a larger sum. In the early case of
Wilson v.
Daniel, 3 Dall. 401, decided in this Court in 1798
under the Judiciary Act of 1789, then in force, it was declared by
Chief Justice Ellsworth that
"The nature of the case must certainly guide the judgment of the
court, and whenever the law makes a rule, that rule must be
pursued. Thus, in an action of debt on a bond for �100, the
principal and interest are put in demand, and the plaintiff can
recover no more, though he may lay his damages at �10,000. The form
of the action therefore gives in that case the legal rule. But in
an action of trespass or assault and battery, where a law
prescribes no limitation as to the amount to be recovered, and the
plaintiff has a right to estimate his damages at any sum, the
damage stated in the declaration is the thing put in demand, and
presents the only criterion to which, from the nature of the
action, we can resort in settling the question of jurisdiction. The
proposition, then, is simply this: where the law gives no rule, the
demand of the plaintiff must furnish one, but where the law gives
the rule, the legal cause of action, and not the plaintiff's
demand, must be regarded."
The amount of damages laid in the declaration, however, in cases
where the law gives no rule is not conclusive upon the
Page 116 U. S. 561
question of jurisdiction; but if upon the case stated there
could legally be a recovery for the amount necessary to the
jurisdiction, and that amount is claimed, it would be necessary, in
order to defeat the jurisdiction since the passage of the Act of
March 3, 1875, for the court to find, as matter of fact upon
evidence legally sufficient,
"that the amount of damages stated in the declaration was
colorable, and had been laid beyond the amount of a reasonable
expectation of recovery, for the purpose of creating a case"
within the jurisdiction of the court. Then it would appear to
the satisfaction of the court that the suit "did not really and
substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of said circuit court."
In the present case, the circuit court has not found as matter
of fact that the amount of damages stated in the declaration was
colorable and had been laid beyond the amount of a reasonable
expectation of recovery for the purpose of creating a case within
the jurisdiction of the court. Its action is not based on evidence
of an attempted fraud upon the jurisdiction of the court, but upon
the assumption, as matter of law, that upon the face of the
declaration, no recovery could be legally had of an amount
sufficient to make the matter in dispute equal to that required to
maintain its jurisdiction.
Such cases, as we have already seen, may exist where a rule of
law, as in certain cases
ex contractu in which the amount
recoverable is liquidated by the terms of the agreement, fixes the
limit of a possible recovery. Such was the case of
Lee v.
Watson, 1 Wall. 337, where it appeared
"that in the progress of the cause, an amendment was made in the
amount of damages claimed for the purpose of bringing the case
within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court."
As was said in
Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U.
S. 165,
108 U. S.
174
"It is undoubtedly true, that until it is in some way shown by
the record that the sum demanded is not the matter in dispute, that
sum will govern in all questions of jurisdiction, but it is equally
true that when it is shown that the sum demanded is not the real
matter in dispute, the sum shown, and not the sum demanded, will
prevail."
In
Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.,
115 U. S. 611, an
amendment was made increasing
Page 116 U. S. 562
the amount demanded as damages under circumstances that rendered
it apparent as a matter of fact that it was done merely to give
color to the jurisdiction of this Court.
No such fact or finding appears on the record in the present
case, and the question recurs whether, as matter of strict law, it
can be judicially declared that upon the cause of action stated in
the declaration, the plaintiff is precluded from recovering
anything in excess of $500 as damages, exclusive of costs.
The cause of action stated in the declaration is a willful and
malicious trespass, in seizing and taking personal property, with
circumstances of aggravation and averments of special damage. The
trespass is alleged to have been committed by the defendant,
colore officii, under the pretended authority of void
process, in open defiance of known law, accompanied by conduct
intended to bring the plaintiff into public contempt and odium, and
amounting to oppression in office.
It is quite clear that the amount of the taxes alleged to be
delinquent, for nonpayment of which the seizure was made, is
immaterial. It is equally clear that the plaintiff is not limited
in his recovery to the mere value of the property taken. That would
not necessarily cover his actual, direct, and immediate pecuniary
loss. In addition, according to the settled law of this Court, he
might show himself, by proof of the circumstances, to be entitled
to exemplary damages calculated to vindicate his right and protect
it against future similar invasions. "It is a well established
principle of the common law," said Mr. Justice Grier in
Day v.
Woodworth, 13 How. 363,
54 U. S.
371,
"that in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for
torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or
vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of
his offense, rather than the measure of compensation to the
plaintiff. We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has
been questioned by some writers, but if repeated judicial decisions
for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition
of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument. . . .
In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and
malicious or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to add to
the measured compensation of
Page 116 U. S. 563
the plaintiff, which he would have been entitled to recover had
the injury been inflicted without design or intention, something
further by way of punishment or example, which has sometimes been
called 'smart money.' This has always been left to the discretion
of the jury, as the degree of the punishment to be thus inflicted
must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case."
In
The Amiable
Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, which was the case of a marine
tort, Mr. Justice Story spoke of exemplary damage as "the proper
punishment which belongs to such lawless misconduct." In
Tracy v.
Swartwout, 10 Pet. 80,
35 U. S. 95, it
was said that "where a ministerial officer acts in good faith for
an injury done, he is not liable to exemplary damages," and this
implies its converse when his acts are not only illegal, but
wanton, willful, malicious, and oppressive. In
Philadelphia, Wilmington &
Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202,
62 U. S. 214,
Mr. Justice Campbell said:
"Whenever the injury complained of has been inflicted
maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or
indignity, the jury are not limited to the ascertainment of a
simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved
person. But the malice spoken of in this rule is not merely the
doing of an unlawful or injurious act. The word implies that the
act complained of was conceived in the spirit of mischief or of
criminal indifference to civil obligations."
In
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Arms,
91 U. S. 489,
91 U. S. 492,
the rule was said to apply to actions on the case, for injuries
arising from the negligence of the defendant. "Redress commensurate
to such injuries," said Mr. Justice Davis, delivering the opinion
of the Court,
"should be afforded. In ascertaining its extent, the jury may
consider all the facts which relate to the wrongful act of the
defendant and its consequences to the plaintiff, but they are not
at liberty to go further unless it was done willfully or was the
result of that reckless indifference to the rights of others which
is equivalent to an intentional violation of them. In that case,
the jury are authorized, for the sake of public example, to give
such additional damages as the circumstances require. The tort is
aggravated by the evil motive, and on this rests the rule of
exemplary damages."
In
Missouri
Pacific
Page 116 U. S. 564
Railway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512,
115 U. S. 521,
MR. JUSTICE FIELD said:
"It is the duty of every state to provide in the administration
of justice for the redress of private wrongs, yet the damages which
should be awarded to the injured party are not always readily
ascertainable. They are in many cases a matter of conjectural
estimate, in relation to which there may be great differences of
opinion. The general rule undoubtedly is that they should be
precisely commensurate with the injury. Yet in England and in this
country, they have been allowed in excess of compensation whenever
malice, gross neglect, or oppression has caused or accompanied the
commission of the injury complained of."
In the English Court of Common Pleas, it was held in the case of
Bell v. Midland Railway Co., 10 C.B.N.S. 287, that where a
railway company had obstructed a siding belonging to an adjoining
land owner with a high hand and in violation of his rights under an
act of Parliament, that exemplary damages might justly be given.
And the rule was applied in
Emblem v. Myers, 6 H. & N.
54, against one who negligently and recklessly pulled down
buildings on his own land so as to injure his neighbor with a view
to make him give up possession. In that case, Baron Bramwell
said:
"If a plaintiff in his particulars claimed �500 because the
defendant walked over his lawn, the jury might award that amount if
they thought it was done for the purpose of annoyance and
insult."
In
Johnson v. Hannahan, 3 Strobhart 425, the Court of
Appeals of South Carolina, in an action of trespass
quare
clausum fregit, where the plaintiff sought to recover damages
for an invasion of his close, accompanied, as he alleged, by
circumstances of oppression and insult, refused to set aside a
verdict for $3,000, as excessive, although the actual and mere
pecuniary loss it was shown did not amount to $20. In
Kolb v.
Bankhead, 18 Tex. 228, which was an action of trespass for
cutting down and carrying off timber from the land of another where
the defendant had willfully or by gross negligence cut over his own
line on the land of the plaintiff, it was said by the Supreme Court
of Texas that,
"in estimating the damages, the jury were not confined strictly
to mere compensation for the timber cut and removed. It was their
right to
Page 116 U. S. 565
look to the particular circumstances of the case, and give such
damages as the facts were deemed by them to warrant, and as would,
in their judgment, be adequate, not only for compensation, but also
for prevention."
It is unnecessary, however, further to multiply authorities on
this point. The precedents are indefinite in number, and the
application of the rule as uniform as the circumstances of the
cases are various. There was clear error in the circuit court in
its ruling, as matter of law, that there could be no lawful
recovery, in such a case as that stated in the declaration, of an
amount equal to that which is necessary to support the jurisdiction
of the court. The same error was repeated in acting upon the
statement that a verdict, if rendered for that amount, would be
excessive and set aside for that reason -- a statement which could
not, at any rate, be judicially made before such a verdict was in
fact rendered. It adds, indeed, to the principal error, if any
distinction can be made, that which consists in encroaching upon
the province of the jury. For nothing is better settled than that,
in such cases as the present and other actions for torts where no
precise rule of law fixes the recoverable damages, it is the
peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount by their
verdict. In
Whipple v. Cumberland Manufacturing Co., 2
Story 661, 670, Mr. Justice Story well expressed the rule on this
subject that a verdict will not be set aside in a case of tort for
excessive damages
"unless the court can clearly see that the jury have committed
some very gross and palpable error, or have acted under some
improper bias, influence, or prejudice, or have totally mistaken
the rules of law by which the damages are to be regulated,"
that is, "unless the verdict is so excessive or outrageous" with
reference to all the circumstances of the case
"as to demonstrate that the jury have acted against the rules of
law or have suffered their passions, their prejudices, or their
perverse disregard of justice to mislead them."
In no case is it permissible for the court to substitute itself
for the jury and compel a compliance on the part of the latter with
its own view of the facts in evidence, as the standard and measure
of that justice, which the jury itself is the appointed
constitutional tribunal to award
Page 116 U. S. 566
The case of
Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wilson 244, was
an action of trespass and false imprisonment against the
defendants, who were four of the King's messengers in ordinary.
They justified the alleged trespass under a warrant of the Earl of
Halifax, then one of the principal secretaries of state, requiring
them to arrest the plaintiff as the author of some seditions
libels, and to seize his books and papers. There was a verdict for
the plaintiff for �1,000 damages, and a motion for a new trial on
the sole ground that the damages were excessive. The court (Pratt,
afterwards Lord Camden, being Lord Chief Justice) said:
"Can we say that �1,000 are monstrous damages as against him who
has granted an illegal warrant to a messenger, who enters into a
man's house and pries into all his secret and private affairs, and
carries him from his house and business, and imprisons him for six
days? It is an unlawful power assumed by a great minister of state.
Can anybody say that a guinea
per diem is sufficient
damages in this extraordinary case, which concerns the liberty of
every one of the King's subjects? We cannot say the damages of
�1,000 are erroneous."
The dignity and value of the right assailed, and the power and
authority of the source from which the assault proceeds, are
elements to be considered in the computation of damages if they are
to be not only compensation for the direct loss inflicted, but a
remedy and prevention for the greater wrong and injury involved in
the apprehension of its repetition.
Huckle v. Money, 2
Wilson 205.
The section of the Act of March 3, 1875, under which the circuit
court acted in dismissing the present action confers a beneficial
authority to be wisely exercised in defeating collusive and
fraudulent experiments upon its jurisdiction, but the discretion it
confers is judicial, proceeding upon ascertained facts according to
rules of law and subject to review for apparent errors. For the
reasons already given, we are not able to uphold its exercise in
the present instance, and
The judgment dismissing the action is accordingly reversed
and the cause is remanded with directions to take such further
proceedings therein as the law requires, and in conformity with
this opinion.
