If a church building is taken down, and a new church, with a
sufficient space around it for air and light, is built on other
land within the same enclosure in order to enable a revenue to be
derived from the sale or lease of the land on which the old church
stood, and it is unnecessary for the enjoyment of the new church
that this land should remain vacant, this land is not exempt from
taxation for the support of the government of the District of
Columbia under § 8 of the Acts of March 3, 1875, ch. 162; July 12,
1876, ch. 180, and March 3, 1877, c. 117.
It is within the constitutional power of Congress, acting as the
local legislature of the District of Columbia, to tax different
classes of property within the District at different rates.
This is an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill in equity by
the Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Diocese of Baltimore, of which
the District of Columbia is a part, to clear the title of lots
numbered 36 to 46, inclusive (being the lots formerly numbered 5,
6, and 7), in square 376, in the City of Washington, from a cloud
created by the assessment and sale thereof for taxes amounting,
with interest, to more than $5,000.
The case was heard upon the bill, answer, a general replication,
and the deposition of the pastor of St. Patrick's Church, from
which the facts appeared to be as follows:
The lots in question front south on F Street about 170 feet,
Page 116 U. S. 405
and have a depth varying from about 93 feet to about 114 feet.
They were conveyed by Anthony Caffray in 1804 to the Roman Catholic
bishop of Baltimore in fee "for the use of the Roman Catholic
congregation worshiping in the place called
St. Patrick's
Church,' in the City of Washington," and thence forward, until
1870, were occupied by the old St. Patrick's Church. During that
period, the church enclosure included about one-half of square 376,
bounded south by F Street, west by Tenth Street, and north by G
Street. In 1870, the old church building was found to be unsafe,
and in 1872 it was taken down. Since 1870, and pending the
completion of a new church now in process of erection, the
congregation has worshiped in Carroll Hall, on G Street, within the
same half square, and separated from the lots in question by a
30-foot passageway. The new church fronts on Tenth Street, with a
strip of open ground about 35 feet wide on its south side and in
the rear for light and ventilation, all to the north of the lots in
question. The reason for so placing the church, instead of putting
it in the middle of the enclosure, was to enable a revenue to be
derived from the sale or lease of these lots to pay off the church
debt incurred in building, and it was not necessary for the
enjoyment of the church that these lots should remain vacant. In
February, 1881, the plaintiff obtained a decree in equity,
authorizing him to sell or otherwise dispose of these lots, and to
apply the proceeds to the completion of the new church building,
and about that time he made leases thereof for twenty-five years to
private persons.
From 1804 until June 30, 1875, no taxes were assessed on these
lots. Afterwards, until June 30, 1880, they were annually assessed
for taxes and sold for nonpayment thereof. The annual taxes since
that time have been paid.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the Court. After
stating the facts in the language reported above, he continued:
Page 116 U. S. 406
The only matter in contest is the validity of the taxes assessed
upon the lots on F Street for the five years between June 30, 1875,
and June 30, 1880, under the annual Acts of Congress of March 3,
1875, c. 162, and July 12, 1876, c. 180, and of the Permanent Act
of March 3, 1877, c. 117, authorizing the levy of taxes for the
support of the government of the District of Columbia, the material
provisions of which are as follows:
The eighth section of each of these statutes exempts from
taxation houses for the reformation of offenders, almshouses,
buildings devoted to art or belonging to institutions of purely
public charity, "church buildings, and grounds actually occupied by
such buildings," houses to improve the condition of seamen or
soldiers, free public library buildings, and cemeteries. The act of
1875 adds:
"The lands or grounds appurtenant to any said house or building,
so far as reasonably needed and actually used for the convenient
enjoyment of any said house or building for its legitimate purpose
and no other, but if any portion of any said building, house,
grounds, or cemetery so in terms excepted is used to secure a rent
or income or for any business purpose, such portion of the same, or
a sum equal in value to such portion, shall be taxed against the
owner of said building or grounds."
18 Stat. 503.
The acts of 1876 and 1877 substitute for this addition a
provision to the same effect, though differing somewhat in form, as
follows:
"But if any portion of any such building, house, grounds, or
cemetery so in terms excepted is larger than is reasonably needed
[in the act of 1876; 'absolutely required' in the act of 1877] and
actually used for its legitimate purpose, and none other, or is
used to secure a rent or income, or for any business purpose, such
portion of the same, or a sum equal in value to such portion shall
be taxed against the owner of said building or grounds."
19 Stat. 85, 399.
Upon the construction most favorable to the appellant, these
statutes exempt nothing from taxation beyond church buildings and
grounds actually occupied for such buildings and the lands or
grounds appurtenant to any such building so far as reasonably
needed and actually used for its convenient enjoyment for its
legitimate purpose. Even parts of the exempted buildings
Page 116 U. S. 407
and lands, if used to secure a rent or income or for any
business purpose, are taxable. But land which is neither actually
occupied for a church building nor reasonably needed and actually
used for the convenient enjoyment of the building as a church is
not exempt from taxation, whether it is used for any other purpose
or not.
We are not disposed to deny that grounds left open around a
church, not merely to admit light and air but also to add to its
beauty and attractiveness, may, if not used or intended to be used
for any other purpose, be exempt from taxation under these
statutes. But upon the uncontroverted facts of the present case, it
was not only unnecessary for the enjoyment of the church that the F
Street lots should remain vacant, but the very reason for placing
the church to the northward of these lots, instead of putting it in
the middle of the whole land controlled by the ecclesiastical
authorities, was to enable a revenue to be derived from the lease
or sale of these lots. Under such circumstances, these lots were
not exempt from taxation even before they had been actually so
leased.
The objection taken in argument that the Act of March 3, 1877,
is unconstitutional because it provides that the tax upon all lands
within the District of Columbia, outside of the Cities of
Washington and Georgetown and held and used solely for agricultural
purposes shall be a dollar and a quarter on the hundred, and upon
all other real and personal property in the District not expressly
exempted a dollar and a half on the hundred is founded on a
misunderstanding of the case of
Loughborough
v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317.
The point there decided was that an act of Congress laying a
direct tax throughout the United States in proportion to the census
directed to be taken by the Constitution might comprehend the
District of Columbia, and the power of Congress, legislating as a
local legislature for the district, to levy taxes for district
purposes only, in like manner as the legislature of a state may tax
the people of a state for state purposes, was expressly admitted,
and has never since been doubted. 5 Wheat.
18 U. S. 318;
Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. 541;
Mattingly v. District
of
Page 116 U. S. 408
Columbia, 97 U. S. 687. In
the exercise of this power, Congress, like any state legislature
unrestricted by constitutional provisions, may at its discretion,
wholly exempt certain classes of property from taxation or may tax
them at a lower rate than other property.
Decree affirmed.
