No rule can be laid down in reference to amendments of equity
pleadings that will govern all cases. They must depend upon the
special circumstances of each case, and in phasing upon
applications to amend, the ends of justice must not be sacrificed
to mere form or by too rigid an adherence to technical rules of
practice.
In a suit brought by the heirs and administrator of a vendor of
land by title bond, the bill alleged that the bond had been
obtained by fraud, and, also that the land had not been fully paid
for according to the contract of sale. Its prayer was, among other
things, that the bond be cancelled; that an account be taken of the
rents and profits which the purchaser had enjoyed, and of the
amount paid on his purchase; that the title of the complainants be
quieted, and that they have such other relief as equity might
require. At the final hearing, the complainants were permitted to
amend the prayer of the bill so as to ask, in the alternative, for
a decree for the balance of the purchase money and a lien on the
land to secure the payment thereof.
Held that no error was
committed in allowing the amendment. It did not make a new case,
but only enabled the court to adapt its relief to that
Page 113 U. S. 757
made by the bill and sustained by the proof. The bill, with the
prayer thus amended, was in the form in which it might have been
originally prepared consistently with the rules of equity
practice.
The case distinguished from
Shields v.
Burrow, 17 How. 130.
Although the debt for unpaid purchase money was barred by
limitation under the local law, the lien therefor on the land was
not barred, for there was no such open adverse possession for the
period within which actions for the recovery of real estate must be
brought as would cut off the right to enforce the equitable lien
for the purchase money.
This was a bill in equity to set aside a conveyance of lands, or
(as amended below) in the alternative for payment of the purchase
money and to make it a lien on the lands.
The main question on this appeal relates to the alleged error of
the circuit court in permitting the complainants at the hearing to
amend the prayer of their bill so as to obtain relief not before
specifically asked, and which, appellants contend, is inconsistent
with the case made by the bill. To make intelligible this and other
questions in the cause, it is necessary to state the issues and the
general effect of the evidence.
On the 28th day of March, 1871, John D. Ware executed his title
bond to William D. Hardin reciting the sale to the latter of
certain lands in Crittenden County, Arkansas, for the sum of
$20,000, one-half of which was to be paid at the delivery of the
bond and the remainder on the 1st day of January thereafter in
county scrip or warrants, and providing for a conveyance to the
purchaser when the purchase money should be fully paid. Ware died
at his home in Tennessee on the 6th day of December, 1871. In the
same month, the Probate Court of Crittenden County appointed L. B.
Hardin (a brother of the purchaser) to be administrator of Ware,
and on the 15th of January, 1872, his bond having been on that day
filed and approved, letters of administration were directed to be
issued. Under date of the 23d day of January of the same year, L.
B. Hardin, in his capacity as administrator, executed to the
purchaser an absolute conveyance of all the right, title, and
interest of Ware in the lands. The deed recited the payment by the
grantee to the said administrator of $10,000 in Crittenden county
scrip and warrants, and that the deed was made in conformity with
an order of the probate court.
Page 113 U. S. 758
The General Statutes of Arkansas declare that
"When any testator or intestate shall have entered into any
contract for the conveyance of lands and tenements in his lifetime
which was not executed and performed during his life and shall not
have given power by will to carry the same into execution, it shall
be lawful for the executor or administrator of such testator or
intestate, with the approval, in term time, to execute a deed of
conveyance of and for such lands, pursuant to the terms of the
original contract, such executor or administrator being satisfied
that payment has been made therefor according to the contract and
reciting the fact of such payment to the testator or intestate or
to such executor or administrator, as the case may be, which deed
may be acknowledged as other deeds and shall have the same force
and effect to pass the title of such testator or intestate to any
such lands as if made pursuant to a decree of court."
Act Feb. 21, 1859; Gantt's Dig. 180.
By deed of July 10, 1877, W. D. Hardin conveyed these lands to
his wife, and they were in possession, by tenants, when the present
suit was instituted on the 28th of October, 1881. The complainants
are the heirs at law of the vendor and one Boyd, his administrator,
the latter having been appointed at the last domicile of the
decedent in Tennessee. The defendants were W. D. Hardin and his
wife and their tenants. The bill proceeds upon these grounds: that
Ware's obligation of March 28, 1871, was obtained through fraud and
imposition practiced by the purchaser; that the latter was at
liberty, according to the real agreement between him and Ware, to
pay the entire purchase money in county scrip or warrants; that he
and his wife were in possession, claiming the lands to be the
absolute property of the latter, although no part of the purchase
money had been paid except $5,400 paid to the intestate in county
scrip or warrants at their face value; that no such proceedings as
are recited in the deed to W. D. Hardin were ever had in the
Probate Court of Crittenden County; that the $10,000 in scrip or
warrants, which the deed states was paid by W. D. Hardin, were
disposed of at private sale for fifteen cents on the dollar of
their face value, and the proceeds applied, by
Page 113 U. S. 759
collusion between the purchaser and his brother, to a claim
which they, acting together, fraudulently procured to be allowed in
favor of W. D. Hardin against Ware's estate, when in fact no such
indebtedness existed; that all the papers relating to the estate of
Ware were destroyed by Hardin, while in his custody as clerk of the
probate court, for the purpose of concealing his fraudulent scheme
to obtain the lands without paying for them; that the deed from
Hardin to his wife was without consideration, and that Hardin,
after he took possession of the lands, appropriated to his own use
all the rents annually accruing therefrom.
The prayer of the bill was that
"the said bond for title and the said deeds made by Lucian B.
Hardin to said William D. Hardin, and by the latter to said Lida
Hardin, his wife, may be set aside for fraud; that an account may
be taken of the said rents and profits, and of the value of the
county warrants delivered by said William D. Hardin, and that your
orators may have a personal decree against said defendants for any
balance that may be found to be justly due to them; that a decree
may be rendered quieting the title of the plaintiff herein to said
lands against said claims of the said defendants, and for such
other relief as equity may require."
Hardin and wife filed separate answers, and also pleas relying
upon the statute of limitations in bar of the suit. They also
demurred to the bill upon numerous grounds.
A good deal of evidence was taken touching the physical and
mental condition of Ware at and before the execution of his title
bond, as well as upon the issue as to whether Hardin had paid for
the lands according to contract. Without detailing all the facts,
it is sufficient to say that according to the weight of the
evidence, the payment to Ware of $5,400 in county scrip or warrants
was the only one ever really made on Hardin's purchase of these
lands, and that the alleged payment subsequently of $10,000 in like
scrip or warrants to L. B. Hardin, administrator, was not intended
to be a payment on the land, because the proceeds of their sale
were, by collusion between him and W. D. Hardin, appropriated by
the latter on a fictitious claim asserted by him against Ware's
estate.
Page 113 U. S. 760
Such was the state of the record when the cause came on for
hearing. After the evidence was read, the complainants asked leave
to amend the prayer of the bill by inserting therein the following
words:
"Or, if thought proper, that the court give a decree for the
purchase money due on said lands, and that the plaintiffs be
decreed to have a lien on said lands for the payment thereof, and
that said lien be foreclosed."
This amendment was allowed, and the defendants excepted. And
thereupon the court, having heard the evidence and the argument of
counsel, rendered a final decree adjudging that W. D. Hardin was
indebted to B. P. Boyd, administrator of Ware, in the sum of
$17,150 on the purchase money for the lands, and that complainants
have a lien thereon for its payment, relating back to the date of
the title bond. The deeds from L. B. Hardin, administrator, to W.
D. Hardin, and from the latter to his wife, were cancelled for
fraud, and the land ordered to be sold in satisfaction of the lien,
no sale, however, to take place until the heirs of Ware should file
in court a warranty deed for the lands. The court refused to give a
personal decree for the balance of the purchase money, "the same
being barred by the statute of limitations." Subsequently, the
heirs of Ware filed the required deed in court, and the decree was
made absolute.
Hardin appealed to this Court. After the appeal was perfected,
he departed this life, and by consent it was revived in the name of
Mrs. Hardin, as his administratrix. After the submission of the
cause here, the heirs at law of Hardin appeared, and by consent
they were made co-appellants without opening the submission.
Page 113 U. S. 761
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
In reference to amendments of equity pleadings, the courts have
found it impracticable to lay down a rule that would govern all
cases. This allowance must at every stage of the cause rest in the
discretion of the court, and that discretion must depend largely on
the special circumstances of each case. It may be said generally
that, in passing upon applications to amend, the ends of justice
should never be sacrificed to mere form or by too rigid an
adherence to technical rules of practice. Undoubtedly great caution
should be exercised where the application comes after the
litigation has continued for some time, or when the granting of it
would cause serious inconvenience or expense to the opposite side.
And an amendment should rarely if ever be permitted where it would
materially change the very substance of the case made by the bill,
and to which the parties have directed their proofs. The rule is
thus stated in
Lyon v. Tallmadge, 1 Johns.Ch. 188:
"If the bill be found defective in its prayer for relief, or in
proper parties, or in the omission or statement of fact or
circumstance connected with the substance of the case, but not
forming the substance itself, the amendment is usually granted. But
the substance of the bill must contain ground for relief. There
must be equity in
Page 113 U. S. 762
the case, when fully stated and correctly applied to the proper
parties, sufficient to warrant a decree."
And in 1 Daniell's Ch.Pr., 5th ed., 384, the author, after
alluding to the rule in reference to amendments, observes:
"The instances, however, in which this will be done are confined
to those where it appears from the case made by the bill that the
plaintiff is entitled to relief although different from that sought
by the specific prayer; when the object of the proposed amendment
is to make a new case, it will not be permitted."
Whether the amendment in question changed the substance of the
case or made a new one we proceed to inquire.
The original bill in this suit certainly states facts entitling
complainants to some relief. He and his wife were in possession,
asserting title, freed from all claim of whatever kind upon the
part either of the heirs or of the estate of Ware. The complainants
evidently supposed that the relief to which they were entitled was
a cancellation, upon the ground of fraud, of Hardin's contract of
purchase, as well as of the deeds to him and his wife, with an
accounting that would embrace, on one side, the rents and profits
derived from the lands and on the other the value of the scrip or
warrants that he had delivered in part payment of the purchase
money. But if it were doubtful whether the evidence was sufficient
to justify a decree setting aside the contract upon the ground of
fraud or imposition practiced upon the vendor, and if the evidence
clearly showed that the purchaser had not fully paid for the lands,
according to the terms of his purchase, should the complainants
have been driven to a new suit in order to enforce a lien for the
unpaid purchase money? And this too after the parties had taken
their proofs upon the issue, distinctly made by the pleadings, as
to the amount of the purchase money really due from Hardin? Such
practice would have done no good to either party, and must have
resulted in delay and additional expense to both. A new suit to
enforce a lien on the land would have brought before the court the
same evidence that was taken in this cause as to the amount Hardin
had paid. When leave was asked to amend the prayer for relief, no
objection was made by the defendant, but, the amendment having been
allowed, he excepted,
Page 113 U. S. 763
but without any suggestion of surprise or any intimation that he
was able or desired to produce additional proof upon that issue.
Apart from the allegations in reference to fraud in obtaining the
title bond, the bill made a case of nonpayment of the greater part
of the purchase money. To amend the prayer of the bill so as to
justify a decree consistent with that fact did not make a new case,
nor materially change the substance of the one actually presented
by the bill and the proofs. It served only to enable the court to
adapt its measure of relief to a case distinctly alleged and
satisfactorily proved. The complainants could thereby meet the
objection which otherwise might have been urged that the nature of
the specific relief originally asked precluded the court from
giving under the general prayer the particular relief which the
amendment and the proof authorized.
It is a well settled rule that the complaint, if not certain as
to the specific relief to which he is entitled, may frame his
prayer in the alternative, so that if one kind of relief is denied,
another may be granted, the relief of each kind being consistent
with the case made by the bill.
Terry v. Rosell, 32 Ark.
492;
Colton v. Ross, 2 Paige 396;
Lloyd v.
Brewster, 4 Paige 540;
Lingan v. Henderson, 1 Bland
252;
Murphy v. Clark, 1 Sm. & Marsh 236. Under the
liberal rules of chancery practice which now obtain, there is no
sound reason why the original bill in this case might not have been
framed with a prayer for the cancellation of the contract upon the
ground of fraud, and an accounting between the parties, and, in the
alternative, for a decree which, without disturbing the contract,
would give a lien on the lands for unpaid purchase money. The
matters in question arose out of one transaction, and were so
directly connected with each other that they could well have been
incorporated in one suit involving the determination of the rights
of the parties with respect to the lands. The amendment had no
other effect than to make the bill read just as it might have been
originally prepared consistently with the established rules of
equity practice. It suggested no change or modification of its
allegations, and in no just sense made a new case.
Page 113 U. S. 764
The decision in
Shields v.
Barrow, 17 How. 130, is invoked with some
confidence as authority against the action of the court in allowing
the prayer of the bill to be amended. That was a suit to set aside
an agreement of compromise on the ground of fraud and imposition
and to restore the complainant to his original rights under a
contract for the sale of certain lands and other property. The bill
was fatally defective as to parties. No decree could have been
based upon it, for indispensable parties were not before the court
and could not be subjected to its jurisdiction. The amendment of
the bill, there tendered and allowed by the court of original
jurisdiction, not only asked that the compromise, if held binding,
be specifically enforced, but it brought into the case entirely new
issues of fact and law and made an additional defendant, in his
individual capacity and as tutor of his minor children. The relief
sought by that amendment was therefore not within the case set out
in the original bill. Nor was the application there, as here,
simply to amend the prayer of the bill, so as to ask in the
alternative for specific relief within the case as originally
presented. It was regarded by this Court as an attempt, under the
cover of amendment, to change the very substance of the case. That
such was its view upon the point necessary to be decided is clear
from the opinion, for the court said:
"To strike out the entire substance and prayer of a bill and
insert a new case by way of amendment leaves the record
unnecessarily encumbered with the original proceedings, increases
expenses, and complicates the suit; it is far better to require the
complainant to begin anew. To insert a wholly different case is not
properly an amendment, and should not be considered within the
rules on that subject."
The circumstances of the present case are entirely different
from those in
Shields v. Barrow. The amendment here did
not introduce new allegations, nor make additional parties, nor
encumber the record, nor increase the expenses of the litigation,
nor complicate the suit, nor make new issues of fact. It simply
enabled the court, upon the case made by the original bill, to give
the relief which that case justified.
Neale v.
Neales, 9 Wall. 8;
Tremolo
Patent, 23 Wall. 518;
Burgess v. Graffam,
10 F.
Page 113 U. S. 765
219;
Battle v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Blatchford 417;
Ogden v. Thornton, 30 N.J.Eq. 573;
McConnell v.
McConnell, 11 Vt. 291.
We are of opinion, for the reasons stated, that the amendment of
the prayer of the bill was properly allowed and that there was no
error in adjudging that Ware's estate had a lien on the land for
the balance of purchase money. The deed to W. D. Hardin and the
deed of the latter to his wife having been properly cancelled, the
legal title remained in the heirs of the vendor. They are not bound
to surrender that title except upon the performance of the
conditions upon which their ancestor agreed to convey,
viz., the payment of the purchase money. According to the
local law, they occupied the position of mortgagees, for "the legal
effect of a title bond is like a deed executed by the vendor and a
mortgage back by the vendee."
Holman v. Patterson's Heirs,
29 Ark. 363;
Martin v. O'Bannon, 35 Ark. 68. The heirs of
Ware held the title in trust for the purchaser, while Hardin was a
trustee for the payment of the purchase money.
Shall v.
Biscoe, 18 Ark. 157;
Moore v. Anders, 14 Ark. 629;
Holman v. Patterson's Heirs, 29 Ark. 363;
Bayley
v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 50;
Boone
v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 225;
Lewis
v. Hawkins, 23 Wall. 126; 1 Story Eq.Jur. ยง 1217
et seq.; 2 Sugden Vendors 375, c.19, n. d.
But it is contended that the debt for unpaid purchase money, as
well as the lien claimed therefor, are equally barred by the
statute of limitations of Arkansas. An action to recover the debt
may be barred by limitation, yet the right to enforce the lien for
the purchase money may still exist.
Lewis
v. Hawkins, 23 Wall. 127;
Birnie v. Main,
29 Ark. 593;
Colcleugh v. Johnson, 34 Ark. 312, 318. In
the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Arkansas said:
"The debt itself would appear to be barred in 1872, and no
action could be brought at law. But the bar of the debt does not
necessarily preclude a mortgagee or vendor retaining the legal
title from proceeding
in rem in a court of equity to
enforce his specific lien upon the land itself. . . . Unless the
defendant can show that the lien has been in some way discharged
and extinguished, or lost upon some
Page 113 U. S. 766
equitable principles, such as estoppel, he can only interpose
the bar of adverse possession of the land for such time as would
bar the action at law for its recovery."
In the same case it was held that as between mortgagor and
mortgagee, the possession of the mortgagor is not inconsistent with
the mortgagee's right, so long as the latter does not treat the
former as a trespasser; that where the mortgagor remained the
actual occupant with the consent of the mortgagee, he was strictly
tenant at will; that if the tenancy be determined by the death of
the mortgagor, and his heirs or devisees enter and hold without any
recognition of the mortgagor's title by payment of interest or
other act, an adverse possession may be considered to take place.
"The principle," said the court,
"is a wholesome one for both parties, as it enables the
mortgagee (or vendor by title bond) to rest securely on his legal
title, and indulge the mortgagor or purchaser, while the latter can
easily, upon payment, procure the legal title, or have satisfaction
of the mortgage entered of record under the statute, and even if he
should neglect this, a court of chancery would not entertain a
stale demand for foreclosure after many years without clear proof
rebutting the presumption of payment; or if the mortgagor should
die and the heirs should enter without recognition of the
mortgagee's rights, the statute of limitations would commence to
run as in case of adverse possession."
When did adverse possession begin in the present case? Not when
Hardin took possession of the land, for he went into possession in
the lifetime of the vendor, and with his consent. The claim of
adverse possession cannot be took possession of the land, for he
went in the probate court purporting to authorize and direct the
administrator of Ware to execute a deed to Hardin, or upon the deed
which was made to him by such administrator, for, according to the
weight of evidence, no such action was ever taken by the court, and
by its order made a matter of record, and that deed, although filed
for record, was never recorded during the period when Hardin held
the office of clerk of that court, nor until 1877. So that there
was nothing upon the public record of conveyances, as shown at the
hearing, nor in any of the circumstances attending Hardin's
possession prior
Page 113 U. S. 767
to the conveyance to his wife, that showed such open, notorious
adverse possession of the land as was requisite to change the
relations originally existing between the vendor and purchaser, or
between the latter and the heirs of the former. Hardin's possession
under the deed of the administrator was simply a continuation of
the possession originally obtained with the consent of his vendor.
If it be said that Mrs. Hardin's possession under the deed from her
husband was, upon her part, an assertion of title adverse to any
claim that Ware's estate had, it may be answered that such
possession commenced less than seven years prior to the bringing
action or suits to be brought within which the statutes of Arkansas
require action or suits to be brought for the recovery of real
estate.
It is objected to the decree that the value of the county scrip
or warrant, which the court found had not been delivered by Hardin
in payment for the land, should have been ascertained upon the
basis of value as alleged in the original bill, namely, ten cents
on the dollar, and this, although the answer placed their value at
seventy-five cents. According to the preponderance of evidence,
they were worth about seventy cents on the dollar of their face
value. The court was not obliged to accept the allegations of value
in the pleadings, and should have been controlled on this point by
the evidence. We do not perceive any error in the aggregate amount
ascertained to be due, taking the two installments of purchase
money at the market value of the scrip or warrants, in which they
were payable at the time they were respectively due, and giving
interest upon those amounts from the maturity of each
installment.
Sometime after the decree, Hardin filed a petition for
rehearing, submitting therewith copies of numerous papers (alleged
to have been lost at and before the final hearing) purporting to
relate to a suit instituted by the heirs of Ware in the Crittenden
circuit court against L. B. Hardin for the purpose of having him
removed as administrator, or preventing his interfering with the
assets of the estate. The record of that suit, it was alleged in
the petition for rehearing, disproved the principal grounds upon
which the decree in this case was rested. Without assenting to this
view and without commenting
Page 113 U. S. 768
upon the failure of the petition to disclose the circumstances
under which the papers alleged to have been lost were found, it is
sufficient to say that the granting of a rehearing was a matter
within the discretion of the court below, and not to be reviewed
here.
Other questions are discussed in the briefs of counsel, but we
have noticed all that we deem of importance. There is no error in
the decree, and it is
Affirmed.
