The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction
to determine whether an arraignment of a prisoner under several
indictments, an order of court that the indictments shall be
consolidated and tried together, an empanelling of a jury for that
purpose, an opening of the case on the part of the prosecution, and
a discharge of the jury at that stage in order to try the prisoner
before the same jury on the indictments separately, so put the
prisoner in jeopardy in regard to the offenses named in the
consolidated indictments, that he cannot be afterwards tried for
any of those offenses.
When a court has jurisdiction by law of an offense and of the
person charged with it, its judgments are, in general, not
nullities; an exception to this rule if relied on, must be clearly
found to exist.
This was a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. The facts upon which the motion was founded appear
in the opinion of the court.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus to release
the petitioner from imprisonment in the jail of the District of
Columbia, where he is held, as he alleges, unlawfully by John S.
Crocker, the warden of said, jail. He presents with the petition
the record of his conviction and sentence in the Supreme Court of
the District to imprisonment for five years under an indictment for
embezzlement, and this record and the petition of the applicant
present all that could be brought before us on a return to the
writ, if one were awarded. We are thus, on this application for the
writ, placed in possession of the merits of the case.
The single point on which petitioner relies arises out of the
following facts which occurred at the trial. There were pending
before the court fourteen indictments against the petitioner for
embezzlement as an officer of the Bank of the Republic, and an
order of the court had directed that they be consolidated
Page 113 U. S. 329
under the statute and tried together. A jury was then impaneled
and sworn, and the district attorney had made a statement of his
case to the jury, when the court took a recess. Upon reconvening a
short time afterwards, the court decided that the indictments could
not be well tried together, directed the jury to be discharged from
further consideration of them, and rescinded the order of
consolidation. The prisoner was thereupon tried before the same
jury on one of those indictments and found guilty. All of this was
against his protest and without his consent. The judgment was taken
by appeal to the supreme court in general term, where it was
affirmed.
It is argued here, as it was in the court in general term, that
the impaneling and swearing the jury and the statement of his case
by the district attorney put the prisoner in jeopardy with regard
to all the offenses charged in the consolidated indictments, within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, so that he
could not be again tried for any of those offenses. That amendment
declares, among other things, that no person
"shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb, . . . nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law."
If the transaction, as thus stated, brings the prisoner's case
within this principle of the Constitution, the court committed an
error. On account of this error, among others assigned, the case
was carried by appeal to the court in general term, where the
matter was heard by other judges, and, after full consideration,
the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
No appeal or writ of error in such case as that lies to this
Court. The act of Congress has made the judgment of that court
conclusive, as it had a right to do, and the defendant, having one
review of his trial and judgment, has no special reason to
complain.
It is said, however, that the court below exceeded its
jurisdiction, and that this Court has the power, in such case and
for that reason, to discharge the prisoner from confinement under a
void sentence. The proposition itself is sound if the facts justify
the conclusion that the court of the district was without authority
in the matter.
Page 113 U. S. 330
But that court had jurisdiction of the offense described in the
indictment on which the prisoner was tried. It had jurisdiction of
the prisoner, who was properly brought before the court. It had
jurisdiction to hear the charge and the evidence against the
prisoner. It had jurisdiction to hear and to decide upon the
defenses offered by him. The matter now presented was one of those
defenses. Whether it was a sufficient defense was a matter of law
on which that court must pass so far as it was purely a question of
law, and on which the jury under the instructions of the court must
pass if we can suppose any of the facts were such as required
submission to the jury.
If the question had been one of former acquittal -- a much
stronger case than this -- the court would have had jurisdiction to
decide upon the record whether there had been a former acquittal
for the same offense, and if the identity of the offense were in
dispute, it might be necessary on such a plea to submit that
question to the jury on the issue raised by the plea.
The same principle would apply to a plea of a former conviction.
Clearly, in these cases, the court not only has jurisdiction to try
and decide the question raised, but it is its imperative duty to do
so. If the court makes a mistake on such trial, it is error which
may be corrected by the usual modes of correcting such errors, but
that the court had jurisdiction to decide upon the matter raised by
the plea, both as matter of law and of fact, cannot be doubted.
This Article V of the Amendments, and Articles VI and VII,
contain other provisions concerning trials in the courts of the
United States designed as safeguards to the rights of parties. Do
all of these go to the jurisdiction of the courts? And are all
judgments void where they have been disregarded in the progress of
the trial? Is a judgment of conviction void when a deposition has
been read against a person on trial for crime because he was not
confronted with the witness, or because the indictment did not
inform him with sufficient clearness of the nature and cause of the
accusation?
It may be confessed that it is not always very easy to determine
what matters go to the jurisdiction of court so as to make its
action when erroneous a nullity. But the general
Page 113 U. S. 331
rule is that when the court has jurisdiction by law of the
offense charged, and of the party who is so charged, its judgments
are not nullities.
There are exceptions to this rule, but when they are relied on
as foundations for relief in another proceeding, they could be
clearly found to exist.
The case of
Ex Parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 166, is relied on here. In that
case, the petitioner had been tried, convicted, and sentenced for
an offense for which he was liable to the alternative punishment of
fine or imprisonment. The court imposed both. He paid the fine, and
made application to the same court by writ of habeas corpus for
release on the ground that he was then entitled to his discharge.
The circuit court, on this application, instead of releasing the
prisoner, set aside its erroneous judgment and sentenced him to
further imprisonment. This Court held that, the prisoner having
been tried, convicted, and sentenced for that offense, and having
performed the sentence as to the fine, the authority of the circuit
court over the case was at an end, and the subsequent proceedings
were void.
In the present case, no verdict nor judgment was rendered, no
sentence enforced, and it remained with the trial court to decide
whether the acts on which he relied were a defense to any trial at
all.
We are of opinion that what was done by that court was within
its jurisdiction. That the question thus raised by the prisoner was
one which it was competent to decide, which it was bound to decide,
and that its decision was the exercise of jurisdiction.
Ex Parte
Watkins, 3 Pet. 202;
Ex Parte Parks,
93 U. S. 23;
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 653;
Ex Parte Crouch, 112 U. S. 178.
Without giving an opinion as to whether that decision was sound
or not,
We cannot grant the writ now asked for, and it is therefore
denied.