The powers conferred upon the commissioners appointed under the
"Act in relation to the Hot Springs Reservation in the State of
Arkansas" passed March 3, 1877, 19 Stat. 377, were analogous to
those conferred upon the Receiver and Register of the Land Office
in cases of conflicting claims to preemption.
The aim of Congress in statutes relieving parties from the
consequences of defects in title has been to protect
bona
fide settlers, and not intruders upon the original settlers,
seeking by violence or fraud or breach of contract to appropriate
the benefit of their labor. The legislation in this respect and the
decisions of this Court upon it reviewed.
The provision in § 5 of the Act of March 3, 1877, that the
commissioners shall "finally determine the right of each claimant
or occupant," relates to the legal title which under the act is to
pass from the United States, but it does not preclude a court of
equity, after issue of a patent in accordance with the
determination of the commissioners, from inquiring whether the
legal title from the United States is not equitably subject to a
trust in favor of other parties.
Johnson
v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, cited and followed.
After the passage of the Act of June 11, 1870, 16 Stat. 149,
referring the title in the Hot Springs Reservation to the Court of
Claims, but before the adjudications under it, A, who had been in
possession of a tract in the reservation for nearly forty years,
leased it to B with a covenant from B to surrender at the
expiration of the term. In the proceedings under that act, A's
title was adjudged invalid.
Hot Springs Cases,
92 U. S. 698. Under
the
Page 111 U. S. 277
Act of March 3, 1877, 19 Stat. 377, A and one claiming by
assignment from B appeared before the commissioners, each claiming
the right to receive the certificate for the leased tract. The
commissioners adjudged it to B's assignee, and a patent issued
accordingly.
Held that under the circumstances, the
assignee of B, the lessee, was estopped in equity from setting up
the subsequently acquired legal title against A, the lessor.
This was a suit in equity commenced in Garland Circuit Court in
Arkansas and removed under the Removal Act to the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The bill
alleged that the plaintiff went into possession in 1839 of a tract
of land within the Hot Springs Reservation in Arkansas, under color
of title derived from the location of a New Madrid claim, and made
valuable improvements on it, and continued in possession until
dispossessed in 1876 by the receiver appointed by the Court of
Claims; that in 1873, a lease was made by his son, as his trustee,
to Gibbon and Kirkpatrick, parties defendant, the lessees
covenanting to make certain improvements thereon, which were to
become the lessor's property on the expiration of the term on
payment of a part of the cost, and to pay an agreed rent and to
deliver up the premises on the expiration of the term; that in
1877, Gibbon and Kirkpatrick transferred the lease to one
Ballantine, who died leaving his children, the other parties
defendant, as heirs; that in the proceedings before the
commissioners under the Act of March 3d 1877, 19 Stat. 377, the
plaintiff appeared and filed a claim to purchase the tract, and the
heirs of Ballantine did the same, and that the commissioners
awarded the right to the heirs. There were other allegations not
material in the issues decided in this case. The bill was demurred
to because
"plaintiff claims the property described in the complaint on the
ground that he was an occupant and owner of improvements thereon
when that question, as appears, was finally decided by the Hot
Springs Commissioners under the Act of Congress of March 3,
1877."
Section 5 of that act is as follows
"SEC. 5. That it shall be the duty of said commissioners to show
by metes and bounds on the map herein provided for, the parcels or
tracts of lands claimed by reason of improvements made
Page 111 U. S. 278
thereon or occupied by each and every such claimant and occupant
on said reservation; to hear any and all proof offered by such
claimants and occupants and the United States in respect to said
lands and in respect to the improvements thereon, and to finally
determine the right of each claimant or occupant to purchase the
same or any portion thereof at the appraised value, which shall be
fixed by said commissioners,
provided, however, that such
claimants and occupants shall file their claims under the
provisions of this act before said commissioners within six
calendar months after the first sitting of the said board of
commissioners or their claims shall be forever barred, and no claim
shall be considered which has accrued since the twenty-fourth day
of April, eighteen hundred and seventy-six."
The demurrer was sustained. The plaintiff appealed.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit in equity brought by the plaintiff to charge the
heirs at law of David Ballantine, as trustees of certain real
property within the Hot Springs reservation in the State of
Arkansas and compel them to convey it to him. The question for
determination is whether, under the Act of Congress of March 3,
1877, providing for the sale of part of the reservation, they were
entitled to purchase the property in preference to him.
From the protracted litigation to which it has given rise, the
Hot Springs reservation is famous in the history of land titles of
the country. Early in the present century, the medicinal qualities
of those springs were discovered, and from that fact the adjacent
lands had an exceptional value. They were claimed by different
individuals, some portions under a New Madrid certificate, and some
portions under preemption settlements. The plaintiff entered upon
the parcels in controversy as early as 1839 under an attempted
location of a New Madrid
Page 111 U. S. 279
certificate made in 1820, and he remained in their exclusive
possession until April 24, 1876. They were then taken in charge by
a receiver appointed by the Court of Claims under an act passed in
1870, to enable persons claiming title, either legal or equitable,
to the whole or to any part of the four sections of land
constituting the reservation, to bring suit in that court for the
determination of their title as against the United States. Four
suits were brought, one of them by the plaintiff, and they resulted
in an adjudication that the title was in the United States, and
that the several claims were invalid.
Hot Springs Cases,
92 U. S. 698. The
decision against him was regarded as a special hardship both from
his long possession and from the fact that his failure to obtain a
title was occasioned by the neglect of the public officer, under
whose direction the land was surveyed, to return the survey and a
plat of the location to the recorder of land titles for the
Territory of Missouri. Until such return, the location under the
New Madrid certificate was incomplete, and the lands were not
appropriated so as to exclude the operation of the Act of April 20,
1832, by which the four sections were reserved for the future
disposal of the United States. This Court, in rejecting all the
claims, observed that whatever hardship might thereby ensue would
no doubt be taken into consideration by the legislative department
in the future disposition of the lands. Accordingly, and, it is
believed, upon this suggestion, Congress passed the Act of March 3,
1877. It provided for the appointment by the President of "three
discreet, competent, and disinterested persons" to constitute a
board of commissioners, and imposed upon them various duties. Among
other things, it required them, under the direction and subject to
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to designate a tract
sufficiently large to include all the hot or warm springs on the
land, embracing what is known as the Hot Springs Mountain, which
tract was declared to be reserved from sale, and to lay out the
residue of the land into convenient squares, blocks, lots, avenues,
streets, and alleys, the lines of which were to correspond with
existing lines of occupants of the reservation, as near as might be
consistent with the interests of the United States. It also
Page 111 U. S. 280
provided that they should, by a map prepared for that purpose,
show the metes and bounds of the parcels or tracts claimed by
reason of improvements thereon, or occupied on the reservation;
should hear proofs offered by claimants and occupants in respect to
the lands and improvements, and "finally determine the right of
each claimant or occupant to purchase the same, or any portion
thereof at the appraised value fixed by the commissioners." It
declared that claimants and occupants should file their claims
before the commissioners within six months after the first session
of the board or that their claims should be barred, and that no
claim should be considered which had accrued after the 24th of
April, 1876. It also made it the duty of the commissioners to file
in the office of the Secretary of the Interior the map and survey,
with the boundary lines of each claim clearly marked thereon, and
with each division and subdivision traced and numbered, accompanied
by a schedule showing the name of the claimant of each lot or
parcel of land, with its appraised value, and also all the evidence
taken by them "respecting the claimant's possessory right of
occupation" to any portion of the reservation, and their findings
in each case, with their appraisal of the value of each tract and
of the improvements thereon, and to issue a certificate to each
claimant setting forth the amount of land the holder was entitled
to purchase, and its valuation, and also the character and
valuation of the improvements. 19 Stat. 377.
The act made it the duty of the Secretary of the Interior,
within thirty days after the commissioners had filed their report
and map, to instruct the land officers of Little Rock land district
to allow the lands to be entered, and to cause a patent to be
issued therefor. Within the required time, the plaintiff filed his
claim before the commissioners and presented proof showing his long
continued occupation of the land in controversy, and the
improvements he had made thereon. While it was in his occupation,
on the 21st of February, 1873, he, through his son, who held the
property as trustee to pay certain debts, leased it to the
defendants Gibbon and Kirkpatrick for the purpose of a hotel, bath
house, and outhouses at an annual rent of $500 and
Page 111 U. S. 281
$1,500 additional for water privileges for the term of three
years and three months beginning on that day and ending on the 21st
of May, 1876. The lease provided that the hotel and other
improvements should not cost more than $12,000; that at the end of
the term the lessor should have the right to take the improvements
by paying two-thirds of their first cost, and should take the
furniture in the hotel and bath house by paying its actual value,
so that the same should not exceed $8,000; that if he should not
pay these amounts at the end of the term, the lease should be
extended on the same conditions until he should make the payments,
giving ninety days' notice of his intention to terminate the lease;
that upon its termination as specified, the lessees should deliver
to him, or to his successors in office or grantees, or "to
whomsoever at that time in law may have the right to control the
trust property," all the lands leased to them, "promptly, without
failure, and free from let or hindrance of any kind whatever,
together with all buildings, outhouses, and improvements" that
might be erected on the premises. The terms "to whomsoever at that
time in law may have the right to control the trust property" refer
to persons lawfully controlling the property under authority
derived from the plaintiff. The lessor then held the property as
trustee, and by the covenant, when the trust should be discharged,
the right of control would revert to him. They were not intended to
authorize a delivery under any circumstances to parties claiming
adversely.
Soon after the lease was executed, the trust was discharged by
the payment of the debts, and the property and possession reverted
to the plaintiff. Before the lease, he had made improvements of the
value of at least $1,000 in excavations, grading, and building a
wall to protect the land from the action of the water of the Hot
Springs creek, and had erected valuable buildings. After the lease,
a hotel was built on the premises, and before the end of the term
the parties agreed that the lease should be continued until
sometime in the future, when it might be terminated by written
notice as provided in the instrument.
In the year 1877, the lessees sold and transferred all their
interest
Page 111 U. S. 282
in the premises to one David Ballantine, he knowing at the time
the terms and conditions of the lease. While the lessees were in
possession and before their transfer, the plaintiff gave them
notice of his desire to terminate the lease, and requested them to
furnish him with a list of the furniture coming within its
provisions, which they promised to do, but never did. He never
could get from them the information required for settlement, and
therefore none was ever made, though he was ready and willing and
frequently offered to pay all the sums that might be due to them
under the terms of the lease, which offer they, under various
pretenses, always declined. After entering upon the premises under
the transfer, Ballantine died, being at the time a resident of
Illinois, leaving surviving him certain of the defendants, who are
named in the bill of complaint as his heirs at law. By the survey
of the commissioners, a part of the premises was laid off and
designated as lots 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, in block 89, in the
Town of Hot Springs, and the residue thereof, on which the hotel
and some of the outbuildings were erected, was laid off into a
street. They were appraised at the value of $10,000 and condemned,
and were then torn down and destroyed. A certificate of their
condemnation and value was given to the heirs of Ballantine. As
already mentioned, the plaintiff filed his claim to purchase the
lots before the commissioners. The heirs of Ballantine also filed a
like claim, and to them was awarded the right to purchase, although
it was shown that their ancestor had acquired his possession under
the lease made to Gibbon and Kirkpatrick. For these reasons -- that
the heirs never had any other right or title to the lands or to
their possession except under the lease, containing covenants to
restore the property and possession to the lessor, or to his
successor in title, on its termination -- the plaintiff prays that
they be adjudged to hold the lands as trustees for his use and
benefit, and be decreed to convey them to him on his paying the
money advanced in the purchase, and that he be allowed reasonable
rent for the occupancy of the lands.
The bill of complaint sets forth the material facts which we
have stated, and a demurrer to it was sustained, the court
holding
Page 111 U. S. 283
that the decision of the commissioners awarding to the heirs of
Ballantine the right to purchase was a final adjudication and
conclusive upon the parties, and even if not conclusive, was
correct. The ruling in both particulars the plaintiff insists was
erroneous.
It is very clear that the heirs of Ballantine are not parties
for whose benefit the act of 1877 was passed. He only acquired his
claim to the property during that year by transfer from the
original lessees of their leasehold interest. He could not assert
any independent claim acquired after April 24, 1876. The act in
terms declares that no claim to purchase any portion of the
reservation accruing after that date shall be considered by the
commissioners. As already mentioned, it followed our decision that
certain persons, claimants and occupants of portions of the
reservation, were not entitled to the land, and was designed to
confer upon them and others in like position a title to such
portions as they had occupied or improved, after first setting
aside and reserving from sale a tract sufficiently large to include
the hot springs and land immediately adjacent. Those parties were
not trespassers in the offensive meaning of that term, nor
intentional invaders of the rights of the United States. They
entered upon the land in the confident belief that they were
authorized to do so. The plaintiff relied upon a New Madrid
certificate, which was located upon the lands in controversy as far
back as 1820, and his failure to secure the title arose, as already
stated, from the omission of the public surveyor to return the
survey and a plat of them to the recorder of land titles before the
act of 1832 took effect and withdrew the lands from appropriation.
The government did not treat him and the other claimants as wanton
intruders on the public domain, for then it might have ejected them
by force. Instead of that, it authorized proceedings for a judicial
ascertainment of the merits of their respective claims. The act of
1877 embraces, therefore, under the designation of claimants and
occupants, those who had made improvements or claimed possession
under an assertion of title or a right of preemption by reason of
their location or settlement. It was for their benefit that the act
was passed, in order that
Page 111 U. S. 284
they should not entirely forfeit their claims from location or
settlement and their improvements, but should have, except as to
the portions reserved, the right of purchase. Parties succeeding by
operation of law or by conveyance to the possession of such
claimants and occupants would succeed also to their rights. But
lessees under a claimant or occupant, holding the property for him
and bound by their stipulation to surrender it on the termination
of their lease, stand in no position to claim an adverse and
paramount right of purchase. Their possession is in law his
possession. The contract of lease implies not only a recognition of
his title, but a promise to surrender the possession to him on the
termination of the lease. They therefore while retaining
possession, are estopped to deny his rights.
Blight's Lessee v.
Rochester, 7 Wheat. 533.
This rule extends to every person who enters under lessees with
knowledge of the terms of the lease, whether by operation of law or
by purchase and assignment. The lessees in this case, and those
deriving their interest under them, could therefore claim nothing
against the plaintiff by virtue either of their possession, for it
was in law his possession, or of their improvements, for they were
in law his improvements, and entitled him to all the benefits they
conferred, whether by preemption or otherwise. Whatever the lessees
and those under them did by way of improvement on the leased
premises inured to his benefit as absolutely and effectually as
though done by himself.
Whenever Congress has relieved parties from the consequences of
defects in their title, its aim has been to protect those who in
good faith settled upon public land and made improvements thereon,
and not those who, by violence or fraud or breaches of contract,
intruded upon the possessions of original settlers and endeavored
to appropriate the benefit of their labors. There has been in this
respect, in the whole legislation of the country, a consistent
observance of the rules of natural right and justice. There was a
time in the early periods of the country when a party who settled
in advance of the public surveys was regarded as a trespasser, to
be summarily and roughly ejected. But all this has been changed
within the last half century. With the acquisition of new
territory, new fields
Page 111 U. S. 285
of enterprise have been opened, population has spread over the
public lands, villages and towns have sprung up on them, and all
the industries and institutions of a civilized and prosperous
people have been established, with the church and schoolhouse by
their side, before the surveyor with his quadrant and line
appeared.
With absolute confidence, these pioneers have relied upon the
justice of their government, and they have never been disappointed.
The most striking illustrations of this confidence and of the just
action of the government are found in the settlement of Oregon and
California. Before any laws of the United States had been extended
to Oregon, enterprising men crossed the plains and took possession
of its fertile fields. They organized a provisional government
embracing guarantees of all private rights. They passed laws under
which persons and property were protected and justice administered
with as much care and wisdom as in old communities. They prescribed
regulations for the possession and occupation of land among
themselves, and when the laws of the United States were extended
over the country, those regulations were respected and the right
acquired under them recognized and enforced.
On this subject, MR. JUSTICE MILLER, speaking for the Court in
Lamb v. Davenport, said of the settlement upon the land
which now embraces the Town of Portland:
"It is sufficient here to say that several years before that
[the donation] act was passed, and before any act of Congress
existed by which title to the land could be acquired, settlement on
and cultivation of a large tract of land, which includes the lots
in controversy, had been made, and a town laid off into lots, and
lots sold, and that these are a part of the present City of
Portland. Of course, no legal title vested in anyone by these
proceedings, for that remained in the United States, all of which
was well known and undisputed. But it was equally well known that
those possessory rights and improvements placed on the soil were,
by the policy of the government, generally protected, so far at
least, as to give priority of the right to purchase whenever the
land was offered for sale, and when no special reason existed to
the contrary. And though these
Page 111 U. S. 286
rights or claims rested on no statute or any positive promise,
the general recognition of them in the end by the government, and
its disposition to protect the meritorious actual settlers, who
were the pioneers of emigration in the new territories, gave a
decided and well understood value to these claims. They were all
subject to bargain and sale, and, as among the parties to such
contracts, they were valid. The right of the United States to
dispose of her own property is undisputed, and to make rules by
which the lands of the government may be sold or given away is
acknowledged; but, subject to these well known principles, parties
in possession of the soil might make valid contracts, even
concerning the title, predicated upon the hypothesis that they
might thereafter lawfully acquire the title, except in cases when
Congress had imposed restrictions on such contracts."
85 U. S. 18 Wall.
307,
85 U. S.
313-314.
So, in California, the discovery of the precious metals was
followed, as is well known, by a large immigration to the state
which increased her population in a few years to several hundred
thousand. The majority of the immigrants at first found their way
into the mineral regions and became seekers of gold. But still a
very large number settled upon the farming lands, erected houses
thereon, planted vineyards and orchards, and subjected portions to
cultivation. Much of this was in advance of the public surveys, and
even before the passage of an act of Congress opening the
agricultural lands to settlement and providing for the sale of the
mineral lands. Yet the progress of the country was not thereby
stayed. The first appropriator of mineral lands within certain
limits, or the first settler on agricultural lands to the extent
prescribed by the preemption laws in force in other states, was
recognized everywhere as having a better right than others to the
claim appropriated, or to the land settled upon. In all
controversies, except as against the government, he was regarded as
the original owner from whom title was to be traced. And when the
government extended its surveys over the agricultural lands it gave
the privilege of purchasing -- the preemption right -- to the first
settler, requiring only that his possession should be continued,
accompanied with improvement. And when it allowed the mineral
lands
Page 111 U. S. 287
to be sold, it was to the original appropriator, or to those
deriving their claim from him that title was given. In no instance
in the legislation of the country have the claims of an intruder
upon the prior possession of others or in disregard of their rights
been sustained. Laborers occupying mining claims or agricultural
lands while working for the first appropriator or settler acquired
no preemptive rights over him to such claims or lands, nor did any
permissive occupation under him, as tenant or otherwise, impair his
rights. To construe the act of 1877 so as to give to lessees a
better right than their landlord to purchase the land of which he
had been in occupation more than a third of a century would require
us to attribute to Congress not only the intention to do him
flagrant injustice, but to depart from its previous uniform and
long settled policy to protect the pioneer and original settler
upon the public domain.
In the dealing of the government with occupants of lots in towns
built upon the public lands we have a further illustration of the
good faith which is exacted from parties seeking the title of the
United States. The Townsite Act of Congress of May 23, 1844,
provides that whenever any portion of the surveyed public lands has
been settled upon and occupied as a townsite, it shall be lawful,
if the town be incorporated, for the corporate authorities, and, if
not incorporated, for the judge of the county court, to enter at
the proper land office, and at the minimum price, such land
"in trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants
thereof, according to their respective interests, the execution of
which trust as to the disposal of the lots in such town, and the
proceeds of the sale thereof, to be conducted under such rules and
regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of
the state or territory in which the same is situated."
5 Stat. 657. The Act of Congress of March 3, 1853, extended the
provisions of this act, and, with certain exceptions, made the
whole of the public lands, not being mineral, occupied as towns or
villages, subject to like entry, whether settled upon before or
after they were surveyed.
In
Ricks v. Reed, decided in 1862, the proper
construction
Page 111 U. S. 288
of the act was a question before the Supreme Court of
California, and the court said:
"It is true, the entry of the town lands by the corporate
authorities or county judge is, under the act of Congress, 'in
trust for the several use and benefit of the occupants thereof,
according to their respective interests,' but this provision does
not establish that it was the intention of Congress to give the
benefits of the entry to mere temporary occupants of particular
tracts at the date of the entry, without reference to the character
of their occupancy, and thereby in many instances deprive the
original
bona fide settlers of the premises and
improvements in favor of those who had, by force or otherwise,
intruded upon their settlement. Were such the effect of the
provision in question, the trespasser of yesterday or the tenant of
today would often be in a better position than the parties who, by
their previous occupation and industry, had built up the town and
made the property valuable. We do not think Congress could have
contemplated that results of this nature should follow from its
legislation, but, on the contrary, that it intended that the
original and
bona fide occupants should be the recipients
of the benefits of the entry to the extent, at least, of their
interest -- that is, of their actual occupancy and
improvements."
19 Cal. 551, 575.
The provision of the act that the commissioners "shall finally
determine the right of each claimant or occupant" to purchase the
land or a portion of it does not necessarily withdraw that
determination from the consideration of the court. It is final so
far as the Land Department is concerned. By the general law, all
proceedings for the alienation of the public lands, from the
incipient steps to a patent, are placed under the supervision of
that department. The provision in question takes the action of the
board, in the particulars mentioned, from that supervision. In
effect, it substitutes the board in the place of the ordinary land
officers, with only a modification of duties and powers adapted to
the peculiar circumstances of the case. It does not withdraw its
decisions from the correcting power of the court when the board has
misconstrued the statute and thus defeated its manifest purpose and
made its benefits inure to those who were never in the
contemplation of Congress,
Page 111 U. S. 289
and therefore were not intended to be the recipients of its
bounty.
The powers of the commissioners under the act of 1877 are not
essentially different from those of the receiver and register of
the land office in cases of conflicting claims to preemption. The
latter officers must hear the evidence of parties and decide as to
which has the better right to the patent certificate. The judicial
character of their investigation and determination is as great and
important as that of the commissioners under the act of 1877. The
acts done in both cases relate merely to the sale of public lands,
and it is difficult to perceive any reason why, when private to
"finally determine the right closed against relief in the courts of
the country in the one case more than in the other."
The statute, in requiring the commissioners to "finally
determine the right of each claimant or occupant to purchase" parts
of the reservation, recognizes the existence of rights as between
different claimants, though equally without title so far as the
government is concerned. But in their decision they have ignored
the universally acknowledged right, as between landlord and
tenants, giving to the latter what could by no possibility belong
to them in the relation which they occupied. Had Congress intended
to invest the commissioners with absolute discretion in awarding
the privilege of preemption of the several parcels of land, its
language would have been different; it would not have required an
examination of witnesses, a regard for existing boundaries, and a
determination of rights. Everything in the statute, from the
beginning to the end, indicates an intent that, in awarding the
right of preemption, the commissioners should be governed not by an
arbitrary discretion, but by the existence of claims by possession
and a consideration of the mutual rights of parties as between one
another. They had no right to disregard the very principle on which
their appointment was based.
On matters depending upon conflicting evidence as to the extent
of occupation and the value of improvements and many other matters,
the action of the commissioners is undoubtedly final; but, upon the
construction of the law, and particularly
Page 111 U. S. 290
as to the parties for whose benefit it is designed, it is
subject equally with all local boards of limited jurisdiction to
have its conclusions, if erroneous, reviewed and corrected by the
judicial tribunals; at least the equities of third parties arising
from contracts or fiduciary relations between them and the person
to whom the commissioners may adjudge the right to purchase are not
concluded by their action. This question was very fully and
thoughtfully considered in
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72. In that case, the direct
question was as to the effect to be given to the tenth section of
the Act of June 12, 1858, which declared that appeals in cases of
contest between different settlers for the right of preemption
should thereafter be decided by the Commissioner of the General
Land Office, "whose decision shall be final unless appeal therefrom
be taken to the Secretary of the Interior." It was held that the
finality there declared had reference only to the supervisory
action of the Land Department; that after the title had passed from
the government, and the question had become one of private right,
the jurisdiction of courts of equity might be invoked to ascertain
if the patentees did not hold in trust for other parties, and if it
appeared that the party claiming the equity had established his
right to the land upon a true construction of the acts of Congress,
and by an erroneous construction the patent had been issued to
another, the court would correct the mistake. In the opinion, MR.
JUSTICE MILLER, speaking for the Court, referred to the general
doctrine that when a special tribunal has authority to hear and
determine certain matters arising in the course of its duties, its
decision within the scope of its authority is conclusive upon all
others, and said:
"That the action of he land office in issuing a patent for any
of the public lands, subject to sale by preemption or otherwise, is
conclusive of the legal title must be admitted under the principle
above stated, and in all courts and in all forms of judicial
proceedings where this title must control, either by reason of the
limited powers of the court or the essential character of the
proceedings, no inquiry can be permitted into the circumstances
under which it was obtained. On the other
Page 111 U. S. 291
hand, there has always existed in the courts of equity the power
in certain classes of cases to inquire into and correct mistakes,
injustice, and wrong, in both judicial and executive action,
however solemn the form which the result of that action may assume
when it invades private rights, and by virtue of this power the
final judgments of courts of law have been annulled or modified,
and patents and other important instruments issuing from the Crown
or other executive branch of the government, have been corrected or
declared void, or other relief granted. No reason is perceived why
the action of the land office should constitute an exception to
this principle. In dealing with the public domain under the system
of laws enacted by Congress for their management and sale, that
tribunal decides upon private rights of great value, and very
often, from the nature of its functions, this is by a proceeding
essentially
ex parte, and peculiarly liable to the
influence of frauds, false swearing, and mistakes. These are among
the most ancient and well established grounds of special
jurisdiction of courts of equity just referred to, and the
necessity and value of that jurisdiction are nowhere better
exemplified than in its application to cases arising in the land
office."
This case is a leading one in this branch of the law, and has
been uniformly followed. The decision aptly expresses the settled
doctrine of this Court with reference to the action of officers of
the Land Department, that when the legal title has passed from the
United States to one party when in equity and in good conscience
and by the laws of Congress it ought to go to another, a court of
equity will convert the holder into a trustee of the true owner and
compel him to convey the legal title. This doctrine extends to the
action of all officers having charge of proceedings for the
alienation of any portion of the public domain. The parties
actually entitled under the law cannot, because of its
misconstruction by those officers, be deprived of their rights.
Townsend v.
Greeley, 5 Wall. 326,
72 U. S. 335;
Carpentier v.
Montgomery, 13 Wall. 480,
80 U. S. 496;
Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330;
Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 530;
Quinby v. Conlan, 104 U. S. 420;
Smelting Company v. Kemp 104 U. S. 636.
Page 111 U. S. 292
The bill is open to the objection that it does not allege that
the heirs of Ballantine have acted upon the award and purchased the
lands in controversy, but their counsel makes no point upon this
omission, and admits that they have in fact purchased.
It follows from the views expressed that
The decree of the court below must be reversed and the cause
remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer, and to take
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, the plaintiff
to have leave to amend his bill and the defendants to
answer.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE, with whom concurred HARLAN, WOODS, and
BLATCHFORD, JJ., dissenting.
I am unable to agree to this judgment. In my opinion the Act of
March 3, 1877, granted a new right to the occupants of the Hot
Springs reservation and provided a special tribunal for the
settlement of all controversies between conflicting claimants. The
right and the remedy were created by the same statute, and
consequently the remedy thus specially provided was exclusive of
all others. No provision was made for a review of the decisions of
the tribunal. Its determination, therefore, of all questions
arising under the jurisdiction must necessarily be conclusive, and
not open to attack collaterally. It seems to me there is a very
broad distinction between this case and that of
Johnson v.
Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, and others of that class.
Here, a special tribunal has been created for a special purpose. It
has been clothed with power to compel the attendance of witnesses,
"and to finally determine the right of each claimant or occupant to
purchase" from the United States, under the provisions of the act
of Congress, the ground he occupies or claims. The duties of the
tribunal are judicial in their character, and their decisions
evidently intended to be binding on the parties. The question now
is not whether, if Rector had kept away from the tribunal and
Gibbon had got a title under his occupancy, he could be charged as
trustee for Rector on account of his tenancy, but whether, having
appeared before the tribunal and been beaten in a contest with
Gibbon
Page 111 U. S. 293
on that identical question, Rector can in this suit correct the
errors of the tribunal in its decision. I think he cannot. If he
can, it is difficult to see why all the decisions of the tribunal
are not open to revision by the courts.
I am authorized to say that JUSTICES HARLAN, WOODS, and
BLATCHFORD concur with me in this opinion.