The statutes of Illinois relating to the redemption of mortgaged
property from sales under decree of the federal courts
examined.
While the local law, giving the right of redemption first to the
mortgagor, then to judgment creditors, is a rule of property
obligatory upon the federal
Page 108 U. S. 52
court, it is competent for the latter by rules to prescribe the
mode in which redemption from sales under its own decrees may be
effected.
The rule in the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois requiring a judgment creditor to pay
the redemption money to the clerk of that court, and not to the
officer holding the execution, sustained as being within the domain
of practice, and not affecting the substantial right to redeem
within the time fixed by the local statute.
The Illinois statute of 1879, entitling the purchaser in case of
redemption to receive interest upon his bid at the rate of eight
percent per annum (the previous law prescribing ten percent), is
applicable to all decretal sales of mortgaged premises thereafter
made, although the mortgage was given before the passage of that
statute. Such reduction in the rate of interest did not impair the
obligation of the contract between mortgagor and mortgagee, because
the amendatory statute did not diminish the duty of the mortgagor
to pay what he agreed to pay, or shorten the period of payment, or
affect any remedy which the mortgagee had by existing law for the
enforcement of his contract.
The purchaser at decretal sale is entitled to interest at the
rate prescribed by statute when he purchased. The amendatory
statute operated
proprio vigore to change the rule of
court previously fixing the rate at ten percent.
The existing laws with reference to which the mortgagor and
mortgagee must be assumed to have contracted are those only which
in their direct or necessary legal operation controlled or affected
the obligations of their contract.
Bill for foreclosure of a mortgage; decree of foreclosure demand
to redeem and tender of payment; petition of the plaintiff,
purchaser at the foreclosure sale, for a master's deed denial of
that petition, and an appeal from that denial.
The property involved in this suit was certain real estate in
the City of Chicago covered by a mortgage, executed January 29,
1880, by W. H. W. Cushman and wife to secure the Connecticut Mutual
Life Insurance Company in the payment of $75,000, five years
thereafter, with interest payable semiannually at the rate of nine
percent per annum. It was thereafter conveyed, subject to that
mortgage, to one W. H. Cushman.
The local law in force when the mortgage was given provided that
upon a sale of lands or tenements under execution, the officer
should give to the purchaser a certificate showing the property
purchased, the sum paid therefor, or, if the plaintiff was the
purchaser, the amount of his bid and the time when the purchaser
(unless the property be redeemed as provided in the statute) would
be entitled to a deed. A duplicate of such certificate, signed by
the officer, was required to be filed by him
Page 108 U. S. 53
in the office of the county recorder within ten days from the
sale. Within twelve months from the sale, the defendant, his heirs,
executors, administrators, or grantees may redeem by paying the
purchaser, or the officer for his benefit, the sum bid by the
former, with interest thereon at the rate of ten percent per annum
from date of sale. Whereupon the sale and certificate becomes null
and void. After the expiration of twelve and at any time before the
expiration of fifteen months from the sale, a judgment creditor
(even one who became such after the expiration of twelve months
from the sale,
Phillips v. Demoss, 14 Ill. 413) may redeem
by suing out execution, placing the same in the hands of the proper
officer (whose duty is to endorse thereon a levy upon the property
to be redeemed), and by paying to such officer, for the use of the
purchaser, his executors, administrators, or assigns, the amount
for which the premises were sold, with interest at the rate of ten
percent per annum from the date of sale. The officer, having filed
in the county recorder's office a certificate of the redemption by
such judgment creditor, is required to advertise and offer the
property for sale under the execution. The judgment creditor, thus
redeeming the property, is considered as having bid at the
execution sale the amount of the redemption money paid by him, with
interest from the date of redemption to the day of sale. If no
larger bid is offered, the property is struck off and sold to such
judgment creditor, who becomes entitled to a deed.
The statute provides that the whole or part of any lands sold
under execution may be redeemed by a judgment creditor in the like
distinct quantities or parcels in which the same are sold; also, if
there be no redemption within the time prescribed, that the
purchaser is entitled to a deed; further, that "lands sold under
and by virtue of any decree of a court of equity for the sale of
mortgaged lands" may be redeemed by the mortgagor, his heirs,
executors, administrators, or grantees, and by judgment creditors,
in the same manner as is prescribed for the redemption by such
parties, respectively, of lands sold under executions at law.
By a subsequent act in force July 1, 1879, the foregoing
statutes were amended so as to require the party redeeming to pay
the amount going to
Page 108 U. S. 54
the purchaser, with interest at the rate of only eight percent
per annum. This act continued in force till after July 1, 1879.
After the passage of this act, the rules of the circuit court
relating to redemption were amended so as to be read as
follows:
"
Ordered that the following rules be entered in regard
to the redemption of property from sales under decrees in chancery
in this court:"
"
First. That whenever any real estate is sold by a
master in chancery, special commissioner, or other officer of this
court by virtue of any decree of foreclosure of mortgage or
vendor's lien, or mechanics' lien or for the payment of money, the
master in chancery, or officer making such sale shall, instead of
executing a deed for the property so sold, give to the purchaser a
certificate describing the premises purchased by him, showing the
amount paid therefor, or, if purchased by the complainant, in whose
favor the decree is made, the amount of his bid, and that such
purchaser will be entitled to a deed of the property so purchased,
on the expiration of fifteen months from the date of said sale,
unless said property shall have been duly redeemed."
"
Second. It shall be the duty of the master in chancery
or other officer making such sale to report the same to the court
within ten days from the day of the making thereof unless time for
filing said report shall be extended by the court, which report
shall be confirmed as a matter of course unless objections to said
sale are filed within twenty days after said report is required to
be filed."
"
Third. Any defendant in the suit in which such decree
is rendered, his heirs, administrators, or assigns, or any person
interested through or under the defendant in the premises so sold,
may, within twelve months from said sale, redeem the real estate so
sold
by paying to the purchaser thereof, his heirs,
executors, or assigns,
or to the clerk of this court for
the benefit of such purchaser, his executors, administrators, or
assigns, the sum of money for which said premises were sold or bid
off, with interest at the rate of ten percent per annum from the
date of such sale, and in case such redemption is made by payment
of the money to the clerk, the person so redeeming shall also pay
an additional sum of one per cent. on the amount so paid in as the
clerk's fee for receiving and disbursing said redemption, and the
clerk on receiving
Page 108 U. S. 55
said redemption money shall at once deposit the same in the
registry of this court, and file a certificate among the papers in
the cause in which said decree was entered, stating that said real
estate has been redeemed."
"
Fourth. If property sold under any decree of this
court shall not be redeemed by the defendant or defendants in the
decree, or some persons claiming by, through or under him or them,
within twelve months from the date of said sale, then any creditor
of the debtor defendant or defendants in such decree who holds a
decree or judgment in fall force and on which he is entitled to
execution against such debtor defendant or defendants, may redeem
said property after the expiration of twelve months and before the
expiration of fifteen months, in the following manner. Such
creditor shall sue out an execution on his decree or judgment and
place the same in the hands of the proper officer to execute, who
shall thereupon endorse on such execution a levy on the property
which is to be redeemed, and thereupon the person desiring to make
such redemption shall pay
to the holder of such certificate or
to the clerk of this court the amount for which the premises
to be redeemed were sold, with interest at the rate of ten percent
per annum from the date of such sale, and if the redemption is made
by the payment of the money to the clerk, there shall also be paid
the additional sum of one percent on the amount of money so paid to
redeem as the clerk's fee for receiving and disbursing said
redemption money. And the clerk shall at once pay said money into
the registry of the court for the use of the person entitled
thereto and give a receipt for said sum to the person making such
redemption."
"And the clerk of this court shall thereupon make and file in
the office of the recorder of the county where said premises are
situate a certificate of such redemption, and the officer in whose
hands said execution shall have been placed and who shall have made
said levy shall proceed in the manner required by the twentieth and
twenty-first sections of chapter seventy-seven of the Revised
Statutes of Illinois, entitled 'Judgments, decrees, and
executions.' After the first redemption, made as aforesaid, any
other judgment or decree creditor who shall have the right under
the laws of this State to redeem said premises from the first
redeeming judgment or decree creditor may apply to this court for
leave to redeem said premises from the creditor first
Page 108 U. S. 56
redeeming the same, and the court will make such order in regard
to further redemption as the rights of the parties under the law
shall seem to require."
"
Fifth. In all cases when the master in chancery or any
other special or general officer of this court is required to make
sale of real estate under any decree or order of this court in any
chancery suit, notice of the time and place of such sale shall be
given by publication in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the county where said real estate is situated, and in
case there is no such newspaper published in such county, then such
publication shall be made in one of the newspapers hereafter named,
published in the City of Chicago, such publication to be made as
often as once each week for three successive weeks, and the first
publication shall be at least twenty days before the day fixed for
such sale."
On the 12th day of December, 1877, the insurance company
instituted a suit for foreclosure in which a final decree of sale
was passed on the 14th day of July, 1879. The sale occurred on the
15th day of August, 1879, when the insurance company became the
purchaser of various lots, into which the mortgaged premises had
been subdivided at prices aggregating in amount the principal and
interest of its debt, the latter being computed up to the decree at
the rate stipulated in the mortgage, and thereafter at the
statutory rate of six percent per annum. The sale was duly
confirmed by an order entered October 10, 1879.
On the 3d day of November, 1880, these rules being in force and
no redemption having been made by the mortgagor or by anyone
claiming under him, a judgment by confession on a warrant of
attorney was entered in the court below for $10,150 in favor of
Henry S. Monroe against W. H. Cushman, grantee of the mortgagor. An
execution on that judgment, sued out November 9, 1880, was placed
in the hands of the Marshal of the United States for the Northern
District of Illinois, who endorsed thereon a levy, as of that date,
on a portion of the lots purchased by the insurance company.
Monroe, on the succeeding day, deposited with the clerk of the
federal court the sum of $12,741.95, which covered as well the
aggregate
Page 108 U. S. 57
amount of principal and interest, as the commissions and fees
allowed to the clerk. R.S. § 828. Thereupon, on the next day, the
clerk, under his hand and seal of office, issued a certificate of
redemption for the lots so levied on.
On November 15, 1880 -- on which day, according to the rule
established by the Supreme Court of Illinois, the additional three
months given to judgment creditors expired -- Robert D. Fowler,
assignee of Monroe's judgment and of his interest in the levy and
redemption that has been made, deposited with the clerk of the
federal court the further sum of $62,047.01 for the redemption of
certain others of the lots purchased by the company. That sum
covered the latter's bid for those lots, with interest at eight
percent. A certificate of redemption covering such lots was issued
on the day of Fowler's deposit. The marshal, on November 16, 1880,
advertised for the sale on the 8th day of December, 1880, of all
the lots sought to be redeemed under the Monroe judgment and
execution. The record does not show the endorsement of any
additional levy beyond that made November 9, 1880. The sale
occurred as advertised, Fowler becoming the purchaser of all the
lots embraced in the two certificates of November 10 and November
15 at a sum equal to the amount of the sums deposited, with
interest at the rate of eight percent per annum from the date of
such deposits. No money was paid to the marshal, and none to any
other officer except that deposited with the clerk, who, as
required by the act of Congress and the rules in question, placed
it in the registry of the court.
The property so sold was, as is claimed by appellee,
subsequently redeemed within the time and in the mode prescribed in
the rules established by the court below for the redemption of real
estate from sales under decrees.
But the contention of the insurance company is that those rules
do not conform to the statutes of Illinois; that the latter,
equally, as to the time within which, the persons by whom, and the
mode in which redemption may be effected, constitute a rule of
property, obligatory as well upon the federal court as upon the
courts of the state, and as the property sold was not redeemed in
the particular mode prescribed by the local statutes,
Page 108 U. S. 58
there was no effectual redemption, and consequently the company
became entitled to a deed at the expiration of the period fixed for
the exercise of the right of redemption.
The circuit court was of opinion, and so adjudged, that the
rights of the parties as to the mode of redemption were to be
determined by its rules, and since there had been a substantial
compliance with them, the application by the company for a deed was
overruled. From the final order denying that application the
present appeal is prosecuted.
Page 108 U. S. 60
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. After
reciting the facts as above set forth, he continued:
In
Brine v. Insurance Company, 96 U. S.
627, it is decided
Page 108 U. S. 61
reversing the practice which had obtained for many years in the
circuit court of the United States sitting in equity in Illinois --
that the state law giving to a mortgagor of real estate the
privilege, within twelve months after a decree of foreclosure, and
to his judgment creditors within three months thereafter, of
redeeming the premises, is a substantial right, and constitutes a
rule of property, to which the circuit court must conform.
In anticipation, however, of the difficulties which might attend
exact conformity in every case to the local statutes, the court, in
the
Brine case, said:
"It is not necessary, as has been repeatedly said in this Court,
that the form or mode of securing a right like this should follow
precisely that prescribed by the statute. It the right is
substantially preserved or secured, it may be done by such suitable
methods as the flexibility of chancery proceedings will enable the
court to adopt, and which are most in conformity with the practice
of the court."
The decision in that case doubtless suggested to the circuit
court the necessity of adopting definite rules in relation to
redemptions from sales under its own decrees. Hence, the rules to
which reference has already been made. They were established by an
order of court entered July 11, 1878.
As the determination of the present case depends upon their
construction and effect, those rules are given in full in the
margin.
*
However this difference may be regarded in the courts of
Illinois when administering the statutes by which they are created
and their jurisdiction defined and limited,
Litter v.
People, 43 Ill. 188;
Stone v. Gardner, 20 Ill. 309;
Durley v. Davis, 69 Ill. 134, we entertain no doubt of the
power of the federal court to adopt its own modes or methods
Page 108 U. S. 62
for the enforcement of the right of redemption given by the
local law. The substantial right given first to mortgagors, their
representatives, and grantees, and then to the judgment creditors
of such mortgagors or their grantees, was to redeem the property
sold within the time specified. Whether the redemption is by the
one or the other class, the money is for the benefit of the
purchaser at the decretal sale. When the amount going to him is
secured by payment into the hands of some responsible
officer, the object of the law, both as respects the purchaser at
the decretal sale and the party redeeming, is fully attained.
Redemption is effected when, by payment of the redemption money
into proper hands, the purchase at the decretal sale is annulled
and the way opened for another sale. The federal court, as
indicated by its rules, preferred that the money, if not paid
directly to the purchaser, should, by payment through its clerk,
come directly under its control for the benefit of the purchaser.
Where the sale of mortgaged premises is under a decree of the
federal court, and the execution of the judgment creditor, who
seeks to redeem is from a state court, there is an evident
propriety in requiring the money going to the purchaser at the
decretal sale to be paid through the clerk of the federal court
into its registry. The necessity for such a regulation is not so
urgent where the judgment creditor's execution is from the federal
court; but we perceive no objection to extending the regulation to
that class of cases. Under the operation of the rules in question,
the records of the federal court will in all cases show whether the
right of the purchaser to a deed has been defeated by redemption.
Can it be said that the mode prescribed by the federal court for
securing the money going to the purchaser impairs his substantial
rights? Is he less secure than he would be if the money is paid to
the officer having the execution? Clearly not. The substantial
right given by the statute to the purchaser is that the redemption
money be secured to him before the benefit of his purchase is taken
away, and the substantial right given to the party redeeming is
that the redemption becomes complete and effectual upon his payment
of the required amount. The particular mode in which the money is
paid or
Page 108 U. S. 63
secured by the latter for the benefit of the former is not of
the substance of the rights of either. The mode or manner of
payment belongs, so far as the federal court is concerned, to the
domain of practice, the power to regulate which, in harmony with
the laws of the United States and the rules of this Court, as might
be necessary and convenient for the administration of justice, is
expressly given by statute to the circuit courts. R.S. § 918.
In the conclusions thus indicated, we are only giving effect to
former decisions. In
Brine v. Insurance Co., supra, it
was, as we have seen, distinctly ruled, touching these local
statutes, that the federal court -- preserving substantially the
right of redemption -- could pursue its own forms and modes for
securing such right. The same doctrine in effect is announced in
Allis v. Insurance Co., 97 U. S. 144. That
case arose under a statute of Minnesota which allowed the defendant
in a foreclosure proceeding to redeem within twelve months after
the confirmation of the sale. The decree ordered the master, on
making sale, to deliver to the purchaser a certificate stating that
unless the property be redeemed within twelve months after the
sale, he would be entitled to a deed. This departure from the
letter of the statute was held not to be material, since
substantial effect was given to the right to redeem within one
year. The Court said:
"In the state courts, where the practice undoubtedly is to
report the sale at once for confirmation, the time begins to run
from that confirmation. But if in the federal court the practice is
to make the final confirmation and deed at the same time, it is a
necessity that the time allowed for redemption shall precede the
deed of confirmation. There is here a substantial recognition of
the right to redeem within twelve months."
It results that the objection taken to the rules established by
the court below must be overruled.
The next question to be examined is whether there could be an
effectual redemption except by payment of the amount bid, with
interest at ten percent, the rate prescribed by statute at the date
of the mortgage. Redemption was made upon the
Page 108 U. S. 64
basis of the amendatory act of 1879 reducing the rate of
interest in such cases to eight percent. The contention of the
company's counsel is that that act cannot be applied without
impairing the obligation of its contract. What was that contract?
In what did its obligation consist? By the contract between the
mortgagor and mortgagee, the former became bound to pay, within a
certain time, the mortgage debt, with the stipulated interest of
nine percent up to final decree, if one was obtained, and with six
percent thereafter, as prescribed by statute when the mortgage was
given. R.S.Ill. 1874, p. 614. Certainly the obligation of
that contract was not impaired by the act of 1879, for it
did not diminish the duty of the mortgage to pay what he agreed to
pay, or shorten the period of payment, or interfere with or take
away any remedy which the mortgagee had, by existing law, for the
enforcement of its contract.
The statute, in force when the mortgage was executed,
prescribing the rate of interest which the amount paid or bid by
the
purchaser should bear, as between him and the party
seeking to redeem, had no relation to the obligation of the
contract
between the mortgagor and mortgagee. The
mortgagor might, perhaps, have claimed that
his statutory
right to redeem could not be burdened by an
increased rate
of interest beyond that prescribed by statute at the time he
executed the mortgage. But as to the mortgagee, the obligation of
the contract was fully met when it received what the mortgage and
statute in force
when the mortgage was executed, entitled
it to demand. The rights which the purchaser at the decretal sale,
if one was had, was not of the essence of the mortgage contract,
but depended wholly upon the law in force when the sale occurred.
The company ceased to be a mortgagee when its debt was merged in
the decree, or at least when the sale occurred. Thenceforward, its
interest in the property was as purchaser, not as mortgagee. And to
require it, as purchaser, to conform to the terms for the
redemption of the property as prescribed by statute at the time of
purchase, does not in any legal sense impair the obligation of its
contract as mortgagee. It assumed the position of a purchaser,
subject necessarily
Page 108 U. S. 65
to the law then in force defining the rights of purchasers.
But it is insisted that the value of the mortgage contract was
impaired by a subsequent law reducing the interest to be paid to a
purchaser at decretal sale, this upon the assumption that the
probability of the debt's being satisfied by the decretal sale of
the property was lessened by reducing the interest which any
purchaser could realize on his bid in the event of redemption. In
other words, the reduction by a subsequent statute of the interest
to be paid to the purchaser would, it is argued, necessarily tend
to lessen the number of bidders seeking investments, and thereby
injuriously affect the value of the mortgage security.
In support of this proposition, counsel cite several decisions
of this Court in which it is ruled that the objection to a law, as
impairing the obligation of a contract, does not depend upon the
extent of the change it affects; that the laws in existence when a
contract is made, including those which affect their validity,
construction, discharge, and enforcement, enter into and form a
part of it, measuring the obligation to be performed by one party,
and the rights acquired by the other, and that one of the tests
that a contract has been impaired is that its value has been
diminished, when the Constitution prohibits any impairment at all
of its obligation.
Green v. Biddle,
8 Wheat. 1;
McCracken v.
Hayward, 2 How. 608;
Planters'
Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. 301;
Edwards v.
Kearney, 96 U. S. 595.
These decisions clearly have no application to the case now
before the Court. The laws with reference to which the parties must
be assumed to have contracted, when the mortgage was executed, were
those which in their direct or necessary legal operation controlled
or affected the obligations of such contract. We have seen that no
reduction of the rate of interest, as between the purchaser of
mortgaged property at decretal sale and the party entitled to
redeem, affected, or could possibly affect, the right of the
insurance company to receive, or the duty of mortgagor to pay, the
entire mortgage debt, with interest as stipulated in the mortgage
up to the decree of sale. And the result of the sale in this
case
Page 108 U. S. 66
shows that the company, as mortgagor, has received all that it
was entitled to demand. The reduction of the rate of interest by
the act of 1879 was by way of relief to the mortgagor and his
judgment creditors, and in no sense an injury to the mortgage. When
that act was passed, there was no person to answer the description
or to claim the rights of a purchaser; consequently no existing
rights were thereby impaired. That the reduction of interest to be
paid to the purchaser would lessen the probable number of bidders
at the decretal sale, and thereby diminish the chances of the
property bringing the mortgage debt, are plainly contingencies that
might never have arisen. They could not occur unless there was a
decretal sale, nor unless the mortgagee became the purchaser, and
are too remote to justify the conclusion, as matter of law, that
such legislation affected the value of the mortgage contract.
One other point remains to be considered. It is said that the
rules of the circuit court requiring payment to the purchaser of
interest at the rate of ten percent were never modified by any
order. The court below, we suppose, proceeded upon the ground that
the interest to be paid to the purchaser by the party redeeming was
of the substance of the rights of both; consequently that the
change in that respect, made by the state law prior to the decretal
sale,
proprio vigore, effected a modification of the rule
without a formal order. In that view we concur.
For the reasons given, the decree below should be affirmed,
and
It is so ordered.
*
"Ordered, that the following rules be entered in regard to the
redemption of property from sales under decrees in chancery in this
Court:"
"First. That whenever any real estate is sold by a master in
chancery, special commissioner, or other officer of this Court, by
virtue of any decree of foreclosure of mortgage or vendor's lien or
mechanic's lien, or for the payment of money, the master in
chancery, or officer making such sale, shall, instead of executing
a deed for the property so sold, give to the purchaser a
certificate describing the premises purchased by him, showing the
amount paid therefor, or, if purchased by the complainant, in whose
favor the decree is made, the amount of his bid, and that such
purchaser will be entitled to a deed of the property so purchased,
on the expiration of fifteen months from the date of said sale,
"
"Second. It shall be the duty of the master in chancery, or
other officer making such sale, to report the same to the court
within ten days from the day of the making thereof, unless time for
filing said report shall be extended by the court, which report
shall be confirmed as a matter of course, unless objections to said
sale are filed within twenty days after said report is required to
be filed."
"Third. Any defendant in the suit in which such decree is
rendered, his heirs, administrators, or assigns, or any person
interested through or under the defendant in the premises so sold,
may, within twelve months from said sale, redeem the real estate so
sold by paying to the purchaser thereof, his heirs, executors, or
assigns, or to the clerk of this Court, for the benefit of such
purchaser, his executors, administrators, or assigns, the sum of
money for which said premises were sold or bid off, with interest
at the rate of ten percent per annum from the date of such sale,
and in case such redemption is made by payment of the money to the
clerk, the person so redeeming shall also pay an additional sum of
one percent on the amount so paid in as the clerk's fee for
receiving and disbursing said redemption, and the clerk on
receiving said redemption money shall at once deposit the same in
the registry of this Court and file a certificate among the papers
in the cause in which said decree was entered, stating that said
real estate has been redeemed."
"Fourth. If property sold under any decree of this Court shall
not be redeemed by the defendant or defendants in the decree, or
some persons claiming by, through, or under him or them, within
twelve months from the date of said sale, then any creditor of the
debtor defendant or defendants in such decree who holds a decree or
judgment in full force, and on which he is entitled to execution
against such debtor defendant or defendants, may redeem said
property after the expiration of twelve months and before the
expiration of fifteen months, in the following manner:"
"Such creditor shall sue out an execution on his decree or
judgment, and place the same in the hands of the proper officer to
execute, who shall thereupon endorse on such execution a levy on
the property which is to be redeemed, and thereupon the person
desiring to make such redemption shall pay to the holder of such
certificate, or to the clerk of this court, the amount for which
the premises to be redeemed were sold, with interest at the rate of
ten percent per annum from the date of such sale, and if the
redemption is made by the payment of the money to the clerk, there
shall also be paid the additional sum of 1 percent on the amount of
money so paid to redeem, as the clerk's fee for receiving and
disbursing said redemption money. And the clerk shall at once pay
said money into the registry of the court for the use of the person
entitled thereto, and give a receipt for said sum to the person
making such redemption."
"And the clerk of this Court shall thereupon make and file in
the office of the recorder of the county where said premises are
situate, a certificate of such redemption, and the officer in whose
hands said execution shall have been placed, and who shall have
made said levy, shall proceed in the manner required by the
twentieth and twenty-first sections of chapter 77 of the Revised
Statutes of Illinois, entitled 'Judgments, decrees, and
executions.' After the first redemption, made as aforesaid, any
other judgment of decree creditor who shall have the right under
the laws of this state to redeem said premises from the first
redeeming judgment may apply to this court for leave to redeem said
premises from the creditor first redeeming the same, and the court
will make such order in regard to further redemption as the rights
of the parties under the law shall seem to require."
"Fifth. In all cases when the master in chancery or any other
special or general officer of this court is required to make sale
of real estate under any decree or order of this court in any
chancery suit, notice of the time and place of such sale shall be
given by publication in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the county where said real estate is situated, and in
case there is no such newspaper published in such county, then such
publication shall be made in one of the newspapers hereafter named,
published in the City of Chicago, such publication to be made as
often as once each week for three successive weeks, and the first
publication shall be at least twenty days before the day fixed for
such sale."
