1. By schedule D of the Act of July 30, 1846, c. 74, a duty of
twenty-five percent
ad valorem was imposed on "cotton
laces, cotton insertings," and "manufactures composed wholly of
cotton, not otherwise provided for." By sec. 1 of the Act of March
3, 1867, c. 98, the duties on the articles enumerated in Schedules
C and P of the act of 1846 were fixed at twenty-four and nineteen
percent, respectively, "with such exceptions as are hereinafter
made." By sec. 2 of the act of 1867, "all manufactures composed
wholly of cotton which are bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, and
delaines" were transferred to schedule C.
Held that laces
and insertings composed wholly of cotton, and bleached or dyed,
were dutiable at twenty-four percent, under the act of 1857.
2. The designations qualified by the word "cotton" in the act of
1846 are designations of articles by special description, as
contradistinguished from designations by a commercial name or a
name of trade, and are designations of quality and material.
3. Under the Act of March 2, 1799, c. 23, the collector of
customs is not entitled to a fee for putting on an invoice a stamp
or certificate as to the presentation of the invoice, or for an
oath to an entry or for a jurat to such oath, or for his order to
the storekeeper to deliver examined packages.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit commenced in 1863, by the members of the firm of
S. Cochran & Co. against the collector of the port of New York.
As tried in the circuit court, it involved the recovery back of
duties paid on cotton laces and cotton insertings imported from
abroad in 1857, 1858, 1859, 1860, and 1861, and of fees paid at the
custom house. The laces and insertings were composed wholly of
cotton, and were "either bleached or dyed." The collector charged a
duty on them of twenty-four percent
ad valorem, the
importers claiming that the proper duty was nineteen percent
ad
valorem. At the trial, the court
Page 107 U. S. 618
instructed the jury that the duty was correctly assessed and
that the plaintiffs could not recover.
The question as to the fees involved four items. On the
presentation of an invoice and an entry, the collector, before he
would receive them as collector, impressed on each invoice, for the
convenience and security of himself and the government, a stamp or
certificate, certifying in the name of a deputy collector that the
invoice was presented "on entry" on such a day. On each entry, one
of the plaintiffs' firm was required to make and subscribe before
the collector or his deputy the owner's or consignee's oath. For
each of such stamps the collector exacted twenty cents, and for
each of such oaths twenty cents. He also exacted a fee of twenty
cents for each permit to land the merchandise embraced in each
entry on which the duties had been paid or secured, such permit
being signed by the collector and the naval officer. Said three
fees of twenty cents were paid with the duties, and otherwise no
permit for the landing and delivery of the goods could be obtained.
The permit to land covered all the goods embraced in the entry, but
at least one package of each invoice, and one package in every ten
packages of each invoice, were, by order of the collector,
designated on each invoice, and each entry, and also on the permit,
to be sent, and were sent, to the public store for examination and
appraisement; and after they had been examined and appraised and
reported on, an order was required by the plaintiffs' firm, signed
by the collector alone, to the storekeeper, to deliver such
examined packages to the plaintiffs' firm. For every such order,
without which the examined packages could not be obtained, the
collector exacted a fee of twenty cents. At the trial, the
plaintiffs conceded that the fee for the permit was legal. The
court directed a verdict for the plaintiffs for the amounts exacted
for the other three fees, with interest, being $1,734.80, and,
after a judgment for the plaintiffs therefor, with costs, the
plaintiffs sued out a writ of error based on their failure to
recover the alleged excess of duty exacted on the laces and
insertings, and the defendant sued out a writ of error based on the
recovery for the three alleged illegal fees.
By Schedule D of the Act of July 30, 1846, c. 74, a duty of
twenty-five percent
ad valorem was imposed on "cotton
laces,
Page 107 U. S. 619
cotton insertings, cotton trimming laces, cotton laces and
braids," and "manufactures composed wholly of cotton not otherwise
provided for."
By sec. 1 of the Act of March 3, 1857, c. 98, it was enacted
that after July 1, 1857,
ad valorem duties should be
imposed in lieu of those then imposed on imported goods, as
follows: "Upon the articles enumerated in Schedules A and B" of the
Tariff Act of 1846, a duty of thirty percent, "and upon those
enumerated in Schedule, C, D, E, F, G, and H of said act," the
duties of twenty-four, nineteen, fifteen, twelve, eight, and four
percent, respectively, "with such exceptions as are hereinafter
made." The schedules above mentioned respectively imposed duties of
one hundred, forty, thirty, twenty-five, twenty, fifteen, ten, and
five percent.
Thus far cotton laces and cotton insertings, being in Schedule D
of the act of 1846 at twenty-five percent, were reduced by the act
of 1857, with the other articles in schedule D, to nineteen
percent. But sec. 2 of the act of 1857 provided
"That all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are
bleached, printed, painted, or died, and delaines, shall be
transferred to Schedule C."
Under this provision, it would seem very plain that the goods in
the present case were subject to a duty of twenty-four percent, and
not of nineteen percent. If sec. 1 of the act of 1857 had merely
reduced from twenty-five percent to nineteen percent the duty on
the articles specially mentioned in Schedule D of the act of 1846,
without exception, the duty on the goods in question would have
been reduced to nineteen percent. But the enactment was distinct
that there should be excepted out of the reduction "all
manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached,
printed, painted, or dyed, and delaines," and that they should go
into Schedule C, the twenty-four percent schedule.
The contention for the plaintiff is that as cotton laces and
cotton insertings were made dutiable by those names in the act of
1846, they are not to be affected by the subsequent general
provision as to manufactures composed wholly of cotton.
Schedule C of the act of 1846 imposed a duty of thirty percent
on "cotton cords, gimps, and galloons," and on "manufactures of
cotton, . . . if embroidered or tamboured in the loom
Page 107 U. S. 620
or otherwise, by machinery, or with the needle, or other
process." Schedule E imposed a duty of twenty percent on "caps,
gloves, leggins, mits, socks, stockings, wove shirts, and drawers,
made on frames, composed wholly of cotton, worn by men, women, and
children," and on "velvet, in the piece, composed wholly of
cotton." These provisions, and the one in Schedule D as to cotton
laces, etc., relate to goods made of cotton entirely. Those goods
are all of them goods to which, as "manufactures composed wholly of
cotton," sec. 2 of the act of 1857 applies, transferring them, when
bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, to the twenty-four percent
schedule, Schedule C. The duty on them had been thirty,
twenty-five, and twenty percent, respectively. But for such
transfer the new duty on those in Schedules D and E would have been
nineteen and fifteen. A new uniform rate of twenty-four was
imposed, and while the thirty was reduced by six percent, the
twenty-five was reduced by only one, and the twenty was increased
by four. This indicates an intention, in the act of 1857, to
impose, in general, on manufactures composed wholly of cotton, when
bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, a relatively higher duty as
compared with other articles named in the act of 1846.
The expression "manufactures composed wholly of cotton" is not
found in the act of 1846. It is in that act qualified by the words
"not otherwise provided for." In the act of 1857, the expression is
"all manufactures composed wholly of cotton, which are bleached,"
&c. If the words "manufactures composed wholly of cotton,"
unqualified, and the words "cotton laces," and "cotton insertings,"
had all of them been found in the act of 1846, as the general
expression would not have embraced the specific terms in that act,
for dutiable purposes, though including them in general language,
it would be reasonable to say that the general expression in a
later act would not include the specific terms, for dutiable
purposes. But the fact that the general expression, as used in
Schedule D of the act of 1846, is qualified by the words "not
otherwise provided for" shows that there were manufactures composed
wholly of cotton otherwise provided for -- that is, in other items
in that act. Thus, besides the embroidered and tamboured
manufactures of cotton provided for in Schedule C of that act,
there are cords,
Page 107 U. S. 621
gimps, galloons, laces, insertings, trimming laces, laces and
braids, each with the word "cotton" prefixed, indicating
manufactures composed wholly of cotton, and there are also the
articles composed wholly of cotton named in Schedule E. The
material "cotton" is the thing of special mark, as the sole
material in the manufacture. In this view, it cannot properly be
said that these manufactured articles, manufactures of cotton
composed wholly of cotton, designated in the act of 1846 always by
the epithet "cotton" applied to them, are not embraced, for
dutiable purposes, in the terms "all manufactures composed wholly
of cotton," in sec. 2 of the act of 1857.
The designations qualified by the word "cotton," in the act of
1846, are designations of articles by special description, as
contradistinguished from designations by a commercial name or a
name of trade. They are designations of quality and material. The
articles referred to, named in Schedules C, D, and E of the act of
1846, are all of them manufactures wholly of cotton; but under that
act, they were not all subject to the same duty, and so that act
designates them substantially as manufactures wholly of cotton
which are gimps at thirty percent, manufactures wholly of cotton
which are laces or insertings at twenty-five percent, manufactures
wholly of cotton which are stockings, made on frames and worn by
human beings at twenty percent, and so on. But for the exceptions
provided for by sec. 1 of the act of 1857 the duties on those
articles, if bleached, printed, painted, or dyed, would have been
reduced to twenty-four, nineteen, and fifteen percent,
respectively, but sec. 2 of that act says in substance that
manufactures wholly of cotton which are gimps, or laces, or
insertings, or stockings, and so on shall all of them be subject to
twenty-four percent duty. T his was the view applied by Mr. Justice
Nelson in
Reimer v. Schell, 4 Blatchford C.C. 328, in
1859, to colored cotton hosiery, under the provisions in question,
and we think it a sound one. It was the view adopted by the circuit
court in this case. There is no question of commercial designation.
Hence the cases cited and relied on by the importers are not cases
in their favor.
Homer v. The
Collector, 1 Wall. 486, in 1863, was a case in
which Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of this Court.
Page 107 U. S. 622
It was a case under these same statutes. Almonds were dutiable
by that name at forty percent in Schedule B of the act of 1846.
Under the act of 1857, the duty on the articles in said Schedule B
was reduced to and fixed at thirty percent, and the collector
exacted that duty on almonds. It was contended that as, by sec. 2
of the latter act, "fruits, green, ripe, or dried," were
transferred to Schedule G, and so made subject to only eight
percent duty, almonds were so transferred, as being "fruits, green,
ripe, or dried." An attempt was made at the trial to show that at
the time the act of 1857 was passed, almonds were fruit, green,
ripe, or dried, according to the commercial understanding of those
terms in the markets of this country, and questions were certified
to this Court, on a division of opinion in the circuit court, as to
the proper duty on almonds and as to the admissibility of such
evidence. It was contended for the importer that the term "dried
fruits," in popular meaning, included almonds. The government
claimed that the term "almonds" was a specific name, and therefore
commercial nomenclature had no application. This Court held that
inquiry as to whether, in a commercial sense, almonds were dried
fruit had nothing to do with the question, as a duty had been
imposed on almonds
eo nomine almost immemorially, and that
as almonds were charged specifically with a duty of forty percent
in the act of 1846, and were not named as almonds in the changes in
the act of 1857, and full effect could be given to the term "fruit,
dried," without including almonds in it, it followed that almonds
were dutiable at thirty percent. There is nothing in this decision
that overrules that in
Reimer v. Schell or that aids the
importers in the present case. The act of 1846, in substance,
mentions manufactures wholly of cotton which are laces or
insertings, bleached or dyed, and ยง 2 of the act of 1857 mentions
them in naming manufactures composed wholly of cotton, bleached or
dyed.
Nor does the case of
Reiche v.
Smythe, 13 Wall. 162, as to birds, apply. That case
was decided on the ground that the word "animals" in the act of
1861 did not include "birds," and so could not include them in the
act of 1866.
There is nothing in
Smythe v.
Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, or in
Arthur v.
Morrison, 96 U. S. 108, which
applies to this case.
Page 107 U. S. 623
Movius v. Arthur, 95 U. S. 144, was
decided on the same view as that of
Homer v. The
Collector. "Patent leather" had been dutiable by that name in
the acts of 1861 and 1862. The act of 1872 imposed a less duty on
"skins dressed and finished, of all kinds." This Court held that
patent leather continued subject to the former duty on the view
that although patent leather was a finished skin, something was
done to it after it could be called a finished skin to make patent
leather of it, and that it could not have been intended to include
patent leather in the general designation of "finished skins."
In
Arthur v. Lahey, 96 U. S. 112, the
subject of duty was laces, manufactures of silk, on which a duty of
sixty percent was exacted, under the act of 1864, as "silk laces."
It was contended that they were dutiable at thirty percent as
"thread laces," under the act of 1861, as amended by the act of
1862. The question being submitted to the jury whether they were
commercially known as "thread laces," although made of silk, it was
found that they were, and the plaintiffs had a verdict. This Court
held that the question was one of commercial designation, and that
the prior specific designation of "thread laces" must prevail over
the words "silk laces," it appearing that there were thread laces
of cotton and thread laces of silk, and articles commercially known
as silk laces, the designation of "thread lace" depending on the
mode of manufacture. The principle of that case and of kindred
cases, such as
Arthur v. Rheims, 96 U. S.
143, is that the specific designation of an article by a
commercial name will prevail over a general term in a later act,
and has no application to the present case, which is not, as to
cotton laces and cotton insertings, one of designation by a
commercial name.
The bill of exceptions in the present case states that
previously to about 1879, there was no cotton laces printed or
dyed, and that from 1850 to 1861 there were many goods composed
wholly of cotton, and bleached, printed, painted, colored, or dyed,
such as calicoes (prints), lawns, handkerchiefs, velvets, and
velveteens, and cotton piece goods generally. If, when sec. 2 of
the act of 1857 was enacted, the words "printed" and "painted" were
not applicable to laces, it does not follow that the provision is
to be limited to such cotton articles as
Page 107 U. S. 624
were then printed or painted as well as bleached or dyed. It
includes any article which, as then known, satisfied any one of the
conditions.
We see no warrant for the view that the act of 1857 applies only
to piece goods.
It results from these views that the goods in question were
subject to the duty imposed.
As to the three disputed fees, we are of opinion that they were
none of them allowed by the law in force, sec. 2 of the Act of
March 2, 1799, c. 23.
The stamp or certificate on the invoice was one for the
convenience and security of the collector and the government, and
was not an "official certificate" in the sense of the statute. It
was not an official document required by the merchant, nor was it
given to him. It was a memorandum between officers in the custom
house, as a part of their system of checks and authentications.
The fee for the oath to the entry, as a fee for its
administration, was not named in the statute. As a fee for the
jurat to the oath, although the oath was required by the statute,
and its form was prescribed, and it was to be taken before the
collector, the jurat was not an official document required by the
merchant or given to him.
The bill of exceptions states that the order to the storekeeper
to deliver examined packages was an order required by the
plaintiffs' firm from the collector. But we do not think it was an
official certificate or an official document required by the
merchant in the sense of the statute. The permit to land the goods
having been issued and paid for, and the duties paid or secured, it
was the duty of the officers of the customs to deliver the goods,
when examined. The order to the storekeeper was a memorandum
between officers. It was "required" by the merchant in one sense,
because without it, according to the course of business, the
storekeeper would not deliver the examined packages, but it was not
an official document passing from the custom house to the
merchant.
Judgment affirmed.