1. In the absence of a special contract, a railroad company, by
receiving cattle for transportation over its own line and other
lines therewith connected, is only bound to carry the cattle over
its own line, and deliver them safely to the next connecting
carrier.
2. A contract whereby the liability of the company is sought to
be extended beyond such carriage and delivery will not be inferred
from loose and doubtful expressions, but must be established by
clear and satisfactory evidence. Taking a through fare on the
receipt of the cattle does not establish such liability.
3. The receipt of the company,
post, p.
107 U. S. 103,
does not of itself constitute such contract. The circumstances
under which it was given should have been submitted to the jury to
determine whether in fact a through contract was made.
4. In passing upon the rights of the parties, this Court will
not be controlled by the judicial decisions of the state where the
contract of carriage was made.
This is an action for breach of two alleged contracts of the
Michigan Central Railroad Company with the plaintiff, Paris Myrick,
each to carry for him two hundred and two head of cattle from
Chicago to Philadelphia and there deliver them to his order. It
arises out of these facts:
Myrick was in 1877 engaged at Chicago in the business of buying
cattle, sometimes on his own account and sometimes for others, and
forwarding them by railway to Philadelphia. The company is a
corporation created by the State of Michigan, and its line extends
from Chicago to Detroit, where it connects with the Great Western
Railroad, which, by its connections, leads to Philadelphia.
In November, 1877, Myrick purchased two lots of cattle, each
consisting of two hundred and two head, and shipped them over the
road of the company. One of the purchases
Page 107 U. S. 103
and shipments was made on the seventh and the other on the
fourteenth of the month. It will suffice to give the particulars of
the first of these transactions, as they were identical in all
respects except in the amount of the draft negotiated and the
weight of the cattle. On the shipment of the cattle, Myrick took
from the company a receipt, as follows:
"
MICHIGAN CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY"
"CHICAGO STATION, November 7, 1877"
"Received from Paris Myrick, in apparent good order, consigned
order Paris Myrick (notify J. and W. Blaker, Philadelphia,
Pa.):"
-----------------------------------------------------------
Articles Weight or
Measure
-----------------------------------------------------------
Two hundred and two (202) cattle . . . . . . . 240,000
-----------------------------------------------------------
"Advance charges, $12. Marked and described as above (contents
and value otherwise unknown) for transportation by the Michigan
Central Railroad Company to the warehouse at _____."
"WM. GEAGAN,
Agent"
On the margin of the receipt was the following:
"This company will not hold itself responsible for the accuracy
of these weights as between buyer and seller, the approximate
weight having been ascertained by track scales, which is
sufficiently accurate for freighting purposes, but may not be
strictly correct as between buyer and seller. This receipt can be
exchanged for a through bill of lading."
"NOTICE -- See rules of transportation on the back hereof. Use
separate receipts for each consignment."
On the back of the receipt the rules were printed, one of which,
the eleventh, was as follows:
"Goods or property consigned to any place off the company's line
of road, or to any point or place beyond the termini, will be sent
forward by a carrier or freightman, when there are such, in the
usual manner, the company acting, for the purpose of delivery to
such carrier, as the agent of the consignor or consignee, and not
as carrier. The company will not be liable or responsible for
any
Page 107 U. S. 104
loss, damage, or injury to the property after the same shall
have been sent from any warehouse or station of the company."
On the day this receipt was obtained, Myrick drew and delivered
to the Commercial National Bank at Chicago, a draft, of which the
following is a copy:
"$12,287.57] CHICAGO, November 7, 1877"
"Pay to the order of Geo. L. Otis, cashier, twelve thousand two
hundred and eighty-seven 57/100 dollars, value received, and charge
the same to account of"
"PARIS MYRICK"
"To J. and W. Blaker, Newtown, Pa."
As security for its payment, Myrick endorsed the receipt
obtained from the railroad company and delivered it, with the
draft, to the bank, which thereupon gave him the money for it.
The cattle were carried on the road of the Michigan Central to
Detroit, and thence over the road of the Great Western Railroad
Company to Buffalo, and thence over the roads of other companies to
Philadelphia, the last of which was the road of the North
Pennsylvania Railroad Company. They arrived in Philadelphia in
about four days after their shipment, where, according to the
uniform custom in the course of business of the railroad company,
they were they were turned over to the Drove-Yard Company, which
was formed for the purpose of receiving cattle arriving there,
taking care of them, and delivering them to their owners or
consignees. This company notified the Blakers of the arrival of the
cattle and delivered them to those parties without the production
of the carrier's receipt transferred by Myrick to the Commercial
National Bank. The Blakers paid the expense of the transportation,
took possession of the cattle, sold them, and appropriated the
proceeds. The lot shipped on the 14th of November were delivered in
like manner to the Blakers by the Drove-Yard Company without the
production of the carrier's receipt, given to the bank, and were in
like manner disposed of. Soon afterwards, the Blakers failed, and
the two drafts on them, one made upon the shipment of November 7
and the other on the shipment of November 14, were not paid. Hence
the present action for the value of the cattle thus lost to the
bank, Myrick suing for its use.
It appeared on the trial that Myrick had made previous
Page 107 U. S. 105
shipments of cattle from Chicago to Philadelphia and taken
similar receipts from the Michigan Central Railroad Company; that
the cattle shipped had always been delivered by the Pennsylvania
Company at Philadelphia to the Drove-Yard Company there, and by
that company delivered to the Blakers without the production of the
carrier's receipt or any bill of lading; that the Blakers were
dealers in cattle, and had particular pens in the yards assigned to
them; that the cattle of the shipments of November 7 and November
14 were, on their arrival, placed by the superintendent of the
drove-yards in those pens and were sold by the Blakers on the
following day, and that the carrier's receipt was not called for
either by the railroad or the stockyard company. It also appeared
on the trial that Myrick bought the cattle for the Blakers, and
that a person employed by them accompanied the cattle from Chicago
until their delivery at the drove-yard at Philadelphia; that the
through rate from Chicago to Philadelphia on the cattle was
fifty-eight cents per hundred; that notice of this rate was posted
in the station of the defendant company at Chicago, and that it was
not the custom of the railroad company at Philadelphia to look to
the consignee for freight, but collected it from the Drove-Yard
Company.
The court was requested to give to the jury various
instructions, one of which, though presented under many forms,
amounts substantially to this: that as the road of the Michigan
Central Railroad Company terminates at Detroit, the company was not
bound, in the absence of special contract, to transport the cattle
beyond such termination, and that the receipt of freight for a
point beyond and an agreement for a through fare did not of
themselves establish such a contract.
The court refused to give this instruction or any embodying the
principle which it expresses. On the contrary, it instructed the
jury that the receipt, termed "bill of lading," under the
circumstances in which it was made, was a through contract whereby
the defendant agreed to transport the cattle named in it from
Chicago the Philadelphia, and there deliver them to the order of
Paris Myrick, and to notify the Blakers from Chicago to
Philadelphia, and the undertaking on the part of the defendant
company with the plaintiff Myrick, and with any
Page 107 U. S. 106
assignee or holder of the contract. The facts attending the
transaction not being disputed, there could be only one result from
this instruction -- a recovery by the plaintiff. From the judgment
entered thereon the case is brought to this Court for review.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court, and, after
stating the case as above, proceeded as follows:
The principal question presented by the instruction requested by
the defendant has been elaborately considered and adjudged by this
Court. It is only necessary, therefore, to state the conclusion
reached.
A railroad company is a carrier of goods for the public, and as
such is bound to carry safely whatever goods are entrusted to it
for transportation, within the course of its business, to the end
of its route, and there deposit them in a suitable place for their
owners or consignees. If the road of the company connects with
other roads, and goods are received for transportation beyond the
termination of its own line, there is superadded to its duty as a
common carrier that of a forwarder by the connecting line; that is,
to deliver safely the goods to such line -- the next carrier on the
route beyond. This forwarding duty arises from the obligation
implied in taking the goods for the point beyond its own line. The
common law imposes no greater duty than this. If more is expected
from the company receiving the shipment, there must be a special
agreement for it. This is the doctrine of this Court, although a
different rule of liability is adopted in England and in some of
the states. As was said in
Railroad Company v. Manufacturing
Company.
"It is unfortunate for the interests of commerce that there is
any diversity of opinion on such a subject, especially in this
country, but the rule that holds the carrier only liable to the
extent of his own route, and for the safe storage and delivery to
the next carrier, is in itself so just and reasonable that we do
not hesitate to give it our sanction."
83 U. S. 16 Wall.
318,
83 U. S.
324.
Page 107 U. S. 107
This doctrine was approved in the subsequent case of
Railroad Company v.
Pratt, 22 Wall. 123, although the contract there
was to carry through the whole route. Such a contract may, of
course, be made with any one of different connecting lines. There
is no objection in law to a contract of the kind, with its
attendant liabilities.
See also Insurance Company v. Railroad
Company, 104 U. S. 146.
The general doctrine, then, as to transportation by connecting
lines, approved by this Court, and also by a majority of the state
courts, amounts to this: that each road, confining itself to its
common law liability, is only bound, in the absence of a special
contract, to safely carry over its own route and safely to deliver
to the next connecting carrier, but that anyone of the companies
may agree that over the whole route its liability shall extend. In
the absence of a special agreement to that effect, such liability
will not attach, and the agreement will not be inferred from
doubtful expressions or loose language, but only from clear and
satisfactory evidence. Although a railroad company is not a common
carrier of live animals in the same sense that it is a carrier of
goods, its responsibilities being in many respects different, yet
when it undertakes generally to carry such freight it assumes,
under similar conditions, the same obligations, so far as the route
is concerned over which the freight is to be carried.
In the present case, the court below held that by its receipt,
construed in the light of the circumstances under which it was
given, the Michigan Central Railroad Company assumed the
responsibility of transporting the cattle over the whole route from
Chicago to Philadelphia. It did not submit the receipt with
evidence of the attendant circumstances to the jury to determine
whether such a through contract was made. It ruled that the receipt
itself constituted such a contract. In this respect it erred. The
receipt does not, on its face, import any bargain to carry the
freight through. It does not say that the freight is to be
transported to Philadelphia, or that it was received for
transportation there. It only says that it is consigned to the
order of Paris Myrick, and that the Blakers at Philadelphia are to
be notified. And, after the description of the property, it adds:
"Marked and described as above (contents
Page 107 U. S. 108
and value otherwise unknown) for transportation by the Michigan
Central Railroad Company to the warehouse at _____," leaving the
place blank. This blank may have been intended for the insertion of
some place on the road of the company, or at its termination. It
cannot be assumed by the court, in the absence of evidence on the
point, that it was intended for the place of the final destination
of the cattle. On the margin of the receipt is the following:
"NOTICE -- See rules of transportation on the back hereof." And
among the rules is one declaring that goods consigned to any place
off the company's line or beyond it would be sent forward by a
carrier or freightman, when there are such, in the usual manner,
the company acting for that purpose as the agent of the consignor
or consignee, and not as carrier, and that the company would not be
responsible for any loss, damage, or injury to the property after
the same shall have been sent from its warehouse or station. Though
this rule, brought to the knowledge of this shipper, might not
limit the liability imposed by a specific through contract, yet it
would tend to rebut any inference of such a contract from the
receipt of goods marked for a place beyond the road of the
company.
The doctrine invoked by the plaintiff's counsel against the
limitation by contract of the common law responsibility of carriers
has no application. There is, as already stated, no common law
responsibility devolving upon any carrier to transport goods over
other than its own lines, and the laws of Illinois restricting the
right to limit such responsibility do not therefore touch the case.
Nor was the common law liability of the defendant corporation
enlarged by the fact that a notice of the charges for through
transportation was posted in the defendant's stationhouse at
Chicago. Such notices are usually found in stations on lines which
connect with other lines, and they furnish important information to
shippers, who naturally desire to know what the charges are for
through freight, as well as for those over a single line. It would
be unfortunate if this information could not be given by a public
notice in the station of a company without subjecting that company,
if freight is taken by it, to responsibility for the manner in
which it is carried on intermediate and connecting lines to the end
of the route.
Page 107 U. S. 109
Nor was the liability of the company affected by the fact that
the notice on the margin of the receipt stated that the ticket
given might be "exchanged for a through bill of lading." It would
seem to indicate that the receipt was not deemed of itself to
constitute a through contract. The through bill of lading may also
have contained a limitation as to the extent of the route over
which the company would undertake to carry the cattle. Besides, if
weight is to be given to this notice as characterizing the contract
made, it must be taken with the rule to which it also calls
attention, that the company assumed responsibility only for
transportation over its own line.
It follows from the views expressed that the court below erred
in its charge that the ticket or bill of lading was a through
contract, whereby the defendant company agreed to transfer the
cattle to Philadelphia and safely deliver them there to the order
of Myrick.
Our attention has been called to some decisions of the Supreme
Court of Illinois which would seem to hold that a railroad company
which receives goods to carry marked for a particular destination,
though beyond its own line, is
prima facie bound to carry
them to that place and deliver them there, and that an agreement to
that effect is implied by the reception of goods thus marked.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88;
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 34 Ill. 389.
Assuming that such is the purport of the decisions, they are not
binding upon us . What constitutes a contract of carriage is not a
question of local law upon which the decision of a state court must
control. It is a matter of general law, upon which this Court will
exercise its own judgment.
Chicago City v.
Robbins, 2 Black 418;
Railroad Co. v. National
Bank, 102 U. S. 14, and
Hough v. Railway Company, 100 U.
S. 213.
If the doctrine of the Supreme Court of Illinois as to what
constitutes contract of carriage over connecting lines of roads is
sound, it ought to govern not only in Illinois, but in other
states, and yet the tribunals of other states, and a majority of
them, hold the reverse of the Illinois court, and coincide with the
views of this Court. Such is the case in Massachusetts.
Page 107 U. S. 110
Nutting v. Connecticut River Railroad Co., 1 Gray
(Mass.) 502;
Burroughs v. Norwich & Worcester Railroad
Co., 100 Mass. 26. If we are to follow on this subject the
ruling of the state courts, we should be obliged to give a
different interpretation to the same act -- the reception of goods
marked for a place beyond the road of the company -- in different
states, holding it to imply one thing in Illinois and another in
Massachusetts.
The judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new
trial, and it is
So ordered.
