1. Where, by a contract for the construction of a ship, the
builder is to furnish the requisite labor and materials and to
receive therefor a sum payable in installments as the work
progresses, this Court will not enforce any arbitrary rule of
construction in determining the question whether the title remains
in the builder until the ship is delivered or ready for delivery,
or whether the property in so much of her as on the payment of any
installment is completed passes to the other party, but it will
carry into effect the intent of the parties, to be gathered from
the terms of the contract and the circumstances attending the
transaction.
2. Being thereunto authorized, the Secretary of the Navy entered
into a contract with S. whereby the latter covenanted to construct
a shot-and-shell-proof war steamer for harbor defense. The
Secretary was to appoint an agent to receive and, on account of the
Navy Department, receipt for all materials delivered at S.'s
establishment for the construction of the steamer -- the materials,
when receipted for, to become the property of the United States,
and to be marked "U.S." The agent's certificate to S.'s accounts
for materials and labor was the evidence on which payments were to
be made to the latter. S. executed a mortgage to the United States
to secure his faithful performance of the contract, conferring upon
the mortgagee, in case of his failure to fulfill it, power to enter
upon his establishment and sell the steamer. When the steamer
should be fully completed by S. and accepted by the United States,
the balance of the purchase price was then to be paid and the
mortgage surrendered. The period within which the vessel was to be
completed was from time to time extended. S. died, and the vessel
was never finished.
Held
1. That the title to the unfinished vessel remained in S., and
that no property therein vested in the United States.
2. That by the resolution of Congress, releasing and conveying
to his heirs at law "all the right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to" the vessel, nothing passed to them.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The controversy in this case arises between the plaintiffs in
error, who are, with others, heirs at law of Robert L. Stevens,
Page 106 U. S. 506
deceased, and the State of New Jersey, and involves the title to
an uncompleted ship-of-war known as the Stevens battery.
The claim of the plaintiffs in error is founded on a resolution
of Congress approved July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 628, as follows:
"
A resolution releasing to the heirs at law of Robert L.
Stevens, deceased, all the right, title, and interest of the United
States in and to 'Stevens battery.'"
"
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, that all the
right, title, and interest of the United States in and to Stevens
battery be, and the same hereby are, released and conveyed to the
heirs at law of the and conveyed to the heirs at law of the
representatives."
Robert L. Stevens died in 1856, having his domicile in New
Jersey, and by his will constituted his brother, Edwin A. Stevens,
who was one of his heirs at law, and whom he made one of his
executors, his sole residuary devisee and legatee.
Conceiving himself to be the owner of the unfinished vessel, of
which he had been in possession since the death of his brother, and
claiming as his residuary legatee, he directed his executors to
complete it on his general plan at a cost not exceeding $1,000,000,
and then to offer it to the State of New Jersey as a present. The
executors, after having expended $919,915.49 upon the vessel, found
that they could not finish it for the amount of money to which they
were limited, and discontinued the work. In the meantime, the State
of New Jersey had accepted the bequest, and the consent of Congress
thereto was given in the following resolution, approved July 1,
1870:
"
A resolution giving the consent of Congress to the
reception of a certain bequest by the New Jersey under the will of
the late Edwin A. Stevens."
"Whereas, Edwin A. Stevens, who was in his lifetime the owner of
the ship known as the
Stevens Battery, originally
commenced under contract for the United States government, and upon
the building of which large sums of money were spent by his brother
and himself, did, by his last will and testament (the United States
having previously relinquished all claims to said ship), leave
the
Page 106 U. S. 507
same to be finished by his executors at an expense not exceeding
the sum of one million dollars, and when finished to be offered to
the State of New Jersey as a present, to be by her received and
disposed of as the said state shall deem proper; and"
"Whereas, doubts have been suggested as to the right of the said
state to accept the said bequest without the consent of Congress,
under the prohibition of the tenth section of the first article of
the Constitution of the United States; therefore,"
"
Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America, in Congress assembled, that the
consent of Congress is hereby given that the State of New Jersey
shall receive and dispose of the said ship according to the terms
and conditions of said bequest."
A bill in equity was filed in the Chancery Court of New Jersey
by the executors of Edwin A. Stevens, asking for a construction of
the will in certain particulars, including the question arising
upon this bequest to the State of New Jersey. The Attorney General
appeared on behalf of the state, and filed an information by way of
a cross-bill, to which the heirs at law of Robert L. Stevens were
made parties, as claiming an adverse title. A final decree was
made, establishing the title of the state, which was affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Errors and Appeals. To reverse that decree
the present writ of error is prosecuted, the question presented
being one, which, as it arises under a law of the United States,
and the decision thereon of the state court being in denial of the
title claimed under the authority thereof, falls within the
jurisdiction of this Court.
To determine the proper construction and legal effect of the
resolution of Congress of July 17, 1862, it becomes necessary to
trace from its origin the history of the Stevens battery.
An act of Congress "authorizing the construction of a war
steamer for harbor defense," approved April 14, 1842, enacted
"that the Secretary of the Navy be and he is hereby authorized
to enter into a contract with Robert L. Stevens for the
construction of a war steamer, shot and shell-proof, to be built
principally of iron, upon the plan of the said Stevens, provided
the whole cost, including the hull, armament, engines, boiler, and
equipment, in all respects complete for service, shall not exceed
the average cost of the steamers Missouri and Mississippi,
Page 106 U. S. 508
and $250,000 was thereby appropriated toward carrying the law
into effect."
In pursuance of this law, on February 10, 1843, the Secretary of
the Navy entered into a contract with Robert L. Stevens for the
construction of a war steamer for harbor defense, which recited his
proposal, describing the vessel, and containing certain
specifications as to its construction, with a covenant on his part
that he would faithfully build and construct the steamer
conformably to the plan submitted, and complete the same within two
years, provided Congress should make the further appropriations
necessary for the purpose within a reasonable period.
According to the plan proposed, the war steamer was to be shot
and shell-proof against the artillery then in use on board vessels
of war,
viz., from 18-pounders to 64-pounders; to be
propelled by submerged machinery, called Stevens' circular shells;
to have greater speed than any of our steam vessels of war then
built; the whole engine to be out of the way of shot from any
vessel of an enemy, and with other specifications as to the
character of the material and the dimensions and relations of the
parts, which are important to be noticed only so far as to show
that the proposed vessel was to be constructed upon a plan original
and novel, and with the expectation of results not previously
obtained in any naval construction.
On November 14, 1844, the Secretary of the Navy and Stevens
entered into an explanatory contract which recited that the
stipulations of the former had been found to be too loose and
indefinite as to the details of its execution, and that the parties
considering themselves bound by so much thereof as related to the
dimensions, power, ability to resist shot and shell, and other
qualities and arrangements of the vessel, and the amount to be paid
therefor, entered into further stipulations modifying and
explaining the same. The time for the completion and delivery of
the vessel was extended two years from the date of the new
contract. Many additional specifications as to the details of
construction were inserted. It was agreed that if the cost of
making any models or patterns used in the construction should be
included in bills paid by the United States in the course of the
work or at its completion, they should become the property of the
United States.
Page 106 U. S. 509
It was also agreed that the Secretary of the Navy should appoint
some person, whom Stevens should admit within his establishment for
building said vessel, whose duty it should be to receive and
receipt for, on account of the Navy Department, all materials
delivered therein for constructing said steamer, which materials,
when so received and receipted for, should be distinctly marked
with the letters U.S. and should become the property of and belong
to the United States, and it should be his further duty to certify
all accounts, presented and certified by Stevens, for materials and
labor, which should form the evidence on which payment should be
made; but the authority of such inspecting officer, it was
understood, should not extend to a right to judge of the quality or
fitness of the materials or workmanship, but merely as to the cost
thereof; "it being understood," the contract proceeds,
"that the quality and fitness thereof, with other matters
concerning the performance of the contract, are to be inspected and
determined in the manner hereinafter provided for."
It was thereupon further stipulated that before the final
payment for the said war steamer should be made, a certificate
should be rendered to the Navy Department that in her construction,
armament, and equipment, all the provisions of the contract had
been fully performed by Stevens, which certificate should be given
and signed by persons appointed to examine the vessel -- one by
Stevens, one by the Secretary of the Navy, and, in case of
disagreement, a third by the other two -- the decision of the
majority to be conclusive. It was also agreed that Stevens, in lieu
of other security for the faithful performance of the contract on
his part, should make to the United States a mortgage, which should
be a first lien on all the land, docks, wharves, slips, and all
their appurtenances belonging to and embraced within the
establishment at Hoboken, New Jersey, at which the war steamer was
to be constructed, with ample power to enter upon and sell the same
in case of failure on the part of the said Stevens to fulfill his
part of the contract or so much thereof as should be necessary to
complete any deficiencies on his part.
The Secretary of the Navy agreed to pay, as the price of the
said war steamer when fully completed and delivered at the navy
yard at Brooklyn, in conformity with the contract,
Page 106 U. S. 510
the sum of $586,717.84, the supposed mean cost of the steamers
Missouri and
Mississippi, or any additional sum
that might afterwards be ascertained as properly included in that
cost, to be endorsed on the contract "as the price which is to be
paid for the said war steamer when fully completed, delivered, and
accepted."
Payments were to be made, from time to time, upon bills
certified by Stevens and the agent of the United States, for not
less than $5,000 each, and approved by the Navy Department, until
the sum of $500,000 should have been paid, at which time it was
stipulated that an examination should be had of the war steamer by
persons to be appointed, as before agreed, for final examination,
and if a majority of them should certify their opinion that the
vessel could be fully completed according to contract for the
remaining balance which might then be due, then payments of further
bills in full should continue, not exceeding the full amount of the
whole agreed price, but otherwise the examiners were required to
certify the amount which, in their opinion, would be required to
complete the steamer, when the Secretary of the Navy was authorized
to withhold from future payments such deductions as might be
necessary to meet the probable excess of cost. It was further
provided that when the said Stevens should have fully completed the
said war steamer, and when she should have been duly delivered to
and received by the agent of the United States according to the
terms of the contract, that full amount of the price remaining
unpaid and to become due when the said war steamer should be fully
completed and accepted, was required to be paid and the mortgage
security cancelled and returned.
In pursuance of his contract to that effect, Robert L. Stevens
executed a and delivered a mortgage on the premises therein
described, being the basin, dock, shops, etc., wherein the war
steamer was to be constructed, conditioned to be void in case he
fully performed his contract in relation thereto, with a power of
entry and sale, on the part of the mortgagee, in case default
should be made in the completing and delivery of the said war
steamer at the expiration of four years from that date, according
to the conditions and stipulations of the contract, and out of the
proceeds of such sale to retain any dues that might have
accrued
Page 106 U. S. 511
by reason of the failure to perform the contract, or so much
thereof as should be necessary to complete any deficiencies on the
part of the said Stevens.
The time for the performance of the contract was by a subsequent
agreement extended for four years from September 9, 1848.
From January 5, 1845, to December 14, 1855, there was paid out
by the Navy Department on account of the vessel $500,000.
Robert L. Stevens, prior to his death, in 1856, had, in
addition, expended in its construction, of his own means,
$113,579.
The Act of Aug. 16, 1856, c. 123, contains an appropriation "for
Stevens war steamer, eighty-six thousand, seven hundred and
seventeen dollars and eighty-five cents," being the remainder of
the contract price, but no portion of this was ever paid.
In the meantime, Edwin A. Stevens took possession of the work
upon the death of his brother, as executor and residuary legatee,
and expended thereon, prior to September 5, 1857, of his own money,
the sum of $89,185.37.
Nothing further appears to have been done until Congress passed
an act, approved April 17, 1862, c. 57, making an additional
appropriation for the naval service for the year ending June 30,
1862. The second section of that act is as follows:
"
And be it further enacted that the sum of $783,294,
being the amount necessary to be provided, as estimated by a board
appointed for that purpose, to pay for and finish the
Stevens
Battery, now partially constructed at Hoboken, New Jersey, be
and the same is hereby appropriated out of any money not otherwise
appropriated for the immediate construction of said battery.
provided that in the contract for the completion of said
vessel it shall be stipulated that no part of the money claimed by
Edwin A. Stevens to have been heretofore expended by him upon said
vessel shall be refunded until the amount of said claim shall be
established to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Navy, and
the payment of the said sum shall be contingent upon the success of
said vessel as an iron-clad seagoing war steamer, to be determined
by the President, and such contract shall stipulate the time within
which the vessel shall be completed,
provided nevertheless
that said money shall not be expended unless the Secretary of the
Navy is of opinion that the same will secure to the public service
an efficient steam-battery. "
Page 106 U. S. 512
The board, whose estimate is adopted in this act, was one
appointed by the Secretary of the Navy under the authority of a
joint resolution of Congress approved July 24, 1861, whose report
was communicated to the House of Representatives in a letter of the
Secretary of the Navy to the Speaker dated January 2, 1862. Ex.Doc.
No. 23, H.R. 37th Congress, 2d Sess. Upon the question of the
expediency of completing the vessel, the board specify six
important particulars, as among "the many novel characteristics
which she would possess," in which she differed from ordinary war
vessels, and conclude by saying:
"We cannot recommend the expenditure of important sums of money
upon projects of more than doubtful success when put into practical
execution, and therefore we do not deem it expedient to complete
this vessel upon the plan proposed."
The report had previously stated
"that the original projector of the vessel was the late Robert
L. Stevens, Esq., deceased, and that his brother, Edwin A. Stevens,
Esq., who now proposes to complete it, has materially changed the
plans from what appears to have been originally intended."
No part of the sum appropriated by the Act of April 17, 1862,
was applied to the purpose of completing the battery. The Secretary
of the Navy declined to do so, in the exercise of the discretion
confided to him in the last clause of the section, for reasons set
forth in his letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
dated May 27, 1862, in which he states that he had taken the
opinion of a commission of experts, who had reported that "the
vessel, if completed on the plans of Mr. Stevens, will not make an
efficient steam battery," and therefore that he did not feel
authorized to make the expenditure unless Congress should so
direct.
Congress thereupon passed the joint resolution, approved July
17, 1862, on which the plaintiffs in error found their claim.
Nothing appears to have been done toward resuming work on the
vessel from the date of the last previous expenditure in 1857 until
the death of Edwin A. Stevens on August 7, 1868, during which time
it remained in his possession and control. His will contained the
following provision:
"I empower my executors to apply not exceeding the sum of one
million dollars
Page 106 U. S. 513
to finish, on my general plans, as near as may be, in the
discretion of my said executors, the battery known as the
Stevens Battery, and for the accomplishment of the said
object I give to them the use of the dock and yard and basin
heretofore appropriated to the said battery and all the material
provided for said battery. When said battery shall be finished, I
direct my executors to offer the same to the State of New Jersey as
a present, to be disposed of as the said state shall deem proper,
and if not accepted by the said state, I direct my executors to
sell the same, and the proceeds thereof shall fall into the residue
of my estate."
In execution of this authority, the executors, prior to February
27, 1873, expended $919,915.49, of which $27,309.79 was received
from the sale of old material.
The Legislature of New Jersey, on March 21, 1871, had authorized
the appointment of commissioners with power to sell the battery,
and, in pursuance of that authority, the vessel, never having been
finished, was sold for the sum of $75,000.
The contention of the plaintiffs in error is that the title to
the unfinished vessel passed, as the work progressed, to the United
States, and became vested, together with the right to enforce the
contract for its completion, and the security of the mortgage, as
against the estate of Robert L. Stevens, in his heirs at law, by
force of the joint resolution of July 17, 1862.
In support of the proposition that by the building contract, the
title to the unfinished ship vested, as the work progressed, in the
United States, counsel rely upon the rule of construction announced
by Lord Tenterden in
Woods v. Russell, 5 Barn. & Ald.
942, and followed by the English cases of
Clark v. Spence,
4 Ad. & E. 448;
Carruthers v. Paine, 5 Bing. 270;
Laidler v. Burlinson, 2 M. & W. 602;
Wood v.
Bell, 5 El. & Bl. 355, affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber,
6 El. & Bl. 355;
McBain v. Wallace, L.R. 6 App.Cas.
589, and the American cases of
Moody v. Brown, 34 Me. 107;
Butterworth v. McKinley, 11 Humph. 209;
Sandford v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 27 Ind. 522;
Scudder v. Calais
Steamboat Co., 1 Cliff. 370.
This conclusion was assented to in the present case by the
chancellor, who proceeded to a final decree, however, against the
plaintiffs in error, on the ground that the title of the
Page 106 U. S. 514
United States passed by the resolution of July 17, 1862, not to
the heirs at law of Robert L. Stevens for their own benefit, but to
or for the benefit of Edwin A. Stevens, the residuary legatee. The
Court of Errors and Appeals took a different view, and decided that
the title of the ship never vested in the United States as owner,
following its own previous decision in
Elliott v. Edwards,
6 N.J.L. 265; S.C. 7 N.J.L. 449; the New York case of
Andrews
v. Durant, 11 N.Y. 35 and supported by the decision in
Williams v. Jackman, 16 Gray (Mass.) 514, in which the
rule is stated by Bigelow, C.J., as follows:
"Under a contract for supplying labor and materials and making a
chattel, no property passes to the vendee till the chattel is
completed and delivered or ready to be delivered. This is a general
rule of law. It must prevail in all cases unless a contrary intent
is expressed or clearly implied from the terms of the
contract."
The rule first introduced in
Woods v. Russell, 5 Barn.
& Ald. 942, as interpreted by the English courts, according to
Clark v. Spence, 4 Ad. & E. 448, is
"founded on the notion that provision for the payment, regulated
by particular stages of the work, is made in the contract with a
view to give the purchaser the security of certain portions of the
work for the money he is to pay, and is equivalent to an express
provision that on payment of the first installment the general
property in so much of the vessel as is then constructed shall vest
in the purchaser."
This dictum from
Woods v. Russell, according to
Benjamin on Sales, 246, 2d ed., was deliberately adopted as a rule
of construction by which, in similar ship-building contracts, the
parties are held to have, by implication, evinced an intention that
the property shall pass, notwithstanding the general rule to the
contrary, and adds: "The law thus established has remained unshaken
to the present time."
Nevertheless, in
Wood v. Bell, 5 El. & Bl. 791,
Lord Campbell, C.J., said:
"When a man contracts with another to make any article for him
for a given price, the general rule is, in the absence of all
circumstances from which a contrary conclusion may be inferred,
that no property passes in the chattel until it be completed and
ready for delivery. On the other hand, where a bargain in made for
the purchase of an existing
Page 106 U. S. 515
ascertained chattel, the general rule, in the same absence of
opposing circumstances, is that the property passes immediately to
the vendee -- that is, that there is at once a complete bargain and
sale. But these general rules are both and equally founded on the
presumed intention of the parties. If in the first there are
attendant circumstances from which the intention may be inferred
that the property shall pass in the incomplete and growing chattel
as the manufacture of it proceeds, or even in ascertained materials
from which it is to be carried to perfection, that intention will
be effectuated, and equally in the latter, if it appear that the
parties intended to postpone the transfer of the property till the
payment of the price or the performance of any other condition,
such intention will be upheld in the courts of law."
"This principle," he added, "we believe to be well settled," and
referring to the cases of
Woods v. Russell, Clark v. Spence,
Laidler v. Burlinson, and others cited in argument, he
remarked that "previous decisions therefore are mainly useful as
serving to guide our judgment in estimating the weight of
circumstances as evidence of intention," and concluded by
saying:
"Still it must be remembered, after all, that what we have to
determine is a question of fact -- namely what, upon a careful
consideration of all the circumstances, we believe to have been the
contract into which the parties have entered."
It is perhaps worthy of remark that this passage from the
judgment of Lord Campbell has, by the editors of Abbott on Merchant
Ships and Seamen, been incorporated into that treatise.
The courts of this country have not adopted any arbitrary rule
of construction as controlling such agreements, but consider the
question of intent, open in every case, to be determined upon the
terms of the contract and the circumstances attending the
transaction. 1 Parsons, Shipping and Admiralty 63. And such seems
to us to be the true principle.
Accordingly, we are of opinion that the fact that advances were
made out of the purchase money, according to the contract, for the
cost of the work as it progressed, and that the government was
authorized to require the presence to an agent to join in
certifying to the accounts, are not conclusive evidence
Page 106 U. S. 516
of an intent that the property in the ship should vest in the
United States prior to final delivery. Indeed, in reference to the
latter circumstance, it is noticeable as indicating a contrary
intention that the authority of the inspecting officer was
expressly limited, so that it should not extend to a right to judge
of the quality and fitness of the materials or workmanship, such
matters and all others concerning the performance of the contract
being reserved for determination after the completion of the work
as a condition of acceptance and final payment.
Much stress is laid in argument upon that provision of the
contract which required all materials received at the yard for use
in constructing the steamer to be distinctly marked with the
letters "U.S." and declared that they should become the property of
and belong to the United States. But it does not follow, because
the materials provided for that use were declared to be the
property of the United States, it was intended that they should
remain so after becoming part of the structure. Such a precaution
might well have been suggested as a security against a diversion of
the materials to any unauthorized use or to preserve the materials
to the United States in case, by reason of the failure of the work
or from any other cause, they should not be used in the vessel.
Indeed, as is remarked by the learned judge who delivered the
opinion of the Court of Errors and Appeals in this case, the
express declaration that defined the property in the unused
materials seems to exclude the implication sought to be raised as
to the property in the unfinished ship, for the inference is
obvious, from the particularity of such a provision, that the
larger interest would not be left to mere intendment.
There are two other provisions of the contract which seem to us
conclusive of the question and in a sense adverse to the
construction of the plaintiffs in error.
The first of these is that which requires Stevens to execute and
deliver a mortgage in lieu of other security for the faithful
performance of the contract on his part, on all the land, docks,
wharves, slips, and all their appurtenances belonging to and
embraced within the establishment at Hoboken, New Jersey at which
the war steamer was to be constructed, with power to the
mortgagee
Page 106 U. S. 517
to enter upon and sell the same in case of failure on the part
of Stevens to fulfill his part of the contract or so much thereof
as should be necessary to complete any deficiencies on his
part.
The taking of this security as an indemnity to the United States
assumes the anticipated possibility that the failure might be
total, so that the vessel, when offered for delivery, might be
altogether rejected. And it does not detract from the force of this
conclusion that the alternative provides for completing
deficiencies, if they should prove to be remediable, for in that
case the United States, at its option, might accept the vessel,
thus becoming invested with the title, and make good its
deficiencies out of this security.
The other feature of the contract which corroborates this view
is that which provides that final payment for the steamer shall be
made only upon the certificate of examiners, to be appointed for
that purpose, that in her construction, armament, and equipment all
the provisions of the contract have been fully performed and
completed, which requires that the steamer shall be fully completed
and delivered at the navy yard at Brooklyn and fixes the gross
amount which is to be paid for it when fully completed, delivered,
and accepted. The fact that advances are to be made in the meantime
is expressly stated to be in consideration of the security to be
given by Stevens for the faithful performance of his contract, and
that compensation for his time and services must be wholly deferred
until the final completing and delivery of the vessel.
It is thus apparent, as we think, from these stipulations that
the vessel was in all respects to be at the risk of the builder
until, upon its completion, the United States should accept it,
upon final examination and certificate, as conforming in every
particular with the requirements of the contract and answering the
description and warranty of an efficient steam battery for harbor
defense, shot and shell-proof.
And looking at the situation of the parties and the objects they
must have had in view, all doubt is removed as to their intention.
Mr. Stevens was an ardent and sanguine inventor, who had convinced
himself that his unique design of a naval structure was practicable
and of great value and that, if adopted, it would prove to be of
immense public utility. He succeeded
Page 106 U. S. 518
also in persuading the government to make the experiment and
give him the opportunity of realizing his theories. But it was
understood to be merely an experiment, and evidently, by the Navy
Department, naturally conservative and inclined to adhere with some
tenacity to its own traditions, regarded at best as of very
doubtful success. The steamer when built was to constitute a part
of the naval establishment of the United States. Can it be supposed
that this was to take place except upon condition that, after
completion and sufficient examination, it should be found fit for
the service? This is the view, as it seems to us, which Congress by
its legislation, and the Navy Department in all its dealings with
the subject, constantly entertained and acted upon, and which both
Robert L. Stevens and his brother Edwin A. Stevens did not hesitate
to accept, the latter not shrinking from a further investment of
$1,000,000 in an enterprise which he still cherished with
confidence of ultimate success, after it had become to almost
everyone else a demonstrated failure and after the government, for
whom it was originally intended, had refused to it all further
subsidies.
We find, therefore, that on July 17, 1862, the date of the joint
resolution of Congress under which the plaintiffs in error make
their claim, the United States had no title to the
Stevens
Battery, but that the property in it had continued in Robert
L. Stevens until his death, and passed by his will to Edwin A.
Stevens as residuary legatee. It follows that it did not pass to
the heirs at law of Robert L. Stevens by virtue of the joint
resolution.
It is urged in argument that if the right to the vessel itself
did not pass, then the joint resolution must be construed as a
transfer to the heirs of Robert L. Stevens of the right of action
of the United States to recover against his estate damages for his
nonperformance of his contract, together with the securities, by
way of mortgage and lien, it held as indemnity. We see no ground
for a construction that leads to so remarkable a result. The plain
meaning of the resolution is limited to a relinquishment on the
part of the United States of any interest it might be supposed to
have in the vessel, in which the heirs of Robert L. Stevens are
mentioned, probably, because
Page 106 U. S. 519
it was with him that the building contract was made, and if it
could operate at all as a release, would be to them, for the
benefit of those who, by law, had become his successors in the
title, and that release would necessarily convey with it, as an
incident, an extinguishment of the obligation of the contract for
construction, and all the securities taken for its performance. It
was in effect, and was doubtless intended as, a declaration on the
part of the United States, for the benefit of whom it might
concern, of its entire abandonment of all further connection with
the battery and the contract for its construction. The subsequent
assent on the part of Congress to its acceptance by the State of
New Jersey, as a bequest from Edwin A. Stevens, while it could not
operate to affect any rights vested in the interval, is at least a
legislative interpretation of its previous release. This resolution
expressly recites that Edwin A. Stevens was the owner of the
battery in his lifetime, and is scarcely more explicit in the
recognition of his title than was the conduct of all the parties,
including the present plaintiffs in error.
We are of opinion for the reasons stated that there is no error
in the decree complained of, and it is accordingly
Affirmed.