1. A patent executed in the required form and by the proper
officers, for such a portion of the public domain as is by law
subject to sale or other disposal passes the title thereto, and the
finding of the facts by the Land Department which authorize its
issue is conclusive in a court of law.
Smelting Co. v.
Kemp, 104 U. S. 636,
cited upon this point and approved.
2. A party who claims to be aggrieved by such issue, although he
cannot have the patent vacated or limited in its operation where it
comes collaterally in question in an action for the recovery of
possession, may obtain relief in
a court of chancery if he has such an equitable right as will
estop the patentee or those claiming under him from asserting the
legal title to the land. Otherwise such party must apply to the
officers of the government, who, although not clothed with power to
set the patent aside, may for that purpose bring suit in the name
of the United States.
3. Mineral lands belonging to the United States, although lying
within a town site on the public domain, are subject to location
and sale for mining purposes, and a title to them is acquired in
the same manner as to lands of that description which are elsewhere
situate.
4. In ejectment for mineral lands by a party claiming under the
patentee, the defendant asserted that he owned the demanded
premises "by superiority of possessory title and priority of actual
possession" of them as part of a town site, that the patentee was
not a citizen, and that frauds, bribery, and subornation of perjury
had been used to obtain the patent.
Held that it was the
province of the Land Department to pass upon such matters before
the patent was issued, and that they could not be set up to defeat
the action.
6. A party cannot invoke the doctrine of estoppel against the
owners by reason of improvements which, with their knowledge, he
put upon the land if he was aware at the time that it belonged to
them and that he had no title to it.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action by the St. Louis Smelting and Refining
Company, a corporation created under the laws of Missouri, against
Steel and others, to recover the possession of certain real
property in the City of Leadville, Colorado. It was commenced
Page 106 U. S. 448
in one of the courts of the state, and on motion of the
defendants was removed to the circuit court of the United States.
The complaint is in the usual form in actions for the recovery of
land, according to the practice prevailing in Colorado. It alleges
that the plaintiff was duly incorporated, with power to purchase
and hold real estate; that it is the owner in fee and entitled to
the possession of the premises mentioned, which are described, and
that the defendants wrongfully withhold them from the plaintiff to
its damage of $1,000. The plaintiff therefore prays judgment for
the possession of the premises and for the damages mentioned.
The defendants filed an answer to the complaint, which appears
to have been amended several times, the questions presented for our
consideration having arisen upon the demurrer to the third amended
answer. That answer denied the material allegations of the
complaint and set up several special defenses and a counterclaim
for the value of the improvements put on the premises. The
plaintiff demurred to these defenses and to the counterclaim. The
demurrer was sustained to the defenses and overruled to the
counterclaim. The defendants elected to stand on their defenses,
and final judgment was accordingly entered on the demurrer for the
plaintiff for the possession of the premises. To review this
judgment, the case is brought by the defendants to this Court.
The amended answer averred that the defendants were the owners
of the land in controversy "by superiority of possessory title and
priority of actual possession" of the premises as part of a town
site on the public domain of the United States, located and
occupied since June, 1860; that the title of the plaintiff was
derived from one Thomas Starr, to whom a patent was issued by the
United States, bearing date on the 29th of March, 1879, embracing
the premises in controversy; and the special defenses set up were
that the patent was void; that fraud, bribery, perjury, and
subornation of perjury were used to obtain it; and that Starr, the
patentee, was estopped by his conduct from asserting title to the
premises.
The patent, which is subsequently stated to be a mineral patent,
by which is meant that it was issued upon a claim for mineral land,
is averred to be void on these grounds: that the
Page 106 U. S. 449
land which it embraces was part of the town site of Leadville
when the claim originated, and was thus reserved from sale by the
laws of Congress; that the land included in the town site was
neither mineral nor agricultural; and that the patentee, Starr, was
not a citizen of the United States and had not declared his
intention to become one when the patent was issued. These grounds
are accompanied with a detail of the facts upon which they are
founded, but they are sufficiently stated for the disposition of
the questions arising upon them.
Land embraced within a town site on the public domain, when
unoccupied, is not exempt from location and sale for mining
purposes; its exemption is only from settlement and sale under the
preemption laws of the United States. Some of the most valuable
mines in the country are within the limits of incorporated cities,
which have grown up on what was, on its first settlement, part of
the public domain, and many of such mines were located and patented
after a regular municipal government had been established. Such is
the case with some of the famous mines of Virginia City, in Nevada.
Indeed, the discovery of a rich mine in any quarter is usually
followed by a large settlement in its immediate neighborhood, and
the consequent organization of some form of local government for
the protection of its members. Exploration in the vicinity for
other mines is pushed in such case by newcomers with vigor, and is
often rewarded with the discovery of valuable claims. To such
claims, though within the limits of what may be termed the site of
the settlement or new town, the miner acquires as good a right as
though his discovery was in a wilderness, removed from all
settlements, and he is equally entitled to a patent for them. It is
the policy of the country to encourage the development of its
mineral resources. The Act of July 26, 1866, declared that all
mineral deposits on lands belonging to the United States were free
and open to exploration, and the lands in which they are found to
occupation and purchase by citizens of the United States and those
who had declared their intention to become such, subject to
regulations prescribed by law, and to the rules and customs of
miners in their several mining districts, so far as the same were
applicable and not inconsistent
Page 106 U. S. 450
with the laws of the United States. This declaration of the
freedom of mining lands to exploration and occupation was repeated
in the Act of Congress of May 10, 1872,c. 152, and is contained in
sec. 2319 of the Revised Statutes. Both acts provided for the
acquisition of title, by patent, to mineral lands -- the first act
to such as constituted lode claims, the second to such as
constituted placer claims.
The acts of Congress relating to town sites recognize the
possession of mining claims within their limits and forbid the
acquisition of any mine of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper within
them under proceedings by which title to other lands there situated
is secured, thus leaving the mineral deposits within town sites
open to exploration, and the land in which they are found to
occupation and purchase, in the same manner as such deposits are
elsewhere explored and possessed, and the lands containing them are
acquired. Rev.Stat. secs. 2386, 2392.
Whenever, therefore, mines are found in lands belonging to the
United States, whether within or without town sites, they may be
claimed and worked provided existing rights of others from prior
occupation are not interfered with. Whether there are rights thus
interfered with which should preclude the location of the miner and
the issue of a patent to him or his successor in interest is, when
not subjected under the law of Congress to the local tribunals, a
matter properly cognizable by the Land Department when application
is made to it for a patent, and the inquiry thus presented must
necessarily involve a consideration of the character of the land to
which title is sought, whether it be mineral, for which a patent
may issue, or agricultural, for which a patent should be withheld,
and also as to the citizenship of the applicant.
We have so often had occasion to speak of the Land Department,
the object of its creation and the powers it possesses in the
alienation by patent of portions of the public lands, that it
creates an unpleasant surprise to find that counsel, in discussing
the effect to be given to the action of that department, overlook
our decisions on the subject. That department, as we have
repeatedly said, was established to supervise the various
proceedings whereby a conveyance of the title from the
Page 106 U. S. 451
United States to portions of the public domain is obtained, and
to see that the requirements of different acts of Congress are
fully complied with. Necessarily, therefore, it must consider and
pass upon the qualifications of the applicant, the acts he has
performed to secure the title, the nature of the land, and whether
it is of the class which is open to sale. Its judgment upon these
matters is that of a special tribunal and is unassailable except by
direct proceedings for its annulment or limitation. Such has been
the uniform language of this Court in repeated decisions.
In
Johnson v. Towsley, the effect of the action of that
department was the subject of special consideration. And the Court
applied the general doctrine
"that when the law has confided to a special tribunal the
authority to hear and determine certain matters arising in the
course of its duties, the decision of that tribunal, within the
scope of its authority, is conclusive upon all others,"
and said, speaking by MR. JUSTICE MILLER,
"that the action of the Land Office in issuing a patent for any
of the public land, subject to sale by preemption or otherwise, is
conclusive of the legal title, must be admitted under the principle
above stated, and in all courts and in all forms of judicial
proceedings where this title must control, either by reason of the
limited powers of the court, or the essential character of the
proceeding, no inquiry can be permitted into the circumstance under
which it was obtained."
81 U. S. 13 Wall.
72,
80 U. S. 83.
In
French v. Fyan, a patent had been issued to the
State of Missouri for swamp and overflowed land under the Act of
September 28, 1850. In an action of ejectment by a party claiming
title under a grant to a railroad company, which would have carried
the title if the land were not swamp and overflowed, parol
testimony was offered to prove that it was not land of that
character, and thus to impeach the validity of the patent. The
court below held that the patent concluded the question and
rejected the testimony. The case being brought here the ruling was
sustained. This Court, speaking through MR. JUSTICE MILLER,
said:
"We are of opinion that in this action at law it would be a
departure from sound principle and contrary to wellconsidered
judgments in this Court and in others of high authority to permit
the validity of the patent
Page 106 U. S. 452
to the state to be subjected to the test of the verdict of a
jury on such oral testimony as might be brought before it. It would
be submitting the jury, or the court sitting as a jury, for the
tribunal which Congress had provided to determine the question, and
would be making a patent of the United States a cheap and unstable
reliance as a title for lands which it purported to convey."
93 U. S. 93 U.S.
169,
93 U. S.
172.
In
Quinby v. Conlan, decided at the last term, we
said:
"It would lead to endless litigation and be fruitful of evil if
a supervisory power were vested in the courts over the action of
the numerous officers of the Land Department, on mere questions of
fact presented for their determination. It is only when those
officers have misconstrued the law applicable to the case, as
established before the department, and thus have denied to parties
rights which, upon a correct construction, would have been conceded
to them, or where misrepresentations and fraud have been practiced
necessarily affecting their judgment, that the courts can, in a
proper proceeding, interfere and refuse to give effect to their
action. On this subject we have repeatedly and with emphasis
expressed our opinion, and the matter should be deemed
settled."
104 U. S. 104 U.S.
420,
104 U. S. 426.
See also Vance v. Burbank, 101 U.
S. 514.
It is among the elementary principles of the law that in actions
of ejectment, the legal title must prevail. The patent of the
United States passes that title. Whoever holds it must recover
against those who have only unrealized hopes to obtain it or claims
which it is the exclusive province of a court of equity to enforce.
However great these may be, they constitute no defense in an action
at law based upon the patent. That instrument must first be got out
of the way or its enforcement enjoined before others having mere
equitable rights can gain or hold possession of the lands it
covers. This is so well established, so completely imbedded in the
law of ejectment, that no one ought to be misled by any argument to
the contrary.
It need hardly be said that we are here speaking of a patent
issued in a case where the Land Department had jurisdiction to act,
the lands forming part of the public domain, and the law having
provided for their sale. If they never were the property
Page 106 U. S. 453
of the United States, or if no legislation authorized their
sale, or if they had been previously disposed of or reserved from
sale, the patent would be inoperative to pass the title and
objection to it could be taken on these grounds at any time and in
any form of action. In that respect, the patent would be like the
deed of an individual, which would be inoperative if he never owned
the property, or had previously conveyed it, or had dedicated it to
uses which precluded its sale. And of course in both cases it is
always open to show that the instrument was never executed by the
parties whose signatures are attached to it, but is a simulated
document. Where ejectment is founded upon either of these
instruments -- the patent of the government or the deed of an
individual -- the question being which of the parties has the legal
title, it is irrelevant to introduce evidence to show that one of
them ought to have had it, and might be able to get it, by a
proceeding in some other tribunal or in some other form of
action.
As to the allegations that fraud, bribery, perjury, and
subornation of perjury were used to obtain the patent to Starr,
only a few words need be said. The bribery and subornation of
perjury are alleged to have been committed by him in inducing
parties to make false affidavits respecting the claim patented to
be laid before the Land Department, and the perjury alleged
consisted in his own affidavit as to his citizenship, the
possession and working, by himself or grantors, of the claim for
which the patent was issued, and the absence of a town site
embracing the land and of improvements thereon. The fraud alleged
is not a specific charge by itself, but is made in connection with
the affidavit of the patentee and his procurement of the false
affidavits of others. The charges amount to this: that false and
perjured testimony was used to influence the officers of the Land
Department. There is no allegation of improper conduct on the part
of those officers. The answer to this ground of defense is that it
is not admissible in an action at law. The validity of a patent of
the government cannot be assailed collaterally because false and
perjured testimony may have been used to secure it, any more than a
judgment of a court of justice can be assailed collaterally on like
ground. If a judgment has been obtained by such means, the remedy
of
Page 106 U. S. 454
the aggrieved party is to apply for a new trial or take an
appeal to a higher court, and if the testimony was accompanied with
acts which prevented him from presenting to the court the merits of
his case or by which the jurisdiction of the court was imposed
upon, he may also institute some direct proceeding to reach the
judgment.
United States v. Flint, 4 Sawyer 42;
United
States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61;
Vance v. Burbank, 101 U. S. 514.
Until set aside or enjoined, it must, of course, stand against a
collateral attack with the efficacy attending judgments founded
upon unimpeachable evidence. So with a patent for land of the
United States, which is the result of the judgment upon the right
of the patentee by that department of the government to which the
alienation of the public lands is confided, the remedy of the
aggrieved party must be sought by him in a court of equity, if he
possess such an equitable right to the premises as would give him
the title if the patent were out of the way. If he occupy with
respect to the land no such position as this, he can only apply to
the officers of the government to take measures in its name to
vacate the patent or limit its operation. It cannot be vacated or
limited in proceedings where it comes collaterally in question. It
cannot be vacated or limited by the officers themselves; their
power over the land is ended when the patent is issued and placed
on the records of the department. This can be accomplished only by
regular judicial proceedings, taken in the name of the government
for that special purpose.
It does not follow that the officers of the government would
take such proceedings even if the charges of fraud and of the use
of false testimony in obtaining the patent were true. They might be
satisfied that the patentee was entitled to the patent upon other
testimony, or that further proceedings would result in a similar
conclusion, and that therefore it would be unwise to reopen the
matter. In any event, whether the officers of the government have
been misled by the testimony produced before them or not, the
conclusions reached by them are not to be submitted for
consideration to every jury before which the patent may be offered
in evidence on the trial of an action. As we said in the case of
Smelting Company v. Kemp:
"It is this unassailable character [of the patent]
Page 106 U. S. 455
which gives to it its chief, indeed its only, value as a means
of quieting its possessor in the enjoyment of the lands it
embraces. If intruders upon them could compel him, in every suit
for possession, to establish the validity of the action of the Land
Department and the correctness of its ruling upon matters submitted
to it, the patent, instead of being a means of peace and security,
would subject his rights to constant and ruinous litigation. He
would recover one portion of his land if the jury were satisfied
that the evidence produced justified the action of that department,
and lose another portion the title whereto rests upon the same
facts because another jury came to a different conclusion. So his
rights in different suits upon the same patent would be determined
not by its efficacy as a conveyance of the government, but
according to the fluctuating prejudices of different jurymen, or
their varying capacities to weigh evidence."
104 U. S. 104 U.S.
636,
104 U. S.
641.
It remains to notice the defense of estoppel. The answer of the
defendants alleges that Starr, the patentee, was living in
Leadville from 1860 until the patent was issued to him in 1879, and
was cognizant of the improvements made and of the large sums of
money expended on the premises; that he and his grantors
fraudulently remained quiet in respect to their ownership of mining
claims there, and, from August, 1870, to the time of their
application for a patent, never made known either to the City of
Leadville or to the defendants that he or they claimed a right to
any portion of the land; that other parties who made similar claims
and united with him in securing the patent also stood by and
remained quiet; that the defendants expended the sum of $5,000 in
making improvements on the premises in controversy under the claim
that they constituted part of a town site on the public domain;
that there was no mining on the land, and that no notice was given
that would lead the defendants to suppose that there had been any
mineral location made by him and his associates; that Starr
published the notice of his application for a patent only in a
weekly paper of Leadville, and that the description of the
consolidated claim was so defective that only a skilled engineer
could tell where the land was situated; and that after the
defendants discovered that the notice of the patent embraced
Page 106 U. S. 456
lands in the city they were assured that they should not be
disturbed in their possessions, and that only a nominal sum would
be demanded from them, not exceeding $25 a lot, and that, relying
upon said assurance, the defendants continued making
improvements.
These allegations are very far from establishing such an equity
in the defendants as to estop the patentee and those claiming under
him from asserting the legal title to the premises. These matters
could not operate to estop the government in any disposition of the
land it might choose to make. Its power of alienation could not be
affected until the defendants had performed all the acts required
by law to acquire a vested interest in the land, and it is not
pretended that they took any steps to secure such an interest.
Whatever right, therefore, the government possessed to use or
dispose of the property, freed from any claim of the defendants, it
could pass to its grantee.
The principle invoked is that one should be estopped from
asserting a right to property upon which he has, by his conduct,
misled another, who supposed himself to be the owner, to make
expenditures. It is often applied where one owning an estate stands
by and sees another erect improvements on it in the belief that he
has the title or an interest in it, and does not interfere to
prevent the work or inform the party of his own title. There is in
such conduct a manifest intention to deceive or such gross
negligence as to amount to constructive fraud. The owner therefore,
in such a case, will not be permitted afterwards to assert his
title and recover the property, at least without making
compensation for the improvements. But this salutary principle
cannot be invoked by one who, at the time the improvements were
made, was acquainted with the true character of his own title, or
with the fact that he had none.
Brant v. Virginia Coal &
Iron Co., 93 U. S. 326;
Henshaw v.
Bissell, 18 Wall. 255. It will not be pretended
that the defendants did not understand all about the title to the
land; they knew that it was vested in the United States. And we
must presume that the patentee gave notice of his purpose to
acquire it -- such as the law required. The mode and manner of
obtaining a patent for mining lands are minutely prescribed
Page 106 U. S. 457
by the acts of Congress. Among other things, the applicant must
file his application under them in the proper land office, showing
a compliance with the laws, together with a plat and the field
notes of his claim or claims in common, made by or under the
direction of the surveyor general of the United States, showing
their boundaries, and he must also, and previously to the filing of
the application, post a copy of the plat, with a notice of his
intended application, in a conspicuous place on the land. It is a
conclusion from the issuing of the patent that this requirement was
complied with, and therefore it cannot be said here that the
patentee did not give notice of his purpose. This notice, as justly
observed by the court below, was of itself a warning to all who
were upon the land and were about to erect improvements upon it
that the patentee was applying for a patent, and thus seeking to
obtain the title. And the answer admits that the defendants did
ascertain the fact of the application, for they aver a subsequent
promise of the applicant to give them a title when the patent was
acquired. Under these circumstances, the alleged estoppel, like the
other matters urged to defeat the action, must fail.
Though the various matters of fraud, perjury, and subornation of
perjury, alleged as a defense, are to be taken as true for the
purpose of this decision, they are not to be taken as true for any
other purpose. What we decide is that, if true, they are not
available in this form of action, and that any relief against the
patent founded upon them must be sought in another way and by a
direct proceeding.
We have thus considered the propositions of law presented by the
record, and the matters urged by counsel in his argument so far as
we have deemed them entitled to notice. They disclose nothing which
would justify interference with the action of the court below. Its
judgment therefore is
Affirmed.