The sixth section of the Act of Aug. 16, 1876, c. 287,
prohibiting, under penalties therein mentioned, certain officers of
the United States from requesting, giving to, or receiving from any
other officer money or property or other thing of value for
political purposes, is not unconstitutional.
The sixth section of the act of Aug. 15, 1876, c. 287, entitled
"An Act making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and
judicial expenses of the government," provides
"That all executive officers or employees of the United States
not appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, are prohibited from requesting, giving to, or receiving
from, any other officer or employee of the government, any money or
property or other thing of value for political purposes, and any
such officer or employee who shall offend against the provisions of
this section shall be at once discharged from the service of the
United States, and he shall also be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and on conviction thereof shall be fined in a sum not exceeding
five hundred dollars."
Curtis, the petitioner, an employee of the United States, was
indicted in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York
and convicted under this act for receiving money for political
purposes from other employees of the government. Upon his
conviction, he was sentenced to pay a fine and stand committed
until payment was made. Under this sentence, he was taken into
custody by the marshal, and on his application a writ of habeas
corpus was issued by one of the Justices of this Court in vacation,
returnable here at the present term, to inquire into the validity
of his detention. The important question presented on the return to
the writ so issued is whether the act under which the conviction
was had is constitutional.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE, after stating the case, delivered the
opinion of the Court.
The act is not one to prohibit all contributions of money or
Page 106 U. S. 372
property by the designated officers and employees of the United
States for political purposes. Neither does it prohibit them
altogether from receiving or soliciting money or property for such
purposes. It simply forbids their receiving from or giving to each
other. Beyond this no restrictions are placed on any of their
political privileges.
That the government of the United States is one of delegated
powers only, and that its authority is defined and limited by the
Constitution, are no longer open questions; but express authority
is given Congress by the Constitution to make all laws necessary
and proper to carry into effect the powers that are delegated.
Article I, sec. 8. Within the legitimate scope of this grant
Congress is permitted to determine for itself what is necessary and
what is proper.
The act now in question is one regulating in some particulars
the conduct of certain officers and employees of the United States.
It rests on the same principle as that originally passed in 1789 at
the first session of the first Congress, which makes it unlawful
for certain officers of the Treasury Department to engage in the
business of trade or commerce, or to own a sea vessel, or to
purchase public lands or other public property, or to be concerned
in the purchase or disposal of the public securities of a state, or
of the United States (Rev.Stat. sec. 243); and that passed in 1791,
which makes it an offense for a clerk in the same department to
carry on trade or business in the funds or debts of the states or
of the United States, or in any kind of public property
(
id., sec. 244), and that passed in 1812, which makes it
unlawful for a judge appointed under the authority of the United
States to exercise the profession of counsel or attorney, or to be
engaged in the practice of the law (
id., sec. 713); and
that passed in 1853, which prohibits every officer of the United
States or person holding any place of trust or profit, or
discharging any official function under, or in connection with any
executive department of the government of the United States, or
under the Senate or House of Representatives, from acting as an
agent or attorney for the prosecution of any claim against the
United States (
id., sec. 5498); and that passed in 1863,
prohibiting members of Congress from practicing in the Court of
Claims (
id., sec. 1058);
Page 106 U. S. 373
and that passed in 1867, punishing, by dismissal from service,
an officer or employee of the government who requires or requests
any working man in a navy yard to contribute or pay any money for
political purposes (
id., sec. 1546); and that passed in
1868, prohibiting members of Congress from being interested in
contracts with the United States (
id., sec. 3739); and
another, passed in 1870, which provides that no officer, clerk, or
employee in the government of the United States shall solicit
contributions from other officers, clerks, or employees for a gift
to those in a superior official position, and that no officials or
clerical superiors shall receive any gift or present as a
contribution to them from persons in government employ getting a
less salary than themselves, and that no officer or clerk shall
make a donation as a gift or present to any official superior
(
id., sec. 1784). Many others of a kindred character might
be referred to, but these are enough to show what has been the
practice in the legislative department of the government from its
organization, and, so far as we know, this is the first time the
constitutionality of such legislation has ever been presented for
judicial determination.
The evident purpose of Congress in all this class of enactments
has been to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of
official duties, and to maintain proper discipline in the public
service. Clearly such a purpose is within the just scope of
legislative power, and it is not easy to see why the act now under
consideration does not come fairly within the legitimate means to
such an end. It is true, as is claimed by the counsel for the
petitioner, political assessments upon officeholders are not
prohibited. The managers of political campaigns, not in the employ
of the United States, are just as free now to call on those in
office for money to be used for political purposes as ever they
were, and those in office can contribute as liberally as they
please, provided their payments are not made to any of the
prohibited officers or employees. What we are now considering is
not whether Congress has gone as far as it may, but whether that
which has been done is within the constitutional limits upon its
legislative discretion.
A feeling of independence under the law conduces to faithful
public service, and nothing tends more to take away this
Page 106 U. S. 374
feeling than a dread of dismissal. If contributions from those
in public employment may be solicited by others in official
authority, it is easy to see that what begins as a request may end
as a demand, and that a failure to meet the demand may be treated
by those having the power of removal as a breach of some supposed
duty, growing out of the political relations of the parties.
Contributions secured under such circumstances will quite as likely
be made to avoid the consequences of the personal displeasure of a
superior, as to promote the political views of the contributor --
to avoid a discharge from service, not to exercise a political
privilege. The law contemplates no restrictions upon either giving
or receiving, except so far as may be necessary to protect, in some
degree, those in the public service against exactions through fear
of personal loss. This purpose of the restriction, and the
principle on which it rests, are most distinctly manifested in sec.
1546,
supra, the reenactment in the Revised Statutes of
sec. 3 of the Act of June 30, 1868, c. 172, which subjected an
officer or employee of the government to dismissal if he required
or requested a workingman in a navy yard to contribute or pay any
money for political purposes, and prohibited the removal or
discharge of a working man for his political opinions, and in ยง
1784, the reenactment of the Act of February 1, 1870, c. 63, "to
protect officials in public employ," by providing for the summary
discharge of those who make or solicit contributions for presents
to superior officers. No one can for a moment doubt that in both
these statutes the object was to protect the classes of officials
and employees provided for from being compelled to make
contributions for such purposes through fear of dismissal if they
refused. It is true that dismissal from service is the only penalty
imposed, but this penalty is given for doing what is made a
wrongful act. If it is constitutional to prohibit the act, the kind
or degree of punishment to be inflicted for disregarding the
prohibition is clearly within the discretion of Congress, provided
it be not cruel or unusual.
If there were no other reasons for legislation of this character
than such as relate to the protection of those in the public
service against unjust exactions, its constitutionality would in
our opinion be clear, but there are others, to our minds,
equally
Page 106 U. S. 375
good. If persons in public employ may be called on by those in
authority to contribute from their personal income to the expenses
of political campaigns, and a refusal may lead to putting good men
out of the service, liberal payments may be made the ground for
keeping poor ones in. So too, if a part of the compensation
received for public services must be contributed for political
purposes, it is easy to see that an increase of compensation may be
required to provide the means to make the contribution, and that in
this way the government itself may be made to furnish indirectly
the money to defray the expenses of keeping the political party in
power that happens to have for the time being the control of the
public patronage. Political parties must almost necessarily exist
under a republican form of government, and when public employment
depends to any considerable extent on party success, those in
office will naturally be desirous of keeping the party to which
they belong in power. The statute we are now considering does not
interfere with this. The apparent end of Congress will be
accomplished if it prevents those in power from requiring help for
such purposes as a condition to continued employment.
We deem it unnecessary to pursue the subject further. In our
opinion, the statute under which the petitioner was convicted is
constitutional. The other objections which have been urged to the
detention cannot be considered in this form of proceeding. Our
inquiries in this class of cases are limited to such objections as
relate to the authority of the court to render the judgment by
which the prisoner is held. We have no general power to review the
judgments of the inferior courts of the United States in criminal
cases, by the use of the writ of habeas corpus or otherwise. Our
jurisdiction is limited to the single question of the power of the
court to commit the prisoner for the act of which he has been
convicted.
Ex Parte
Lange, 18 Wall. 163;
Ex Parte Rowland,
104 U. S. 604.
The commitment in this case was lawful, and the petitioner is
consequently
Remanded to the custody of the Marshal for the Southern
District of New York.
Page 106 U. S. 376
MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, dissenting.
I cannot concur in the opinion of the court in this case. The
law under which the petitioner is imprisoned makes it a penal
offense for any executive officer or employee of the United States,
not appointed by advice of the Senate [an unimportant distinction
so far as the power to make the law is concerned], to request, give
to or receive from any other officer or employee of the government
any money or property or other thing of value for political
purposes, thus in effect making it a condition of accepting any
employment under the government that a man shall not, even
voluntarily and of his own free will, contribute in any way through
or by the hands of any other employee of the government to the
political cause which he desires to aid and promote. I do not
believe that Congress has any right to impose such a condition upon
any citizen of the United States. The offices of the government do
not belong to the legislative department to dispose of on any
conditions it may choose to impose. The legislature creates most of
the offices, it is true, and provides compensation for the
discharge of their duties; but that is its duty to do in order to
establish a complete organization of the functions of government.
When established, the offices are, or ought to be, open to all.
They belong to the United States, and not to Congress, and every
citizen having the proper qualifications has the right to accept
office and to be a candidate therefor. This is a fundamental right
of which the legislature cannot deprive the citizen, nor clog its
exercise with conditions that are repugnant to his other
fundamental rights. Such a condition I regard that imposed by the
law in question to be. It prevents the citizen from cooperating
with other citizens of his own choice in the promotion of his
political views. To take an interest in public affairs and to
further and promote those principles which are believed to be vital
or important to the general welfare is every citizen's duty. It is
a just complaint that so many good men abstain from taking such an
interest.
Among the necessary and proper means for promoting political
views or any other views are association and contribution of money
for that purpose, both to aid discussion and to disseminate
information and sound doctrine. To deny
Page 106 U. S. 377
to a man the privilege of associating and making joint
contributions with such other citizens as he may choose, is an
unjust restraint of his right to propagate and promote his views on
public affairs. The freedom of speech and of the press, and that of
assembling together to consult upon and discuss matters of public
interest, and to join in petitioning for a redress of grievances,
are expressly secured by the Constitution. The spirit of this
clause covers and embraces the right of every citizen to engage in
such discussions and to promote the views of himself and his
associates freely, without being trammeled by inconvenient
restrictions. Such restrictions, in my judgment, are imposed by the
law in question. Every person accepting any, the most
insignificant, employment under the government must withdraw
himself from all societies and associations having for object the
promotion of political information or opinions. For if one officer
may continue his connection, others may do the same, and thus it
can hardly fail to happen that some of them will give and some
receive funds mutually contributed for the purposes of the
association. Congress might just as well, so far as the power is
concerned, impose as a condition of taking any employment under the
government entire silence on political subjects, and a prohibition
of all conversation thereon between government employees. Nay, it
might as well prohibit the discussion of religious questions, or
the mutual contribution of funds for missionary or other religious
purposes. In former times, when the slavery question was agitated,
this would have been a very convenient law to repress all
discussion of the subject on either side of Mason and Dixon's line.
At the present time, any efficient connection with an association
in favor of a prohibitory liquor law, or of a protective tariff, or
of greenback currency, or even for the repression of political
assessments, would render any government official obnoxious to the
penalties of the law under consideration. For all these questions
have become political in their character, and any contributions in
aid of the cause would be contributions for political purposes.
The whole thing seems to me absurd. Neither men's mouths nor
their purses can be constitutionally tied up in that way. The truth
is that public opinion is oftentimes like a pendulum, swinging
Page 106 U. S. 378
backward and forward to extreme lengths. We are not infrequently
in danger of becoming purists, instead of wise reformers, in
particular directions, and hastily pass inconsiderate laws which
overreach the mark they are aimed at or conflict with rights and
privileges that a sober mind would regard as indisputable. It seems
to me that the present law, taken in all its breadth, is one of
this kind.
The legislature may undoubtedly pass laws excluding from
particular offices those who are engaged in pursuits incompatible
with the faithful discharge of the duties of such offices. That is
quite another thing.
The legislature may make laws ever so stringent to prevent the
corrupt use of money in elections, or in political matters
generally, or to prevent what are called political assessments on
government employees, or any other exercise of undue influence over
them by government officials and others. That would be all right.
That would clearly be within the province of legislation.
It is urged that the law in question is intended, so far as it
goes, to effect this very thing. Probably it is. But the end does
not always sanctify the means. What I contend is that, in adopting
this particular mode of restraining an acknowledged evil, Congress
has overstepped its legitimate powers and interfered with the
substantial rights of the citizen. It is not lawful to do evil that
good may come. There are plenty of ways in which wrong may be
suppressed without resorting to wrongful measures to do it. No
doubt it would often greatly tend to prevent the spread of a
contagious and deadly epidemic, if those first taken should be
immediately sacrificed to the public good. But such a mode of
preventing the evil would hardly be regarded as legitimate in a
Christian country.
I have no wish to discuss the subject at length, but simply to
express the general grounds on which I think the legislation in
question is
ultra vires. Though as much opposed as anyone
to the evil sought to be remedied, I do not think the mode adopted
is a legitimate or constitutional one, because it interferes too
much with the freedom of the citizen in the pursuit of lawful and
proper ends. If similar laws have been passed before, that does not
make it right. The question is whether
Page 106 U. S. 379
the present law, with its sweeping provisions, is within the
just powers of Congress. As I do not think it is, I dissent from
the opinion of the majority of the Court.