The State of Louisiana provided for funding her bonds at reduced
rates and on certain terms. A subsequent statute prohibits the
funding of all questionable obligations, among which are specially
designated those issued in aid of the construction of a certain
canal, until, by a final decree of the Supreme Court,
"they have been declared legal and valid obligations against the
State of Louisiana, and that the same were issued in strict
conformity to law, and not in violation of the constitution of this
state, or of the United States, and for a valid consideration."
A., a holder of the canal bonds, filed his bill praying for such
a decree. The court decided that the statute did not allow them to
be funded, they not being valid obligations in the hands of the
first taker, and that the latter occupied as good a position as a
bona fide holder.
Held that this not being an
action to recover the contents of the bonds, and A. having the same
right to enforce payment as he ever possessed, the statute as thus
construed does not impair the obligation of any contract.
The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.
Page 105 U. S. 623
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The federal question which this case involves rests on the
following facts:
On the 8th of March, 1869, the General Assembly of the State of
Louisiana, passed Act No. 116, of 1869, to authorize an issue of
negotiable state bonds to aid in the construction of the
Mississippi and Mexican Gulf Ship Canal. Special provision was made
in the act for taxation to meet any liability that might be
incurred in this way. Bonds to the amount of $480,000 were put out,
purporting on their face to have been issued under the authority
thus granted, and the New York Guaranty and Indemnity Company, for
all that appears to the contrary, became the
bona fide
holder of $250,000 of this amount.
On the 24th of January, 1874, Act No. 3 of 1874 was passed to
provide for funding the obligations of the state by an issue, if
necessary, of $15,000,000 of "consolidated bonds of the State of
Louisiana." To accomplish this, a "board of liquidation" was
created with power to execute the new bonds and exchange them for
old at the rate of sixty cents of the new for one dollar of the
old. If the board rejected any bond offered for exchange, the
holder could apply by petition to some proper court for relief, and
if on that petition final judgment should be rendered in his favor
against the board, he would be entitled, on giving up his old bond,
to get one of the new on the terms proposed.
On the 14th of March in the same year, 1874, Act No. 55 of 1874
was passed, which purported to prohibit all state officers from
levying or collecting any tax to pay the principal or interest
falling due after Jan. 1, 1874, of any of the state debt unless
such levy and collection were specially authorized by some law of
the state subsequently adopted, and also prohibiting the setting
apart of any funds in the treasury for any such payment. The same
law purported to take away from the courts of the state all power
or jurisdiction to arrest or impede its operation by mandamus,
injunction, or otherwise.
On the 17th of March, 1875, Act No. 11 of 1875 was passed to
prohibit the board of liquidation from funding, under Act
Page 105 U. S. 624
No. 3 of 1874, questionable and doubtful obligations of the
state
"until said bonds . . . shall first, by final decree of the
Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, have been declared legal
and valid obligations against the State of Louisiana and that the
same were issued in strict conformity to law, and not in violation
of the Constitution of this state or of the United States, and for
a valid consideration."
In this act, the bonds issued in aid of the Mississippi and
Mexican Gulf Ship Canal Company were specially designated as
questioned and of doubtful validity.
After this act was passed, the New York Guaranty and Indemnity
Company, being desirous of funding its bonds under the provisions
of Act No. 3, filed its petition in the Fifth District Court of the
Parish of Orleans, praying that the bonds
"be decreed to have been issued in strict conformity to law, and
not in violation of the Constitution of this state or of the United
States, and that they be declared legal and valid obligations
against the State of Louisiana, and issued for a valid
consideration."
No other judgment was asked than such an one as was necessary
under Act No. 11, of 1875, to secure the benefit of Act No. 3, of
1874, the funding act. This petition got in due course of procedure
to the supreme court of the state, and it was there decided that
the suit thus begun was not one for the recovery of the money due
on the bonds, but was rather in the nature of an inquisition to
determine whether the bonds in question were of the class which the
state had determined to include in its funding scheme. For this
reason, the court held that for the purposes of such an inquiry the
petitioner, as a
bona fide holder, occupied no better
position than the first taker. Because of this ruling, the present
writ of error has been brought by the company.
This statement of the case is sufficient, as we think, to show
that the question below was not whether, in an action against the
state, properly authorized, to recover the amount due upon the
bond, Act No. 11 permitted the state to prove, as against a
bona fide holder, that the bond was invalid, but whether
the
bona fide holder of an invalid bond was entitled to
the benefit of the scheme of compromise which the state had offered
to the holders of its securities that were valid in the hands of
the first
Page 105 U. S. 625
taker. Such being the case, no obligation of the original
contract has been impaired. Every legal right which the original
taker acquired when the bond was put out still remains. The
Guaranty Company may enforce all such rights now in any appropriate
manner. All the court below has said is that, as between the state
and the first taker, the bonds were not valid obligations, and that
consequently they are not entitled to the privileges of the funding
laws. The obligation of the state to pay the bonds in money to the
bona fide holders in accordance with the original promise
still remains. The judgment, which has been rendered, and which we
are now reviewing, is no bar to any proper proceeding for that
purpose. The suit which was authorized, and the suit which was
actually begun, only related to the right of the holder to come
into the compromise which the state offered to certain classes of
its creditors. The judgment is that the bonds do not belong to any
of the designated classes. The question here is not whether, if
that inquiry were open to us, we should be of the same opinion, but
whether the obligation the state is under to the company has been
impaired by Act 11 of 1875 as thus construed. We think the state
had the right to say, when it proposed a scheme for the compromise
of its debts, what creditors should be included. That, in our
opinion, is all that has been done.
It follows that the federal question was decided right below,
and the judgment is consequently
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD did not sit in this case nor take any
part in deciding it.